.-^y^' 


/ 


^k^ 


.^■ 


/^ 


X 


NOTE. 


I  HAVE  been  informed  that  an  American  publisher  has  printed 
the  first  edition  of  this  translation  of  M.  Antoninus.  I  do 
not  grudge  him  his  profit,  if  he  has  made  any.  There  may 
be  many  men  and  women  in  the  United  States  who  will  be 
glad  to  read  the  thoughts  of  the  Eoman  emperor.  If  the 
American  politicians,  as  they  are  called,  would  read  them 
also,  I  should  be  much  pleased,  but  I  do  not  think  the 
emperor's  morality  would  suit  their  taste. 

I  have  also  been  informed  that  the  American  publisher 
has  dedicated  this  translation  to  an  American.  I  have  no 
objection  to  the  book  being  dedicated  to  an  American ;  but 
in  doing  this  without  my  consent  the  publisher  has  trans- 
gressed the  bouuds  of  decency.  1  have  never  dedicated  a 
book  to  any  man,  and  if  I  dedicated  this,  I  should  choose  the 
man  whose  name  seemed  to  me  most  worthy  to  be  joined  to 
that  of  the  Koman  soldier  and  philosopher.  I  might  dedicate 
the  book  to  the  successful  general  who  is  now  the  President 
of  the  United  States,  with  the  hope  that  his.  integrity  and 
justice  will  restore  peace  and  happiness,  so  far  as  he  can,  to 
those  unhappy  States  which  have  suffered  so  much  from  war 
and  the  unrelenting  hostility  of  wicked  men. 

But,  as  the  Koman  poet  said, 

Victrix  causa  Deis  placuit,  sed  victa  Catoni ; 

and  if  I  dedicated  this  little  book  to  any  man,  I  would 
dedicate  it  to  him  who  led  the  Confederate  armies  against 
the  powerful  invader,  and  retired  from  an  unequal  contest 
defeated,  but  not  dishonoured ;  to  the  noble  Virginian  soldier, 
whose  talents  and  virtues  place  him  by  the  side  of  the  best 
and  wisest  man  who  sat  on  the  throne  of  the  Imperial  Caesars. 

George  Long. 


Ill 
THE    THOUGHTS 


OF    THE 


EMPEROR  M.  AURELIUS 
ANTONINUS. 


TRANSLATED  BY  GEORGE  LONG. 


SECOND    EDITION. 


SdH*^ 


REVISED  AND  CORRECl'ED. 


LONDON  :    GEORGE  BELL  &  SONS,  YORK  STREET, 

COVENT   GARDEN. 

1880. 


335  S^ 


LONDON : 

PRINTED  BY   WILLIAM   CLOWES    AND   SONS^ 

SXAJWOBD  6TBEET  AND  CHAEING  CKOSS. 


PREFACE. 


I  HAVE  carefully  revised  the  Life  and  Philosophy  of 
Antoninns,  in  which  I  have  made  a  few  corrections,  and 
added  a  few  notes. 

I  have  also  made  a  few  alterations  in  the  translation 
where  I  thought  that  I  conld  approach  nearer  to  tho 
author's  meaning ;  and  I  have  added  a  few  notes  and 
references. 

There  still  remain  difficulties  which  I  cannot  remove, 
because  the  text  is  sometimes  too  corrupt  to  be  under- 
stood, and  no  attempt  to  restore  tlie  true  readings  could 
be  successful. 

Gkobge  Long. 


103148 


CONTENTS. 


PAGE 

M.  AuBELius  Antoninus 1 

The  Philosophy  of  ANTONnrcs 28 

M.  AnTONiNrs 6*8 

Ikdex    .     .     .     , 207 


M.   AUEELIUS   ANTONINUS. 


M  ANTONINUS  was  born  at  Eome  a.d.  121,  on  the  2Gth 
•  of  April.  His  father  Annius  Yerns  died  while  he 
was  praetor.  His  mother  was  Domitia  Calvilla  also  named 
Lucilla.  The  Emperor  T.  Antoninus  Pius  married  Annia 
Galeria  Faustina,  the  sister  of  Annius  Verus,  and  was  con- 
sequently the  uncle  of  M.  Antoninus.  When  Hadrian  adopted 
Antoninus  Pius  and  declared  him  his  successor  in  the  empire, 
Antoninus  Pius  adopted  both  L.  Ceionius  Commodus,  the 
son  of  Aelius  Caesar,  and  M.  Antoninus,  whose  original  name 
was  M.  Annius  Verus.  Antoninus  then  took  the  name  of 
M.  Aelius  Aurelius  Verus  to  which  was  added  the  title  of 
Caesar  in  a.d.  139  :  the  name  Aelius  belonged  to  Hadrian's 
family,  and  Aurelius  was  the  name  of  Antoninus  Pius.  When 
M.  Antoninus  became  Augustus,  he  dropped  the  name  of  Verus 
and  took  the  name  of  Antoninus.  Accordingly  he  is  generally 
named  M.  Aurelius  Antoninus  or  simply  M.  Antoninus. 

The  youth  was  most  carefully  brought  up.  He  thanks 
the  gods  (i.  17)  that  he  had  good  grandfathers,  good  parents, 
a  good  sister,  good  teachers,  good  associates,  good  kinsmen 
and  friends,  nearly  everything  good.  He  had  the  happy 
fortune  to  witness  the  example  of  his  uncle  and  adoptive 
father  Antoninus  Pius,  and  he  has  recorded  in  Lis  work 

•'J 


2  M.  Aurelius  Antoninus. 

(i.  16 ;  VI.  30)  the  virtues  of  this  excellent  man  and  prudent 
ruler.  Like  many  young  Romans  he  tried  his  hand  at 
poetry  and  studied  rhetoric.  Herodes  Atticus  and  M.  Cor- 
nelius Pronto  were  his  teachers  in  eloquence.  There  are 
extant  letters  between  Fronto  and  Marcus/  which  show  the 
great  affection  of  the  pupil  for  the  master,  and  the  master's 
great  hopes  of  his  industrious  pupil.  M.  Antoninus  mentions 
Fronto  (i.  11)  among  those  to  whom  he  was  indebted  for  his 
education. 

When  he  was  eleven  years  old,  he  assumed  the  dress  of 
philosophers,  something  plain  and  coarse,  became  a  hard 
student,  and  lived  a  most  laborious  abstemious  life,  e^en  so 
far  as  to  injure  his  health.  Finally,  he  abandoned  poetry 
and  rhetoric  for  philosophy,  and  he  attached  himself  to  the 
sect  of  the  Stoics.  But  he  did  not  neglect  the  study  of  law, 
which  was  a  useful  preparation  for  the  high  place  which  he 
was  designed  to  fill.  His  teacher  was  L.  Volusianus 
Maecianus  a  distinguished  jurist.  We  must  suppose  that  he 
learned  the  Eoman  discipline  of  arms,  which  was  a  necessary 
part  of  the  education  of  a  man  who  afterwards  led  his  troops 
to  battle  against  a  warlike  race. 

Antoninus  has  recorded  in  his  first  book  the  names  of  his 
teachers  and  the  obligations  which  he  owed  to  each  of  them. 
The  way  in  which  he  speaks  of  what  he  learned  from  them 
might  seem  to  savour  of  vanity  or  self-praise,  if  we  look 
carelessly  at  the  way  in  which  he  has  expressed  himself ;  but 
if  any  one  draws  this  conclusion,  ho  will  be  mistaken.  Anto- 
ninus means  to  commemorate  the  merits  of  his  several  teachers, 
what  they  taught  and  what  a  pupil  might  learn  from  them, 

1  M.  Cornelii  Frontonis  Reliquiae,  Berlin,  181G.  There  are  a  few 
letters  between  Fronto  and  Antouiuus  Pius. 


M.  AureUus  Antoninus.  3 

Besides,  this  book  like  the  eleven  other  books  was  for  his  own 
use,  and  if  we  may  trust  the  note  at  the  end  of  the  fii-st  book, 
it  was  written  duiing  one  of  M.  Antoninus'  campaigns  against 
the  Quadi,  at  a  time  when  the  commemoration  of  the  virtues 
of  his  illustrious  teachers  might  remind  him  of  their  lessons 
and  the  j)ractical  uses  which  he  might  derive  from  them.* 

Among  his  teachers  of  philosophy  was  Sextus  of  Chacroneia 
a  grandson  of  Plutarch.  What  he  learned  from  this  excellent 
man  is  told  by  himself  (i.  9).  His  favourite  teacher  was 
Q.  Junius  Eusticus  (i.  7),  a  philosopher  aud  also  a  man  of 
practical  good  sense  in  public  affairs.  Eusticus  was  the 
adviser  of  Autoninus  after  he  became  emperor.  Young  men 
who  are  destined  for  high  places  are  not  often  fortunate  in 
those  who  are  about  them,  their  companions  and  teachers ; 
and  I  do  not  know  any  example  of  a  young  prince  having 
had  an  education  which  can  be  compared  with  that  of  M.  An- 
toninus. Such  a  body  of  teachers  distinguished  by  their  ac- 
quirements and  their  character  will  hardly  be  collected  again  ; 
and  as  to  the  pupil,  we  have  not  had  one  like  him  since. 

Hadrian  died  in  July  a.d.  138,  and  was  succeeded  by 
Antoninus  Pius.  M.  Antoninus  married  Faustina,  his  cousin, 
the  daughter  of  Pius,  probably  about  a.d.  146,  for  he  had  a 
daughter  born  in  147.  He  received  fi*om  his  adoptive  father 
the  title  of  Caesar  and  was  associated  with  him  in  ^he  adminis- 
tration of  the  state.  The  father  and  the  adopted  son  lived  to- 
gether in  perfect  friendship  and  confidence.  Antoninus  was  a 
dutiful  son,  and  the  emperor  Pius  loved  and  esteemed  him. 

Antoninus  Pius  died  in  March  a.d.  161.  The  Senate,  it 
is  said,  urged  M.  Antoninus  to  take  the  sole  administration 
of  the  empire,  but  he  associated  with  himself  the  other  adopted 
son  of  Pius,  L.  Ceionius  Commodus,  who  is  generally  called 


4  M.  Aurelius  Antoninus. 

L.  Verus.  Thus  Eome  for  the  first  time  liad  two  emperors. 
Verus  was  an  indolent  man  of  pleasure  and  unworthy  of  his 
station.  Antoninus  however  bore  with  him,  and  it  is  said 
that  Verus  had  sense  enough  to  pay  to  his  colleague  the 
respect  due  to  his  character.  A  virtuous  emperor  and  a 
loose  partner  lived  together  in  peace,  and  their  alliance  was 
strengthened  by  Antoninus  giving  to  Verus  for  wife  his 
daughter  Lucilla. 

The  reign  of  Antoninus  was  first  troubled  by  a  Parthian 
war,  in  which  Verus  was  sent  to  command,  but  he  did  nothing, 
and  the  success  that  was  obtained  by  the  Romans  in  Armenia 
and  on  the  Euphrates  and  Tigris  was  due  to  his  generals. 
This  Parthian  war  ended  in  a.d.  165.  Aurelius  and  Verus 
had  a  triumph  (a.d.  166)  for  the  victories  in  the  east.  A 
pestilence  followed  which  carried  off  great  numbers  in  Eome 
and  Italy,  and  spread  to  the  west  of  Europe. 

The  north  of  Italy  was  also  threatened  by  the  rude  people 
beyond  the  Alps  from  the  borders  of  Gallia  to  the  eastern  side 
of  the  Hadi'iatic.  These  barbarians  attempted  to  break  into 
Italy,  as  the  Germanic  nations  had  attempted  near  three 
hundred  years  before ;  and  the  rest  of  the  life  of  Antoninus 
with  some  intervals  was  employed  in  driving  back  the  in- 
vaders. In  169  Verus  suddenly  died,  and  Antoninus  ad- 
ministered ihe  state  alone. 

During  the  German  wars  Antoninus  resided  for  three  years 
on  the  Danube  at  Carnuntum.  The  Marcomanni  were  driven 
out  of  Pannonia  and  almost  destroyed  in  their  retreat  across 
the  Danube;  and  in  a.d.  174  the  emperor  gained  a  great 
victory  over  the  Quadi. 

In  A.D.  175  Avidius  Cassius  a  brave  and  skilful  Eoman 
commander  who  was  at  the  head  of  the  troops  in  Asia  revolted 


M.  Aurelius  Antoninus.  5 

and  declared  himself  Augustus.  But  Cassius  was  assassinated 
by  some  of  his  officers,  and  so  the  rebellion  came  to  an  end. 
Antoninus  showed  his  humanity  by  his  treatment  of  the 
family  and  the  partizans  of  Cassius,  and  his  letter  to  the 
senate  in  which  he  recommends  mercy  is  extant.  (Vulcatius, 
Avidius  Cassius,  c.  12.) 

Antoninus  set  out  for  the  east  on  hearing  of  Cassius'  revolt. 
Though  he  appears  to  have  retiu-ned  to  Eome  in  a.d.  174,  he 
went  back  to  prosecute  the  war  against  the  Germans,  and 
it  is  probable  that  he  marched  direct  to  the  east  from  the 
German  war.  His  wife  Faustina  who  accompanied  him 
into  Asia  died  suddenly  at  the  foot  of  the  Taurus  to  the 
great  grief  of  her  husband.  Capitolinus,  who  has  written 
the  life  of  Antoninus,  and  also  Dion  Cassius  accuse  the 
empress  of  scandalous  infidelity  to  her  husband  and  of 
abominable  lewdness.  But  Capitolinus  says  that  Antoninus 
either  knew  it  not  or  pretended  not  to  know  it.  Nothing 
is  so  common  as  such  malicious  reports  in  all  ages,  and  the 
history  of  imperial  Kome  is  full  of  them.  Antoninus  loved 
his  wife  and  he  says  that  she  was  "  obedient,  affectionate  and 
simple."  The  same  scandal  had  been  spread  about  Faustina's 
mother,  the  wife  of  Antoninus  Pius,  and  yet  he  too  was 
perfectly  satisfied  with  his  wife.  Antoninus  Pius  says  after 
her  death  in  a  letter  to  Fronto  that  he  would  rather  have 
lived  in  exile  with  his  wife  than  in  his  palace  at  Eome 
without  her.  There  are  not  many  men  who  would  give  their 
wives  a  better  character  than  these  two  emperors.  Capi- 
tolinus wrote  in  the  time  of  Diocletian.  He  may  have 
intended  to  tell  the  truth,  but  he  is  a  poor  feeble  biographer. 
Dion  Cassius,  the  most  malignant  of  historians,  always  reports 
and  perhaps  he  believed  any  scandal  against  anybody. 


6  M.  Aurelius  Antoninus. 

Antoninus  continued  his  journey  to  Syria  and  Egypt,  and 
on  his  return  to  Italy  through  Athens  he  was  initiated  into 
the  Eleusinian  mysteries.  It  was  the  practice  of  the  emperor 
to  conform  to  the  established  rites  of  the  age  and  to  perform 
religious  ceremonies  with  due  solemnity.  We  cannot  con- 
clude from  this  that  he  was  a  superstitious  man,  though  we 
might  perhaps  do  so,  if  his  book  did  not  show  that  he  was 
not.  But  this  is  only  one  among  many  instances  that  a 
ruler's  public  acts  do  not  always  prove  his  real  opinions.  A 
prudent  governor  will  not  roughly  oppose  even  the  super- 
stitions of  his  people,  and  though  he  may  wish  that  they  were 
wiser,  he  will  know  that  he  cannot  make  them  so  by  offending 
their  prejudices. 

Antoninus  and  his  son  Commodus  entered  Rome  in  triumph, 
perhaps  for  some  German  victories,  on  the  23rd  of  December 
A.D.  176.  In  the  following  year  Commodus  was  associated 
with  his  father  in  the  empire  and  took  the  name  of  Augustus. 
This  year  a.d.  177  is  memorable  in  ecclesiastical  history. 
Attains  and  others  were  put  to  death  at  Lyon  for  their  ad- 
herence to  the  Christian  religion.  The  evidence  of  this  per- 
secution is  a  letter  preserved  by  Eusebius  (E.  H.  v.  1  ;  printed 
in  Eouth's  Reliquiae  Sacrae,  vol.  i.  with  notes).  The  letter  is 
from  the  Christians  of  Vienna  and  Lugdunum  in  Gallia 
(Vienne  and  Lyon)  to  their  Christian  brethren  in  Asia  and 
Phrygia  ;  and  it  is  preserved  perhaps  nearly  entire.  It  con- 
tains a  very  particular  description  of  the  tortui-es  inflicted  on 
the  Christians  in  Gallia,  and  it  states  that  while  the  persecu- 
tion was  going  on,  Attalus  a  Christian  and  a  Roman  citizen 
was  loudly  demanded  by  the  populace  and  brought  into  the 
amphitheatre,  but  the  governor  ordered  him  to  be  reserved 
nrith  the  rest  who  were  in  prison,  until  he  had  received  in- 


M.  Aurelius  Antoninus.  7 

structious  from  tlie  emperor.  Many  had  been  tortured  before 
the  governor  tbouglit  of  applying  to  Antoninus.  The  im- 
perial rescript,  says  the  letter,  was  that  the  Christians  should 
be  punished,  but  if  they  would  deny  their  faith,  they  must  be 
released.  On  this  the  work  began  again.  The  Christians 
who  were  Roman  citizens  were  beheaded :  the  rest  were 
exposed  to  the  wild  beasts  in  the  amphitheatre.  Some  modern 
writers  on  ecclesiastical  history,  when  they  use  this  letter, 
say  nothing  of  the  wonderful  stories  of  the  martyrs'  sufferings. 
Sanctus,  as  the  letter  says,  was  burnt  with  plates  of  hot  -iron 
till  his  body  was  one  sore  and  had  lost  all  human  form,  but 
on  being  put  to  the  rack  he  recovered  his  former  appearance 
under  the  torture,  which  was  thus  a  cure  instead  of  a  punish- 
ment. He  was  afterwards  torn  by  beasts,  and  placed  on  an 
iron  chair  and  roasted.     He  died  at  last. 

The  letter  is  one  piece  of  evidence.  The  writer,  whoever 
he  was  that  wrote  in  the  name  of  the  Gallic  Christians,  is  our 
evidence  both  for  the  ordinary  and  the  extraordinary  circum- 
stances of  the  story,  and  we  cannot  accept  his  evidence  for 
one  part  and  reject  the  other.  We  often  receive  small  evi- 
dence as  a  proof  of-a  thing  which  we  believe  to  be  within  the 
limits  of  probability  or  possibility,  and  we  reject  exactly  the 
same  evidence,  when  the  thing  to  which  it  refers,  appears 
very  improbable  or  impossible.  But  this  is  a  false  method 
of  inquiry,  though  it  is  followed  by  some  modern  writers, 
who  select  what  they  like  from  a  story  and  reject  the  rest  of 
the  evidence  ;  or  if  they  do  not  reject  it,  they  dishonestly 
suppress  it.  A  man  can  only  act  consistently  by  accepting 
all  this  letter  or  rejecting  it  all,  and  we  cannot  blame  him 
for  either.  But  he  who  rejects  it  may  still  admit  that  such 
a  letter  may  be  founded  on  real  facts ;  and  he  would  make 


8  M,  Aurelius  Antoninus. 

this  admission  as  the  most  probable  way  of  accounting  for 
the  existence  of  the  letter  :  but  if,  as  he  would  suppose,  the 
writer  has  stated  some  things  falsely,  he  cannot  tell  what 
part  of  his  story  is  worthy  of  credit. 

The  war  on  the  northern  frontier  appears  to  have  been 
uninterrupted  during  the  visit  of  Antoninus  to  the  East,  and 
on  his  return  the  emperor  again  left  Eome  to  oppose  the 
barbarians.  The  Germanic  people  were  defeated  in  a  great 
battle  A.D.  179.  During  this  campaign  the  emperor  was 
seized  with  some  contagious  malady,  of  which  he  died  in  the 
camp  at  Sirmium  (Mitrovitz)  on  the  Save  in  Lower  Pannonia, 
but  at  Vindebona  (Vienna)  according  to  other  authorities,  on 
the  17th  of  March  a.d.  180,  in  the  fifty-ninth  year  of  his 
age.  His  son  Commodus  was  with  him.  The  body  or  the 
ashes  probably  of  the  emperor  were  carried  to  Eome,  and  he 
received  the  honour  of  deification.  Those  who  could  afford 
it  had  his  statue  or  bust,  and  when  Capitolinus  wrote,  many 
people  still  had  statues  of  Antoninus  among  the  Dei  Penates 
or  household  deities.  He  was  in  a  manner  made  a  saint. 
Commodus  erected  to  the  memory  of  his  father  the  Antonine 
column  which  is  now  in  the  Piazza  Colonna  at  Eome.  The 
bassi  rilievi  which  are  placed  in  a  spiral  line  round  the  shaft 
commemorate  the  victories  of  Antoninus  over  the  Marco- 
manni  and  the  Quadi,  and  the  miraculous  shower  of  rain 
which  refreshed  the  Eoman  soldiers  and  discomfited  their 
enemies.  The  statue  of  Antoninus  was  placed  on  the  capital 
of  the  column,  but  it  was  removed  at  some  time  unknown, 
and  a  bronze  statue  of  St.  Paul  was  put  in  the  place  by  Pope 
Sixfcus  the  fifth. 

The  historical  evidence  for  the  times  of  Antoninus  is  very 
defective,  and  some  of  that  which  remains  is   not  credible, 


M.  Aurelius  Antoninus.  9 

The  most  curious  is  the  story  about  the  miracle  which 
happened  in  a.d.  174  dui-ing  the  war  with  the  Quadi.  The 
Roman  army  was  in  danger  of  perishing  by  thirst,  but  a 
sudden  storm  drenched  them  with  rain,  while  it  discharged 
fire  and  hail  on  their  enemies,  and  the  Eomans  gained  a  great 
victory.  All  the  authorities  which  speak  of  the  battle  speak 
also  of  the  miracle.  The  Gentile  writers  assign  it  to  their 
gods,  and  the  Christians  to  the  intercession  of  the  Christian 
legion  in  the  emperor's  army.  To  confii-m  the  Christian 
statement  it  is  added  that  the  emperor  gave  the  title  of 
Thundering  to  this  legion ;  but  Dacier  and  others  who 
maintain  the  Christian  report  of  the  miracle,  admit  that  this 
title  of  Thundering  or  Lightning  was  not  given  to  this  legion 
because  the  Quadi  were  struck  with  lightning,  but  because 
there  was  a  figure  of  lightning  on  their  shields,  and  that  this 
title  of  the  legion  existed  in  the  time  of  Augustus. 

Scaliger  also  had  observed  that  the  legion  was  called 
Thundering  (KepawofSokos,  or  Kepavvo<fi6po<;)  before  the  reign  of 
Antoninus.  We  learn  this  from  Dion  Cassius  (Lib.  55,  c.  23, 
and  the  note  of  Keimarus)  who  enumerates  all  the  legions 
of  Augustus'  time.  The  name  Thundering  or  Lightning  also 
occurs  on  an  inscription  of  the  reign  of  Trajan,  which  was 
found  at  Trieste.  Eusebius  (v.  5)  when  he  relates  the 
miracle,  quotes  Apolinarius,  bishop  of  Hierapolis,  as  authority 
for  this  name  being  given  to  the  legion  Melitene  by  the 
emperor  in  consequence  of  the  success  which  he  obtained 
through  their  prayers;  from  which  we  may  estimate  the 
value  of  Apolinarius'  testimony.  Eusebius  does  not  say  in 
what  book  of  Apolinarius  the  statement  occurs.  Dion  says 
that  the  Thundering  legion  was  stationed  in  Cappadocia  in 
the  time  of  Augustus.     Valesius  also  observes  that  in  the 


10  M.  Aurelius  Antoninus. 

Notitia  of  the  Imperium  Romanum  there  is  mentioned  under 
the  commander  of  Armenia  the  Praefectura  of  the  twelfth 
legion  named  "  Thundering  Melitene  ;"  and  this  position  in 
Armenia  will  agree  with  what  Dion  says  of  its  position  in 
Cappadocia.  Accordingly  Valesius  concludes  that  Melitene 
was  not  the  name  of  the  legion,  but  of  the  town  in  which  it 
was  stationed.  Melitene  was  also  the  name  of  the  district  in 
which  this  town  was  situated.  The  legions  did  not,  he  says, 
take  their  name  from  the  place  where  they  were  on  duty,  but 
from  the  country  in  which  they  were  raised,  and  therefore, 
what  Eusebius  says  about  the  Melitene  does  not  seem 
probable  to  him.  Yet  Valesius  on  the  authority  of  Apolina- 
rius  and  Tertullian  believed  that  the  miracle  was  worked 
through  the  prayers  of  the  Christian  soldiers  in  the  emperor's 
army.  Eufinus  does  not  give  the  name  of  Melitene  to  this 
legion,  says  Valesius,  and  probably  he  purposely  omitted  it, 
because  he  knew  that  Melitene  was  the  name  of  a  town  in 
Armenia  Minor,  where  the  legion  was  stationed  in  his  time. 

The  emperor,  it  is  said,  made  a  report  of  his  victory  to  the 
Senate,  which  we  may  believe,  for  such  was  the  practice  ;  but 
we  do  not  know  what  he  said  in  his  letter,  for  it  is  not 
extant.  Dacier  assumes  that  the  emperor's  letter  was  pur- 
posely destroyed  by  the  Senate  or  the  enemies  of  Christianity, 
that  so  honourable  a  testimony  to  the  Christians  and  their 
religion  might  not  be  perpetuated.  The  critic  has  however 
not  seen  that  he  contradicts  himself  when  he  tells  us  the 
purport  of  the  letter,  for  he  says  that  it  was  destroyed,  and 
even  Eusebius  could  not  find  it.  But  thert  does  exist  a  letter 
in  Greek  addressed  by  Antoninus  to  the  Koman  people  and 
the  sacred  Senate  after  this  memorable  victory.  It  is  some- 
times printed  after  Justin's  first  Apology,  but  it  is  totally 


Al.  Awrelius  Antoninus.  H 

unconnected  witli  the  apologies.  This  letter  is  one  of  tho 
most  stupid  forgeries  of  the  many  which  exist,  and  it  cannot 
be  possibly  founded  even  on  the  genuine  report  of  Antoninus 
to  the  Senate.  If  it  were  genuine,  it  would  free  the  emperor 
from  the  charge  of  persecuting  men  because  they  were 
Christians,  for  he  says  in  this  false  letter  that  if  a  man 
accuse  another  only  of  being  a  Christian  and  the  accused 
confess  and  there  is  nothing  else  against  him,  he  must  be  set 
free ;  with  this  monstrous  addition,  made  by  a  man  incon- 
ceivably ignorant,  that  the  informer  must  be  bui-nt  alive.' 

During  the  time  of  Antoninus  Pius  and  Marcus  Antoninus 
there  appeared  the  first  Apology  of  Justinus,  and  under 
M.  Antoninus  the  Oration  of  Tatian  against  the  Greeks, 
which  was  a  fierce  attack  on  the  established  religions ;  the 
addi'ess  of  Athenagoras  to  M.  Antoninus  on  behalf  of  the 
Chi"istians,  and  the  Apology  of  Melito,  bishop  of  Sardes,  also 
addressed  to  the  emperor,  and  that  of  Apolinarius.  The  first 
Apology  of  Justinus  is  addressed  to  T.  Antoninus  Pius  and 
his  two  adopted  sons  M.  Antoninus  and  L.  Yerus ;  but  we  do 
not  know  whether  they  read  it.^  The  second  Apology  of 
Justinus  is  intitled  "  to  the  Roman  Senate ;"  but  this  super- 

2  Eusebius  (v.  5)  quotes  Tertullian's  Apology  to  the  Roman  Senate  in 
C5onfinnation  of  the  story.  TertuUian,  he  says,  writes  that  letters  of  the 
emperor  were  extant,  in  which  he  declares  tliat  his  army  was  saved  by 
the  prayers  of  the  Christians ;  and  that  he  "  threatened  to  punish  with 
death  those  who  ventured  to  accuse  us."  It  is  possible  that  the  forged 
letter  which  is  now  extant  may  be  one  of  those  which  Tertulhan  had 
seen,  for  he  uses  the  plural  number  '•  letters."  A  great  deal  has  been 
written  about  this  miracle  of  the  Thundering  Legion,  and  more  than  is 
worth  reading.  There  is  a  dissertation  on  this  supposed  miracle  in 
Moyle's  "Works,  London,  1726. 

3  Orosius,  vn.  l-i,  says  that  Justinus  the  philosopher  presented  to 
Antoninus  Pius  his  work  in  defence  of  tlie  Christian  religion,  and  made 
him  mercifiil  to  the  Christians. 


12  M.  Aurelius  Antoninas. 

scription  is  from  some  copyist.  In  the  first  chapter  Justinus 
addresses  the  Eomans.  In  the  second  chapter  he  speaks  of 
an  affair  that  had  recently  happened  in  the  time  of  M.  Anto- 
ninus and  L.  Yerus,  as  it  seems ;  and  he  also  directly 
addresses  the  emperor,  saying  of  a  certain  woman,  "  she 
addressed  a  petition  to  thee  the  emperor,  and  thou  didst 
grant  the  petition."  In  other  passages  the  writer  addresses 
the  two  emperors,  from  which  we  must  conclude  that  the 
Apology  was  directed  to  them.  Eusebius  (E.  H.  iv.  18) 
states  that  the  second  Apology  was  addressed  to  the  successor 
of  Antoninus  Pius,  and  he  names  him  Antoninus  Yerus, 
meaning  M  Antoninus.  In  one  passage  of  this  second 
Apology  (c.  8.),  Justinus,  or  the  writer,  whoever  he  may  be, 
says  that  even  men  who  followed  the  Stoic  doctrines,  when 
they  ordered  their  lives  according  to  ethical  reason,  were 
hated  and  murdered,  such  as  Heraclitus,  Musonius  in  his  own 
times  and  others ;  for  all  those  who  in  any  way  laboured  to 
live  according  to  reason  and  avoided  wickedness  were  always 
hated ;  and  this  was  the  effect  of  the  work  of  daemons. 

Justinus  himself  is  said  to  have  been  put  to  death  at  Rome, 
because  he  refused  to  sacrifice  to  the  gods.  It  cannot  have 
been  in  the  reign  of  Hadrian,  as  one  authority  states ;  nor  in 
the  time  of  Antoninus  Pius,  if  the  second  Apology  was 
written  in  the  time  of  M.  Antoninus ;  and  there  is  evidence 
that  this  event  took  place  under  M.  Antoninus  and  L.  Yerus, 
when  Rusticus  was  praefect  of  the  city.* 

4  See  the  Martyriura  Sanctorum  Justini,  &c.,  in  the  works  of  Justinus, 
ed.  Otto,  vol.  II.  559.  "  Junius  Kusticus  Praefectus  Urbi  erat  sub  inipe- 
ratoribus  M.  Aureiio  et  L.  Vero,  id  quod  liquet  ex  Themistii  Orat.  xxxiv. 
Diudorf.  p.  451,  et  ex  quodam  illorum  rescripto,  Dig.  49.  1.1,  §2.' 
(Otto.)  The  rescript  contains  the  words  "  Juuiuni  Uusiicuni  amicum 
nostrum  Piaefectum  Urbi."     The  Martyri-Tuu  of  Justinus  and  others  is 


M.  Aurtlius  Antoninus.  13 

Tlic  persecution  iu  whick  Polycarp  sufifered  at  Sinyrua 
belongs  to  the  time  of  M.  Antoninus.  The  evidence  for  it  is 
the  letter  of  the  church  of  Smyrna  to  the  churches  of 
Philomelium  and  the  other  Christian  churches,  and  it  is 
preserved  by  Eusebius  (E.  H.  iv.  15).  But  the  critics  do 
not  agree  about  the  time  of  Polycarp's  death,  differing  in  the 
two  extremes  to  the  amount  of  twelve  years.  The  circum- 
stances of  Polycarp's  martyrdom  were  accompanied  by 
mii'acles,  one  of  which  Eusebius  (iv.  15)  has  omitted,  but  it 
appears  in  the  oldest  Latin  version  of  the  letter,  which  Usher 
published,  and  it  is  suj^posed  that  this  versicm  was  made  not 
long  after  the  time  of  Eusebius.  The  notice  at  the  end  of 
the  letter  states  tliat  it  was  transcribed  by  Caius  from  the 
copy  of  Irenaeus,  the  disciple  of  Polycarp,  then  transcribed 
by  Socrates  at  Corinth ;  "  after  which  I  Pionius  again  wrote 
it  out  from  the  copy  above  mentioned,  having  searched  it  out 
by  the  revelation  of  Polycarp,  who  directed  me  to  it,  &c." 


written  in  Greek.  It  begins,  "  In  the  time  of  the  wicked  defendtrs  of 
idolatry  impious  edicts  were  published  against  the  pious  Cliristians  both 
in  cities  and  couutry  places,  for  the  purpose  of  compelling  them  to  make 
offerings  to  vain  idols.  Accordingly  the  holy  men  (Juatinus,  Chariton, 
a  woman  Charito,  Paeon,  Liberianus,  and  others)  were  brought  before 
Eutoticus,  the  praefect  of  liome." 

The  Martyrium  gives  the  examination  of  the  accused  by  Rusticus. 
All  of  them  professed  to  be  Christians.  Justinus  was  asked  if  he 
expected  to  ascend  into  heaven  and  to  receive  a  reward  for  his  suffer- 
ings, if  he  was  condemned  to  death.  He  answered  that  he  did  not  ex- 
pect :  he  was  certain  of  it.  Finally,  the  test  of  obedience  was  proposed 
to  the  prisoners :  they  were  required  to  sacrifice  to  the  gods.  AH 
refused,  and  Rusticus  pronounced  the  sentence,  which  was  that  those, 
who  refused  to  sacrifice  to  the  gods  and  obey  the  emperor's  order, 
should  be  whipped  and  beheaded  according  to  the  law.  The  martyrs 
were  then  led  to  the  usixal  place  of  execution  and  beheaded.  Some 
of  the  faithful  secretly  carried  off  the  bodies  and  deposited  then) 
in  a  fit  place. 


14  M.  Aurelius  Antoninus. 

The  story  of  Polycarp's  martyrdom  is  embellished  with 
miraculous  circumstances  which  some  modern  writers  on 
ecclesiastical  history  take  the  liberty  of  omitting.^ 

In  order  to  form  a  proper  notion  of  the  condition  of  the 
Christians  under  M.  Antoninus  we  must  go  back  to  Trajan's 
time.  When  the  younger  Pliny  was  governor  of  Bithynia, 
the  Christians  were  numerous  in  those  parts,  and  the 
worshippers  of  the  old  religion  were  falling  off.  The  temples 
were  deserted,  the  festivals  neglected,  and  there  were  no 
purchasers  of  victims  for  sacrifice.  Those  who  were  interested 
in  the  maintenance  of  the  old  religion  thus  found -that  their 
profits  were  in  danger.  Christians  of  both  sexes  and  of  all 
ages  were  brought  before  the  governor,  who  did  not  know 
what  to  do  with  them.  He  could  come  to  no  other  conclusion 
than  this,  that  those  who  confessed  to  be  Christians  and 
persevered  in  their  religion  ought  to  be  punished  ;  if  for 
nothing  else,  for  their  invincible  obstinacy.  He  found  no 
crimes  proved  against  the  Christians,  and  he  could  only 
characterize  their  religion  as  a  depraved  and  extravagant 
superstition,  which  might  be  stopped,  if  the  people  were 
allowed  the  opportunity  of  recanting.  Pliny  wrote  this  in  a 
letter  to  Trajan  (Plinius,  Ep.  x.  97).  He  asked  for  the 
emperor's  directions,  because  he  did  not  know  what  to  do  : 
He  remarks  that  he  had   never   been   engaged  in  judicial 

5  Conyers  Middleton,  An  luquiry  into  the  Miraculous  Fowers,  &c. 
p.  126.  Middleton  says  that  Eusebius  omitted  to  mention  the  dove,  which 
flew  out  of  Polycarp's  body,  and  Dodwell  and  Archbishop  Wake  have 
done  the  same.  Wake  says  "  I  am  so  little  a  friend  to  such  miracles 
that  I  thought  it  better  with  Eusebius  to  omit  that  circumstance  than  to 
mention  it  from  Bp.  Usher's  Manuscript,"  which  manuscript  however, 
Bays  Middleton,  he  afterwards  declares  to  be  so  well  attested  that  we 
need  not  any  fm-ther  assurance  of  the  truth  of  it 


M.  Aurelhis  Antoninus.  15 

inquiries  about  the  Christians,  and  that  accordingly  he  did 
not  know  what  to  inquire  about  or  how  far  to  inquire  and 
punish.  This  proves  that  it  was  not  a  new  thing  to  examine 
into  a  man's  profession  of  Christianity  and  to  punish  him  for 
it.^  Trajan's  Kescript  is  extant.  He  approved  of  the 
governor's  judgment  in  the  matter ;  but  he  said  that  no 
search  must  be  made  after  the  Christians ;  if  a  man  was 
charged  with  the  new  religion  and  convicted,  he  must  not  be 
punished,  if  he  affirmed  that  he  vras  not  a  Christian  and  con- 
firmed his  denial  by  showing  his  reverence  to  the  heathen 
gods.  He  added  that  no  notice  must  be  taken  of  anonymous 
informations,  for  such  things  were  of  bad  example.  Trajan 
was  a  mild  and  sensible  man,  and  both  motives  of  mercy  and 
policy  probably  also  induced  him  to  take  as  little  notice  of 
the  Christians  as  he  could  ;  to  let  them  live  in  quiet,  if  it 
were  possible.  Trajan's  rescript  is  the  first  legislative  act  of 
the  head  of  the  Roman  state  with  reference  to  Christianity, 
which  is  known  to  us.  It  does  not  appear  that  the  Christians 
were  fiu-ther  disturbed  under  his  reign.  The  martyrdom  of 
Ignatius  by  the  order  of  Trajan  himself  is  not  universally 
admitted  to  be  an  historical  fact.'' 

In  the  time  of  Hadrian  it  was  no  longer  possible  for  the 
Roman  government  to  overlook  the  great  increase  of  the 
Christians  and  the  hostility  of  the  common  sort  to  them.  If 
the  governors  in  the  provinces  were  willing  to  let  them  alone, 

^  Orcisius  (vn.  12)  speaks  of  Trajan's  persecution  of  the  Christians, 
and  of  Pliny's  application  to  him  having  led  the  emperor  to  mitigate  his 
severity.  The  punishment  by  the  Mosaic  law  for  those  who  attempted 
to  seduce  the  Jews  to  follow  new  gods,  was  death.  If  a  man  was 
secretly  enticed  to  such  new  worship,  he  must  kill  the  seducer,  even  if 
the  seducer  were  brother,  son,  daughter,  wife,  or  friend,     (Deut.  xiii.) 

'  The  Martyrium  Ignatii,  first  pu])li&hed  in  Latin  by  ArehbisJiop 
Usher,  is  the  chief  evideuce  for  the  circumstances  of  Ignatius'  death. 


16  M.  Aurelius  Antoninus. 

they  could  not  resist  the  fanaticism  of  the  heathen  community, 
who  looked  on  the  Christians  as  atheists.  The  Jews  too  who 
were  settled  all  over  the  Roman  Empire  were  as  hostile  to 
the  Christians  as  the  Gentiles  were.^  With  the  time  of 
Hadrian  begin  the  Christian  Apologies,  which  show  plainly 
what  the  popular  feeling  towards  the  Christians  then  was. 
A  rescript  of  Hadrian  to  Minucius  Fundanus  the  Proconsul 
of  Asia,  which  stands  at  the  end  of  Justin's  first  Apology,"  in- 
structs the  governor  that  innocent  people  must  not  be 
troubled  and  false  accusers  must  not  be  allowed  to  extort 
money  from  them  ;  the  charges  against  the  Christians  must 
be  made  in  due  form  and  no  attention  must  be  paid  to 
popular  clamours  ;  when  Christians  were  regularly  prosecuted 
and  convicted  of  illegal  acts,  they  must  be  punished  according 
to  their  deserts ;  and  false  accusers  also  must  be  punished. 
Antoninus  Pius  is  said  to  have  published  Rescripts  to  the 
same  effect.  The  terms  of  Hadrian's  Rescript  seem  very 
favourable  to  the  Christians ;  but  if  we  understand  it  in  this 
sense,  that  they  were  only  to  be  punished  like  other  people 
for  illegal  acts,  it  would  have  had  no  meaning,  for  that  could 

^  We  have  the  evidence  of  Justinus  (ad  Diognetum,  c.  5)  to  this  effect : 
"  the  Christians  are  attacked  by  the  Jews  as  if  they  were  men  of  a 
different  race  and  are  persecnted  by  the  Greeks ;  and  those  who  hate 
them  cannot  give  the  reason  of  their  enmity." 

9  And  in  Eusebius,  E,  H.  iv.  8,  9.  Orosius  (vn,  13)  says  that  Hadrian 
sent  this  rescript  to  Minucius  Fundanus  proconsul  of  Asia  after  being 
instructed  in  books  written  on  the  Christian  rehgion  by  Quadratus  a 
disciple  of  the  Apostles  and  Aristides  an  Athenian,  an  honest  and  wise 
man,  and  Serenus  Granius.  In  the  Greek  text  of  Hadrian's  rescript 
there  is  mentioned  Serenius  Granianus,  the  predecessor  of  Minucius 
Fundanus  in  the  government  of  Asia. 

This  rescript  of  Hadrian  has  clearly  been  added  to  the  Apology  by 
some  editor.  The  Ajiology  ends  with  the  words:  %  (piXov  r^i  6^^,  rovro 
yev4adu. 


M.  Aurelius  Anfoninus.  17 

liavo  been  done  without  asking  tlic  emperor's  advice.  The 
real  purpose  of  the  Ecscrijjt  is  that  Christians  must  bo 
punished  if  they  persisted  in  their  belief,  and  would  not 
prove  their  renunciation  of  it  by  acknowledging  the  heathen 
religion.  This  was  Trajan's  rule,  and  we  have  no  reason  for 
supposing  that  Hadrian  granted  more  to  the  Christians  than 
Trajan  did.  There  is  also  printed  at  the  end  of  Justin's 
first  Apology  a  Rescript  of  Antoninus  Pius  to  the  Com- 
mune of  Asia  {to  kolvov  Trj<s  'Ao-tas),  and  it  is  also  in 
Eusebius  (E.  H.  iv.  13).  The  date  of  the  Rescript  is  the 
third  consulship  of  Antoninus  Pius.^"  The  Rescript  declares 
that  the  Christians,  for  they  are  meant,  though  the  name 
Christians  does  not  occm*  in  the  Rescript,  were  not  to  be 
distui'bed,  unless  they  were  attempting  something  against  the 
Roman  rule,  and  no  man  was  to  be  punished  simply  for  being 
a   Christian.      But   this   Rescript   is   spui'ious.      Any   man 

10  Eusebius  (E,  H.  iv.  12)  after  giving  the  beginning  of  Justiuus'  First 
Apology,  which  contains  the  address  to  T,  Antoninus  and  bis  two 
adopted  sons,  adds  "  the  same  emperor  being  addressed  by  other 
brethren  in  Asia  lionoured  tlie  Commune  of  Asia  with  the  following 
Eescript."  .This  Eescript,  which  is  in  the  next  chapter  of  Eusebius 
(E.  H.  IV.  13),  is  in  the  sole  name  of  Caesar  Marcus  Aurelius  Antoninus 
Augustus  Armenius,  thougb  Eusebius  bad  just  before  said  that  he  was 
going  to  give  us  a  Rescript  of  Antoninus  Pius,  There  are  some  material 
variations  between  the  two  copies  of  the  Eescript  besides  the  difference 
in  the  title,  wliich  ditierence  makes  it  impossible  to  sny  whether  the 
forger  intended  to  assign  this  Eescript  to  Pius  or  to  M.  Antoninus. 

The  author  of  the  Alexandrine  Chronicura  says  that  Marcus  being 
moved  by  the  entreaties  of  Melito  and  other  heads  of  the  church  wrote 
an  Epistle  to  the  Commune  of  Asia  in  which  he  forbade  the  Christians 
to  be  troubled  on  account  of  their  religion.  Valesius  supposes  this  to 
be  the  letter  or  rescript  which  is  contained  in  EiirsL-bius  (iv.  13),  and  to 
be  the  answer  to  the  apology  of  Mtlito  of  which  I  shall  soon  give  the  sub- 
stance. But  Marcus  certainly  did  not  write  tliia  letter  which  is  in 
Eusebius,  and  we  know  not  what  answer  he  made  to  Melito. 

O 


18  M.  Aurelius  Antoninus. 

moderately  acquainted  with  Eoman  history  will  see  by  the 
style  and  tenor  that  it  is  a  clumsy  forgery. 

In  the  time  of  M.  Antoninus  the  opposition  between  the 
old  and  the  new  belief  was  still  stronger,  and  the  adherents 
of  the  heathen  religion  urged  those  in  authority  to  a  more 
regular  resistance  to  the  invasions  of  the  Christian  faith. 
Melito  in  his  apology  to  M.  Antoninus  represents  the 
Christians  of  Asia  as  persecuted  under  new  imperial  orders. 
Shameless  informers,  he  says,  men  who  were  greedy  after  the 
property  of  others,  used  these  orders  as  a  means  of  robbing 
those  who  were  doing  no  harm.  He  doubts  if  a  just  emperor 
could  have  ordered  anything  so  unjust ;  and  if  the  last  order 
was  really  not  from  the  emperor,  the  Christians  entreat  him 
not  to  give  them  up  to  their  enemies."     We  conclude  from 

^1  Eusebius,  iv.  26 ;  and  Routh's  Eeliquiae  Saerae,  vol.  i.  and  the 
notes.  The  interpretation  of  this  Fragment  is  not  easy.  Mosheim  mis- 
understood one  passage  so  far  as  to  affirm  that  Marcus  promised  rewards 
to  tiiose  wlio  denounced  the  Christians ;  un  interpretation  which  is 
entirely  false.  Melito  calls  the  Christian  religion  "our  philosophy," 
which  began  among  barbarians  (the  Jews),  and  flourished  among  the 
Eoman  subjects  in  the  time  of  Augustus,  to  the  great  advantage  of  the 
empire,  for  from  that  time  the  power  of  the  Eomans  grew  great  and 
glorious.  He  says  that  the  emperor  ha  s  and  will  have  as  the  successor 
to  Augustus'  power  the  good  wishes  of  men,  if  he  will  protect  that 
philosophy  which  grew  up)  with  the  empire  and  began  with  Augustus, 
which  philosophy  the  predecessors  of  Antoninus  honoured  in  addition 
to  the  other  religions.  He  further  says  that  the  Christian  religion  had 
suffered  no  harm  since  the  time  of  Augustus,  but  on  the  contrary  had 
enjoyed  all  honour  and  respect  tliat  any  man  could  desire.  Nero  and 
Domitian,  he  says,  ^were  alone  persuaded  by  some  malicious  men  to 
calumniate  the  Christian  religion,  and  this  was  the  origin  of  the  false 
charges  against  the  Christians.  But  this  was  corrected  by  the  emperors 
who  immediately  preceded  Antoninus,  who  often  by  their  Eescripta 
reproved  those  who  attempted  to  trouble  the  Ciiristians.  Hadrian, 
Antoninus'  grandfather,  wrote  to  many  and  among  them  to  Fuudanus 
the  governor  of  Asia.      Antoninus  Pius  when  Mureus  was  aasociateU 


M.  Aurelius  Antoninus.  19 

this  that  there  were  at  least  imperial  Rescripts  or  C(mstitu- 
tions  of  M.  Antoninus,  which  were  made  the  foundation  of 
these  persecutions.  The  fact  of  being  a  Christian  was  now 
a  crime  and  punished,  unless  the  accused  denied  their 
religion.  Then  come  the  persecutions  at  Smyrna,  which 
some  modern  critics  place  in  a.d.  167,  ten  years  before  the 
persecution  of  Lyon.  The  governors  of  the  provinces  under 
M.  Antoninus  might  have  found  enough  even  in  Trajan's 
Rescript  to  warrant  them  in  punishing  Christians,  and  the 
fanaticism  of  the  people  would  drive  them  to  persecution, 
even  if  they  were  unwilling.  But  besides  the  fact  of  the 
Christians  rejecting  all  the  heathen  ceremonies,  we  must  not 
forget  that  they  plainly  maintained  that  all  the  heathen 
religions  were  false.  The  Chi-istians  thus  declared  war 
against  the  heathen  rites,  and  it  is  hardly  necessary  to 
observe  that  this  was  a  declaration  of  hostility  against  the 
Roman  government,  which  tolerated  all  the  various  forms  of 
superstition  that  existed  in  the  empire,  and  could  not  con- 
sistently tolerate  another  religion,  which  declared  that  all 


with  liim  in  the  empire  wrote  to  the  cities,  that  they  must  not  trouLle 
tlie  Cliristians  ;  among  others  to  the  people  of  Larissa,  Tiie^salonica,  tlie 
Athenians  and  all  the  Greeks.  Melito  concluded  thus :  "We  are  per- 
suaded that  thou  who  hast  about  these  things  the  same  mind  that  they 
had,  nay  rather  one  much  more  humane  and  philosophical,  wilt  do  all 
that  we  ask  thee. — This  apology  was  written  after  a.d.  169,  the  year  in 
which  Verus  died,  for  it  speaks  of  Marcus  only  and  his  son  Commodus. 
According  to  Melitos  testimony,  Christians  had  only  been  punished 
for  their  religion  in  the  time  of  Nero  and  Domitian,  and  the  persecu- 
tions began  again  in  the  time  of  M.  Antoninus  and  were  founded  on  his 
orders,  which  were  abused  as  he  seems  to  mean.  He  distinctly  affirms 
"  that  the  race  of  the  godly  is  now  persecuted  and  harassed  by  fresli 
imperial  orders  in  Asia,  a  thing  which  had  never  happened  before." 
But  we  know  that  all  this  is  not  true,  and  that  Christians  had  boen 
punished  in  Trajan's  time. 


20  M.  Aurelius  Antoninus. 

the  rest  were  false  ahd  all  tlie  splendid  ceremonies  of  the 
empire  only  a  worship  of  devils. 

If  we  had  a  true  ecclesiastical  history,  we  should  know 
how  the  Eoman  emperors  attempted  to  check  the  new  religion, 
how  they  enforced  their  principle  of  finally  punishing 
Christians,  simply  as  Christians,  which  Justin  in  his 
Apology  nffivms  that  they  did,  and  I  have  no  doubt  that  he 
tells  the  truth ;  how  far  popular  clamour  and  riots  went  in 
this  matter,  and  how  far  many  fanatical  and  ignorant 
Christians,  for  there  were  many  such,  contributed  to  excite 
the  fanaticism  on  the  other  side  and  to  embitter  the  quarrel 
between  the  Eoman  government  and  the  new  religion.  Our 
extant  ecclesiastical  histories  are  manifestly  falsified,  and 
what  truth  they  contain  is  grossly  exaggerated ;  but  the  fact 
is  certain  that  in  the  time  of  M.  Antoninus  the  heathen 
populations  were  in  open  hostility  to  the  Christians,  and  that 
under  Antoninus'  rule  men  were  put  to  death  because  they 
were  Christians.  Eusebius  in  the  preface  to  his  fifth  book 
remarks  that  in  the  seventeenth  year  of  Antoninus'  reign,  in 
some  parts  of  the  world  the  persecution  of  the  Christians 
became  more  violent  and  that  it  proceeded  from  the  populace 
in  the  cities ;  and  he  adds  in  his  usual  style  of  exaggeration, 
that  we  may  infer  from  what  took  place  in  a  single  nation 
that  myriads  of  martyrs  were  made  in  the  habitable  earth. 
The  nation  which  he  alludes  to  is  Gallia ;  and  he  then  pro- 
ceeds to  give  the  letter  of  the  churches  of  Vienna  and  Lug- 
dunum.  It  is  probable  that  he  has  assigned  the  true  cause 
of  the  persecutions,  the  fanaticism  of  the  populace,  and  that 
both  governors  and  emperor  had  a  great  deal  of  trouble  with 
these  distm'bances.  How  far  Marcus  was  cognizant  .of  these 
cruel  proceedings  we  do  not  know,  for  the  historical  records 


M.  Aurclius  Antoninus.  21 

of  his  reign  are  very  defective.  lie  did  not  make  the  rulo 
against  the  Christians,  for  Trajan  did  that ;  and  if  we  admit 
that  he  would  have  been  willing  to  let  the  Christians  alone, 
we  cannot  affirm  that  it  was  in  his  power,  for  it  would  be  a 
great  mistake  to  suppose  that  Antoninus  had  the  unlimited 
authority,  which  some  modern  sovereigL^s  have  had.  His 
power  was  limited  by  certain  constitutional  forms,  by  the 
senate,  and  by  the  precedents  of  his  predecessors.  We  can- 
not admit  that  such  a  man  was  an  active  persecutor,  for  there 
is  no  evidence  that  he  was,^^  though  it  is  certain  that  he  had 
no  good  opinion  of  the  Christians,  as  appears  from  his  own 
words.^^     But  he  knew  nothing  of  them  except  their  hostility 

^2  Except  that  of  Orosius(YTi.  15),  who  says  that  during  the  Parthiau 
war  there  were  grievous  persecutions  of  the  Christians  in  Asia  and 
Gallia  under  the  orders  of  Marcus  (praecepto  ejus),  and  "many  were 
crowned  with  the  martyrdom  of  saints." 

^2  See  XI.  3.  The  emperor  probably  speaks  of  such  fanntics  as  Cle- 
mens (quoted  by  Gataker  on  this  passage)  mentions.  The  rational 
Christians  admitted  no  fellowship  with  them.  "  Some  of  these  heretics,"' 
says  Clemens,  "  show  their  impiety  and  cowardice  by  loving  their  lives, 
saying  that  the  knowledge  of  the  really  existing  God  is  true  testimony 
(martyrdom),  but  that  a  man  is  a  self-murderer  who  bears  witness  by  \nM 
death.  We  also  blame  those  who  nash  to  deatli,  for  there  are  some,  not 
of  us,  but  only  bearing  the  same  name  w  ho  give  themselves  up.  We  say 
of  them  that  they  die  without  being  martyrs,  even  if  they  are  publicly 
punished ;  and  they  give  themselves  up  to  a  death  which  avails  nothing, 
as  the  Indian  Gymnosophists  give  themselves  up  foolishlj-  Lo  fire." 
Cave  in  his  Primitive  Christianity  (n.  c.  7)  says  of  the  Christians  : 
'■  They  did  flock  to  the  place  of  torment  faster  than  droves  of  beasts  that 
are  driven  to  the  shambles.  They  even  longed  to  be  in  the  arms  of 
suffering.  Ignatius,  though  then  in  his  journey  to  Kome  in  order  to  his 
execution,  yet  by  the  way  as  he  went  could  not  but  vent  his  passionate 
desire  of  it :  0  that  I  might  come  to  those  wild  beasts,  that  are  prepared 
for  me ;  I  heartily  wish  that  I  may  presently  meet  with  them  ;  I  would 
invite  and  encourage  them  speedily  to  devoiu-  me,  and  not  be  afraid  tc 
set  upon  me  as  they  have  been  to  others  ;  nay  should  thi  y  refuse  it,  1 
would  even  force  them  to  it;"    and  more  to  the  same  purpose  from 


22  M.  Aiirelius  Anioninus. 

to  the  Roman  religion,  and  he  probably  thought  that  they 
were  dangerous  to  the  state,  notwithstanding  the  professions 
false  or  true  of  some  of  the  Apologists.  So  much  I  have 
said,  because  it  would  be  unfair  not  to  state  all  that  can  be 
urged  against  a  man  whom  his  contemporaries  and  subsequent 
ages  venerated  as  a  model  of  virtue  and  benevolence.  If  I 
admitted  the  genuineness  of  some  documents,  he  would  be 
altogether  clear  from  the  charge  of  even  allowing  any  perse- 
cutions ;  but  as  I  seek  the  truth  and  am  sure  that  they  are 
false,  I  leave  him  to  bear  whatever  blame  is  his  due.^*  I  add 
that  it  is  quite  certain  that  Antoninus  did  not  derive  any  of  his 
Ethical  principles  from  a  religion  of  which  he  knew  nothing.^^ 
There  is  no  doubt  that  the  Emperor's  Reflections  or  his 
Meditations,  as  they  are  generally  named,  is  a  genuine  work. 
In  the  first  book  he  speaks  of  himself,  his  family,  and  his 
teachers ;  and  in  other  books  he  mentions  himself.  Suidaa 
(v.  MapKos)  notices  a  work  of  Antoninus  in  twelve  books, 
which  he  names  the  "  conduct  of  his  own  life  ;"  and  he  cites 
the  book  under  several  words  in  his  Dictionary,  giving  the 
emperor's  name,  but  not  the  title  of  the  work.  There  are 
also   passages   cited   by    Suidas    from    Antoninus    without 


Eusebius.  Cave,  an  honest  and  good  man,  says  all  this  in  praise  of  the 
Christians ;  but  I  tliink  that  he  mistook  the  matter.  We  admire  a  man 
who  holds  to  his  principles  even  to  death  ;  but  these  fanatical  Christiana 
are  the  Gymnosophists  whom  Clemens  treats  with  disdain. 

^*  Dr.  F.  C.  Baur  in  his  work  entitled  Das  Christenthum  und  die 
Christliche  Kirche  der  drei  ersten  Jahrhunderte,  &c.,  has  examined  this 
question  with  great  good  sense  and  fairness,  and  I  believe  he  has  stated 
the  tmth  as  near  as  our  authorities  enable  us  to  reach  it. 

^'  In  the  Digest,  48, 19,  30,  there  is  the  following  excerpt  from  Modes- 
tinus:  "  Si  quis  aliquid  fecerit,  quo  leves  hominum  animi  superstitiono 
numinis  terrerentur,  divus  Marcus  hujusmodi  homines  in  insulaiu 
relegari  rescripsit." 


M.  Aurelius  Antoninus.  23 

mention  of  the  emperor's  name.  The  true  title  of  the  work 
is  unknown.  Xylandcr  who  published  the  first  edition  of 
this  book  (Ziiricli,  1558,  8vo.  with  a  Latin  version)  used  a 
manuscript,  which  contained  the  twelve  books,  but  it  is  not 
known  where  the  manuscript  is  now.  The  only  other 
complete  mauuscript  which  is  known  to  exist  is  in  the 
Vatican  library,  but  it  has  no  title  and  no  inscriptions  of  the 
several  books :  the  eleventh  only  has  the  inscription  MdpKov 
avTOKpaTopo<i  marked  with  an  asterisk.  The  other  Vatican 
manuscripts  and  the  three  Florentine  contain  only  excerpts 
from  the  emperor's  book.  All  the  titles  of  the  excerpts 
nearly  agree  with  that  which  Xy lander  prefixed  to  his  edition, 
MapKOu  'Arrwj/iVov  At»roKpa-opos  roiv  ets  iavrov  ^ifiXia  l^.  This 
title  has  been  used  by  all  subsequent  editors.  We  cannot 
tell  whether  Antoninus  divided  his  work  into  books  or  some- 
body else  did  it.  If  the  inscriptions  at  the  end  of  the  first 
and  second  books  are  genuine,  he  may  have  made  the  division 
himself. 

It  is  plain  that  the  emperor  wrote  down  his  thoughts  or 
reflections  as  the  occasions  arose;  and  since  they  were 
intended  for  his  own  use,  it  is  no  improbable  conjecture  that 
he  left  a  complete  copy  behind  him  written  with  his  own 
hand ;  for  it  is  not  likely  that  so  diligent  a  man  would  use 
the  labour  of  a  transcriber  for  such  a  pui-pose,  and  expose 
his  most  secret  thoughts  to  any  other  eye.  He  may  have 
also  intended  the  book  for  his  son  Commodus,  who  however 
had  no  taste  for  his  father's  philosophy.  Some  careful  hand 
preserved  the  precious  volume  ;  and  a  work  by  Antoninus  is 
mentioned  by  other  late  writers  besides  Suidas. 

Many  critics  have  laboured  on  the  text  of  Antoninus.  The 
most  complete  edition  is  that  by  Thomas  Gataker,  1652,  4to, 


24  31.  Aurelius  Antoninus. 

The  second  edition  of  Gataker  was  superintended  by  George 
Stanhope,  1697,  dto.  There  is  also  an  edition  of  1704. 
Gataker  made  and  suggested  many  good  corrections,  and  he 
also  made  a  new  Latin  version,  which  is  not  a  very  good 
specimen  of  Latin,  but  it  generally  expresses  the  sense  of 
the  original  and  often  better  than  some  of  the  more  recent 
translations.  He  added  in  the  margin  opposite  to  each 
paragraph  references  to  the  other  parallel  passages ;  and  he 
wrote  a  commentary,  one  of  the  most  complete  that  has  been 
written  on  any  ancient  author.  This  commentary  contains 
the  editor's  exposition  of  the  more  difficult  passages,  and 
quotations  from  all  the  Greek  and  Eoman  writers  for  the 
illustration  of  the  text.  It  is  a  wonderful  monument  of 
learning  and  labour,  and  certainly  no  Englishman  has  yet 
done  anything  like  it.  At  the  end  of  his  preface  the  editor 
says  that  he  wrote  it  at  Eotherhithe  near  London  in  a  severe 
wdnter,  when  he  was  in  the  seventy-eighth  year  of  his  age, 
1651,  a  time  when  Milton,  Selden  and  other  great  men  of  the 
Common v/ealth  time  were  living ;  and  the  great  French 
scholar  Saumaise  (Salmasius),  with  whom  Gataker  corre- 
sponded and  received  help  from  him  for  his  edition  of 
Antoninus.  The  Greek  text  has  also  been  edited  by  J.  M. 
Schultz,  Leipzig,  1802,  8vo. ;  and  by  the  learned  Greek 
Adamantinus  Corais,  Paris,  1816,  8vo.  The  text  of  Schultz 
vi^as  republished  by  Tauchnitz,  1821. 

There  are  English,  German,  French,  Italian,  and  Spanish 
translations  of  M.  Antoninus,  and  there  may  be  others. 
I  have  not  seen  all  the  English  translations.  There 
is  one  by  Jeremy  Collier,  1702,  8vo.,  a  most  coarse  and 
vulgar  copy  of  the  original.  The  latest  French  translation 
by  Alexis  Pierron  in  the  collection  of  Charpentier  is  better 


M.  AureUus  Antoninus.  25 

than  DaciGi-'s,  which  has  been  honoured  with  an  Italian 
version  (Udiue,  1772).  There  is  an  Italian  version  (1G75) 
which  I  have  not  seen.  It  is  by  a  cardinal.  "  A  man 
illustrious  in  the  church,  the  Cardinal  Francis  Barberini  the 
elder,  nephew  of  Pope  Urban  VIII.,  occupied  the  last  years 
of  his  life  in  translating  into  his  native  language  the 
thoughts  of  the  Eoman  emperor,  in  order  to  diffuse  among 
the  faithful  the  fertilizing  and  vivifying  seeds.  He  dedicated 
this  translation  to  his  soul,  to  make  it,  as  he  says  in  his 
energetic  style,  redder  than  his  purple  at  the  sight  of  the 
vii'tues  of  this  Gentile  "  (Pierron,  Preface). 

I  have  made  this  translation  at  intervals  after  having  used 
the  book  for  many  years.  It  is  made  from  the  Greek,  but  I 
have  not  always  followed  one  text ;  and  I  have  occasionally 
compared  other  versions  with  my  own.  I  made  this  trans- 
lation for  my  own  use,  because  I  found  that  it  was  worth  the 
labour ;  but  it  may  be  useful  to  others  also  and  therefore  I 
determined  to  print  it.  As  the  original  is  sometimes  very 
difficult  to  understand  and  still  more  difficult  to  translate,  it 
is  not  possible  that  I  have  always  avoided  error.  But  I 
believe  that  1  have  not  often  missed  the  meaning,  and  those 
who  will  take  the  trouble  to  compare  the  translation  with 
the  original  should  not  hastily  conclude  that  I  am  wrong,  if 
they  do  not  agree  with  me.  Some  passages  do  give  the 
meaning,  though  at  fii-st  sight  they  may  not  appear  to  do  so ; 
and  when  I  differ  from  the  translators,  I  think  that  in  some 
places  they  are  wrong,  and  in  other  places  I  am  sure  that 
they  are.  I  have  placed  in  some  passages  a  f,  which 
indicates  corruption  in  the  text  or  great  uncertainty  in  the 
meaning.  I  could  have  made  the  language  more  easy  and 
flowing,  but  I  have  preferred  a  ruder  style  as  being  better 


26  M.  Aurelius  Antoninus. 

suited  to  express  tlie  cliaracter  of  tlic  original ;  and  some- 
times the  obscurity  which  may  appear  in  the  version  is  a 
fair  copy  of  the  obscurity  of  the  Greek.  If  I  should  ever 
revise  this  version,  I  would  gladly  make  use  of  any  correc- 
tions which  may  be  suggested.  I  have  added  an  index  of 
some  of  the  Greek  terms  with  the  corresponding  English. 
If  I  have  not  given  the  best  words  for  the  Greek,  I  have 
done  the  best  that  I  could ;  and  in  the  text  I  have  always 
given  the  same  translation  of  the  same  word. 

The  last  reflection  of  the  Stoic  philosophy  that  I  have 
observed  is  in  Simplicius'  Commentary  on  the  Enchiridion 
of  Epictetus.  Simplicius  was  not  a  Christian,  and  such  a 
man  was  not  likely  to  be  converted  at  a  time  when 
Christianity  was  grossly  corrupted.  But  he  was  a  really 
religious  man,  and  he  concludes  his  commentary  with  a 
prayer  to  the  Deity  which  no  Christian  could  improve. 
From  the  time  of  Zeno  to  Simplicius,  a  period  of  about  nine 
hundred  years,  the  Stoic  philosophy  formed  the  characters  of 
some  of  the  best  and  greatest  men.  Finally  it  became 
extinct,  and  we  hear  no  more  of  it  till  the  revival  of  letters 
in  Italy.  Angelo  Poliziano  met  wdth  two  very  inaccurate 
and  incomplete  manuscripts  of  Epictetus'  Enchiridion,  which 
he  translated  into  Latin  and  dedicated  to  his  great  patron 
Lorenzo  de'  Medici  in  whose  collection  he  had  found  the 
book,  Poliziano's  version  was  printed  in  the  first  Bale 
edition  of  the  Enchiridion,  a.d.  1531  (apud  And.  Cratandrum). 
Poliziano  recommends  the  Enchiridion  to  Lorenzo  as  a  work 
well  suited  to  his  temper,  and  useful  in  the  difficulties  by 
which  he  was  surrounded. 

Epictetus  and  Antoninus  have  had  readers  ever  since  they 
were  first  printed.     The  little  book  of  Antoninus  has  been 


M,  Aurelius  Antoninus.  27 

the  companlou  of  some  great  men.  Macliiavelli's  Art  of 
War  and  Marcus  Antoninus  were  the  two  books  which  were 
used  when  he  was  a  young  man  by  Captain  John  Smith,  and 
he  could  not  have  found  two  writers  better  fitted  to  form  the 
character  of  a  soldier  and  a  man.  Smith  is  almost  unknown 
and  forgotten  in  England  his  native  country,  but  not  in 
America  where  he  saved  the  young  colony  of  Virginia.  He 
was  great  in  his  heroic  mind  and  his  deeds  in  arms,  but 
greater  still  in  the  nobleness  of  his  character.  For  a  man's 
greatness  lies  not  in  wealth  and  station,  as  the  vulgar  believe, 
nor  yet  in  his  intellectual  capacity,  which  is  often  associated 
with  the  meanest  moral  character,  the  most  abject  servility 
to  those  in  high  places  and  arrogance  to  the  poor  and  lowly ; 
but  a  man's  true  greatness  lies  in  the  consciousness  of  an 
honest  purpose  in  life,  founded  on  a  just  estimate  of  himself 
and  everything  else,  on  frequent  self-examination,  and  a 
steady  obedience  to  the  rule  which  he  knows  to  be  right, 
without  troubling  himself,  as  the  emperor  says  he  should  not, 
about  what  others  may  think  or  say,  or  whether  they  do  or 
do  not  do  that  which  he  thinks  and  savs  and  does. 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ANTONINUS. 

IT  has  been  said  that  the  Stoic  philosophy  first  showed  its 
real  value  when  it  passed  from  Greece  to  Roma  The 
doctrines  of  Zeno  and  his  successors  were  well  suited  to  the 
gravity  and  practical  good  sense  of  the  Eomans ;  and  even  in 
the  Eepublican  period  we  have  an  example  of  a  man,  M.  Cato 
Uticensis,  who  lived  the  life  of  a  Stoic  and  died  consistently 
with  the  opinions  which  he  professed.  He  was  a  man,  says 
Cicero,  who  embraced  the  Stoic  philosophy  from  conviction  ; 
not  for  the  purpose  of  vain  discussion,  as  most  did,  but  in 
order  to  make  his  life  conformable  to  the  Stoic  precepts.  In 
the  wretched  times  from  the  death  of  Augustus  to  the  murder 
of  Domitian,  there  was  nothing  but  the  Stoic  philosophy 
which  could  console  and  support  the  foUo^i^f  the  old 
religion  under  imperial  tyranny  and  amidst  ^HK^l  corrup- 
tion. There  were  even  then  noble  minds  that  could  dare 
and  endure,  sustained  by  a  good  conscience  and  an  elevated 
idea  of  the  purposes  of  man's  existence.  Such  were  Paetus 
Thrasea,  Helvidius  Prisons,  Cornutus,  C.  Musonius  Rufus,^ 
and  the  poets  Persius  and  Juvenal,  whose  energetic  language 

1  I  have  omitted  Seneca,  Nero's,  preceptor.  He  was  in  a  sense  a 
Stoic  and  he  has  said  many  good  things  in  a  very  fine  way.  There  is 
a  judgment  of  Gellius  (xii,  2)  on  Seneca,  or  rather  a  statement  of  what 
some  people  thought  of  his  philosophy,  and  it  is  not  favourable.  His 
writings  and  his  life  must  be  taken  together,  and  I  have  nothing  more 
to  say  of  him  here.  The  reader  will  find  a  notice  of  Seneca  and  his 
philosophy  in  "  Seekers  after  God,"  by  the  Rev.  F.  W.  Farrar,  Ma> 
millan  and  Co. 


The  Philosophy  of  Antoninus.  29 

and  manly  thoughts  may  be  as  instructive  to  us  now  as  they 
might  have  been  to  theii-  contemporaries.  Persius  died  under 
Nero's  bloody  reign,  but  Juvenal  had  the  good  fortune  to 
survive  the  tyrant  Domitian  and  to  see  the  better  times  of 
Nerva,  Trajan  and  Hadrian.^  His  best  precepts  are  derived 
from  the  Stoic  school,  and  they  are  enforced  in  his  finest 
verses  by  the  unrivalled  vigour  of  the  Latin  language. 

The  two  best  expounders  of  the  later  Stoical  philosophy 
were  a  Greek  slave  and  a  Eoman  emperor.  Epictetus,  a 
Phrygian  Greek,  was  brought  to  Eomo,  we  know  not  how,  but 
he  was  there  the  slave  and  afterwards  the  freedman  of  an 
unworthy  master,  Epajihroditus  by  name,  himself  a  freedman 
and  a  favourite  of  Nero.  Epictetus  may  have  been  a  hearer  of 
C  Musonius  Eufus,  while  he  was  still  a' slave,  but  he  could 
hardly  have  been  a  teacher  before  he  was  made  free.  He  was 
one  of  the  philosophers  whom  Domitian's  order  banished 
from  Rome.  He  retired  to  Nicopolis  in  Epirus,  and  he  may 
have  died  there.  Like  other  great  teachers  he  wrote  nothing, 
and  we  are  indebted  to  his  gTateful  pupil  Arrian  for  what  we 
have  of  E]^h|^|s'  discourses.  Arrian  wrote  eight  books  of 
the  discourPIWl  Epictetus,  of  which  only  four  remain  and 
some  fragments.  \\e  have  also  from  Arrian's  hand  the  small 
Enchiridion  or  Manual  of  the  chief  precepts  of  Epictetus. 
There  is  a  valuable  commentary  on  the  Enchiridion  by  Sim- 
plicius,  who  lived  in  the  time  of  the  emperor  Justinian.^ 

2  Eibbeck  has  laboured  to  prove  that  those  Satires,  which  contain 
philosophical  precepts,  are  not  the  work  of  the  real,  but  of  a  false 
Juvenal,  a  Declainator.  •  Still  the  verses  exist,  and  were  written  by 
somebody  wiio  was  acquainted  with  the  Stoic  doctrines. 

^  There  is  a  complete  edition  of  Arrian's  Epictetus  with  the  com- 
mentary of  Simplicius  by  J.  Schweighaeuser,  6  vols.  Svo.  1  799,  1800 
There  is  also  an  English  tronslatiou  of  Epictetus  by  Mrs.  (Jaiter. 


30  The  Philosojphy  of  Antoninus. 

Antoninus  in  liis  first  book  (i.  7),  in  which  he  gratefully 
commemorates  his  obligations  to  his  teachers,  says  that  he 
was  made  acquainted  by  Junius  Eusticus  with  the  discourses 
of  Epictetus,  whom  he  mentions  also  in  other  passages  (iv. 
41 ;  XI.  34.  36).  Indeed  the  doctrines  of  Epictetus  and 
Antoninus  are  the  same,  and  Epictetus  is  the  best  authority 
for  the  explanation  of  the  philosophical  language  of  Antoninus 
and  the  exposition  of  his  opinionsT^  But  the  method  of  the 
two  philosophers  is  entirely  different.  Epictetus  addressed 
himself  to  his  hearers  in  a  continuous  discourse  and  in  a 
familiar  and  simple  manner.  Antoninus  wrote  dowj  his 
reflections  for  his  Own  use  only,  in  short  unconnected 
paragraphs,  which  are  often  obscure. 

The  Stoics  made  three  divisions  of  philosophy,  Pliysic 
((jiva-LKov),  Ethic  (jjOiKov),  and  Logic  (Xoyi/cov)  (viii.  13).  This 
division,  we  are  told  by  Diogenes,  was  made  by  Zeno  of 
Citium,  the  founder  of  the  Stoic  sect  and  by  Chrysippus ; 
but  these  philosophers  placed  the  three  divisions  in  the 
following  order,  Logic,  Physic,  Ethic.  It  appears  however 
that  this  division  was  made  before  Zeno's  time  and  acknow- 
ledged by  Plato,  as  Cicero  remarks  (Acad.  Post.  i.  5).  Logic 
is  not  synonymous  with  our  term  Logic  in  the  narrower  sense 
of  that  word. 

Cleanthes,  a  Stoic,  subdivided  the  three  divisions,  and  made 
six  :  Dialectic  and  PJietoric,  comprised  in  Logic  ;  Ethic  and 
Politic;  Physic  and  Theology.  This  division  was  merely 
,  for  practical  use,  for  all  Philosophy  is  one.  Even  among  the 
earliest  Stoics  Logic  or  Dialectic  does  not  occupy  the  same 
place  as  in  Plato :  it  is  considered  only  as  an  instrument 
which  is  to  be  used  for  the  other  divisions  of  Philosophy. 
An  exposition  of  the  earlier  Stoic  doctrines  and  of  their 


The  PhilosojjJuj  of  Antoninus.  31 

modifications  would  require  a  volume.  My  object  is  to 
explain  only  the  opinions  of  Antoninus,  so  far  as  tbcy  can  be 
collected  from  bis  book. 

According  to  tbe  subdivision  of  Cleantbes  Pbysic  and 
Tbeology  go  togetber,  or  tbe  study  of  tbe  nature  of  Tbings, 
and  tbe  study  of  tbe  nature  of  tbe  Deity,  so  far  as  man  can 
understand  tbe  Deity,  and  of  bis  government  of  tbe  universe. 
Tbis  division  or  subdivision  is  not  formally  adopted  by 
Antoninus,  for  as  already  observed,  tbere  is  no  metboti  in  bis 
booJs ;  but  it  is  virtually  contained  in  it. 

Cleantbes  also  connects  Etbic  and  Politic,  or  tbe  study  of 
tbe  principles  of  morals  and  tbe  study  of  tbe  constitution  of 
civil  society;  and  undoubtedly  be  did  well  in  subdividing 
Etbic  into  two  parts,  Etbic  ili^be  narrower  sense  and  Politic, 
for  tbougb  tbe  two  are  intimately  connected,  tbey  are  also 
very  distinct,  and  many  questions  can  only  be  properly 
discussed  by  carefully  observing  tbe  distinction.  Antoninus 
does  not  treat  of  Politic.  His  subject  is  Etbic,  and  Etbic  in 
its  practical  application  to  bis  own  conduct  in  life  as  a  man^ 
and  as  a  governor.  His  Etbic  is  founded  on  bis  doctrines 
about  man's  naturCj  tbe  Universal  Nature,  and  tbe  relation  of 
every  man  to  everytbLng.  elsQ^  It  is  tberefore  intimately  and 
inseparably  connected  witb  Pbysic  or  tbe  nature  of  Tbings 
and  witb  Tbeology  or  tbe  Natui-e  of  tbe  Deity.  He  advises 
us  to^examine  well  all  tbe  impressions  on  our  minds  (<^avracrrat) 
and  to  form  a  rigbt  judgment  of  tbem,  to  make  just  conclu- 
sions, and  to  inquire  into  tb.e  meanings  of  words,  and  so  far 
to  apply  Dialectic,  but  be  bas  no  attempt  at  any  exposition  of 
Dialectic,  and  bis  pbilosopby  is  in  substance  purely  moral  ^^ 
and  practical.  He  says  (viii.  13),  "Constantly  and,  if  it 
be  possible,    on    tbe   occasion  of  every  impression   on  the 


32  The  Philosophy  of  Anto7iinus. 

soul,*  apj)ly  to  it  the  principles  of  Physic,  of  Ethic  and  of 
Dialectic  :"  which  is  only  another  way  of  telling  ns  to  examine 
the  impression  in  every  possible  way.  In  another  passage 
(hi.  11)  he  says,  "  To  the  aids  which  have  been  mentioned 
let  this  one  still  be  added :  make  for  thyself  a  definition  or 
description  of  the  object  (to  cfiavrao-rov)  which  is  presented  to 
thee,  so  as  to  see  distinctly  what  kind  of  a  thing  it  is  in  its 
substance,  in  its  nudity,  in  its  complete  entirety,  and  tell 
thyself  its  proper  name,  and  the  names  of  the  things  of  which 
it  has  been  compounded,  and  into  which  it  will  be  resol-tted." 
Such  an  examination  implies  a  use  of  Dialectic,  which 
Antoninus  accordingly  employed  as  a  means  towards  estab- 
lishing his  Physical,  Theological  and  Ethical  principles. 

There  are  several  expositions  of  the  Physical,  Theological, 
and  Ethical  princij)les,  which  are  contained  in  the  work  of 
Antoninus ;  and  more  expositions  than  I  have  read.  Eitter 
(Geschichte  der  Philosophic,  iv.  241)  after  explaining  the 
doctrines  of  Epictetus,  treats  very  briefly  and  insufficiently 
those  of  Antoninus,  But  he  refers  to  a  short  essay,  in  which 
the  work  is  done  better.*  There  is  also  an  essay  on  the 
Philosophical  Principles  of  M.  Aurelius  Antoninus  by  J.  M. 
Schultz,  placed   at    the    end   of  his  German   translation  of 

*  The  original  is  iirl  irda-ris  (pavracrias.  We  have  no  word  which 
expresses  (pavraaia,  for  it  is  not  only  the  sensuous  appearance  wliich 
comes  from  an  external  object,  which  object  is  called  t^  (pavTaardv,  but 
it  is  also  the  thought  or  feeling  or  opinion  which  is  produced  even  when 
there  is  no  corresponding  external  object  before  us.  Accordingly 
everything  which  moves  the  soul  is  (pavraarSu  and  i)roduces  a  (pavTuaia. 

In  this  extract  Antoninus  says  (pv(Tio\oyf7u,TTa9okoye7v,  SiaXfKriKsvia-dai. 
I  have  translated  TraOoXoyelu  by  using  the  word  Moral  (Ethic),  and  that 
is  the  meaning  here. 

^  De  Marco  Aurelio  Antonino  ...  ex  ipsius  Commeutariis.  Scriptio 
I'hilologica.    Instituit  Nicolaus  Bachius,  Lipsiae,  1826. 


The  Philosophy  of  Antoninus.  33 

Antoninus  (Sclileswig,  1799).  With  tlie  assistance  of  tlicso 
two  useful  essays  and  his  own  diligent  study  a  man  may  form 
a  sufl&cicnt  notion  of  the  principles  of  Antoninus  ;  but  he  will 
find  it  more  difficult  to  expound  them  to  others.  Besides  the 
want  of  arrangement  in  the  original  and  of  connection  among 
the  numerous  paragraphs,  the  corruption  of  the  text,  tlie 
obscurity  of  the  language  and  the  style,  and  sometimes 
perha2)s  the  confusion  in  the  writer's  own  ideas, — besides  all 
this  there  is  occasionally  an  apparent  contradiction  in  the 
emperor's  thoughts,  as  if  his  principles  were  sometimes 
unsettled,  as  if  doubt  sometimes  clouded  his  mind.  A  man 
who  leads  a  life  of  tranquillity  and  reflection,  who  is  not 
disturbed  at  home  and  meddles  not  with  the  aff'airs  of  the 
world,  may  keep  his  mind  at  ease  and  his  thoughts  in  one 
even  course.  But  such  a  man  has  not  been  tried.  All  his 
Ethical  philosophy  and  his  passive  virtue  might  turn  out  to 
be  idle  words,  if  he  were  once  exposed  to  the  rude  realities  of 
human  existence.  Fine  thoughts  and  moral  dissertations 
from  men  who  have  networked  and  suffered  may  be  read,  but 
they  will  be  forgotten.  No  religion,  no  Ethical  philosophy 
is  worth  anything,  if  the  teacher  has  not  lived  the  "  life  of  an 
apostle,"  and  been  ready  to  die  "  the  death  of  a  martyr." 
"  Not  in  passivity  (the  passive  affects)  but  in  activity  lie  tuv 
evil  and  the  good  of  the  rational  social  animal,  just  as  his 
virtue  and  his  vice  lie  not  in  passivity,  but  in  activity " 
(ix.  16).  The  emperor  Antoninus  was  a  practical  moralist. 
From  his  youth  he  followed  a  laborious  discipline,  and 
though  his  high  station  placed  him  above  all  want  or  the 
fear  of  it,  he  lived  as  frugally  and  temperately  as  the  poorest 
philosopher.  Ej^ictetus  wanted  little,  and  it  seems  that  he 
always  had  the  little  that  he  wanted     and  he  was  content 


34  The  Philosophj  of  Antoninus. 

with  it,  as  lie  had  been  with  his  servile  station.  But 
Antoninus  after  his  accession  to  the  empire  sat  on  an  uneasy 
seat.  He  had  the  administration  of  an  empire  which 
extended  from  the  Euphrates  to  the  Atlantic,  from  the  cold 
mountains  of  Scotland  to  the  hot  sands  of  Africa ;  and  we 
may  imagine,  though  we  cannot  know  it  by  experience,  what 
must  be  the  trials,  the  troubles,  the  anxiety  and  the  sorrows 
of  him  who  has  the  world's  business  on  his  hands  with  the 
wish  to  do  the  best  that  he  can,  and  the  certain  knowledge 
that  he  can  do  very  little  of  the  good  which  he  wishes^ 

In  the  midst  of  war,  pestilence,  conspiracy,  general  corrup- 
tion and  with  the  weight  of  so  unwieldy  an  empire  upon  him, 
we  may  easily  comprehend  that  Antoninus  often  had  need  of 
all  his  fortitude  to  support  him.  The  best  and  the  bravest 
men  have  moments  of  doubt  and  of  weakness,  but  if  they  are 
the  best  and  the  bravest,  they  rise  again  from  their  depression 
by  recurring  to  first  principles,  as  Antonmus  ,does.  The 
emperor  says  that  life  is  smoke,  a  vapour,  and  St.  James  in 
his  Epistle  is  of  the  same  mind ;  that  the  world  is  full  of 
envious,  jealous,  malignant  people,  and  a  man  might  be  well 
content  to  get  out  of  it.  He  has  doubts  perhaps  sometimes 
even  about  that  to  which  he  holds  most  firmly.  There  are 
only  a  few  passages  of  th's  kind,  but  they  are  evidence  of  the 
struggles  which  even  the  noblest  of  the  sons  of  men  had  to 
maintain  against  the  hard  realities  of  his  daily  life.  7  A  poor 
remark  it  is  which  I  have  seen  somewhere,  an'a  made  in 
a  disparaging  way,  that  the  emperor's  reflections  show  that  he 
had  need  of  consolation  and  comfort  in  life,  and  even  to 
prepare  him  to  meet  his  death.  True  that  he  did  need 
comfort  and  suj)port,  and  we  sec  how  he  found  it.  He  con- 
stantly recurs  to  his  fundamental  principle  that  the  universe 


The  Philosophy  of  Antoninus,  35 

IB  wisely  ordered,  that  every  man  is  a  part  of  it  and  must 
conform  to  that  order  which  he  cannot  change,  that  whatever 
the  Deity  has  done  is  good,  that  all  mankind  are  a  man's 
brethren,  that  he  must  love  and  cherish  them  and  try  to  make 
them  better,  even  those  who  would  do  him  harm.  This  is 
his  conclusion  (ii.  17)  :  "  What  then  is  that  which  is  able  to 
conduct  a  man  ?  One  thing  and  only  one,  Philosophy.  But 
this  consists  in  keeping  the  divinity  within  a  man  free  from 
violence  and  unharmed,  superior  to  pains  and  pleasures,  doing 
nothing  without  a  purpose  nor  yej;  falsely  and  with  hypocrisy, 
not  feeling  the  need  of  another  man's  doing  or  not  doing  any- 
thing ;  and  besides,  acce^^ting  all  that  happens  and  all  that  is 
allotted,  as  coming  from  thonce,  wherever  it  is,  from  whence 
he  himself  came ;  and  finally  waiting  for  death  with  a 
cheerful  mind  as  being  nothing  else  than  a  dissolution  of  the 
'elements,  of  which  every  living  being  is  compounded.  But 
if  there  is  no  harm  to  the  elements  themselves  in  each  con- 
tinually changing  into  another,  why  should  a  man  have  any 
apprehension  about  the  change  and  dissolution  of  all  the 
elements  [himself] '?    for   it   is   according   to   nature ;    and 

nothing  is  evil  that  is  according  to  natui-e." ' 

The  Physic  of  Antoninus  is  the  knowledge  of  the  Nature 
of  the  Universe,  of  its  government,  and  of  the  relation  of 
man's  nature  to  both.  He  names  the  universe  (17  tojv  oXwv 
ova-ca,  VI.  1),''  "  the  universal  substance,"  and  he  adds  that 

^  As  to  the  word  ovaia,  the  reader  may  see  the  Index.  I  add  here  a 
few  examples  of  tlie  use  of  the  word ;  Antoninus  has  (v.  24),  ^  crv/j-iraaa 
ohaia,  "  the  universal  substance."  He  says  ^xii.  30), "  there  is  one  com- 
mon substance "  (ovcria),  distributed  among  countless  bodies ;  and 
(IV.  40).  In  Stobaeus  (torn.  i.  lib.  1,  tit.  34)  tliere  is  this  definition, 
ovcriav  Se  (paaiv  twv  ovrcav  airdvTcov  ttju  irpwrrju  v\y)v.  (In  vin.  11}, 
Antoninus  speaks  of  t^   ouo-iwSes   koX  v\ik6v,   "  the   substantial    and 


36  27/e  PhiIosoj)hy  of  Antoninus. 

"reason"  (Aoyo?)  governs  the  universe.  He  also  (vi.  9) 
uses  the  terms  "  universal  nature  "  or  "  nature  of  the  uni- 
verse." He  (vi.  25)  calls  the  universe  "the  one  and  all, 
which  we  name  Cosmus  or  Order"  (K6aiJio<;).  If  he  ever 
seems  to  use  these  general  terms  as  significant  of  the  All, 
of  all  that  man  ean  in  any  way  conceive  to  exist,  he  still  on 
other  occasions  plainly  distinguishes  between  Matter,  Ma- 
terial things  {vXrj,  vkiKov),  and  Cause,  Origin,  Eeason  (aiTia^ 
atTtwSes,  Xoyos)/      This  is  conformable  to  Zeno's  doctrine 


the  material ;"  and  (vii.  10)  lie  says  that  "  everything  material " 
(JivvXov)  disappears  in  the  substance  of  the  whole  (t??  twv  '6\av  ovaii,). 
The  ovaia  is  the  generic  name  of  that  existence,  which  we  assume  as  the 
highest  or  ultimate,  because  we  conceive  no  existence  which  can  be  co- 
ordinated with  it  and  none  above  it.  It  is  the  philosopher's  "  sub- 
stance :"  it  is  the  ultimate  expression  for  that  which  w'e  conceive  or 
suppose  to  be  the  basis,  the  being  of  a  thing.  "  From  tlie  Divine, 
which  is  substance  in  itself,  or  the  only  and  sole  substance,  all  and 
every  thing  that  is  created  exists."  (Swedenborg,  Angelic  Wisdom,  198.) 
''  I  remark,  in  order  to  anticipate  any  misapprehension,  that  all  these 
general  terms  involve  a  contradiction.  The  "one  and  all,"  and  the  like, 
and  "  the  whole,"  imply  limitation.  "  One  "  is  limited  ;  ''  all  "  is 
limited;  the  "whole"  is  limited.  We  cannot  help  it.  We  cannot  find 
words  to  express  that  which  we  cannot  fully  conceive.  The  addition  of 
*' absolute"  or  any  other  such  word  does  not  mend  the  matter.  Even 
the  word  God  is  used  by  most  people,  often  unconsciously,  in  such  a 
way  that  limitation  is  impMtd,  and  yet  at  the  same  time  words  are 
added  which  are  intended  to  deny  limitation.  A  Christian  maityr, 
when  he  was  asked  what  God  was,  is  said  to  have  answered  that  God 
nas  no  name  like  a  man;  and  Justin  says  the  same  (Apol.  ii.  G),  ''the 
names  Father,  God,  Creator,  Lord  and  Master  are  not  names,  but 
appellations  derived  from  benefactions  and  acts."  (Compare  Seneca, 
De  Benef.  iv.  8.)  We  can  conceive  the  existence  of  a  thing,  or  rather 
we  may  have  the  idea  of  an  existence,  witliout  an  adequate  notion  of  it, 
"  adequate  "  meaning  coextensive  and  coequal  with  the  tiling.  We  have 
a  notion  of  limited  space  derived  from  the  dimensions  of  what  we  call  a 
material  thing,  though  of  space  absolute,  if  I  may  use  the  term,  we  have 
no  notion  at  all ;  and  of  infinite  space  the  notion  is  the  same,  no  notion 


lite  Philosophy  of  Antoninus.  37 

ihn,t  there  arc  two  original  principles  (apX^O  ^^^  ^^^  things, 
that  whicli  acts  (to  ttolovv)  and  that  which  is  acted  upon 
[to  Traaxov)-.  That  which  is  acted  on  is  the  formless 
matter  ({'Avy) :  that  which  acts  is  the  reason  (Aoyos), 
God,  who  is  eternal  and  operates  through  all  matter,  and 
produces  all  things.  So  Antoninus  (v.  32)  speaks  of  the 
reason  (Xoyos)  which  pervades  all  stibstance  (ovata),  and 
through  all  time  bj  fixed  periods  (revolutions)  administers 
the  universe  (to  ttuv).  God  is  eternal,  and  Matter  is 
eternal.  It  is  God  who  gives  form  to  matter,  but  he  is  not 
said  to  liave  created  matter.  According  to  this  view,  which 
is  as  old  as  Auaxagoras,  God  and  matter  exist  independently, 
but  God  governs  matter.  This  doctrine  is  simply  the 
expression  of  the  fact  of  the  existence  both  of  matter  and  of 
God.  The  Stoics  did  not  perplex  themselves  with  the 
insoluble   question   of  the   origin    and   :|^ature    of    matter.^ 


at  all ;  and  yet  we  conceive  it  in  a  sense,  though  I  know  not  how,  and 
we  believe  that  space  is  infinite,  and  we  cannot  conceive  it  to  be  finite, 
s  The  notions  of  matter  and  of  space  are  inseparable.  "We  derive  the 
notion  of  space  from  matter  and  form.  But  we  have  no  adequate  con- 
ception either  of  matter  or  of  space.  Matter  in  its  ultimate  resolution 
is  as  unintelligible  as  what  men  call  mind,  spirit,  or  by  whatever  otliei 
name  they  may  express  the  power  which  makes  itself  known  by  acts. 
Anaxagoras  laid  down  the  distinction  between  intelligence  (uovs)  and 
matter,  and  he  said  that  intelligence  impressed  motion  on  matter,  and  so 
separated  the  elements  of  matter  and  gave  them  order  ;  but  he  probably 
only  assumed  a  beginning,  as  Simplicius  says,  as  a  foundation  of  his 
philosophical  teaching.  Empedocles  said  •'  The  universe  always  existed." 
He  had  no  idea  of  what  is  called  creation.  Ocellus  Lucanus  (1,  §  2) 
maintained  that  the  Universe  (rt)  irai^)  was  imperishable  and  uncreated. 
Consequently  it  is  eternal.  He  admitted  the  existence  of  God;  but  his 
Theology  would  require  some  discussion.  On  the  contrary,  the  Brach- 
mauB,  according  to  Strabo  ^p.  713,  ed.  Cas.),  taught  that  the  universe  was 
created  and  perishable  ;  and  the  creator  and  administrator  of  it  pervades 
the  whole.     The  author  of  the  book  of  Solomon's  Wisdom  says  ;xi.  17)  : 


38  The  Philosophy  of  Antoninus. 

Autonimis  also  assumes  a  beginning  of  tilings,  as  we  now 
know  them  ;  but  bis  language  is  sometimes  very  obscure. 
I  have  endeavoured  to  explain  the  meaning  of  one  difficult 
passage,  (vii.  75,  and  tbe  note.) 

Matter  consists  of  elemental  parts  ((rroLxua)  of  wbicb  all 
material  objects  are  made.  But  nothing  is  permanent  in 
form.  The  nature  of  the  universe,  according  to  Antoninus' 
expression  (iv.  36),  "loves  nothing  so  much  as  to  change 
the  things  which  are,  and  to  make  new  Jhings  like  them_._ 
For  everything  that  exists  is  in  a  manner  the  seed  of  that 
which  will  be.  But  thou  art  thinking  only  of  seeds  which 
are  cast  into  the  earth  or  into  a  womb  :  but  this  is  a  very 
vulgar  notion."  All  things  then  are  in  a  constant  flux  and 
change  :  some  things  are  dissolved  into  the  elements,  others 
come  in  their  places  ;  and  so  the  "  whole  universe  continues 
ever  young  and  perfect."  (xii.  23.) 

Antoninus  has  some  obscure  expressions  about  what  he 
calls  "  seminal  principles  "  (a-jrepixaTtKot  Xoyot).  He  opposes 
them  to  the  Epicurean  atoms  (vi.  24),  and  consequently  his 
"seminal  principles"  are  not  material  atoms  which  wander 
about  at  hazard,  and  combine  nobody  knows  how.  In  one 
passage  (iv.  21)  he  speaks  of_liying  principleSj  souls^(;//vxat) 
after  the  dissolution  of  their  bodies  being  received  into  the 
"seminal  principle  of  the  universe."  Schultz  thinks  that 
by  "  seminal  principles  Antoninus  means  the  relations  of 
the  various  elemental  principles,  which  relations  are  de- 
termined by  the  deity  and  by  which  alone  the  production  of 


"  Thy  Almighty  hand  made  the  world  of  matter  without  form,"  which 
may  mean  that  matter  existed  already. 

The  common  Greek  word  which  we  translate  "  matter  "  is  v\t].    It  is 
the  stuff  that  things  are  made  of. 


The  Philosophy  of  Antoninus.  39 

organized  beings  is  possible."  This  may  be  the  meaning, 
but  if  it  is,  nothing  of  any  value  can  be  derived  from  it." 
Antoninus  often  uses  the  word  "  Nature "  (^v'o-ts),  and  wo 
must  attempt  to  fix  its  meaning.  The  simple  etymological 
sense  of  ^I'crts  is  "  production,"  the  birth  of  what  wc  call 
Things.  The  Eomans  used  Natura,  which  also  means 
"  birth  "  originally.  But  neither  the  Greeks  nor  the  Romans 
stuck  to  this  simple  meaning,  nor  do  we.  Antoninus  says 
(x.  6)  :  "  Whether  the  universe  is  [a  concourse  of]  atoms  or 
Nature  [is  a  system],  let  this  first  be  established  that  I  am 
a  part  of  the  whole  which  is  governed  by  nature."  Here  it 
might  seem  as  if  nature  were  personified  and  viewed  as  an 
active,  efficient  power,  as  something  which,  if  not  inde- 
pendent of  the  Deity,  acts  by  a  power  which  is  given  to  it 
by  the  Deity.  Such,  if  I  understand  the  expression  right, 
is  the  way  in  which  the  word  Nature  is  often  used  now, 
though  it  is  plain  that  many  writers  use  the  word  without 
fixing  any  exact  meaning  to  it.  It  is  the  same  with  the 
expression  Laws  of  Nature,  which  some  writers  may  use  in 
an  intelligible  sense,  but  others  as  clearly  use  in  no  definite 
sense  at  all.  There  is  no  meaning  in  this  word  Nature, 
except  that  which  Bishop  Butler  assigns  to  it,  when  he  says, 
"  The  only  distinct  meaning  of  that  word  Natural  is  Stated, 
Fixed  or  Settled;  since  what  is  natural  as  much  requires 
and  presupposes  an  intelligent  agent  to  render  it  so,  i.  e.  to 

9  Justin  (Apol.  n.  8)  has  the  words  Kara  aTrepfxariKOv  Xoyov  ix4pos, 
where  he  is  speaking  of  the  Stoics ;  but  he  uses  this  expression  in  a 
peculiar  sense  (note,  11).  The  early  Christian  writers  were  familiar  with 
the  Stoic  terms,  and  their  writings  show  that  thfe  contest  was  begun  be- 
tween the  Christian  expositors  and  the  Greek  philosophy.  Even  in  the 
second  Epistle  of  St.  Peter  (ir.  1,  v.  4)  we  find  a  Stoic  expression,  Ti'a 
hia  TovTuy  yevrjcrdt  deias  koivwvoI  (pvcrfws. 


40  The  Philosophif  of  Antoninus, 

effect  it  continually  or  at  stated  times,  as  wliat  is  super- 
natural or  miraculous  does  to  effect  it  at  once."  This  is 
Plato's  meaning  (De  Leg.  iv.715),  when  he  says,  that  God  holds 
the  beginning  and  end  and  middle  of  all  that  exists,  and 
proceeds  straight  on  his  course,  making  his  circuit  according 
to  nature  (that  is,  by  a  fixed  order) ;  and  he  is  continually 
accompanied  by  justice  who  punishes  those  who  deviate 
from  the  divine  law,  that  is,  from  the  order  or  course  which 
God  observes. 

When  we  look  at  the  motions  of  the  planets,  the  action  of 
what  we  call  gravitation,  the  elemental  combination  of 
unorganized  bodies  and  their  resolution,  the  production  of 
plants  and  of  living  bodies,  their  generation,  growth,  and 
their  dissolution,  which  we  call  their  death,  we  observe  a 
regular  sequence  of  phaenomena,  which  within  the  limits 
of  experience  present  and  past,  so  far  as  we  know  the  past, 
is  fixed  and  invariable.  But  if  this  is  not  so,  if  the  order 
and  sequence  of  phaenomena,  as  known  to  us,  are  subject  to 
change  in  the  course  of  an  infinite  progression, — and  such 
change  is  conceivable, — w^e  have  not  discovered,  nor  shall 
we  ever  discover,  the  whole  of  the  order  and  sequence  of 
phaenomena,  in  which  sequence  there  may  be  involved 
according  to  its  very  nature,  that  is,  according  to  its  fixed 
order,  some  variation  of  what  we  now  call  the  Order  or 
Nature  of  Things.  It  is  also  conceivable  that  such  changes 
have  taken  place,  changes  in  the  order  of  things,  as  we  are 
comj)elled  by  the  imperfection  of  language  to  call  them,  but 
which  are  no  changes;  and  further  it  is  certain,  that  our 
knowledge  of  the  true  sequence  of  all  actual  phaenomena, 
as  for  instance,  the  phaenomena  of  generation,  growth,  and 
dissolution,  is  and  ever  must  be  imperfect. 


The  Philosophy  of  Antoninus.  41 

Wc  do  not  fare  much  bettor  when  we  spcalc  of  Causes  and 
Effects  than  when  wo  speak  of  Nature.  For  the  practical 
purposes  of  lifie  we  may  use  the  terms  cause  and  effect 
conveniently,  and  we  may  fix  a  distinct  meaning  to  them, 
distinct  enough  at  least  to  prevent  all  misunderstanding. 
But  the  case  is  different  when  we  speak  of  causes  and  effects 
as  of  Things.  All  that  we  know  is  phaenomena,  as  the 
Greeks  called  them,  or  appearances  which  follow  one  another 
in  a  regular  order,  as  we  conceive  it,  so  that  if  some  one 
phaenomenon  should  fail  in  the  series,  we  conceive  that 
there  must  either  be  an  interruption  of  the  series,  or  that 
something  else  will  appear  after  the  phaenomenon  which 
has  failed  to  appear,  and  will  occupy  the  vacant  place  ;  and 
so  the  series  in  its  progression  may  be  modified  or  totally 
changed.  Cause  and  effect  then  mean  nothing  in  the 
seq^uence  of  natural  phaenomena  beyond  what  I  have  said ; 
and  the  real  cause,  or  the  transcendent  cause,  as  some  would 
call  it,  of  each  successive  phaenomenon  is  in  that  which  is 
the  cause  of  all  things  which  are,  which  have  been,  and 
which  will  be  for  ever.  Thus  the  word  Creation  may  have 
a  real  sense  if  we  consider  it  as  the  first,  if  we  can  conceive 
a  first,  in  the  present  order  of  natural  phaenomena  ;  but  in  the 
vulgar  sense  a  creation  of  all  things  at  a  certain  time,  followed 
by  a  quiescence  of  the  first  cause  and  an  abandonment  of  all 
sequences  of  Phaenomena  to  the  laws  of  Nature,  or  to  j 
other  words  that  people  may  use,  is  absolutely  absurd.^" 

1"  Time  and  space  are  the  conditions  of  our  thought ;  but  time  infinite 
and  space  infinite  cannot  be  objects  of  thought,  except  in  a  very  im- 
perfect way.  Time  and  space  must  not  in  any  way  be  thought  of,  when 
we  think  of  the  Deity.  Swedenborg  says,  '•  The  natural  man  may 
believe  that  he  would  have  no  thought,  if  the  ideas  of  time,  of  space, 
and  of  things  material  were  taken  away  ;  for  upon  those  is  founded  all 


42  The  Fhilosoijhy  of  Antoninus. 

Now,  thougli  tliere  is  great  difficulty  in  understanding  all 
the  passages  of  Antoninus,  in  which  he  s]3eaks  of  Nature,  of 
the  changes  of  things  and  of  the  economy  of  the  universe,  I 
am  convinced  that  his  sense  of  Nature  and  Natural  is  the 
same  as  that  which  I  have  stated  ;  and  as  he  was  a  man  who 
knew  how  to  use  w^ords  in  a  clear  way  and  with  strict  con- 
sistency, we  ought  to  assume,  even  if  his  meaning  in  some 
passages  is  doubtful,  that  his  viejy  of  Nature  was  in  harmony 
with  his  fixed  belief  in  the  all-pervading,  ever  present,  and 
ever^ active  energy  of  God._(ii.  4  ;  iv.  40  ;  x.  1 ;  vi.  40  ;  and 
other  passages.  Compare  Seneca,  De  Benef.  iv.  7.  Sweden- 
borg,  Angelic  Wisdom,  349-357.) 

There  is  much  in  Antoninus  that  is  hard  to  understand, 
and  it  might  be  said  that  he  did  not  fully  comprehend  all 
that  he  wrote ;  which  would  however  be  in  no  way  remark- 
able, for  it  happens  now  that  a  man  may  write  what  neither 
he  nor  anybody  can  understand.  Antoninus  tells  us  (xii.  10) 
to  look  at  things  and  see  what  they  are,  resolving  them  into 
the  material  (vXt]),  the  causal  (atVtov),  and  the  relation 
(ava<f>opd),  or  the  purpose,  by  which  he  seems  to  mean 
something  in  the  nature  of  what  we  call  effect,  or  end. 
The  word  Cause  (airta)  is  the  difficulty.  There  is  the 
same  word  in  the  Sanscrit  (hetu) ;  and  the  subtle  philosophers 
of  India  and  of  Greece,  and  the  less  subtle  philosophers  of 
modern  times  have  all  used  this  word,  or  an  equivalent 
word,  in  a  vague  way.     Yet  the  confusion  sometimes  may  be 


the  thought  that  man  has.  But  let  him  know  that  the  thoughts  are 
limited  and  confined  in  proportion  as  they  partake  of  time,  of  space,  and 
of  what  is  material ;  and  that  they  are  not  limited  and  are  extended,  in 
proportion  as  they  do  not  partake  of  those  things ;  since  the  mind  is  so 
far  elevated  above  the  things  corporeal  and  worldly."  (Concerning 
Heaven  and  Hell,  169.) 


The  FhlJusojjltu  of  Antoninus.  43 

in  the  inevitable  ambiguity  of  language  rather  tlian  in  tho 
mind  of  the  writer,  for  I  cannot  think  that  some  of  the 
wisest  of  men  did  not  know  what  they  intended  to  say. 
AYhen  Antoninus  says  (iv.  36),  "  that  everything  that  exists 
is  in  a  manner  the  seed  of  that  which  will  be,"  he  might  be 
supposed  to  say  w^hat  some  of  the  Indian  philosophers  have 
said,  and  thus  a  profound  truth  might  be  converted  into  a 
gross  absurdity.  But  he  says,  "  in  a  manner,"  and  in  a 
manner  he  said  true  ;  and  in  another  manner,  if  you  mistake 
his  meaning,  he  said  false.  When  Plato  said,  "Nothing 
ever  is,  but  is  ahvays  becoming  "  (del  ytyverat).  he  delivered 
a  text,  out  of  which  we  may  derive  something ;  for  he 
destroys  by  it  not  all  practical,  but  all  specidative  notions 
of  cause  and  effect.  The  whole  series  of  things,  as  they 
appear  to  us,  must  be  contemplated  in  time,  that  is  in  suc- 
cession, and  we  conceive  or  suppose  intervals  between  one 
state  of  things  and  another  state  of  things,  so  that  there  is 
priority  and  sequence,  and  interval,  and  Being,  and  a  ceasing 
to  Be,  and  beginning  and  ending.  But  there  is  nothing  of 
the  kind  in  the  Nature  of  Things.  It  is  an  everlasting  con- 
tinuity, (iv.  45;  VII.  75.)  When  Antoninus  speaks  of 
generation  (x.  26),  he  speaks  of  one  cause  (atria)  acting, 
and  then  another  cause  taking  up  the  work,  which  the 
former  left  in  a  certain  state  and  so  on;  and  we  might 
perhaps  conceive  that  he  had  some  notion  like  what  has  been 
called  "  the  self-evolving  power  of  nature  ;'^  a  fine  phrase 
indeed,  the  full  import  of  which  I  believe  that  the  writer 
of  it  did  not  see,  and  thus  he  laid  himself  open  to  the  impu- 
tation of  being  a  follower  of  one  of  the  Hindu  sects,  which 
makes  all  things  come  by  evolution  out  of  nature  or  matter, 
cr  out  of  something  which  takes  the  place  of  deity,  but  is 


44  The  Philoso])hy  of  Antoninus. 

not  deity.  I  would  have  all  men  think  as  they  please,  or  as 
they  can,  and  I  only  claim  the  same  freedom  which  I  give. 
When  a  man  writes  anything,  we  may  fairly  try  to  find  out 
all  that  his  words  must  mean,  even  if  the  result  is  that  they 
mean  what  he  did  not  mean ;  and  if  we  find  this  contra- 
diction, it  is  not  our  fault,  but  his  misfortune.  Now  An- 
toninus is  perhaps  somewhat  in  this  condition  in  what  he 
says  (x.  26),  though  he  speaks  at  the  end  of  the  paragraph 
of  the  power  which  acts,  unseen  by  the  eyes,  but  still  no 
less  clearly.  But  whether  in  this  passage  (x.  26)  he  means 
that  the  power  is  conceived  to  be  in  the  different  successive 
causes  (atrtat),  or  in  something  else,  nobody  can  tell.  From 
other  passages  however  I  do  collect  that  his  notion  of  the 
phaenomena  of  the  universe  is  what  I  have  stated.  The 
deity  works  unseen,  if  we  may  use  such  language,  and  perhaps 
I  may,  as  Job  did,  or  he  who  wrote  the  book  of  Job.  "  In 
him  we  live  and  move  and  are,"  said  St.  Paul  to  the  Athe- 
nians, and  to  show  his  hearers  that  this  was  no  new  doctrine, 
he  quoted  the  Greek  poets.  One  of  these  poets  was  the  Stoic 
Cleanthes,  whose  noble  hymn  to  Zeus  or  God  is  an  elevated 
expression  of  devotion  and  philosophy.  It  deprives  Nature 
of  her  power  and  puts  her  under  the  immediate  government 
of  the  deity. 

"  Thee  all  this  heaven,  which  whirls  around  the  eartli, 
Obeys  and  willing  fo  Hows  where  thou  leadest. — 
Without  tliee,  God,  nothing  is  done  on  earth, 
Nor  in  the  aethereal  realms,  nor  in  the  sea, 
Save  what  the  wicked  througli  their  folly  do." 

Antoninus'  conviction  of  the  existence  of  a  divine  power 
and  government  was  founded  on  his  perception  of  the  order 
ofJ;he  universe.     Like  Socrates  (Xen.  Mem.  iv.  3,  13,  kc), 


The  Fhilosophy  of  Antunlmis.  45 

he  says  that  though  we  caDnot  see  the  forms  of  divine 
powers,  we  know  that  they^xist  because  we  see  their  works. 

"  To  those  who  ask,  Where  hast  thou  seen  the  gods,  or 
how  dost  thou  comprehcud  that  they  exist  and  so  worshipest 
them  ?  I  answer,  in  the  fii'st  place,  that  they  may  be  seen 
even  with  the  eyes  ;  in  the  second  place,  neitlier  have  I  seen 
my  owTi  soul  and  yet  I  honour  it.  Thus  then  with  respect 
to  the  gods,  from  what  I  constantly  experience  of  their 
power,  from  this  I  comprehend  that  they  exist  and  I  venerate 
them."  (xii.  28,  and  the  note.  Comp.  Aristotle  de  Mundo,  c.  6 ; 
Xen.  :\lem.  i.  4,  9  ;  Cicero,  Tuscul.  i.  28,  29  ;  St.  Paul's 
Epistle  to  the  Romans,  i.  19,  20  ;  and  Montaigne's  Apology 
for  Eaimond  de  Sebonde,  ii.  c.  12.)  This  is  a  very  old 
argument  which  has  always  had  great  weight  with  most 
people  and  has  appeared  sufficient.  It  does  not  acquire  the 
least  additional  strength  by  being  developed  in  a  learned 
treatise.  It  is  as  intelligible  in  its  simple  enunciation  as  it 
can  be  made.  If  it  is  rejected,  there  is  no  arguing  with  him 
who  rejects  it :  and  if  it  is  worked  out  into  innumerable  par- 
ticulars, the  value  of  the  evidence  runs  the  risk  of  being 
bui'ied  under  a  mass  of  words.^ 

Man  being  conscious  thatrie  is  a  spiritual  power  or  an 
intellectual  power,  or  that  he  has  such  a  power,  in  whatever 
way  he  conceives  that  he  has  it— for  I  wish  simply  to  state  a 
fact — from  this  power  which  he  has  in  himself,  he  is  led,  as 
Antoninus  says,  to  believe  that  there  is  a  greater  power, 
which  as  the  old  Stoics  tell  us,  pervades  the  whole  universe 
as  the  intellect '^  (lovs)  pervades  man.     (Compare  Epictetus' 

1*  I  have  always  translated  tlie  word  vovs,  "  intelligence  "or  * '  in- 
tellect." It  appears  to  be  the  word  used  by  the  oldest  Greek  philosophers 
to  express  the  notion  of  "  intelligence "  as  opposed  to  the  notion  of 


46  The  Fhilosophy  of  Antoninus. 

Discourses,  i.   14;  and  Voltaire  a  Mad".  Necker,  vol.  lxvii. 
p.  278,  ed.  Lequien.) 


"  matter."  I  have  always  translated  the  word  Xoyos  by  "  reason,"  and 
\oyiK6s  by  the  word  "  rational,"  or  j)erhaps  sometimes  "  reasonable,"  as 
I  have  translated  vospos  by  the  word  "  intellectual."  Every  man  who 
has  thought  and  has  read  any  philosophical  writings  knows  the  difficulty 
of  finding  words  to  express  certain  notions,  how  imperfectly  words 
express  these  notions,  and  how  carelessly  the  words  are  often  used. 
The  various  senses  of  the  word  Xoyos  are  enough  to  perplex  any  man. 
Our  translators  of  the  New  Testament  (St.  Jolin,  c.  i.)  have  simply 
translated  6  x6yos  by  "  the  word,"  as  the  Germans  translated  it  by  "das 
Wort;"  but  in  their  theological  writings  they  sometimes  retain  the 
original  term  Logos.  The  Germans  have  a  term  Vernunft,  which 
seems  to  come  nearest  to  our  word  Reason,  or  the  necessary  and  absolute 
truths,  which  we  cannot  conceive  as  being  other  than  what  they  are. 
Such  are  what  some  people  have  called  the  laws  of  thought,  the  con- 
ceptions of  space  and  of  time,  and  axioms  or  first  principles,  which  need 
no  proof  and  cannot  be  proved  or  denied.  Accordingly  the  Germans 
can  say  '■  Gott  i&t  die  hochste  Vernunft,"  the  Supreme  Reason.  The 
Germans  have  also  a  word  Verstand,  which  seems  to  represent  our 
word  "  understanding,"  "  intelligence,"  "  intellect,"  not  as  a  thing 
absolute  whicli  exists  by  itself,  but  as  a  thing  connected  with  an 
individual  being,  as  a  man.  Accordingly  it  is  the  capacity  of  receiving 
impressions  (Vorstellungen,  (pauTaa-iaL),  and  forming  from  them  distinct 
ideas  (Begrifie),  and  perceiving  differences.  I  do  not  think  that  these 
remarks  will  help  the  reader  to  the  understanding  of  Antoninus,  or  his 
use  of  the  words  vovs  and  Xoyos.  The  Emperor's  meaning  must  be  got 
from  his  own  words,  and  if  it  does  not  agree  altogether  with  modern 
notions,  it  is  not  our  business  to  force  it  into  agreement,  but  simply  to 
find  out  what  his  meaning  is,  if  we  can, 

Justinus  (ad  Diognetum,  c.  vii.)  says  that  the  omnipotent,  all-creating, 
and  invisible  God  has  fixed  trutli  and  the  holy,  incomprehensible  Logos 
in  men's  hearts;  and  this  Logos  is  the  architect  and  creator  of  the 
Universe.  In  the  first  Apology  (c.  xxxii.)  he  says  that  the  seed  (a-TT^p/xa] 
from  God  is  the  Logos,  which  dwells  in  those  who  believe  in  God.  So 
it  appears  that  according  to  Justinus  the  Logos  is  only  in  such  believers. 
In  the  second  Apology  (c.  viii.)  he  sj^eaksof  the  seed  of  the  Logos  being 
imiDlanted  in  all  mankind  ;  but  those  who  order  their  lives  according  to 
Logos,  such  as  the  Stoics,  have  only  a  portion  of  the  Logos  («aTa 
OTTsp/xariKov  x6yov  /xe'pos),  and  have  not  the  knowledge  and  contempla 


tion  of  the  entire  Logos,  -which  is  Christ.  Swedeiiborg's  remarks 
(Angelic  Wisdom,  240)  are  worth  comparing  with  Justinus.  The  modern 
philosopher  in  substance  agrees  with  the  ancient ;  but  he  is  more  precise. 

^-  Comp.  Ep.  to  the  Corinthians,  i.  3.  17,  and  James  iv.  8,  "  Draw 
nigh  to  God  and  he  will  draw  nigh  to  you." 

^  This  is  also  Swedenborg's  doctrine  of  the  soul.  "As  to  wliat 
concerns  the  soul,  of  which  it  is  said  that  it  shall  live  after  death,  it  is 
nothing  else  but  the  man  himself,  who  lives  in  the  body,  that  is,  the 
interior  man,  who  by  the  body  acts  in  the  world  and  from  whom  the 
body  itself  lives"  (quoted  by  Clissold,  p.  45C  of  "The  Practical  Nature 
of  the  Theological  "Writings  of  Emanuel  Swedenborg,  in  a  Letter  to  the 
Archbishop  of  Dublin  (Whately ;,"  second  edition,  1859  ;  a  book  which 
theologians  might  read  with  profit ,.  Tiiis  is  an  old  doctrine  of  the 
soul,  which  has  been  often  proclaimed,  but  n«ver  better  expressed  than 
by  the  "  Auctor  de  INIundo,"  c.  6,  quoted  by  Gatakei  iu  his"  Antoninus," 
p.  43G.  '•  The  soul  by  which  we  live  and  have  cities  and  houses  ia 
invisible,  but  it  is  seen  by  its  works ;  for  the  whole  method  of  life  has 
been  devised  by  it  and  ordered,  and  by  it  is  held  together.    Li  like 


Tlte  PJiilosoijhy  of  Antoninus.  47 

God  exists  theu,  but  what  do  we  know  of  his  Nature  ? 
Antouiuus^  says  that  the  soul  xtf  mau  is  an  efflux  from  the 
divinity.  We  have  bodies  like  animak,  but  we  have  reason,^^^*^ 
intelligence  as  the  gods.  Animals  have  life  {^vxq),  and 
what  we  call  instincts  or  natura]^  j)rinciples  of  action :  but 
the  rational  animal  man  alone  has  a  rational,  intelligent  soul 
(i/a;^^/  AoyiKr;,  voepo),  Antoninus  insists  on  this  continu- 
ally :  God  is  in  man,'-  and  so  we  must  constantly  attend  to 
the  divinity  within  us,  for  it  is  only  in  this  way  that  we  can 
have  any  knowledge  of  the  nature  of  God.  The  human  soul 
is  in  a  sense  a  portion  of  the^  divinity,  and  the  soul  alone  has 
any  communication  with  the  deity,  for_as  he  says  (xii.  2)  : 
"  With  his  intellectual  part  alone  God  touches  the  intelligence 
only  which  has  flowed  and  been  derived  from  himself  into 
these  bodies."  In  fact  he  says  that  which  is  hidden  within  a 
mau  is  life,  that  is  the  man  himself.  All  the  rest  is  vesture,  \K 
covering,  organs,  instrument,  which  the  living  man,  the  real''* 


48  Tlie  Pliihsopinj  of  Antoninus. 

man,  uses  for  tlie  puriDose  of  his  present  existence.  The  air 
is  universally  diffused  for  him  who  is  able  to  respire,  8iid  so 
for  him  who  is  willing  to  partake  of  it  the  intelligent  power, 
which  holds  within  it  all  things,  is  diffused  as  wide  and  free 
as  the  air.  (viii.  54.)  It  is  by  living  a  divine  life  that  man 
approaches  to  a  knowledge  of  the  divinity."  It^s  by  following 
the  divinity  within,  Sat/xcaj/  or  ^eo's  as  Antoninus  calls  it, 
that  man  comes  nearest  to  jthe^eity,  the  supreme  good,  for 
man  can  never  attain  to  perfect  agreement  with  his  internal 
guide  {to  rjycixovLKov).  "  Live  with  the  gods.  And  he  does 
live  with  the  gods  who  constantly  shows  to  them  that  his  own 
soul  is  satisfied  with  that  which  is  assigned  to  him,  and  that 
it  does    all  the  daemon   (Sat/xcoj/)  wishes,   which  Zeus  hath 


manner  we  must  think  also  about  the  deity,  who  in  power  is  most 
mighty,  in  beauty  most  comely,  in  life  immortal,  and  in  virtue  supreme : 
wherefore  though  he  is  invisible  to  human  nature,  he  is  seen  by  his  very 
works."  Other  passages  to  the  same  purpose  are  quoted  by  Gataker 
(p.  382)  Bishop  Butler  has  the  same  as  to  the  soul :  "  Upon  the  whole 
then  our  organs  of  sense  and  our  limbs  are  certainly  instruments,  which 
the  living  persons,  ourselves,  make  use  of  to  perceive  and  move  with." 
If  this  is  not  plain  enough,  he  also  says  :  "  It  follows  that  our  organized 
bodies  are  no  more  ourselves,  or  part  of  ourselves  than  any  other  matter 
around  us."     (Compare  Anton,  x.  38.) 

!■*  The  reader  may  consult  Discourse  V.  "  Of  the  existence  and  nature 
of  God,"  in  Jolm  Smith's  "  Select  Discourses."  He  has  prefixed  as  a 
text  to  this  Discourse,  the  striking  passage  of  Agapetus,  Paraenes.  §  3  : 
*■  He  who  knows  himself  will  know  God;  and  he  who  knows  God  will 
be  made  like  to  God  ;  and  he  will  be  made  like  to  God,  who  has  become 
worthy  of  God ;  and  be  becomes  worthy  of  God,  who  does  nothing 
unworthy  of  God,  but  thinks  the  things  tliat  are  his,  and  speaks  what 
he  thinks,  and  does  what  he  speaks  "  I  suppose  that  the  old  saying, 
"Know  thyself,"  wliich  is  attributed  to  Socrates  and  others,  had  a 
larger  meaning  than  the  narrow  sense  which  is  generally  given  to  it. 
(Agapetus,  ed.  Stephan.  Bchoning,  Franeker,  1608.  This  volume  coii« 
tains  also  the  Paraeneses  of  Nilus ) 


The  Philosophy  of  Antoninus.  49 

given  to  every  man  for  liis  guardian  and  guide,  a  portion  of 
himself.  And  this  daemon  is  every  man's  understanding  and 
reason."  (v.  27.) 

There  is  in  man,  that  is  in  the  reason,  the  intelligence,  a 
superior  faculty  which  if  it  is  exercised  rules  all  the  rest. 
This  is  the  ruling  faculty  (to  qyejxovLKov),  which  Cicero 
(De  Natiu-a  Deorum,  ii.  11)  renders  by  the  Latin  word  Prin- 
cipatus,  "  to  which  nothing  can  or  ought  to  be  superior." 
Antoninus  often  uses  this  term,  and  others  which  arc  equiva- 
lent. He  names  it  (vii.  64)  "  the  governing  intelligence." 
The  governing  faculty  is  the  master  of  the  soul,  (v.  26.)  A 
man  must  reverence  only  his  ruling  faculty  and  the  divinity 
within  him.  As  we  must  reverence  that  which  is  supreme 
in  the  universe,  so  we  must  reverence  that  which  is  supreme 
in  ourselves,  and  this  is  that  which  is  of  like  kind  with  that 
which  is  supreme  in  the  universe,  (v.  21.)  So,  as  Plotinus 
says,  the  soul  of  man  can  only  know  the  divine,  so  far  as  it 
knows  itself.  In  one  passage  (xi.  19)  Antoninus  speaks  of  a 
man's  condemnation  of  himself,  when  the  diviner  part  wdthin 
him  has  been  overpowered  and  yields  to  the  less  honourable 
and  to  the  perishable  part,  the  body,  and  its  gross  pleasures. 
In  a  word,  the  views  of  Antoninus  on  this  matter,  however 
his  expressions  may  vary,  are  exactly  what  Bishop  Butler 
expresses,  when  he  speaks  of  "  the  natural  supremacy  of  re- 
flection or  conscience,"  of  the  faculty  "  which  sui-veys,  ap- 
proves or  disapproves  the  several  affections  of  our  mind  and 
actions  of  our  lives." 

Much  matter  might  be  collected  from  Antoninus  on  the 
notion  of  the  Universe  being  one  animated  Being.  But  all 
that  he  says  amounts  to  no  more,  as  Schultz  remarks,  than 
this  :  the  soul  of  man  is  most  intima^tely^united  to  his  body 


50  The  PhiIosoj)hy  of  Antoninus. 

and  together  they  make  one  animal,  which  we  call  man ;  so 
the  Deity  is  most  intimately  united  to  the  world  or  the 
material  universe,  and  together  they  form  one  whole.  But 
A.ntoninus  did  not  view  God  and  the  material  universe  as  the 
same,  any  more  than  he  viewed  the  body  and  soul  of  man  as 
one.  Antoninus  has  no  speculations  on  the  absolute  nature 
of  the  deity.  It  was  not  his  fashion  to  waste  his  time  on 
what  man  cannot  understand.^*  He  was  satisfied  that  God 
exists,  that  he  governs  all  things,  that  ma,n  can  only 
have  an  imperfect  knowledge  of  his  nature,  and  he  must 
attain  this  imperfect  knowledge  by  reverencing  the^diyinity 
which  is  within Jiinvandjifigping  it  j3ure. 

From  all  that  has  been  said  it  follows  that  the  universe  is 
administered  by  the  Providence  of  God  (TrpovoLa),  and 
that  all  things  are  wisely  ordered.  There  are  passages  in 
which  Antoninus  expresses  doubts,  or  states  different  pos- 
sible theories  of  the  constitution  and  government  of  the 
Universe,  but  he  always  recurs  to  his  fundamental  principle, 
that  if  we  admit  the  existence  of  a  deity,  we  must  also 
admit  that  he  orders  all  things  wisely  and  well.  (iv.  27 ; 
Yi.  1 ;  IX.  28 ;  xii.  5,  and  many  other  passages.)  Epictetus 
says  (i.  6)  that  ^ve  can  discern  the  providence  which  rules 
the  world,  if  j^^,43QSsess  two  things,  the  powe^_of_seeing_all 
that  baj2p^PTia  wjjJTj^Rgpft  to  panh  thing,  and  q.  grateful  dis- 
position^  

But  if  all  things  are  wisely  ordered,  how  is  the  world  so 
full  of  what  we  call  evil,  j)hysical  and  moral  ?  If  instead  of 
saying  that  there  is  evil  in  the  world,  we  use  the  expression 
v/hich  I  have  used,  "  what  we  call  evil,"  we  have  partly  anti- 

^■'  "  God  wlio  is  infinitely  beyond  tlic  reacli  of  our  narrow  capacities." 
LockCi  Essay  concerning  the  Human  Understanding,  ii.  ebap.  17. 


The  Fhilosoi)hif  of  Antoninus.  51 

cipated  the  Emperor's  answer.  Wc  sec  and  feel  and  know 
imperfectly  very  few  things  in  the  few  years  that  we  live,  and 
all  the  knowledge  and  all  the  experience  of  all  the  human 
race  is  positive  ignorance  of  the  whole,  which  is  infinite. 
Now  as  our  reason  teaches  us  that  everything  is  in  some  way 
related  to  and  connected  with  every  other  thing,  all  notion 
of  evil  as  being  in  the  universe  of  things  is  a  contradiction, 
for  if  the  whole  comes  from  and  is  governed  by  an  intelligent 
being,  it  is  impossible  to  conceive  anything  in  it  which  tends 
to  the  evil  or  destruction  of  the  whole,  (viii.  55;  x.  6.) 
Everything  is  in  constant  mutation,  and  yet  the  whole  sub- 
sists. We  might  imagine  the  solar  system  resolved  into  its 
elemental  parts,  and  yet  the  whole  would  still  subsist  "  ever 
young  and  perfect." 

All  things^_all  forms,  are_dissolyedja,nd  new  forms  appear. 
All  IJTin^  things  undero;o  the  change  which  we  call  death. 
If  we  call  death  an  evil,  then  all  change  is  an  evil.  Living 
beings  also  suffer  pain,  and  man  suffers  most  of  all,  for  he 
suffers  both  in  and  by  his  body  and  by  his  intelligent  part. 
Men  suffer  also  from  one  another,  and  perhaps  the  largest 
part  of  human  suffering  comes  to  man  from  those  whom  ho 
calls  his  brothers.  Antoninus  says  (viii.  55),  "  Generally, 
wickedness  does  no  harm  at  all  to  the  universe ;  and  par- 
ticularly, the  wickedness  [of  one  man]  does  no  harm  to 
another.  It  is  only  harmful  to  him  who  has  it  in  his  power 
to  be  released  from  it  as  soon  as  he  shall  choose."  The  first 
part  of  this  is  perfectly  consistent  with  the  doctrine  that  the 
whole  can  sustain  no  evil  or  harm.  The  second  part  must 
be  explained  by  the  Stoic  principle  that  there  is  no  evil  in 
anything  which  is  not  in  our  power.  What  wrong  we  sufier 
from  another  is  his  evil,  not  ours.     But  this.is  ^n  admission 


r 


52  The  Fhilosopliij  of  Antoninus. 

that  there  is  evil  in  a  sort,  for  he  who  does  wrong  does  evil, 
and  if  others  can  endure  the  wrong,  still  there  is  evil  in  the 
wrong  doer.  Antoninus  (xi.  18)  gives  many  excellent  pre- 
cepts with  respect  to  wrongs  and  injimes,  and  his  precepts 
are  practical.  He  teaches  us  to  bear  what  we  cannot  avoid, 
and  his  lessons  may  be  just  as  useful  to  him  who  denies  the 
being  jiftd  the^  government  of  God  as  to  him  who  believes  in 
both^^.-/rhere  is  no  direct  answer  in  Antoninus  to  the  ob- 
jections which  may  be  made  to  the  existence  and  providence 
of  God  because  of  the  moral  disorder  and  suffering  which  are 
in  the  world,  except  this  answer  which  he  makes  in  reply  to 
the  supposition  that  even  the  best  men  may  be  extinguished 
by  death.  He  says  if  it  is  so,  we  may  be  sure  that, if  it. ought 
toJiaveJbefin_piherwise,  the  gods,  wxaild  have  ordered  it  other  - 
wiae--(xii.  5.)  His  conviction  of  the  wisdom  which  we  may 
observe  in  the  government  of  the  world  is  too  strong  to  be  dis- 
turbed by  any  apparent  irregularities  in  the  order  of  things. 
That  these  disorders  exist  is  a  fact,  and  those  who  would 
conclude  from  them  against  the  being  and  government  of  God 
conclude  too  hastily.  We  all  admit  that  there  is  an  order  in 
the  material  world,  a  Nature,  in  the  sense  in  which  that 
word  has  been  explained,  a  constitution  (Karao-Keury),  what  we 
call  a  system,  a  relation  of  parts  to  one  another  and  a  fitness 
of  the  whole  for  something.  So  in  the  constitution  of  plants 
and  of  animals  there  is  an  order,  a  fitness  for  some  end. 
Sometimes  the  order,  as  v/e  conceive  it,  is  interrupted  and 
the  end,  as  we  conceive  it,  is  not  attained.  The  seed,  the 
plant  or  the  animal  sometimes  perishes  before  it  has  passed 
through  all  its  changes  and  done  all  its  uses.  It  is  according 
to  Nature,  that  is  a  fixed  order,  for  some  to  perish  early  and 
for  others  to  do  all  their  uses  and  leave  successors  to  take 


N 


The  Philosojihif  of  Antoninus.  .03 

their  place.  So  mau  has  a  corporeal  and  intellectual  and 
moral  constitution  fit  fur  certain  uses,  and  on  the  whole  man 
performs  these  uses,  dies  and  leaves  otlier  men  in  his  place. 
So  society  exists,  and  a  social-atale  is  mauifebll)'  the  Natural 
State  of  man,  the  state  for  which  his  Nature  tits  him  ;  and 
society  amidst  innumerable  irregularities  and  disorders  still 
subsists ;  and  pcrliajis  we  may  say  that  the  history  of  the  past 
and  oiu*  present  knowledge  give  us  a  reasonable  hope  that  its 
disorders  will  diminish,  and  that  order,  its  governing  prin- 
ciple, may  be  more  firmly  established.  As  order  then,  a 
fixed  order,  we  may  say,  subject  to  deviations  real  or  ajjpa- 
rent,  must  be  admitted  to  exist  in  the  whole  Nature  of  things, 
that  which  we  call  disorder  or  evil  as  it  seems  to  us,  does  not 
in  any  way  alter  the  fact  of  the  general  constitution  of  things 
having  a  Nature  or  fixed  order.  Nobody  will  conclude  from 
the  existence  of  disorder  that  order  is  not  the  rule,  for  the 
existence  of  order  both  physical  and  moral  is  proved  by  daily  \ 
experience  and  all  past  experience.  We  cannot  conceive 
how  the  order  of  the  universe  is  maintained :  we  cannot  eveu 
conceive  how  our  own  life  from  day  to  day  is  continued,  nor 
how  we  perform  the  simplest  movements  of  the  body,  nor 
how  we  grow  and  think  and  act,  though  we  know  many  of 
the  conditions  which  are  necessary  for  all  these  functions. 
Knowing  nothing  then  of  the  imseen  power  which  acts  in 
ourseives^xcept._by  what  is  done,  we  know  nothing  of  the 
.  power  which  acts  through  what  we  call  all  time  and  all 
^pace  ;  but  seeing  that  there  is  a  Nature  or  fixed  order  in  all 
things  known  to  us,  it  is  conformable  to  the  nature  of  our 
minds  to  believe  that  this  universal  Nature  has  a  cause  which 
operates  continually,  and  that  we  are  totally  ui4ible  to  specu- 
late  on  the  reason  of  any  of  those  disorders  or  evils  which 


54  The  Philosojjhj/  of  Antoninus. 

we  perceive.  Tliis  I  believe  is  the  ai^^er  whicli  may  be 
collected  from  all  tbat  Antoninus  has  said.^®\ 

The  origin  of  evil  is  an  old  questiofiT:  ■'-  Achilles  tells 
Priam  (Iliad,  24,  527)  that  Zeus  has  two  casks,  one  filled 
with  good  things,  and  the  other  wdth  bad,  and  that  he  gives 
to  men  out  of  each  according  to  his  pleasure ;  and  so  we 
must  be  content,  for  we  cannot  alter  the  will  of  Zeus.  One  of 
the  Greek  commentators  asks  how  must  we  reconcile  this 
doctrine  with  what  we  find  in  the  first  book  of  the  Odyssey, 
where  the  king  of  the  gods  says,  Men  say  that  evil  comes  to 
them  from  us,  but  they  bring  it  on  themselves  through  their 
own  folly.  The  answer  is  plain  enough  even  to  the  Greek 
commentator.  The  poets  make  both  Achilles  and  Zeus 
speak  appropriately  to  their  several  characters.  Indeed  Zeus 
says  plainly  that  men  do  attribute  their  sufferings  to  the 
gods,  but  they  do  it  falsely,  for  they  are  the  cause  of  their 
own  sorrows, 

Epictetus  in  his  Enchiridion  (c.  27)  makes  short  work  of 
the  question  of  evil.  He  says,  "  As  a  mark  is  not  set  up  for 
the  purpose  of  missing  it,  so  neither  does  the  nature  of  evil 
exist  in  the  Universe."  This  will  appear  obscure  enough  to 
those  who  are  not  acquainted  with  Epictetus,  but  he  always 
knows  what  he  is  talking  about.  We  do  not  set  up  a  mark 
in  order  to  miss  it,  though  we  may  miss  it.  God,  whose 
existence  Epictetus  assumes,  has  not  ordered  all  things  so 
that  his  purpose  shall  fail.     Whatever  there  may  be  of  what 

^s  Cleanthes  says  in  his  Hymn  : 

"  For  all  things  good  and  bad  to  One  thou  formest, 
So  that  One  everlasting  reason  governs  all." 

See  Bishop  Butler's  Sermons.  Sermon  XV.  "  Upon  the  Ignorance  uS 
Man." 


The  Philosojjhy  of  Anioninus.  55 

we  call  ev^il,  the  Xature  of  evil,  as  he  expresses  it,  does  not 
exist ;  that  is,  evil  is  not  a  jxart  of  the  constitution  or  nature 
of  Things.  If  there  were  a  principle  of  evil  (apx'^z)  ^^  ^^^^ 
constitution  of  things,  evil  would  no  longer  be  evil,  as 
Simplicius  argues,  but  evil  would  be  good.  Simplicius 
(c.  34,  [27J)  has  a  long  and  curious  discourse  on  this 
text  of  Epictctus,  and  it  is  amusing  and  instructive. 

One  passage  more  will  conclude  this  matter.  It  contains 
all  that  the  emperor  could  say  (ii.  11)  :  "  To  go  from  among 
men,  if  there  are  gods,  is  not  a  thing  to  be  afraid  of,  iov  the 
gods  will  not  involve  thee  in  evil ;  but  if  indeed  they  do  not 
exist,  or  if  they  have  no  concern  about  human  affairs,  what  is 
it  to  me  to  live  in  a  universe  devoid  of  gods  or  devoid  of  pro- 
vidence ?  \  But  in  truth  they  do  exist,  and  they  do  care  for 
human  things,  and  they  have  put  all  the  means  in  man's 
power  to  enable  him  not  to  foil  into  real  evils.  And  as  to 
the  rest,  if  there  was  anything  evil,  they  would  have  provided 
for  this  also,  that  it  should  be  altogether  in  a  man's  power 
not  to  fall  into  it.  But  that  which  does  not  make  a  man 
worse,  how  can  it  make  a  man's  life  worse  ?  But  neither 
through  ignorance,  nor  having  the  knowledge,  but  not  the 
power  to  guard  against  or  correct  these  things,  is  it  possible 
that  the  nature  of  the  Universe  has  overlooked  them  ;  nor  is 
it  possible  that  it  has  made  so  great  a  mistake,  either  through 
want  of  power  or  want  of  skill,  that  good  and  evil  should 
happen  indiscriminately  to  the  good  and  the  bad.  But  death 
certainly  and  life,  honour  and  dishonour,  pain  and  pleasure, 
all  these  things  equally  happen  to  good  and  bad  men,  being 
things  which  make  us  neither  better  nor  worse.  Therefore 
they  are  neither  good  nor  evil." 

The  Ethical  part  of  Antoninus'  Philosophy  follows  from 


y 


56  The  Philosophy  of  Antoninus 

his  geueral  principles.  The  end  of  all  his  philosophy  is  to 
^ci^  live  conformably  to  Nature,  both  a  man's  own  nature  and  the 
nature  of  the  Universe.  Bishop  Butler  has  explained  what 
the  Greek  philosophers  meant  when  they;^  j^ke  of  livings 
accordiiigJo_Nature,  and  he  says  that  when  it  is  explained, 
as  he  has  explained  it  and  as  they  understood  it,  it  is  "  a 
manner  of  speaking  not  loose  and  unjletermmatej_bui  clear 
and  distinct,  strictly  just  and  true."  To  live  according  to 
Nature  is  to  live  according  to  a  man's  whole  nature,  not 
according  to  a  part  of  it,  and  to  reverence  the  divinity 
within  him  as  the  governor  of  all  his  actions.  '*  To  the 
rational_animal  the  same  act  is  accordingto  nature  and 
according  to  reason."'^  (vii.  11.)  That  which  is  done 
contrary  to  reason  is  also  an  act  contrary  to  nature,  to  the 
whole  nature,  though  it  is  certainly  conformable  to  some 
part  of  man's  nature,  or  it  could  not  be  done.  Man  is  made 
for  action,  not  for  idleness  or  pleasure,  As  plants  and 
Scc((f    animals   do    the    uses   of    their_natuie,   so   man   must   do 

his7~(v.  !•) 

Man  must  also  live  conformably  to  the  universal  nature, 
conformably  to  the  nature  of  all  things  of  which  he  is  one ; 
and  as  a  citizen  of  a  political  community  he  must  direct  his 
life  and  actions  with  reference  to  those  among  whom,  and  for 
whom,  among  other  purposes,  he  lives.^®  A  man  must  not 
retire  into  solitude  and  cut  himself  off  from  his  fellow  men. 


lie  must  be  ever  active  to_do  his  part  in  the  great  whole. 
All  men  are  his  kin,  not  only  in  blood,  but  still  more  by 
participating  in  the  same  intelligence  and  by  being  a  portion 

1^  This  is  what  Juvenal  means  when  he  says  (xiv.  321) — 

Nunquam  aliud  Natura  aliucl  Sapicntia  elicit. 
»3  See  vni.  52  :  and  Persius  iii.  66. 


The  PhiIoso2)hfj  of  Antoninus. 

I 
of  the  same  divinity.  A  man  cannot  really  bo  injured  by  uio 
brethren,  for  no  act  of  theii's  can  make  him  bad,  and  he 
must  not  be  angry  with  them  nor  hate  them :  "  For  we  are 
made  for  co-operation,  like  feet,  like  hands,  like  eyelids,  like 
the  rows  of  the  upper  and  lower  teeth.  To  act  against  one 
another  then  is  contrary  to  nature  ;  and  it  is  acting^  against 
one  another  to  be  vexed  and  to  turn  away."    (ii.  1 .) 

Further  he  says  :  "  Take  pleasure  in  one  thing  and  rest  in 
it,  in  passing  from  one  social  act  to  another  social  act, 
thinking  of  God."  (vi.  7.)  Again  :  "  Love  mankind.  Follow 
God."  (vii.  31.)  It  is  the  characteristic  of  the  rational  soul 
for  a  man  to  love  his  neighbour,  (xi.  1.)  Antoninus  teaches 
in  various  passages  the  forgiveness  of  injui'ies,  and  we  know 
that  he  also  practised  what  he  taught.  Bishop  Butler 
remarks  that  "  this  divine  precept  to  forgive  injimes  and  to 
love  our  enemies,  though  to  be  met  ^^th  in  Gentile  moralists, 
yet  is  in  a  peculiar  sense  a  precept  of  Christianity,  as  our 
Saviour  has  insisted  more  upon  it  than  on  any  other  single 
virtue."  The  practice  of  this  precept  is  the  most  difficult  of 
all  virtues.  Antoiiinus  often  enforces  it  and  gives  us  aid 
towards  following  it.  When  we  are  injured,  we  feel  anger 
and  resentment,  and  the  feeling  is  natural,  just  and  useful  for 
the  conservation  of  society.  It  is  useful  that  wrong  doers 
should  feel  the  natural  consequences  of  their  actions,  among 
which  is  the  disapprobation  of  society  and  the  resentment  of 
him  who  is  vrronged.  But  revenge,  in  the  proper  sense  of 
that  word,  must  not  be  practised.  "The  best  way  of 
avenging  thyself,"  says  the  emperor,  "is  not  to  become  like 
the  wrong  doer."  It  is  plain  by  this  that  he  does  not  mean 
that  we  should  in  any  case  practise  revenge ;  but  he  says  to 
those  who  talk  of  revenging  wrongs,  Be  not  like  him  who 


68  The  Fhilosoi:>liy  of  Antoninus. 

has  done  tlie  wrong.  Socrates  in  the  Crito  (c.  10)  says  the 
same  in  other  ^yords,  and  St.  Paul  (Ep.  to  the  Eomans,  xii. 
17).  "  When  a  man  has  done  thee  any  wrong,  innnediately 
consider -with. what  opinion  about  good  or  evil  he  has  done 
wrong.  For  when  thou^JbLast  seen  this,  thou  wilt  pity  him 
and  wilt  neither  wonder  nor  be  angry."  (vii.  26.)  Antoninus 
would  not  deny  that  wrong  naturally  produces  the  feeling  of 
anger  and  resentment,  for  this  is  implied  in  the  recommenda- 
tion to  reflect  on  the  nature  of  the  man's  mind  who  has  done 
the  wrong,  and  then  you  will  have  pity  instead  of  resent- 
ment :  and  so  it  comes  to  the  same  as  St.  Paul's  advice  to  be 
angry  and  sin  not ;  which,  as  Butler  well  explains  it,  is  not  a 
recommendation  to  be  angry,  which  nobody  needs,  for  anger 
is  a  natural  passion,  but  it  is  a  warning  against  allowing 
anger  to  lead  us  into  sin.  In  short  the  emperor's  doctrine 
about  wrongful  acts  is  this  :  wrong  doers  do  not  know  what 
good  and  bad  are :  they  offend  out  of  ignorance,  and  in  the 
sense  of  the  Stoics  this  is  true.  Though  this  kind  of 
ignorance  will  never  be  admitted  as  a  legal  excuse,  and  ought 
not  to  be  admitted  as  a  full  excuse  in  any  way  by  society, 
there  may  be  grievous  injuries,  such  as  it  is  in  a  man's  power 
to  forgive  without  harm  to  society;  and  if  he  forgives 
because  he  sees  that  his  enemies  know  not  what  they  do,  he 
is  acting  in  the  spirit  of  the  sublime  prayer,  "  Father,  forgive 
them,  for  they  know  not  what  they  do." 

The  emperor's  moral  philosophy  was  not  a  feeble,  narrow 
system,  which  teaches  a  man  to  look  directly  to  his  own 
happiness,  though  a  man's  happiness  or  tranquillity  is 
indirectly  promoted  by  living  as  he  ought  to  do.  A  man 
must  live  conformably  to  the  universal  nature,  which  means, 
as  the  emperor  explains  it  in  many  passages,  that  a  man's 


The  Philosopliy  of  Antoninus.  59 

BctioriS  must  be  conformable  to  bis  true  rcLitions  to  all  otlicr 
bumau  beings,  botli  as  a  citizen  of  a  political  community  and 
as  a  member  of  tbo  wbole  buman  family.  Tbis  implies,  and 
be  often  expresses  it  in  tbe  most  forcible  language,  tbat  a 
man's  words  and_actionSj^  so  far  as  tbcy  affect  otjiers^  must  be 
measured  by  a  fixed  rule,  wbicb  is  tbeir^consistency  witb  the 
conservation  and  tbe  interests  of^  tbe  jpru^tijjiilar  society  of 
wbicb  be  is  a  member,  and  of  tbe  wbole  buman  race.  To 
live  conformably  to  siicb  a  rule,  a  man  must  use  bis  rational 
faculjies  iu^^m;;dCT  to  discern  cjcaQyjtbe  consec^cnces  and 
full  effect  of  all  bis  actions  and  of  tbe  actions  of  otbers  :  be 
must  not  live  a  life  of  contemplation  aid  reflection  only, 
tbougb  bo  must  often  retire  within  himself  to  calm  and 
purify  bis  soul  by  thought,^®  but  be  must  mingle  in  the  work 
of  man  and  be  a  fellow  labourer  for  tbe  general  good. 

A  man  should  have  an  object  or  purpose  in  life^-ibat  he 
mayjirect  all  bis  energies_tj3_it ;  of  coui'se  a  good  object. 
(n.  7.)  He  who  has  not  one  object  or  purpose  of  life,  cannot 
be  one  and  the  same  all  through  his  life.  (xi.  21.)  Bacon 
has  a  remark  to  the  same  effect,  on  the  best  means  of 
"  reducing  of  tbe  mind  unto  virtue  and  good  estate ;  which  is, 
the  electing  and  propoimding  unto  a  man's  self  good  and 
virtuous  ends  of  his  life,  such  as  may  be  in  a  reasonable  sort 
within  his  compass  to  attain."  He  is  a  happy  man  who  has 
been  wise  enough  to  do  this  when  he  was  young  and  has  bad 
tbe  opportunities ;  but  the  emperor  seeing  well  that  a  man 
cannot  always  be  so  wise  in  his  youth,  encourages  himself  to 
do  it  when  be  can,  and  not  to  let  life  slip  away  before  be  has 
begun.  He  who  can  propose  to  himself  good  and  virtuous 
ends  of  life,  and  be  true  to  them,  cannot  fail  to  live  con- 
^^  Ut  nemo  in  sese  tentat  descendere,  nemo, — Persiits,  iv.  21. 


60  The  Fhilo8ophy  of  Antoninus. 

formably  to  his  own  interest  and  the  universal  interest,  for 
in  the  nature  of  things  they  are  one.  Tf  a  thing  is  not  good 
for  the  hive,  it  is  not  good  for  the  bee.  (vi.  54.) 

One  passage  may  end  this  matter.  "If  the  gods  have 
determined  about  me  and  about  the  things  which  must 
happen  to  me,  they  have  determined  well,  for  it  is  not  easy 
even  to  imagine  a  deity  without  forethought ;  and  as  to  doing 
me  harm,  why  should  they  have  any  desire  towards  that? 
For  what  advantage  would  result  to  them  from  this  or  to  the 
whole,  which  is  the  special  object  of  their  providence  ?  But 
if  they  have  not  determined  about  me  individually,  they  have 
certainly  determined  about  the  whole  at  least;  and  the 
things  which  happen  by  way  of  sequence  in  this  general 
arrangement  I  ought  to  accept  with  pleasure  and  to  be 
content  with  them.  But  if  they  determine  about  nothing — 
which  it  is  wicked  to  believe,  or  if  we  do  believe  it,  let  us 
neither  sacrifice  nor  pray  nor  swear  by  them  nor  do  anything^ 
else  which  we  do  as  if  the  gods  were  present  and  lived  with 
us — but  if  however  the  gods  determine  about  none  of  the 
things  which  concern  us,  I  am  able  to  determine  about 
myself,  and  I  can  inquire  about  that  which  is  useful ;  and 
that  is  useful  to  every  man  which  is  conformable  to  his  own 
constitution  (^KaraaK^vy'])  and  nature,  f  But  my  nature  is 
rational  and  social ;  and  my  city  and  country,  so  far  as  I  am 
Antoninus,  is  Eome ;  but  so  far  as  I  aiii  a  man,  it  is  the 
world.  The  things  then  whj^h  are  useful  to  tKese  cities  are 
alone  useful  to  me."  (vi.  44.) \ 

It  would  be  tedious,  and  ir  is  not  necessary  to  state  the 
emperor's  opinions  on  all  the  ways  in  ^vhich  a  man  may 
profitably  use  his  understanding  towards  perfecting  himself 
in  practical  virtue.     The  passages  to  this  pm'pose  are  in  all 


Tlie  Philosojjh?/  of  Antoninus.  61 

parts  of  his  book,  but  as  they  arc  in  no  order  or  connection, 
a  man  must  use  the  book  a  long  time  before  he  will  find  out  all 
that  is  in  it.  A  few  words  may  be  added  here.  If  we  ansvlyso 
all  other  tilings,  wo  find  how  insufficient  they  are  for  human 
life,  and  how  truly  worthless  many  of  them  arc.  Virtue 
alone  is  indivisible,  one,  and  perfectly  satisfying.  The  notion 
of  Virtue  cannot  be  considered  vague  or  unsettled,  because  a 
man  ma}'  find  it  difficult  to  explain  the  notion  fully  to  him- 
self or  to  expound  it  to  others  in  such  a  way  as  to  prevent 
cavilling.  Virtue  is  a  whole,  and  no  more  consists  of  parts 
than  man's  intelligence  does,  and  yet  we  speak  of  various 
intellectual  faculties  as  a  convenient  way  of  expressing  the 
vai'ious  powers  which  man's  intellect  shows  by  his  wc-ili.-^ 
In  the  same  way  we  may  speak  of  various  virtues  or  parts  of 
virtue,  in  a  practical  sense,  for  the  purpose  of  showing  what 
particular  virtues  we  ought  to  practise  in  order  to  the  exercise 
of  the  whole  of  virtue,  that  is,  as  much  as  man's  nature  is 
capable  of. 

The  prime  principle  in  man's  constitution  is  social.  _  The 
next  in  order  is  not  to  yield,  to  the  persuasions  of  the  body, 
when  they  are  not  conformable  to  the  rational  principle, 
which  must  govern.  The  third  is  freedom  from  error  and 
from  deception.  "  Let  then  the  ruling  principle  holding 
fast  to  these  things  go  straight  on  and  it  has  what  is  its  own." 
(vii.  55.)  The  emperor  selects  justjce  as  the  virtue  which  is 
the  basisj>f_iillJ;iia_rest^.  11).  and  this  had  been  said  long 
before  his  time. 

It  is  true  that  all  people  have  some  notion  of  what  is 
meant  by  justice  as  a  disposition  of  the  mind,  and  some 
notion  about  acting  in  conformity  to  this  disposition ;  but 
experience  shows  that  men's  notions  about  justice  are  as  con- 


62  The  PhilGSo^hy  of  Antoninus. 

fused  as  tlieir  actions  are  inconsistent  with  the  true  notion  of 
justice.  The  emperor's  notion  of  justice  is  clear  enough,  but 
not  practical  enough  for  all  mankind.  "  Let  there  be  freedom 
from  perturbations  with  respect  to  the  things  which  come 
from  the  external  cause;  and  let  there  be  justice  in  the 
things  done  by  vii'tue  of  the.  internal  cause,  that  is,  let  there 
be  movement  and  action  terminating  in  this,  in  social  acts, 
for  this  is  according  to  thy  nature."  (ix.  31.)  In  another 
place  (ix.  1)  he  says  that  "  he  who  acts  unjustly  acts  im- 
piously," which  follows  of  course  from  all  that  he  says  in 
various  places.  He  insists  ^n  the  practice  of  truth_as  a 
virtue  and  as  a  means  to  virtue,  which  no  doubt  it  is  :  for 
lying  even  injndifferent  things__weakens  the  understanding; 
andjjing  maliciously  is  as  great  a  moral  offence  'as  jjman 
can  be  guilty  of,  viewed  both  as  showing  an  habitual  dis- 
position, and  viewed  with  respect  to  consequences.  He 
couples  the  notion  of  justice  with  action.  A  man  must  not 
pride  himself  on  having  some  fine  notion  of  justice  in  his 
head,  but  he  must  exhibit  his  justice  in  act,  like  St.  James's 
notion  of  faith.     But  this  is  enough. 

^  The  Stoics  and  Antoninus  among  them  call  some  things 
beautiful  (Kaka)  and  some  ugly  (ala-^a),  and  as  they  are 
beautiful  so  they  are  good,  and  as  they  are  ugly  so  they  arc 
evil  or  bad.  (ii.  1.)  All  these  things  good  and  evil  are  in 
our  power,  absolutely  some  of  the  stricter  Stoics  would  say ; 
in  a  manner  only,  as  those  who  would  not  depa\-t  altogether 
from  common  sense  would  say ;  practically  i;hoy  are  to  a 
great  degree  in  the  power  of  some  persons  and  in  some  cir- 
cmnstances,  but  in  a  small  degree  only  in  other  persons  "and 
in  other  circumstances.  The  Stoics  maintain  man's  free  will 
as  to  the  things  which  are  in  his  power ;  for  as  to  the  things 


The  Philosophj  of  Antoninus. 

which  are  out  of  his  power,  free  will  terminating  in 
of  course  excluded  by  the  very  terms  of  the  expressioi.. 
hardly  know  if  we  can  discover  exactly  Antoninus'  notion  of 
the  free  will  of  man,  nor  is  the  question  worth  the  inquiry. 
What  he  does  mean  and  does  say  is  intelligible.  Alt  the 
things  which  are  not  in  our  power  (ttTrpoaipera)  are  indifferent  >- 
they  are  neither  good  nor  bad,  morally^Such  are  life,  health, 
wealth,  power,  disease,  poverty  and  death.  Life  and  death 
are  all  men's  portion.  Health,  wealth,  power,  disease  and 
poverty  happen  to  men  indifferently  to  the  good  and  to  tho 
bad ;  to  those  who  live  according  to  nature  and  to  those  who 
do  not.^"  "Life,"  says  the  emperor,  "is  a  warfare  and  a 
stranger's  sojourn,  and  after  fame  is  oblivion."  (n.  17.) 
After  speaking  of  those  men  who  have  disturbed  the  world 
and  then  died,  and  of  the  death  of  philosophers  such  as 
Heraclitus  and  Democritus  who  was  destroyed  by  lice,  and  of 
Socrates  whom  other  lice  (his  enemies)  destroyed,  he  says : 
*  What  means  all  this  ?  Thou  hast  embarked,  thou ,  hast 
made  the  voyage,  thou  art  come  to  shore  ;  get  out.  If  indeed 
to  another  life,  there  is  no  want  of  gods,  not  even  there.  But 
if  to  a  state  v/ithout  sensation,  thou  wilt  cease  to  be  held  by 
pains  and  pleasures,  and  to  be  a  slave  to  the  vessel  W'hich  is 
as  much  inferior  as  that  which  serves  it  is  superior :  for  the 
one  is  intelligence  and  deity  ;  the  other  is  earth  and  corrup- 

^^  "  All  events  come  alike  to  all :  there  is  one  event  to  the  righteous 
and  to  the  wicked :  to  the  good  and  to  the  clean  and  to  the  unclean," 
&c.  Ecclesiastes,  ix.  v.  2 ;  and  v.  3  :  "  This  is  an  evil  among  all  things 
that  are  done  under  the  sun,  that  there  is  one  event  unto  all,"  In  what 
sense  "  evil "  is  meant  here  seem  s  rather  doubtful.  There  is  no  doubt 
about  the  Emperor's  meaning.  Compare  Epictetus,  Enchiridion,  c.  i., 
&c. ;  and  the  doctrine  of  the  Brachmans  (Strabo.  p.  713,  ed.  Cas.); 
ayaBhv  Se  v)  KUKhu  ixyidiy  eJuat.  tuu  (rvfj.PaLv6vTwv  avSpairois. 


64  The  Philosoj'jhij  of  Antoninus. 

tion.^'  (ill.  3.)  It  is  not  death  that  a  man  should  fear,  but 
he  should  fear  never  beginuing^to  live  according  to  nature, 
(xii.  1.)  Every  man  should  live  in  such  a  way  as  to  discharge 
his  duty,  and  to  trouble  himself  about  nothing  else.  He 
should  live  such  a  life  that  he  shall  always  be  ready  for  death, 
and  shall  depart  content  when  the  summons  comes.  For 
what  Js  death  j  "  A_cessation  of  the  impressions  through  the 
senses^  and  of  the  pulling  of  the  strings  which  move  the 
appetites  and  of  the  discursive  movements  of  the  thoughts, 
and  of  the  service  to  the  flesh."  (vi.  28.)  Death  is  such  as 
generation  is,  a  mystery  of  nature,  (iv.  5.)  In  another 
passage,  the  exact  meaning  of  which  is  perhaps  doubtful 
(ix.  3),  he  speaks  of  the  child  which  leaves  the  womb,  and  so 
he  says  the  soul  at  death  leaves  its  envelope.  As  the  child 
is  born  or  comes  into  life  by  leaving  the  womb,  so  the  soul 
may  on  leaving  the  body  pass  into  anotlier  existence  which 
is  perfect.  I  am  not  sure  if  this  is  the  emperor's  mean- 
ing. Eutler  compares  it  with  a  passage  in  Strabo  (p.  713) 
about  the  Brachmans'  notion  of  death  being  the  birth  into 
real  life  and  a  happy  life  to  those  who  have  philoso- 
phized ;  and  he  thinks  that  Antoninus  may  allude  to  this 
opinion.'^ 

Antoninus'  oijinion  of  a  future  life  is  nowhere  clearly 
expressed.    His  doctrine  of  the  nature  of  the  soul  of  necessity 

-^  Seneca  (Ep.  102)  has  the  same,  whether  an  expression  of  his  own 
opinion,  or  merely  a  fine  saying  of  othei-s  employed  to  embellish  his 
writings,  I  know  not.  After  speaking  of  the  child  being  prepared  in 
the  womb  to  live  this  life,  he  adds,  "  Sic  per  boo  spatium,  quod  ab 
infantia  patct  in  senectutera,  in  alium  naturae  sumimur  partura.  Alia 
origo  nos  ex  pec  tat,  alius  rerum  status."  See  Ecclesiastes,  xii.  7;  ard 
Lucan,  i.  457 : 

"  Lcngae,  cauitis  si  cognita,  vitae 
Mors  melia  est." 


The  Philosophy  of  Antoninus.  Cj 

implies  that  it  does  not  perisli  absolutely,  for  a  portion  of  the 
divinity  cannot  perish.  The  opinion  is  at  least  as  old  as  the 
time  of  Epichai-mus  and  Euripides ;  what  comes  from  eartlk:!^^^,^^ 
goes  back  to  earth^and  what  comes  from  heaven,  the  divinity, 
returns  to  him  who  gave  it.  But  I  find  nothing  clear  in 
Antoninus  as  to  the  notion  of  the  man  existing  after  death  so 
as  to  be  conscious  of  his  sameness  with  that  soul  which 
occupied  his  vessel  of  clay.  He  seems  to  be  perplexed  on 
this  matter,  and  finally  to  have  rested  in  this,  that  God  or 
the  gods  will  do  whatever  is  best  and  consistent  with  the 
university  of  things. 

Nor  I  think  does  he  speak  conclusively  on  another  Stoic 
doctrine,  which  some  Stoics  practised,  the  anticipating  the 
regular  course  of  nature  by  a  man's  own  act.  The  reader 
will  find  some  passages  in  which  this  is  touched  on,  and  he 
may  make  of  them  what  he  can.  But  there  are  passages  in 
which  the  emperor  encom'ages  himself  to  wait  for  the  end 
patiently  and  with  tranquillity  ;  and  certainly  it  is  consistent 
with  all  his  best  teaching  that  a  man  should  bear  all  that 
falls  to  his  lot  and  do  useful  acts  as  long  as  he  lives.  He 
ghould  not  therefore  abridge  the  time  of  his  usefulness  by  his 
own  act.  "Whether^he  jcontemplates  any  possible  cases  in 
which  a  man  should  die  by  his  own  hand,  I  cannot  tell,  and  q.  •  ^ 
the  matter  is  not^  worth  a  curiqus_inquiry,  for  I  believe  it  y"^^^^ 
would  not  lead  to  any  certain  result  as  to  his  opinion  on  this 
point.  I  do  not  think  that  Antoninus,  who  never  mentions 
Seneca,  though  he  must  have  kno-^Ti  all  about  him,  would  ^ 
have  agreed  with  Seneca  when  he  gives  as  a  reason  for  suicide, 
that  the  eternal  laWj^  whatever  he  means,  has  made  nothing 
better  forjis  than  this,  that  it  has  given  us  only  one  way  of 
entering  into  life  and  many  ways  of  going  out  of  it.     The 

jt 


66  The  Philosoj)h7j  of  Antoninus. 

ways  of  going  out  indeed  are  many,  and  that  is  a  good  reason 
for  a  man  taking  care  of  liimself.^^ 

Happiness  was  not  the  direct  object  of  a  Stoic's  life.  There 
is  no  rule  of  life  contained  in  the  precept  that  a  man  should 
pursue  his  own  hajppiness.  Many  men  think  that  they  are 
seeking  happiness  when  they  are  only  seeking  the  gratification 
of  some  j)articular  passion,  the  strongest  that  they  have. 
The  end  of  a  man  is,  as  already  explained^to  live  conformably 
to  nature,  and  he  will  JJyi^ j)btain  hajDpines^^  tranc[uillity  of 
mind  and  contentment,  (iii.  12;  viii.  1,  and  other  places.) 
As  a  means  of  living  conformably  to  nature  he  must  study 
the  four  chief  virtues,  each  of  which  has  its  proper  sphere  : 
wdsdom,  or  the  knowledge  of  good  and  evil ;  justice,  or  the 
giving  to  every  man  his  due ;  fortitude,  or  the  enduring  of 
labour  and  pain ;  and  temperance^  which  is  moderation  in  all 
things.  By  thus  living  conformably  to  nature  the  Stoic 
obtained  all  that  he  wished  or  expected.  Hisj.'eward  was  in 
his  virtuous  life,  and  he  was  satisfied  with  that.  Some  Greek 
poet  long  ago  wrote  : 

For  virtue  only  of  all  Imman  things 

Takes  her  reward  not  from  the  hands  of  others. 

Virtue  herself  re  vards  the  toils  of  virtue. 

Some  of  the  Stoics  indeed  expressed  themselves  in  very 
arrogant,  absurd  terms,  about  the  wise  man's  self  sufficiency ; 
they  elevated  him  to  the  rank  of  a  deity.^'*  But  these  were 
only  talkers  and  lecturers,  such  as  those  in  all  ages  who  utter 

22  See  Plinius,  H.  N.  ii.  c.  7  ;  Seneca,  De  Provid.  c.  6.  ;  and  Ep.  70: 
'•  Nihil  melius  aeterna  lex,"  &c.  • 

'3  J.  Smith  in  his  Select  Discourses  on  "the  Excellency  and  Noble- 
ness of  True  lleligion"  (c.  vi.'i  has  remarked  on  this  Stoical  arrogance. 
He  finds  it  in  Seneca  and  others.  In  Seneca  certainly,  and  peihaps 
Bomethiug  of  it  in  Epietetus ;  but  it  is  not  in  Antoninus. 


Tile  Phihsopluj  of  Antoninus.  07 

fme  words,  know  little  of  human  aflfairs,  and  care  only  for 
notoriety.  Epictetus  and  Antoninus  both  by  precejit  and 
•jxample  laboured  to  improve  themselves  and  others ;  and  if 
we  discover  imi^erfections  in  their  teaching,  we  miLst  still 
honour  these  great  men  w^ho  attempted  to  show  that  there  is 
in  man's  nature  and  in  the  constitution  of  things  sufficient 
reason  for  living  a  virtuous  life.  It  is  difficult  enough  to 
live  as  we  ought  to  live,  difficult  even  for  any  man  to  live  in 
such  a  way  as  to  satisfy  himseK,  if  he  exercises  only  in  a 
moderate  degree  the  power  of  reflecting  upon  and  reviewing 
his  own  conduct ;  and  if  all  men  cannot  be  brought  to  the 
same  opinions  in  morals  and  religion,  it  is  at  least  worth 
while  to  give  them  good  reasons  for  as  much  as  thoy  can  be 
persuaded  to  accept. 


68  M,  Antoninus,    L 


M.  ANTONINUS. 


I. 

FROM  my  grandfather  Verus^  [I  learned]  good  morals  and 
the  government  of  my  temper. 

2.  From  the  reputation  and  remembrance  of  my  father,^ 
modesty  and  a  manly  character. 

3.  From  my  mother,^  piety  and  beneficence,  and  abstinence, 
not  only  from  evil  deeds,  but  even  from  evil  thoughts  ;  and 
further,  simplicity  in  my  way  of  living,  far  removed  from  the 
habits  of  the  rich. 

4.  r'rom  my  great-grandfather,^  not  to  have  frequented 
public  schools,  and  to  have  had  good  teachers  at  home,  and 
to  know  that  on  such  things  a  man  should  spend  liberally. 

5.  From  my  governor,  to  be  neither  of  the  green  nor  of 
the  blue  party  at  the  games  in  the  Circus,  nor  a  partizan 
either  of  the  Parmularius  or  the  Scutarius  at  the  gladiators' 
fights ;  from  him  too  I  learned  endurance  of  labour,  and  to 
want  little,  and  to  work  with  my  own  hands,  and  not  to 

1  Annius  Verus  was  his  grandfathers  name.  Tliere  is  no  verb  in 
this  section  connected  with  the  word  "  from,"  nor  in  the  foUowing  sections 
of  this  book ;  and  it  is  not  quite  certain  what  verb  should  be  supplied. 
What  I  have  added  may  express  the  meaning  here,  though  there  are 
sections  which  it  will  not  fit.  If  he  does  not  mean  to  say  that  ho  learned 
all  these  good  things  from  the  several  persons  whom  he  mentions,  he 
means  that  he  observed  certain  good  qualities  in  them,  or  received 
certain  benefits  from  them,  and  it  is  implied  that  he  was  the  better  for 
it,  or  at  least  might  have  been ;  for  it  would  be  a  mistake  to  understand 
Marcus  as  saying  that  he  possessed  all  the  virtues  which  he  observed  in 
his  kinsmen  and  teachers. 

-  His  father's  name  was  Annius  Verus. 
His  mother  was  Domitia  Culvillii,  named  also  Lucilla. 
Perhaps  his  mother's  grandfather,  Catilius  Severus. 


M.  Antoninus.     I.  69 

meddle  with  other  people's  afiairs,  and  not  to  1)0  ready  to 
listen  to  slander. 

6.  From  Diognctus,*  not  to  busy  myseli  about  trifling 
things,  and  not  to  give  credit  to  vrhat  was  said  by  miracle- 
workers  and  jugglers  about  incantations  and  the  driving  away 
of  daemons  and  such  things ;  and  not  to  breed  quails  [for 
fighting],  nor  to  give  myself  up  passionately  to  such  things ; 
and  to  endure  freedom  of  speech ;  and  to  have  become  intimate 
with  philosophy  ;  and  to  have  been  a  hearer,  first  of  Bacchius, 
then  of  Tandasis  and  Marcianus ;  and  to  have  written  dia- 
logues in  my  youth ;  and  to  have  desired  a  plank  bed  and 
skin,  and  whatever  else  of  the  kind  belongs  to  the  Grecian 
discipline. 

7.  From  Eusticus^  I  received  tho  impression  that  my  cha- 
racter required  improvement  and  discipline  ;  and  from  him  I 
learned  not  to  be  led  astray  to  sophistic  emulation,  nor  to 
wi'iting  on  speculative  matters,  nor  to  delivering  little  hor- 
tatory orations,  nor  to  showing  myself  off  as  a  man  who 
practises  much  discipline,  or  does  benevolent  acts  in  order  to 
make  a  disi)lay ;  and  to  abstain  from  rhetoric,  and  poetry, 
and  fine  writing ;  and  not  to  walk  about  in  the  house  in  my 
outdoor  dress,  nor  to  do  other  things  of  the  kind ;  and  to 

^  In  the  works  of  Justinus  there  is  printed  a  letter  to  one  Diognetus, 
•whom  the  writer  names  "  most  excellent."  He  was  a  Gentile,  but  he 
wished  very  much  to  know  what  the  religion  of  the  Christians  was,  what 
God  they  worshipped,  and  how  this  worship  made  them  despise  the  world 
and  death,  and  neither  believe  in  the  gods  of  the  Greeks  nor  observe 
the  superstition  of  the  Jews ;  and  what  was  this  love  to  one  anotlier 
which  they  had,  and  wliy  this  new  kind  of  religirix  was  introduced  now 
and  not  before.  My  friend  Mr,  Jenkius,  rector  of  Lyminge  in  Kent, 
has  suggested  to  me  that  this  Diognetus  may  have  been  the  tutor  of 
M.  Antoninus. 

^  Q.  Jimius  Eusticus  was  a  Stoic  philosopher,  whom  Antoninus  valued 
highly,  and  often  took  his  advice.     (Capitol.  M.  Antonin.  rn.) 

Antoninus  says,  toTs  'ETriKTTjrei'ois  v-KOfjivv.^aaiv^  which  raiist  not  le 
translated,  "the  writings  of  Epictetus,"  fur  Epictetus  wrote  nothing. 
His  pupil  Arrian,  who  has  preserved  for  us  all  that  we  know  of  Epictetus, 
eavs,  ravTa  iireipadriv  v.ouvrjixaTa  ijxavrcf  dia(pv\d^ai  TrjS  iKUVOV  diavoias. 
{Eg.  ad  GeU.) 


70  M.  Antoninus.     L 

write  my  letters  with  simplicity,  like  the  letter  which  Eiisticus 
wrote  from  Sinuessa  to  my  mother ;  and  with  respect  to  those 
who  have  offended  me  by  words,  or  done  me  wrong,  to  be 
easily  disposed  to  be  pacified  and  reconciled,  as  soon  as  they 
have  shown  a  readiness  to  be  reconciled ;  and  to  read  care- 
fully, and  not  to  be  satisfied  with  a  superficial  understanding 
of  a  book ;  nor  hastily  to  give  my  assent  to  those  who  talk 
overmuch ;  and  I  am  indebted  to  him  for  being  acquainted 
with  the  discourses  of  Epictetus,  which  he  communicated  to 
me  out  of  his  own  collection. 

8.  From  Apollonius^  I  learned  freedom  of  will  and  un- 
deviating  steadiness  of  purpose ;  and  to  look  to  nothing  else, 
not  even  for  a  moment,  except  to  reason ;  and  to  be  always 
the  same,  in  sharp  pains,  on  the  occasion  of  the  loss  of  a 
child,  and  in  long  illness ;  and  to  see  clearly  in  a  living 
example  that  the  same  man  can  be  both  most  resolute  and 
yielding,  and  not  peevish  in  giving  his  instruction ;  and  to 
have  had  before  my  eyes  a  man  who  clearly  considered  his 
experience  and  his  skill  in  expounding  philosophical  prin- 
ciples as  the  smallest  of  his  merits  ;  and  from  him  I  learned 
how  to  receive  from  friends  what  are  esteemed  favours,  with- 
out being  either  humbled  by  them  or  letting  them  pass  un- 
noticed. 

9.  From  Sextus,^  a  benevolent  disposition,  and  the  example 
of  a  family  governed  in  a  fatherly  manner,  and  the  idea  of 
living  conformably  to  nature  ;  and  gravity  without  affectation, 
and  to  look  carefully  after  the  interests  of  friends,  and  to 
tolerate  ignorant  persons,  and  those  who  form  opinions  with- 
out consideration! :  he  had  the  power  of  readily  accom- 
modating himself  to  all,  so  that  intercoiu'se  with  him  was 
more  agreeable  than  any  flattery ;  and  at  the  same  time  he 
was  most  highly  venerated  by  those  who  associated  with  him : 
and  he  had  the  faculty  both  of  discovering  and  ordering,  in 

7  Apollonius  of  Clialcis  came  to  Rome  in  the  time  of  Pius  to  bo 
Marcus'  preceptor.     He  was  a  rigid  Stoic. 

°  Sextus  of  CliOironea,  a  grandson  of  Plutarch,  or  nephew,  as  some 
say  ;  but  more  probably  a  grandson. 


M.  Antoninus.     I.  71 

an  iutelligent  and  mctlioclical  way,  the  principles  necessary 
for  life;  and  lie  never  showed  anger  or  any  other  passion, 
but  was  entirely  free  from  passion,  and  also  most  aftectionato  ; 
and  he  could  express  approbation  without  noisy  display,  and 
he  possessed  much  knowledge  without  ostentation. 

10.  From  Alexander''  the  grammarian,  to  refrain  from 
fault-linding,  and  not  in  a  reproachful  way  to  chide  those 
who  uttered  any  barbarous  or  solecistic  or  strange-sounding 
exj)ression  ;  but  dexterously  to  introduce  the  very  expression 
which  ought  to  have  been  used,  and  in  the  way  of  answer  or 
giviug  confirmation,  or  joining  in  an  inquiry  about  the  thing 
itself,  not  about  the  word,  or  by  some  other  fit  suggestion. 

11.  From  Fronto'"  I  learned  to  obsei've  what  envy,  and 
duplicity,  and  hypocrisy  are  in  a  tyrant,  and  that  generally 
those  among  us  who  are  called  Patricians  are  rather  deficient 
in  paternal  affection. 

12.  From  Alexander  the  Platonic,  not  frequently  nor 
without  necessity  to  say  to  any  one,  or  to  write  in  a  letter, 
that  1  have  no  leisure  ;  nor  continually  to  excuse  the  neglect 
of  duties  required  by  our  relation  to  those  with  whom  we 
live,  by  alleging  urgent  occupations. 

13.  From  Catulus,"  not  to  be  indifferent  when  a  friend 
finds  fault,  even  if  he  should  find  fault  without  reason,  but  to 
try  to  restore  him  to  his  usual  disposition ;  and  to  be  ready 
to  speak  well  of  teachers,  as  it  is  reported  of  Domitius  and 
Athenodotus  ;  and  to  love  my  children  truly. 

14.  From  my  br other ^^  Severus,  to  love  my  kin,  and  to  love 
truth,  and  to  love  justice ;  and  through  him  I  learned  to  know 

^  Alexander  was  a  Graniraaticus,  a  native  of  Plirygia.  He  wrote  a 
commentary  on  Homer  ;  and  tb.c  rhetorician  A  riptides  wrote  a  panegyric 
on  Alexander  in  a  funeral  oration. 

'°  M.  Cornelius  Fronto  was  a  rhetorician,  and  in  great  favour  with 
Marcus.     There  are  extant  various  letters  between  Marcus  and  Fronto. 

^^  Cinna  Catulus,  a  Stoic  philosopher. 

'^  The  word  brother  may  not  be  genuine.  Antoninus  had  no  biotLer. 
It  has  been  supposed  that  he  may  mean  some  cousin.  Schultz  in  iiis 
translation  omits  "brother,"'  and  says  tLat  this  Severus  is  probably 
Claudius  Severus.  a  peripatetic. 


72  M.  Antoninus.     1. 

Thrasea,  Helvidius,  Cato,  Dion,  Brutus  ;^^  and  from  him  I 
received  tlae  idea  of  a  polity  in  v/liicli  there  is  the  same  law 
for  all,  a  polity  administered  with  regard  to  equal  rights  and 
equal  freedom  of  speech,  and  the  idea  of  a  kingly  government 
which  respects  most  of  all  the  freedom  of  the  governed ;  I 
learned  from  him  alsof  consistency  and  undeviating  steadiness 
in  my  regard  for  philosoj)hy ;  and  a  disposition  to  do  good, 
and  to  give  to  others  readily,  ''and  to  cherish  good  hopes,  and 
to  believe  that  I  am  loved  by  my  friends  ;  and  in  him  I  ob- 
served no  concealment  of  his  opinions  with  respect  to  those 
whom  he  qondemned,  and  that  his  friends  had  no  need  to 
conjecture  what  he  wished  or  did  not  wish,  but  it  was  quite 
plain. 

15.  From  Maximus^*  I  learned  self-government,  and  not  to 
be  led  aside  by  anything;  and  cheerfulness  in  all  circum- 
stances, as  well  as  in  illness  ;  and  a  just  admixture  in  the 
moral  chai:acter  of  swe^ness  and  dignity,  and  to  do  what  was 
set  before  me  without  comjplaining.  I  observed  that  every- 
body beliisved  that  he  thought  as  he  spoke,  and  that  in  all 
that  he  did  he  never  had  any  bad  intention ;  and  he  never 
showed  amazement  and  surprise,  and  was  never  in  a  hurry, 
and  never  put  off  doing  a  thing,  nor  was  perplexed  nor  de- 
jected, nor  did  he  ever  laugh  to  disguise  his  vexation,  nor,  on 
the  other  hand,  was  he  ever  passionate  or  suspicious.  He  was 
accustomed  to  do  acts  of  beneficence,  and  was  ready  to  forgive, 
and  was  free  from  all  falsehood ;  and  he  presented  the  appear- 
ance of  a  man  who  could  not  be  diverted  from  right  rather 
than  of  a  man  who  had  been  improved.  I  observed,  too, 
that  no  man  could  ever  think  that  he  was  dcsj)ised  by 
Maximus,  or  ever  venture  to  think  himself  a  better  man. 
He  had  also  the  art  of  being  humorous  in  an  agreeable  way.| 

'3  We  know,  from  Tacitus  {Annal.  xiii.,  xvi.  21  ;  and  other  passages), 
who  Thrasea  and  Helvidius  were.  Plutarch  has  written  the  lives  of  the 
two  Catos,  and  of  Dion  and  Brutus.  Atitouinvis  probably  alludes  to 
Cato  of  Utica,  who  was  a  Stoic. 

14  Claudius  Maximits  was  a  Stoic  ]>hilosopher,  who  was  highly 
esteemed  also  by  Antoninus  Pius,  Marcus'  predecessor.  Tiie  characto? 
of  Maximus  is  that  of  a  perfect  man.    ''See  vni.  25.) 


M.  Antoninus.    I.  73 

16.  In  my  father^*  I  observed  mildness  of  temper,  and 
nncliangcable  resolution  in  the  things  which  he  had  deter- 
mined after  due  deliberation ;  and  no  vainglory  in  those 
things  which  men  call  honours ;  and  a  love  of  labour  and 
perseverance  ;  and  a  readiness  to  listen  to  those  who  had  any- 
thing to  propose  for  the  common  weal ;  and  undeviating 
fii'mness  in  giving  to  every  man  according  to  his  deserts ;  and 
a  knowledge  derived  from  experience  of  the  occasions  for 
vigorous  action  and  for  remission.  And  I  observed  that  he 
had  overcome  all  passion  for  boys ;  and  he  considered  him- 
self no  more  than  any  other  citizen ;'®  and  he  released  his 
friends  from  all  obligation  to  sup  with  him  or  to  attend  him 
of  necessity  when  he  went  abroad,  and  those  who  had  failed 
to  accompany  him,  by  reason  of  any  urgent  circumstances, 
always  found  him  the  same.  I  observed  too  his  habit  of 
careful  inquiry  in  all  matters  of  deliberation,  and  his  persis- 
tency, and  that  he  never  stopped  his  investigation  through 
being  satisfied  with  appearances  which  first  present  them- 
selves ;  and  that  his  disposition  was  to  keep  his  friends,  and 
not  to  be  soon  tired  of  them,  nor  yet  to  be  extravagant  in  his 
affection ;  and  to  be  satisfied  on  all  occasions,  and  cheerful ; 
and  to  foresee  things  a  long  way  off,  and  to  provide  for  the 
smallest  without  display ;  and  to  check  immediately  popular 
applause  and  all  flattery ;  and  to  be  ever  watchful  over  the 
things  which  were  necessary  for  the  administration  of  the 
empire,  and  to  be  a  good  manager  of  the  expenditure,  and 
patiently  to  endure  the  blame  which  he  got  for  such  conduct ; 
and  he  was  neither  superstitious  with  respect  to  the  gods,  nor 
did  he  court  men  by  gifts  or  by  trying  to  please  them,  or  by 
flattering  the  populace  ;  but  he  showed  sobriety  in  all  things 
and  firmness,  and  never  any  mean  thoughts  or  action,  nor 
love  of  novelty.  And  the  things  which  conduce  in  any  way 
to  the  commodity  of  life,  and  of  which  fortune  gives  an 
abundant   supply,   he  used  without    arrogance  and  without 

'5  He  means  his  adoptive  father,  his  predecessor,  the  Emperor  An* 
touinus  Pius.     Compare  ti.  30. 

'^  He  uses  the  word  icoivouonuoavvn-     See  Gataker's  uoto. 


74        ^  M.  Antoninus.     I. 

excusing  himself;  so  tliat  wlien  he  had  them,  he  enjoyed 
them  without  affectation,  and  when  he  had  them  not,  he  did 
not  want  them.  No  one  could  ever  say  of  him  that  he  was 
either  a  sophist  or  a  [home-bred]  flippant  slave  or  a  pedant ; 
but  every  one  acknowledged  him  to  be  a  man  ripe,  perfect, 
above  flattery,  able  to  manage  his  own  and  other  men's  affairs. 
Besides  this,  he  honoured  those  who  were  true  philosoj^hers, 
and  he  did  not  reproach  those  who  pretended  to  be  philo- 
sophers, nor  yet  was  he  easily  led  by  them.  He  was  also 
easy  in  conversation,  and  he  made  himself  agreeable  without 
any  offensive  affectation.  He  took  a  reasonable  care  of  his 
body's  health,  not  as  one  who  was  greatly  attached  to  life,  nor 
out  of  regard  to  personal  appearance,  nor  yet  in  a  careless 
way,  but  so  that,  through  his  own  attention,  he  very  seldom 
stood  in  need  of  the  physician's  art  or  of  medicine  or  external 
ai)plications.  He  was  most  ready  to  give  way  without  envy 
to  those  who  possessed  any  particular  faculty,  such  as  that  of 
eloquence  or  knowledge  of  the  law  or  of  morals,  or  of  any- 
thing else ;  and  he  gave  them  his  help,  that  each  might  enjoy 
reputation  according  to  his  deserts ;  and  he  always  acted 
conformably  to  the  institutions  of  his  country,  without  show- 
ing any  affectation  of  doing  so.  Further,  he  was  not  fond  of 
change  nor  unstead}^,  but  he  loved  to  stay  in  the  same  places, 
and  to  employ  himself  about  the  same  things  ;  and  after  his 
paroxysms  of  headache  he  came  immediately  fresh  and 
vigorous  to  his  usual  occupations.  His  secrets  were  not 
many,  but  very  few  and  very  rare,  and  these  only  about  public 
matters;  and  he  showed  prudence  and  economy  in  the 
exhibition  of  the  public  spectacles  and  the  construction  of 
public  buildings,  his  donations  to  the  people,  and  in  such 
things,  for  he  was  a  man  who  looked  to  what  ought  to  bo 
done,  not  to  the  reputation  which  is  got  by  a  man's  acts. 
He  did  not  take  the  bath  at  unseasonable  hours  :  he  was  not 
fond  of  building  houses,  nor  curious  about  what  he  ate,  nor 
about  the  texture  and  colour  of  his  clothes,  nor  about  the 
beauty  of  his  slaves.^'^  His  dress  came  from  Lorium,  his  villa 
'"'  This  passage  is  corrupt,  and  the  exact  meaning  is  uncertain. 


M.  Antoninus.     I.  75 

on  the  coast,  and  from  Lanuvium  generally.'^  We  know  liow 
Le  behaved  to  the  toll-collector  at  Tusculum  who  asked  his 
pardon  ;  and  such  was  all  his  behaviour.  There  was  in  him 
nothing  harsh,  nor  implac^ible,  nor  violent,  nor,  as  one  may 
say,  anything  carried  to  the  sweating  point ;  but  he  examined 
all  things  severally,  as  if  he  had  abundance  of  time,  and  with- 
out confusion,  in  an  orderly  way,  vigorously  and  consistently. 
And  that  might  be  applied  to  him  which  is  recorded  of  ^ 
Socrates,^^  that  he  was  able  both  to  abstain  from,  and  to 
enjoy,  those  things  which  many  are  too  weak  to  abstain  from^ 
and  cannot  enjoy  without  excess.  But  to  be  strong  enough 
both  to  bear  the  one  and  to  be  sober  in  the  other  is  the  mark 
of  a  man  who  has  a  perfect  and  invincible  soul,  such  as  he 
showed  in  the  illness  of  Maximus. 

17.  To  the  gods  I  am  indebted  for  having  good  grand- 
fiithers,  good  parents,  a  good  sister,  good  teachers,  good 
associates,  good  kinsmen  and  friends,  nearly  everything  good. 
Further,  I  owe  it  to  the  gods  that  I  was  not  hurried  into  any 
oflence  against  any  of  them,  though  I  had  a  disposition  which, 
if  opportunity  had  offered,  might  have  led  me  to  do  something  . 
of  this  kind  ;  but,  through  theii*  favour,  there  never  was  such 
a  concmTcnce  of  circumstances  as  put  me  to  the  trial. 
Further,  I  am  thankful  to  the  gods  that  I  was  not  longer 
brought  up  with  my  grandfather's  concubine,  and  that  I 
preserved  the  flower  of  my  youth,  and  that  I  did  not  make 
proof  of  my  virility  before  the  proper  season,  but  even 
deferred  the  time ;  that  I  was  subjected  to  a  ruler  and  a  father 
who  was  able  to  take  away  all  pride  from  me,  and  to  bring  me 
to  the  knowledge  that  it  is  possible  for  a  man  to  live  in  a 
palace  without  wanting  either  guards  or  embroidered  di-esses, 
or  torches  and  statues,  and  such-like  show ;  but  that  it  is  in 
such  a  man's  power  to  bring  himself  very  near  to  the  fashion 
of  a  private  person,  without  being  for  this  reason  either 
meaner  in  thought,  or  more  remiss  in  action,  with  respect  to 

^8  Lorium  was   a   villa  on  the  coast  north  of  Eome,  and  there  Aa 
toninus  was  brought  np,  and  he  died  there.     This  also  is  corrupt. 
19  Xenophon,  Memorab.  i.  3.  15. 


76  M.  Antoninus.    I. 

the  things  which  must  be  done  for  the  public  interest  in  a 
manner  that  befits  a  ruler.  I  thank  the  gods  for  giving  me 
such  a  brother,^  who  was  able  by  his  moral  character  to  rouse 
me  to  vigilance  over  myself,  and  who,  at  the  same  time, 
pleased  me  by  his  respect  and  aifection  ;  that  my  children 
have  not  been  stupid  nor  deformed  in  body ;  that  I  did  not 
make  more  proficiency  in  rhetoric,  poetry,  and  the  other 
studies,  in  which  I  should  perhaps  have  been  completely 
engaged,  if  I  had  seen  that  I  was  making  progress  in  them ; 
that  I.  made  haste  to  place  those  who  brought  me  up  in  the 
station  of  honour,  which  they  seemed  to  desire,  without 
putting  them  off  with  hope  of  my  doing  it  some  time  after, 
because  they  were  then  still  young  ;  that  I  knew  ApoUonius, 
Eusticus,  Maximus ;  that  I  received  clear  and  frequent 
impressions  about  living  according  to  nature,  and  what  kind 
of  a  life  that  is,  so  that,  so  far  as  depended  on  the  gods,  and 
their  gifts,  and  help,  and  inspirations,  nothing  hindered  me 
from  forthwith  living  according  to  nature,  though  I  still  fall 
short  of  it  through  my  own  fault,  and  through  not  observing 
the  admonitions  of  the  gods,  and,  I  may  almost  say,  their 
direct  instructions ;  that  my  body  has  held  out  so  long  in  such 
a  kind  of  life;  that  I  never  touched  either  Benedicta  or 
Theodotus,  and  that,  after  having  fallen  into  amatory  passions, 
I  was  cured ;  and,  though  I  was  often  out  of  humour  with 
Eusticus,  I  never  did  anything  of  which  I  had  occasion  to 
repent ;  that,  though  it  was  my  mother's  fate  to  die  young, 
she  spent  the  last  years  of  her  life  with  me  ;  that,  whenever  I 
wished  to  help  any  man  in  his  need,  or  on  any  other  occasion, 
I  was  never  told  that  I  had  not  the  means  of  doing  it ;  and 
that  to  myself  the  same  necessity  never  happened,  to  receive 
anything  from  another ;  that  I  have  such  a  wife,^^  so  obedient, 
and  so  affectionate,  and  so  simple ;  that  I  had  abundance  of 
good  masters  for  my  children ;  and  that  remedies  have  been 
shown  to  me  by  dreams,  both  others,  and  against  bloodspitting 

-°  The  emperor  had  no  brother,  except  L.  Verus,  his  brother  hy 

adoption. 

^'  See  the  Life  of  Antoninus. 


M.  Antoninus.     1.  77 

and  giddiness  22  ******  •  and  that,  when  I  had  aii  in- 
clination to  ijhilosophy,  I  did  not  fall  into  the  hands  of  any 
sophist,  and  that  I  did  not  waste  my  time  on  writers  [of 
histories],  or  in  the  resolution  of  syllogisms,  or  occupy 
myself  about  the  investigation  of  appearances  in  the  heavens ; 
for  all  these  things  require  the  help  of  the  gods  and  fortune. 
Among  the  Quadi  at  the  Granua."^^ 

^  This  is  corrupt. 

'^  The  Quadi  hved  in  the  southern  part  of  Bohemia  and  Moravia  ; 
and  Antoninus  made  a  campaitrn  against  them.  (See  the  Life.)  Granua 
is  probably  the  river  Graan,  which  flows  into  the  Danube. 

If  these  words  are  genuine,  Antoninus  may  liave  written  thl3  first 
book  during  the  war  with  the  Quadi.  In  the  first  etiition  of  Antoninusj, 
and  in  the  older  editions,  the  first  three  sections  of  the  second  book 
make  the  conclusion  of  the  first  book.  Gataker  placed  theni  at  the 
betjinning  of  tlie  second  book. . 


78  M.  Antoninus.    IL 


II. 

BEGIN  tlie  morning  by  saying  to  thyself,  I  sball  meet 
with  the  busybody,  the  ungrateful,  arrogant,  deceitful, 
envious,  unsocial.  All  these  things  happen  to  them  by  reason 
of  their  ignorance  of  what  is  good  and  evil.  But  I  who  have 
seen  the  nature  of  the  good  that  it  is  beautiful,  and  of  the 
bad  that  it  is  ugly,  and  the  nature  of  him  who  does  wrong, 
that  it  is  akin  to  me,  not  [only]  of  the  same  blood  or  seed, 
but  that  it  participates  in  |]the  same]  intelligence  and  [the 
same]  portion  of  the  divinity,  I  can  neither  be  injured  by  any 
of  them,  for  no  one  can  fix  on  me  what  is  ugly,  nor  can  I  be 
angry  with  my  kinsman,  nor  hate  him.  For  we  are  made  for 
CQioperation,  like  feet,  like  hands,  like  eyelids,  like  the  rows 
of  the  upper  and  lower  teeth.'  To  act  against  one  another 
then  is  contrary  to  nature;  and  it  is  acting  against  one 
another  to  be  vexed  and  to  turn  away. 

2.  Whatever  this  is  that  I  am,  it  is  a  little  flesh  and  breath, 
and  the   ruling  part.     Throw  away  thy  books;   no  longer 

,  distract  thyself :  it  is  not  allowed ;  but  as  if  thou  wast  now 
j  dying,  despise  the  flesh ;  it  is  blood  and  bones  and  a  net- 
work, a  contexture  of  nerves,  veins,  and  arteries.  See  the 
breath  also,  what  kind  of  a  thing  it  is,  air,  and  not  always 
the  same,  but  every  moment  sent  out  and  again  sucked  in. 
The  third  then  is  the  ruling  part :  consider  thus  :  Thou  art 
an  old  man ;  no  longer  let  this  be  a  slave,  no  longer  be 
pulled  by  the  strings  like  a  puppet  to  unsocial  movements,  no 
longer  be  either  dissatisfied  with  thy  present  lot,  or  shrink 
from  the  future. 

3.  All  that  is  from  the  gods  is  full  of  providence.     That 
which  is  from  fortune  is  not  separated  from  nature  or  without 

'  Xenophon,  Mem.  ii.  3.  l-S. 


M.  Antoninus.     II.  79 

an  interweaving  and  involution  with  the  things  which  aro 
ordered  by  providence.  From  thence  all  things  flow ;  and 
there  is  besides  necessity,  and  that  which  is  for  the  advantage 
of  the  whole  universe,  of  which  thou  art  a  part.  But  that  is 
good  for  every  part  of  nature  which  the  nature  of  the  whole 
brings,  and  what  serves  to  maintain  this  nature.  Now  the 
universe  is  preserved,  as  by  the  changes  of  the  elements  so 
by  the  changes  of  things  compounded  of  the  elements.  Let 
these  j^rinciples  be  enough  for  thee,  let  them  always  be  fixed 
opinions.  But  cast  away  the  thirst  after  books,  that  thou 
mayest  not  die  murmuring,  but  cheerfully,  truly,  and  from 
thy  heart  thankful  to  the  gods. 

4.  Eemember  how  long  thou  hast  been  putting  off  these 
things,  and  how  often  thou  hast  received  an  opportunity  from 
the  gods,  and  yet  dost  not  use  it.  Thou  must  now  atlast 
perceive  of  what  universe  thou  art  a  part,  and  of  what  ad- 
mimstratorLiiJLi±ie-un i verse JLtiyLexigtence'ls'an  efflux,  and  that 
a  limitjc>fJLi^  is  faed  for  thee,  which  if  thou  dost  not  use 
forclearmg  away  The  clouds  from  thy  mind,  it  will  go  and 
thou  wilt  go,  and  it  will  i^ever  return. 

5.  Every  moment  think  steadily  as  a  Koman  and  a  man  to 
do  what  thou  hast  in  hand  with  perfect  and  simple  dignity, 
and  feeling  of  affection,  and  freecTbm,  and  justice ;  and 'to 
give  thyself  relief  from  all  other  thoughts.  And  thou  wilt 
give  thyself  relief,  if  thou  doest  every  act  of  thy  life  as  if  it 
were  the  last,  laying  aside  all  carelessness  and  passionate 
aversion  from  the  commands  of  reason,  and  all  hypocrisy, 
and  self-love,  and  discontent  with  the  portion  which  has  been 
given  to  thee.  (Thou  seest  how  few  the  things  are,  the  which 
if  a  man  lays  hold  of,  he  is  able  to  live  a  life  which  flows  in 
quiet,  and  is  like  the  existence  of  the  gods ;  for  the  gods  on 
their  part  will  requii'e  nothing  more  from  him  who  observes 
these  things.^ 

6.  Do  wrong^  to  thyself,  do  wrong  tothyself,  rQyisouL;_but 
thou  wilt  no  longer  have  the  opportunity  of  honouring  thyself. 

-  Perhaps  it  should  be  "  thou  art  doing  violence  to  thyself,'  vfipiCuSt 
not  vBoiCe.  • 


/ 


80  M.  Antoninus.     11. 

Every  man's  life  is  sufiicient.f  But  thine  is  nearly  finishedj 
tliough  thy  soul  reverences  not  itself,  but  places  thy  felicity 
in  the  souls  of  others. 

7.  Do  the  things  external  which  fall  upon  thee  distract 
thee?  Give  thyself  time  to  learn  something  new  and  good, 
and  cease  to  be  whirled  around.  But  then  thou  must  also 
avoid  being  carried  about  the  other  way.  For  those  tco  are 
triflers  who  have  wearied  themselves  m  life  by  their  activity, 
and  j'et  have  no  object  to  which- to  direct  every  movement, 
and,  in  a  word,  all  their  thoughjis. 

8.  Through  not  observing  what  is  in  the  mind  of  another 
a  man  has  seldom  been  seen  to  be  unhappy ;  but  those  who 
do  not  observe  the  movements  of  their  own  minds  must  of 
necessity  be  unhappy. 

9.  This  thou  must  always  bear  in  mind,  what  is  the  nature 
of  the  whole,  and  what  is  my  nature,  and  how  this  is  related 
to  that,  and  what  kind  of  a  part  it  is  of  what  kind  of  a  whole  ; 
and  that  there  is  no  one  who  hinders  thee  from  always  doing 
and  saying  the  things  which  are  according  to  the  nature  of 
which  thou  art  a  part. 

10.  Theophrastus,  in  his  comparison  of  bad  acts — such  a 
comparison  as  one  "^vould  make  in  accordance  with  the  com- 
mon notions  of  mankind — says,  like  a  true  philosojjher,  that 
the  oifences  which  are  committed  through  _desiro  are  more 
blameable  than  those  whicJi  are~committed  through  a nger . 
H'or  he  who  is  excited  by  anger^seems  to  turn  away  from 


reason  with  a  certain  pain  and  unconscious_f^nntrnrtion  j  but 
he  who  offp.uds  f>b rough  desire,  being  overpowered by^pleasure, 
seems  to  be  in  a  manner  more  intemperate  aiocT 


in  his  offences.  EightlytheST'and  in  a  way  \\^orthy  of 
philosophy,  Ee  said  that  the  offence  which  is  committed 
with  pleasui'e  is  more  blameable  than  that  which  is  com- 
mitted with  pain  ;  and  on  the  whole  the  one  is  more  like  a 
person  who  has  been  first  wronged  and  through  pain  is 
comp oiled  to  be  angry ;  but  the  other  is  moved  by  his  own 
impulse  to  do  wrong,  being  carried  towards ^oing  something 
bv  desire.  '  ^^^T       "  I 


M.  Antoninus.    II.  81 

j  11.  Since  it  is  possible^  that  thou  rnayest  depart  from  life 
I  thLs  very  moment,  regulate  every  act  and  thought  accordingly.^ 
But  to  go  away  from  among  men,  if  there  are  gods,  is  not  a 
thing  to  be  afraid  of,  fur  the  gods  will  not  involve  thee  in 
evil ;  but  if  indeed  they  do  not  exist,  or  if  they  have  no  con- 
cern aboiit  human  atfairs,  what  is  it  to  me  to  live  in  a  universe 
devoid  of  gods  or  devoid  of  providence  ?  But  in  truth  they 
do  exist,  and  they  do  care  for  human  things,  and  they  have 
put  all  the  means  in  man^s  power  to  enable  him  not  to  fall 
into  real  evils.  And  as  to  the  rest,  if  there  was  anything 
evil,  they  would  have  provided  for  this  also,  that  it  should  be 
altogether  in  a  man's  power  not  to  fall  into  it.  Now  that 
which  does  not  make  a  man  worse,  how  can  it  make  a  man_[^s 
life  worse  ?  But  neither  through  ignorance,  nor  having  the 
knowledge,  but  not  the  power  to  guard  against  or  correct 
these  things,  is  it  possible  that  the  nature  of  the  universe  has 
overlooked  them;  nor  is  it  possible  that  it  has  made  so  great 
a  mistake,  either  through  want  of  power  or  want  of  skill,  that 
good  and  evil  should  happen  indiscriminately  to  the  good 
and  the  bad.  But  death  certainly,  and  life,  honour  and  dis- 
honour, pain  and  pleasure,  all  these  things  equally  happen  to 
good  men  and  bad,  being  things  which  make  us  neither  better 
(  nor  worse.     Therefore  they  are  neither  good  nor  evil,   f 

12.  How  quickly  all  things  disappear,  in  the  universe  the 
bodies  themselves,  but  in  time  the  remembrance  of  them ; 
what  is  the  nature  of  all  sensible  things,  and  particularly 
those  which  attract  with  the  bait  of  pleasure  or  terrify  by 
pain,  or  are  noised  abroad  by  vapoury  fame  ;  how  worthless, 
and  contemptible,  an^  sordid,  and  perishable,  and  dead  they 
are — all  this  it  is  the  part  of  the  intellectual  faculty  to 
observe.  To  observe  too  who  these  are  whose  opinions  and 
voices  give  reputation  :  what  death  is,  and  the  fact  that,  if  a 
man  looks  at  it  in  itself,  and  by  the  abstractive  power  of 
reflection  resolves  into  their  parts  all  the  things  which  pre- 

3  Or  it  may  mean  "  since  it  iii  in  thy  power  to  depart ;"  which  gives 
a  meaning  somewhat  different. 
■*  See  Cicero,  Tuscul.  i.  49. 

6 


82  M.  Antoninus.     11. 

sent  themselves  to  the  imagination  in  it,  lie  will  then  consider 
it  to  be  nothing  else  than  an  operation  of  nature  ;  and  if  any- 
one is  afraid  of  an  operation  of  nature,  he  is  a  child.  This, 
however,  is  not  only  an  operation  of  nature,  but  it  is  also  a 
thing  which  conduces  to  the  purposes  of  nature.  To  observe 
too  how  man  comes  near  to  the  deity,  and  by  what  part  of 
him,  and  when  this  part  of  man  is  so  disposed.f     (vi.  28.) 

13.  Nothing  is  more  wretched  than  a  man  who  traverses 
everything  in  a  round,  and  pries  into  the  things  beneatli  the 
earth,  as  the  poef^  says,  and  seeks  by  conjecture  what  is  in 
the  minds  of  his  neighbours,  without  perceiving  that  it  is 
sufficient  to  attend  to  the  daemon  within  him,  and  to  reverence 
it  sincerely.  And  reverence  of  the  daemon  consists  in  keeping 
it  pure  from  passion  and  thoughtlessness,  and  dissatisfaction 
with  what  comes'  from  gods  and  men.  ^ov  the  things  from 
the  gods  merit  veneration  for  their  excellence  ;  and  the^things 
from^^en  should  be~~dear  to  us  by"  reason  of  kinship  ;  and 
sometimes  even,  in  a  manner,  they  move  our  pity  by  reason 
of  men's  ignorance  of  good  and  bad ;  this  defect  being  not 
less  than  that  which  deprives  us  of  the  power  of  distinguishing 
things  that  are  white  and  ]>lack. 

14.  Though  thou  shouldest  bo  going  to  live  three  thousand 
years,  and  as  many  times  ten  thousand  years,  still  remember 
that  no  man  loses  any  other  life  than  this  which  he  now  lives.  ' 
nor  lives_anyother  than  thiji,j.Jaieh.-he  now  JLoseg.,  The 
longest  and  shortest  are  thus  brought  to  the  same.  For  the 
present  is  the  same  to  all,  though  that  which  perishes  is  not 
the  same  ;t  ^  and  so  that  which  is  lost  appears  to  be  a  niere 
moment.  For  a  mancannot  lose  either  tj^^paist  '"'  th^_ 
future :  for  what  a  man  has  not,  how  can  any  one  take  this 
from  him  ?  These  two  things  then  thou  must  bear  in  mind  ; 
the  one^that  all  things  from  eternity  are  of  like  forms  and 
come  round  in  a  circle,  and  that  it  makes  no  difference 
whether  a  man  shall  see  the  same  things  during  a  hundred 
years  or  two  hundred,  or  an  infinite  time  ;  and  the  second, 

*  Pindar  iu  tlie  Theuetetus  of  Plato.     Soe  xi.  1. 
^  {See  Gataker's  note. 


M.  Antoninus.     II.  83 

that  the  longest  liver  and  he  who  will  die  soonest  lose  just 
tlic  same.  For  the  present  is  the  only  thing  of  which  a  man 
can  be  deprived,  if  it  is  true  that  this  is  the  only  thing  which 
hcTias,  and  that  a  man  cannot  lose  a  thing  if  lie  has  it  not. 

15.  Ecmember^  that_all  is  o])inion.  For  wliat  was  said  by 
the  Cynic  Monimus  is  manifest :  and  manifest  too  is  the  use 
of  what  was  said,  if  a  man  receives  what  may  be  got  out  of  it 
as  far  as  it  is  true. 

16:  The  soul  of  man^^es  violence  to  itself,  fii-st  of  all, 
when  it  becomes  an  abscess  and,  as  it  were,  a  tumour  on  the, 
^uniierse,  so~IaFaslt  can.     For  to  be  vexed  at  anything  which  ^ 
hajipens  is  a  separation  of  ourselves  from  nature,  in  some  * 
part  of  which  the  natures  of  all  other  things  are  contained. 
^    In  the  next  place,  the  soul  does  violence  to  itself  when  it 
turns  away  from  any  man,  or  even  moves  towards  him  with  i 
the  intention  of  iujui-ing,  such  as  are  the  souls  of  those  who  1 
are  angry.5  In   the  third  place,  the  soul  does   violence   to  j 
itself    when   it   is    overpowered   by   pleasure   or    by   pain. 
^  Foui'thly,  when  it  plays  a  part,  and  does  or  says  anything  in-  i 
sincerely  and  untruly.  n»  "fifthly,  when  it  allows  any  act  of  its  i 
own  and  any  movement  to  be  without  an  aim,  and  docs  any- 
thing thoughtlessly  and  without  considering  what  it  is,  it 
being   right   that   even  the    smallest    things  be    done  with  j 
reference  to  an  end ;  and  the  end  of  rational  animals  is  to  1 
follow  the  reason  and  the  law  of  the  most  ancient  city  and  \ 
polity. 

17.  Of  human  life  the  time  is  a  point,  and  the  substance 
is  in  a  flux,  and  the  perception  dull,  and  the  composition  of 
the  whole  body  subject  to  putrefaction,  and  the  soul  a  whirl, 
and  fortune  hard  to  divine,  and  fame  a  thing  devoid  of  judg- 
ment. And,  to  say  all  in  a  word,  everything  which  belongs 
to  the  body  is  a  stream,  and  what  belongs  to  the  soul  is  a 
dream  and  vajDour,  and  life  is  a  w^arfare  and  a  stra:  iter's  so- 
journ, and  after-fame  is  oblivion.  What  then  is  that  which 
is  able  to  conduct  a  man?  One  thing  and  only  one,  phi- 
losophy. But  this  consists  in  keeping  the  daemon  withjn  a 
man  fve^  from  violence  and  unharmed,  superior  to  pains  and 


84  M.  Antoninus.     11. 

pleasures,  doing  nothing  without  a  purpose,  nor  yet  falsely 
and  with  hypocrisy,  not  feeling  the  need  of  another  man's 
doing  or  not  doing  anything ;  and  besides,  acceptuig  all  that 
happens,  and  all  that  is  allotted,  as  coming  from  thence, 
wherever  it  is,  from  whence  he  himself  came ;  and,  finally, 
waiting  for  death  with  a  cheerful  mind,  as  being  nothing  else 
than  a  dissolution  of  the  elements  of  which  every  living  being 
is  compounded.  But  if  there  is  no  harm  to  the  elements 
themselves  in  each  continually  changing  into  another,  why 
should  a  man  have  any  apprehension  about  the  change  and 
dissolution  of  all  the  elements?  For  it  is  according  to 
nature,  and  nothing  is  evil  which  is  according  to  nature. 
This  in  Carnuntum7 

7  Carnuntum  was  a  town  of  Pannonia,  on  the  south  side  of  the  Danube, 
about  thiity  miles  east  of  Yiudobona  (Vienna).  Orosius  (vn.  15)  and 
Eutropius  (vni.  13)  say  that  Antoninus  remained  three  years  at  Cai:- 
nuntum  during  his  war  with  the  Marcomanni. 


A 


M.  Antoninus.    111.  85 


III. 

WE  onglit  to  consider  not  only  tliat  our  life  is  daily 
wasting  away  and  a  smaller  part  of  it  is  left,  but 
another  thing  also  must  be  taken  into  the  account,  that  if  a 
man  should  live  longer,  it  is  quite  uncertain  whether  the 
understanding  will  still  continue  sufficient  for  the  compre- 
hension of  things,  and  retain  the  power  of  contemplation 
which  strives  to  acquii-e  the  knowledge  of  the  divine  and  the 
human.  For  if  he  shall  begin  to  fall  into  dotage,  perspiration 
and  nutrition  and  imagination  and  appetite,  and  whatever 
else  there  is  of  the  kind,  T\ill  not  fail;  but  the  power  of 
making  use  of  oui'selves,  and  filling  up  the  measure  of  our 
duty,  and  clearly  separating  all  appearances,  and  considering 
whether  a  man  should  now  depart  from  life,  and  whatever 
else  of  the  kind  absolutely  requires  a  disciplined  reason,  all 
this  is  already  extinguished.  We  must  make  haste  then,  not 
only  because  we  are  daily  nearer  to  death,  but  also  because 
the  conception  of  things  and  the  undei'standing  of  them  cease 
first.    • 

2.  We  ought  to  observe  also  that  even  the  things  which 
follow  after  the  things  which  are  produced  according  to 
nature  contain  soigething  pleasing  and  attractive.  For  in- 
stance, when  breadTis^baked^some  parts  are  split  at  the 
surface,  and  these  parts  which  thus  open,  and  have  a  certain 
fashion  contrary  to  the  purpose  of  the  baker's  art,  are  beau- 
tiful in  a  manner,  and  in  a  peculiar  way  excite  a  desire  for 
eating.  And  again,  figs,  when  they  are  quite  ripe,  gape  open  ; 
and  in  the  ripe  olives  the  very  circumstance  of  their  being 
near  to  rottenness  adds  a  peculiar  beauty  to  the  fruit.  And 
the  ears  of  corn  bending  down,  and  the  lion's  eyebrows,  and 
the  foam  which  flows  from  the  mouth  of  wild  boars,  and  many 


86  ill.  Antoninus.     III. 

other  tilings — though  they  are  far  from  being  beautiful,  if  a 
man  should  examine  them  severally, — still,  because  they  are 
consequent  upon  the  things  which  are  formed  by  nature,  help 
to  adorn  them ,  and  they  please  the  mind ;  so  that  if  a  man 
should  have  a  feeling  and  deeper  insight  with  resj)ect  to  the 
things  which  are  produced  in  the  universe,  there  is  hardly 
one  of  those  which  follow  by  way  of  consequence  which  will 
not  seem  to  him  to  be  in  a  manner  disposed  so  as  to  give 
pleasure.  And  so  he  will  see  even  the  real  gaping  jaws  of 
wild  beasts  with  no  less  pleasure  than  those  which  painters 
and  sculptors  show  by  imitation ;  and  in  an  old  woman  and 
an  old  man  he  will  be  able  to  see  a  certain  maturity  and 
comeliness  ;  and  the  attractive  loveliness  of  young  persons 
he  will  be  able  to  look  on  with  chaste  eyes ;  and  many  such 
things  will  j)resent  themselves,  not  pleasing  to  every  man, 
but  to  him  only  who  has  become  truly  familiar  with  nature 
and  her  works. 

3.  Hippocrates  after  curing  many  diseases  himself  fell 
sick  and  died.  The  Chaldaei  foretold  the  deaths  of  many, 
and  then  fate  caught  them  too.  Alexander,  and  Pompeius, 
and  Caius  Caesar,  after  so  often  completely  destroying  whole 
cities,  and  in  battle  cutting  to  pieces  many  ten  thousands  of 
cavalry  and  infantry,  themselves  too  at  last  departed  from 
life.  Heraclitus,  after  so  many  speculations  on  the  conflagra- 
tion of  the  universe,  was  filled  with  water  internally  and 
died  smeared  all  over  with  mud.  And  lice  destroyed  De- 
mocritus;  and  other  lice  killed  Socrates.  What  means  all 
this '?  Thou  hast  embarked,  thou  hast  made  the  voyage,  thou 
art  come  to  shore ;  get  out.  If  indeed  to  another  life,  there 
is  no  want  of  gods,  not  even  there.  But  if  to  a  state  without 
sensation,  thou  wilt  cease  to  be  held  by  pains  and  pleasures, 
and  to  be  a  slave  to  the  vessel,  which  is  as  much  inferior  as 
that  which  serves  it  is  superior  :f  for  the  one  is  intelligence 
and  deity  ;  the  other  is  earth  and  corruption. 

4.  Do  not  waste  the  remainder  of  thy  life  in  thoughts  about 
others,  when  thou  dost  not  refer  thy  thoughts  to  some  object 
of  common  utility.     For  thou  losest  the  opportunity  of  doing 


M.  Antoninus.     III.  87 

something  else  ^vhen  tlioii  hast  such  thoughts  as  these,  "What 
is  such  a  person  doing,  and  why,  and  ^hat  is  he  saying,  and 
what  is  he  thinking  of,  and  what  is  ho  contriving,  and  what- 
ever else  of  the  kind  makes  us  wander  away  from  the  ob- 
servation of  our  own  ruling  power.     We  ought  then  to  check  ^^ 
in  the  series  of  our  thouglits  every  tiling  that  is  witliout  a  | 
purpose  and  useless,  but  most  of  all  the  overcurious  feeling ; 
and  the  malignant;  and  a  man  should  use  himself  to  think; 
of  those  things  only  about  which  if  one  should  suddenly  ask, 
What  hast  thou  now  in  thy  thoughts  ?  with  perfect  ojienness     / 
thou  mightest  immediately  answer,  This  or  That  ;  so  that 
from  thy  words  it  should  be  plain  that  everytliing  in^thee  is 
simple  and  benevolent,  and  such  as  befits  a  social  animal,  and 
one  that  cares  not  for  thoughts  about  pleasure  or  sensual 
enjoyments  at  all,  nor  has  any  rivalry  or  envy  and  suspicion,  , 
or  anvthinf?  else  for  which  thou  wouldst  blush  if  thou  shouldst  1 
say  that  thou  hadst  it  in  thy  mind.     For  the  man  who  is  such 
and  no  longer  delays  being  among  the  number  of  the  best,  is  ' 
like  a  priest  and  minister  of  the  gods,  using  too  the  [deity j 
which  is  planted  within  him,  which  makes  the  man  uncon- 
taminated  by  pleasure,  unharmed  by  an}^  pain,  untouched  by 
any  insult,  feeling  no  wrong,  a  fighter  in  the  noblest  fight, 
one  who  cannot  be  overpowered  by  any  passion,  dyed  deep 
with  justice,  accepting  with  all  his  soul  everything  which 
happens  and  is  assigned  to  him  as  his  j^ortion ;  and  not  often, 
nor  yet  without  great  necessity  and  for  the  general  interest, 
imagining  what  another  says,  or  does,  or  thinks.     For  it  is 
only  what  belongs  to  himself  that  he  makes  the  matter  for  ^ 
his  activity ;    and  he  constantly    thinks    of    that   which   is 
allotted  to  himself  out   of  the  sum  total  of  things,  and   he 
makes  his  own  acts  fair,  and  he  is  persuaded  that  his  ov»n 
portion  is  good.     For  the  lot  which  is  assigned  to  each  man 
is  carried  along  with  him  and  carries  him  along   with  it.j 

And  he  remembers  also  that   every  rational  .animal  is  his  v. 

kinsman,  and  that  to  care  for  all  men  is  according  to  man's      ^ 
nature  ;  and  a  man  should  hold  on  to  the  opinion  not  of  all,  J 

but  of  those  only  who  confessedly  live  according  to  natui'o. 


88  M.  Antoninus.     IIL 

But  as  to  those  who  live  not  so,  he  always  bears  in  mind 
what  kind  of  men  they  are  both  at  home  and  from  home,  both 
by  night  and  by  day,  and  what  they  are,  and  with  what  men 
they  live  an  imjDure  life.  Accordingly,  he  does  not  value  at 
all  the  praise  which  comes  from  such  men,  since  they  are  not 
even  satisfied  with  themselves. 

5.  Labour  not  unwilKngly,  nor  without  regard  to  the  com- 
mon interest,  nor  without  due  consideration,  nor  with  dis- 
traction ;  nor  let  studied  ornament  set  off  thy  thoughts, 
and  be  not  either  a  man  of  many  words,  or  busy  about  too 
many  things.  And  further,  let  the  deity  which  is  in  thee  be 
the  guardian  of  a  living  being,  manly  and  of  ripe  age,  and 
engaged  in  matter  political,  and  a  Roman,  and  a  ruler,  who 
has  taken  his  post  like  a  man  waiting  for  the  signal  which 
summons  him  from  life,  and  ready  to  go,  having  need 
neither  of  oath  nor  of  any  man's  testimony.  Be  cheerful 
also,  and  seek  not  external  help  nor  the  tranquillity  which 
others  give.  A  man  then  must  stand  erect,  not  be  kept  erect 
by  others. 

6.  If  thou  findest  in  human  life  anything  better  than  justice, 
truth,  temperance,  fortitude,  and,  in  a  word,  anything  better 
than  thy  own  mind's  self-satisfaction  in  the  things  which  it 
enables  thee  to  do  according  to  right  reason,  and  in  the  con- 
dition that  is  assigned  to  thee  without  thy  own  choice  ;  if,  I 
say,  thou  seest  anything  better  than  this,  turn  to  it  with  all 
thy  soul,  and  enjoy  that  which  thou  hast  found  to  be  the  best. 

/But  if  nothing  appears  to  be  better  than  the  deity  which  is 
planted  in  thee,  which  has  subjected  to  itself  all  thy  appetites, 
and  carefully  examines  all  the  impressions,  and,  as  Socrates 
said,  has  detached  itself  from  the  persuasions  of  sense,  and 

V^  has  submitted  itself  to  the  gods,  and  cares  for  mankind  ;  if 
thou  findest  everything  else  smaller  and  of  less  value  than 
this,  give  place  to  nothing  else,  for  if  thou  dost  once  diverge 
and  incline  to  it,  thou  wilt  no  longer  without  distraction  be 
able  to  give  the  j^reference  to  that  good  thing  which  is  thy 
proper  possession  and  thy  own;  for  it  is  notl-ight  that  any- 
thing of  any  other  kind,  such  as  praise  from  the  many,  or 


M.  Antoninus.     III.  89 

power,  or  enjoyment  of  pleasure,  should  come  into  competition 
with  that  which  is  rationally  and  politically  [or,  practically] 
good.     All  these  things,  even  though  they  may  seem  to  adapt    ~ 
themselves  [to  the  better  things]  in  a  small  degree,  obtain 
tliu  superiority  all  at  once,  and  carry  us  away.     But  do  thou, 
I  say,  simply  and  freely  choose  the  better^  and  hold  to  it. —     ^ 
But  that  which  iilnsp,fu1_is_  the  bett9r. — Well  then,  if  it  is     \ 
useful  to  theeois  a  rational  being,  keep  to  it ;  but  if  it  is  only 
useful  to  thee  as  an  animal,  say  so,  and  maintain  thy  judgment 
witliout  arrogance :  only  take  care  that  thou  makest  the  in- 
quiry by  a  sure  method.   ^ 

7.  Never  value  anything  as  profitable  to  thyself  which 
shall  compel  thee  to  break  thy  promise,  to  lose  thy  self- 
respect,  to  hate  any  m.an,  to  suspect,  to  curse,  to  act  the 
hypocrite,  to  .desire  anything  which  needs  walls  and  cm-tains  : 
for  he  who  has  preferred  to  everything  else  his  own  intelli- 
gence and  daemon  and  the  worship  of  its  excellence,  acts  no 
ti-agic  part,  does  not  groan,  will  not  need  either  solitude  or 
much  company  ;  and,  what  is  chief  of  all,  he  will  live  with- 
out either  pm-suing  or  flying  from  [death]  ;^  but  whether  for 
a  longer  or  a  shorter  time  he  shall  have  the  soul  inclosed  in 
the  body,  he  cares  not  at  all :  for  even  if  he  must  depart 
immediately,  he  will  go  as  readily  as  if  he  were  going  to  do 
anything  else  which  can  be  done  with  decency  and  order; 
taking  care  of  this  only  all  through  life,  that  his  thoughts 
turn  not  away  from  anything  vrhich  belongs  to  an  intelligent  / 
animal  and  a  member  of  a  civil  community.  y' 

8.  In  the  mind  of  one  who  is  chastened  and  purified  thou 
wilt  find  no  corrupt  matter,  nor  impurity,  nor  any  sore  skinned 
over.  Nor  is  his  Kfe  incomplete  when  fate  overtakes  him,  as 
one  may  say  of  an  actor  who  leaves  the  stage  before  ending  /T'^ 
and  finishing  the  play.  Besides,  there  is  in  him  nothing 
servile,  nor  aftected,  nor  too  closely  bound  [to  other  things], 
nor  yet  detached'^  [from  other  things],  nothing  worthy  of 
blame,  nothing  which  seeks  a  hiding-place. 

9.  Pieverence  the  faculty  which    produces    opinion.      On 

Comp.  IX.  3.  2  yiij_  34^ 


=1 


90  M.  Antoninus.     III. 

this  faculty  it  entirely  deiDends  whether  there  shall  exist  in 
thy  ruling  part  any  opinion  inconsistent  with  nature  and  the 
constitution  of  the  rational  animal.  And  this  faculty  promises 
freedom  from  hasty  judgment,  and  friendship  towards  men, 
and  obedience  to  the  gods. 

10.  Throwing  away  then  all  things,  hold  to  these  only 
which  are  few  ;  and  besides  bear  in  mind  that  every  man  lives 
only  this  present  time,  which  is  an  indivisible  point,  and  that 
all  the  rest  of  his  life  is  either  past  or  it  is  uncertain.  Short 
then  is  the  time  which  every  man  lives,  and  small  the  nook  of 
the  earth  where  he  lives  ;  and  short  too  the  longest  posthumous 
fame,  and  even  this  only  continued  by  a  succession  of  poor 
human  beings,  who  will  very  soon  die,  and  who  know  not 
even  themselves,  much  less  him  who  died  long  ago. 

11.  To  the  aids  which  have  been  mentioned  let  this  one 
still  be  added  : — Make  for  thyself  a  definition  or  description 
of  the  thing  which  is  presented  to  thee,  so  as  to  see  distinctly 
what  kind  of  a  thing  it  is  in  its  substance,  in  its  nudity,  in  its 
complete  entirety,  and  tell  thyself  its  proper  name,  and  the 
names  of  the  things  of  which  it  has  been  compounded,  and 
into  which  it  will  be  resolved.  For  nothing  is  so  productive 
of  elevation  of  mind  as  to  be  able  to  examine  methodically  and 
truly  every  object  which  is  j)resented  to  tliee  in  life,  and 
always  to  look  at  things  so  as  to  see  at  the  same  time  what 
kind  of  universe  this  is,  and  what  kind  of  use  everything 
performs  in  it,  and  what  value  everything  has  with  reference 
to  the  whole,  and  what  with  reference  to  man,  who  is  a  citizen 
of  the  highest  city,  of  which  all  other  cities  are  like  families  ; 
v/hat  each  thing  is,  and  of  what  it  is  composed,  and  how  long 
it  is  the  nature  of  this  thing  to  endure  which  now  makes  an 
impression  on  me,  and  what  virtue  I  have  need  of  with  respect 
to  it,  such  as  gentleness,  manliness,  truth,  fidelity,  simplicity, 
contentment,  and  the  rest.  Wherefore,  on  every  occasion  a 
man  should  say  :  this  comes  from  god ;  and  this  is  according 
to  the  apportionment!  and  spinning  of  the  thread  of  destiny, 
and  such-like  coincidence  and  chance  ;  and  this  is  from  one 
of  the  same  stock,  and  a  kinsman  and  partner,  one  who  knows 


M.  Antoninus.     III.  [)1 

not  however  what  is  according  to  his  nature.  But  I  know  ; 
for  this  reason  I  behave  towards  him  according  to  the  natural 
hiw  of  fellowship  with  benevolence  and  justice.  At  tlie  same 
time  however  in  things  indifferent^  I  attempt  to  ascertain  the 
value  of  each. 

12.  Jf  thou  workest  at  that  which  is  before  thee,  following 
righjL-Xfiason  seriously,  vigorously,  calmly,  without  allowing 
"anything  else  to  distract  thee,  but  keeping  thy  divine  part 

pure,  as  if  thou  shouldst  be  bound  to  give  it  back  im- 
mediately ;  if  thou  boldest  to  this,  expecting  nothing,  fearing 
nothing,  but  satisfied  with  thy  present  activity  according  to 
trature,  and  with  heroic  truth  in  every  word  and  sound  which 
thou  utterestj  thou  wilt  live  happy.  And  there  is  no  man 
wlro  is  able  to  prevent  this. 

13.  As  physicians  have  always  their  instruments  and  knives 
ready  for  cases  which  suddenly  requii'e  their  skill,  so  do  thou 
have  principles  ready  for  the  understanding  of  things  divine 
and  human,  and  for  doing  everything,  even  the  smallest,  with 
a  recollection  of  the  bond  which  unites  the  divine  and  human 
to  one  another.  For  neither  wilt  thou  do  anything  well 
which  pertains  to  man  without  at  the  same  time  having  a 
reference  to  things  divine  ;  nor  the  contrary. 

14.  No  longer  wander  at  hazard;  for  neither  wilt  thou 
read  thy  own  memoirs,*  nor  the  acts  of  the  ancient  Romans 
and  Hellenes,  and  the  selections  from  books  which  thou  wast 
reserving  for  thy  old  age,^  Hasten  then  to  the  end  which 
thou  hast  before  thee,  and,  throwing  away  idle  hopes,  come 
to  thy  own  aid,  if  thou  carest  at  all  for  thyself,  while  it  is  in 
thy  power. 

15.  They  know  not  how  many  things  are  signified  by  the 
words  stealing,  so^^ing,  buying,  keeping  quiet,  seeing  what 

3  "  Est  et  horum  quae  media  appellamus  grande  discrimen." — Seneca, 
Ep.  82. 

*  vTTQixv^^^ara  ;  or  memoranda,  notes  and  the  like.     See  i.  17. 

^  Compare  Fronto,  n.  9 ;  a  letter  of  Marcus  to  Fronto,  who  was  then 
consul :  "  Feci  tamen  mihi  per  hos  dies  excerpta  ex  libris  sexaginta  m 
quinque  tomis."     But  he  says  some  of  them  were  small  books. 


92  M.  Antoninus.     III. 

ougM  to  be  done ;  for  this  is  not  effected  by  tlie  eyes,  but  by 
another  kind  of  vision. 

16.  Body,  soul,  intelligence  :  to  the  body  belong  sensations, 
to  the  soul  appetites,  to  the  intelligence  principles.  To 
receive  the  impressions  of  forms  by  means  of  appearances 
belongs  even  to  animals ;  to  be  pulled  by  the  strings^  of 
desire  belongs  both  to  wild  beasts  and  to  men  who  have  made 
themselves  into  women,  and  to  a  Phalai'is  and  a  Nero  :  and  to 
have  the  intelligence  that  guides  to  the  things  which  appear 
suitable  belongs  also  to  those  who  do  not  believe  in  the  gods, 
and  who  botray  their  country,  and  do  their  impure  deeds 
when  they  have  shut  the  doors.  If  then  everything  else  is 
common  to  all  that  I  have  mentioned,  there  remains  that 
which  is  peculiar  to  the  good  man,  to  be  pleased  and  content 
with  what  happens,  and  with  the  thread  which  is  spun  for 
him ;  and  not  to  defile  the  divinity  which  is  planted  in  his 
breast,  nor  disturb  it  by  a  crow^l  of  images,  but  to  preserve  it 
tranquil,  following  it  obediently  as  a  god,  neither  saying  any- 
thing contrary  to  the  truth,  nor  doing  anything  contrary  to 
justice.  And  if  all  men  refuse  to  believe  that  he  lives  a 
simple,  modest,  and  contented  life,  he  is  neither  angry  with 
any  of  them,  nor  does  he  deviate  from  the  way  which  leads 
to  the  end  of  life,  to  which  a  man  ought  to  come  pure, 
tranquil,  ready  to  depart,  and  without  any  compulsion  perfectly 
reconciled  to  his  lot. 

6  Compare  Plato.  De  Lcgibus,  i.  p.  644,  or.  ravra  zb.  viBv,  etc. :  ',\Jiii 
Autoniims,  ii.  2;  vn,  3;  xu,  19. 


^ 


I 


ill.  Antoniims.     IV.  93 


IV. 

THAT  which  rules  within,  when  it  is  accoriliiig  to  nature, 
is  so  affected  with  respect  to  the  events  which  hapj)en, 
that  it  always  easily  adapts  itself  to  that  which  is  possible  and 
is  presented  to  it.  For  it  requires  no  definite  inaterial,  but  it 
moves  towards  its  purpose,^  under  certain  conditions  however  ; 
and  it  makes  a  material  for  itself  out  of  that  which  opposes 
it,  as  fire  lays  hold  of  what  falls  into  it,  by  which  a  small 
light  would  have  been  extinguished :  but  when  the  fii-e  is 
strong,  it  soon  appropriates  to  itself  the  matter  which  is  heaped 
on  it,  and  consumes  it,  and  rises  higher  by  means  of  this 
very  material. 

2.  Let  no  act  be  done  without  a  purpose,  nor  otherwise 
than  according  to  the  perfect  principles  of  art. 

3.  Men  seek  retreats  for  themselves,  houses  in  the  country, 
sea-shores,  and  mountains ;  and  thou  too  art  w^ont  to  desire 
such  things  very  much.  But  this  is  altogether  a  mark  of  the 
most  common  sort  of  men,  for  it  is  in  thy  power  whenever 
thou  shalt  choose  to  retire  into  thyself.  For  nowhere  either 
with  more  quiet  or  more  freedom  from  trouble  does  a  man 
retii'e  than  into  his  own  soul,  particularly  w^hen  he  has 
within  him  such  thoughts  that  by  looking  into  them  be  is 
immediately  in  perfect  tranquillity ;  and  I  afSrm  that  tran- 
quillity is  nothing  else  than  the  good  ordering  of  the  mind. 
Constantly  then  give  to  thyself  this  retreat,  and  renew 
thyself;  and  let  thy  principles  be  brief  and  fundamental, 
which,  an  soon  as  thou  shalt  recur  to  them,  will  be  sufficient 
to  cleanse  the  soul  completely,  and  to  send  thee  back  free  from 
all  discontent  with  the  things  to  which  thou  returnest.      For 

't( 
translation  is  doubtful.     Seti  Gataker's  note. 


94      ^  M.  Antoninm.     IT.  .^ 

witli  what  art  tliou  discontented  ?  Witli  tlie  badness  of  men  ? 
Eecall  to  tliy  mind  tliis  conclusion,  that  rational  animals 
exist  for  one  another,  and  that  to  endure  is  a  part  of  justice, 
and  that  men  do  wrong  involuntarily ;  and  consider  how 
many  already,  after  mutual  enmity,  susjDicion,  hatred,  and 
fighting,  have  been  stretched  dead,  reduced  to  ashes ;  and  be 
quiet  at  last. — But  perhaps  thou  art  dissatisfied  with  that 
which  is  assigned  to  thee  out  of  the  universe. — Recall  to  thy 
recollection  this  alternative  ;  either  there  is  providence  or 
atoms  [fortuitous  concurrence  of  things]  ;  or  remember  the 
arguments  by  which  it  has  been  proved  that  the  world  is  a 
kind  of  political  community  [and  be  quiet  at  last]. — But 
perhaps  corporeal  things  will  still  fasten  upon  thee. — Con- 
sider then  further  that  the  mind  mingles  not  with  the  breath, 
whether  moving  gently  or  violently,  when  it  has  once  drawn 
itself  apart  and  discovered  its  own  power,  and  think  also  of 
all  that  thou  hast  heard  and  assented  to  about  pain  and 
pleasure  [and  be  quiet  at  last]. — But  perhaps  the  desire  of 
the   thing   called   fame    will    torment  thee — See   how  soon 

I  everything  is  forgotten,  and  look  at  the  chaos  of  infinite  time 

on  each  side  of  [the  present],  and  tho  emptiness  of  applause, 
and  the  changeablenesa  and  want  of  judgment  in  those  who 
pretend  to  give  praise,  and  the  narrowness  of  the  space  v/ithin 
which  it  is  circumscribed  [and  be  quiet  at  last].  For  the 
whole  earth  is  a  point,  and  how  small  a  nook  in  it  is  this  thy 
dwelling,  and  how  few  arc  there  in  it,  and  what  kind  of 
people  are  they  who  will  praise  thee.  ^ 

This  then  remains :  Eumember  to  retire  into  this  little 
territory  of  thy  own,^  and  above  all  do  not  distract  or  strain 
thyself,  but  be  free,  and  look  at  things  as  a  man,  as  a  human 
being,  as  a  citizen,  as  a  mortal.  But  among  the  things 
readiest  to  thy  hand  to  wdiicli  thou  slialt  turn,  let  there  be 
these,  which  are  two.  One  is  that  things  do  not  touch  the 
soul,  for  they  are  external  and  remain  immovable ;  but  our 

S^r  pei:tii£batiaDS  come  only  from  the  opinion  which  is  w'ithin. 
The  other  is  that  all  these  things,  which  thou  seest,  change 
2  Tecum  habita,  noris  qiwm  sit  tibi  curta  supellex. — Persiue,  iv.  52. 


M.  Antoninus.     IV.  95 

immediately  and  will  no  longer  be  ;  and  constantly  bear  in 
mind  how  many  of  these  changes  thou  hast  already  witnessed. 
The  universe  is^trausformation  :  life  is  opinion. 

4.  If  our  intellectual  part  is  common,  the  reason  also,  in 
respect  of  which  we  are  rational  beings,  is  common :  if  this 
is  so,  common  also  is  the  reason  which  commands  us  what  to 
do,  and  what  not  to  do  ;  if  this  is  so,  there  is  a  common  law 
also ;  if  this  is  so,  we  are  fellow-citizens  ;  if  this  is  so,  we 
are  members  of  some  political  community ;  if  this  is  so,  the 
world  is  in  a  manner  a  state.^  For  of  what  other  common 
political  community  will  any  one  say  that  the  whole  human 
race  are  members  ?  And  from  thence,  from  this  common 
political  community  comes  also  our  very  intellectual  faculty 
and  reasoning  faculty  and  our  capacity  for  law ;  j  or  whence 
do  they  come  ?  For  as  my  earthly  part  is  a  portion  given  to 
me  from  certain  earth,  and  that  which  is  watery  from  another 
element,  and  that  which  is  hot  and  fiery  from  some  peculiar 
source  (for  nothing  comes  out  of  that  which  is  nothing,  as 
nothing  also  returns  to  non-existence),  so  also  the  intellectu'^J 
part  comes  from  some  source. 

5.  Death  is  such  as  generation  is,  a  mystery  of  nature ;  \ 
composition  out  of  the  same  elements,  and  a  decomposition 
into  the  same ;  and  altogether  not  a  thing  of  which  any  man 
should  be  ashamed,  for  it  is  not  contrary  to  [the  nature  of] 
a  reasonable  animal,  and  not  contrary  to  the  reason  of  our 
constitution. 

6.  It  is  natural  that  these  things  should  be  done  by  such 
persons,  it  is  a  matter  of  necessity ;  and  if  a  man  w^ill  not 
have  it  so,  he  will  not  allow  the  fig-tree  to  have  juice.  But 
by  all  means  bear  this  in  mind,  that  within  a  very  short 
time  both  thou  and  he  will  be  dead  ;  and  soon  not  even  your 
names  will  be  left  behind. 

7.  Take  away  thy  opinion,  and  then  there  is  taken  away 
tlie  complaint,  "  I  have  been  harmed."  Take  away  the 
complaint,  "  I  have  been  harmed,"  and  the  harm  is  taken 
away. 

^  Compare  Cicero  De  Legibus,  i.  7. 


96      ^  M.  Antoyiinus,     IV. 

8.  That  whicli  does  not  make  a  man  worse  than  ne  was, 
also  does  not  make  his  life  worse,  nor  does  it  haim  him  either 
from  without  or  from  within. 

9.  The  nature  of  that  which  is  [universally]  useful  has 
been  compelled  to  do  this. 

10.  Consider  that  everything  which  happens,  haj^pens 
justly,  and  if  thou  observest  carefully,  thou  wilt  find  it  to  be 
so.  I  do  not  say  only  with  respect  to  the  continuity  of  the 
series  of  things,  but  with  respect  to  what  is  just,  and  as  if  it 
were  done  by  one  who  assigns  to  each  thing  its  value. 
Observe  then  as  thou  hast  begun  ;  and  whatever-  thou  doest, 
do  it  in  conjunction  with  this,  the  being  good,  and  in  the 
sense  in  which  a  man  is  properly  understood  to  be  good. 
Keep  to  this  in  every  action. 

11.  Do  not  have  such  an  opinion  of  things  as  he  has  who 
does  thee  wrong,  or  such  as  he  wishes  thee  to  have,  but  look 
at  them  as  they  are  in  truth. 

12.  A  man  should  always  have  these  two  rules  in  readi- 
ness ;  the  one,  to  do  only  whatever  the  reason  of  the  ruling 
and  legislating  faculty  may  suggest  for  the  use  of  men  ;  the 
other,  to  change  thy  opinion,  if  there  is  any  one  at  hand  who 
sets  thee  right  and  moves  thee  from  any  opinion.  But  this 
change  of  opinion  must  proceed  only  from  a  certain  per- 
suasion, as  of  what  is  just  or  of  common  advantage,  and  the 
like,  not  because  it  appears  pleasant  or  brings  reputation. 

13.  Hast  thou  reason  ?  I  have. — Why  then  dost  not  thou 
use  it  ?  For  if  this  does  its  own  work,  what  else  do£.t  thou 
wish  ? 

14.  Thou  hast  existed  as  a  part.  Thou  shalt  disappear  in 
that  which  produced  thee  ;  but  rather  thou  shalt  be  received 
back  into  its  seminal  princii^le  by  transmutation. 

15.  Many  grains  of  frankincense  on  the  same  altar  :  one 
falls  before,  another  falls  after  ;  but  it  makes  no  difference. 

16.  Within  ten  days  thou  wilt  seem  a  god  to  those  to 
whom  Ihou  art  now  a  beast  and  an  ajje,  if  thou  wilt  return 
to  thy  principles  and  the  worship  of  reason. 

17.  ])o  not  act  as  if  thou  wert  going  to  live  ten  thousand 


M.  Antoninus.     IV.  97 

years.     Deaili  bangs  over  tlice.     While  tliou  livest,  while  it 
is  in  thy  power,  bo  good. 

18.  How  mueb  trouble  he  avoids  who  does  not  look  to  sec 
what  his  neighbour  says  or  does  or  thinks,  but  only  to  wliat 
he  does  himself,  that  it  may  be  just  and  pure ;  or  as  Agathon  | 
says,  look  not  round  at  the  depraved  morals  of  others,  but 
run  straight  along  the  line  without  deviating  from  it. 

19.  He  who  has  a  vehement  desire  for  posthumous  fi^me 
does  not  consider  that  every  one  of  those  who  remember  him 
will  himself  also  die  very  soon  ;  then  again  also  they  who 
have  succeeded  them,  until  the  whole  remembrance  shall  have 
been  extinguished  as  it  is  transmitted  through  men  who 
foolishly  admire  and  perish.  But  suj)pose  that  those  who 
will  remember  are  even  immortal,  and  that  the  remembrance 
will  be  immortal,  what  then  is  this  to  thee  ?  And  I  say  not 
what  is  it  to  the  dead,  but  what  is  it  to  t\e  living.  What  is 
praise,  exceptf  indeed  so  far  as  it  hasf  a  certain  utility? 
For  thou  now  rejectest  unseasonably  the  gift  of  nature, 
clinging  to  something  else  *  *  *  -j-. 

20.  Everything  which  is  in  any  way  beautiful  is  beautiful 
in  itself,  and  terminates  in  itself,  not  having  praise  as  part  of 
itself.  Neither  worse  then  nor  better  is  a  thing  made  by 
being  praised.  I  affirm  this  also  of  the  things  which  are 
called  beautiful  by  the  vulgar,  for  example,  material  things 
and  works  of  art.  That  which  is  really  beautiful  has  no 
need  of  anything ;  not  more  than  law,  not  more  than  truth, 
not  more  than  benevolence  or  modesty.  Which  of  these 
things  is  beautiful  because  it  is  praised,  or  spoiled  by  being 
blamed  ?  Is  such  a  thing  as  an  emerald  made  worse  than  it 
was,  if  it  is  not  praised  ?  or  gold,  ivory,  purple,  a  lyre,  a  little 
knife,  a  flower,  a  shrub  ? 

21.  If  souls  continue  to  exist,  how  does  the  air  contain 
them  from  eternity  ? — But  how  does  the  earth  contain  the 
bodies  of  those  who  have  been  buried  from  time  so  remote '? 
For  as  here  the  mutation  of  these  bodies  after  a  certain  con- 
tinuance, whatever  it  may  be,  and  their  dissolution  make 
room  for  other  dead  bodies ;  so  the  souls  which  are  removed 

II 


-U4^ 


98  If.  Antoninus.     IV. 

into  the  air  after  subsisting  for  some  time  are  transmuted 
and  diffused,  and  assume  a  fiery  nature  by  being  received 
into  the  seminal  intelligence  of  the  universe,  and  in  this  way 
make  room  for  the  fresh  souls  which  come  to  dwell  there. 
And  this  is  the  answer  which  a  man  might  give  on  the 
hypothesis  of  souls  continuing  to  exist.  But  we  must  not 
only  think  of  the  number  of  bodies  which  are  thus  buried, 
but  also  of  the  number  of  animals  which  are  daily  eaten  by 
us  and  the  other  animals.  For  what  a  number  is  consumed, 
and  thus  in  a  manner  buried  in  the  bodies  of  those  who  feed 
on  them?  And  nevertheless  this  earth  receives  them  by 
reason  of  the  changes  [of  these  bodies]  into  blood,  and  the 
transformations  into  the  aerial  or  the  fiery  element. 

What  is  the  investigation  into  the  truth  in  this  matter  ? 
The  division  into  that  which  is  material  and  that  which  is 
the  cause  of  form  [the  formal],     (vii.  29.) 

22.  Do  not  be  whirled  about,  but  in  every  movement  have 
respect  to  justice,  and  on  the  occasion  of  every  impression 
maintain  the  faculty  of  comprehension  [or  understanding]. 

23.  Everything  harmonizes  with  me,  which  is  harmonious 
to  thee,  0  Universe.  Nothing  for  me  is  too  early  nor  too 
late,  which  is  in  due  time  for  thee.  Everything  is  fruit  to 
me  which  thy  seasons  bring,  0  Nature  :  from  thee  are  all 
things,  in  thee  are  all  things,  to  thee  all  things  return.  The 
poet  says,  Dear  city  of  Cecrops ;  and  wilt  not  thou  say,  Dear 
city  of  Zeus  ? 

24.  Occupy  thyself  with  few  things,  says  the  philosopher, 
if  thou  would  st  be  tranquil. — But  consider  if  it  would  not  be 
better  to  say,  Do  what  is  necessary,  and  whatever  the  reason 
of  the  animal  which  is  naturally  s;)cial  requires,  and  as  it 
requires.  For  this  brings  not  only  the  tranquillity  which 
comes  from  doing  well,  but  also  that  which  comes  from  doing 
few  things.  For  the  greatest  part  of  what  we  say  and  do 
being  unnecessary,  if  a  man  takes  this  away,  he  will  have 
more  leisure  and  less  uneasiness.  Accordingly  on  every 
eccasion  a  man  should  ask  hi?uself,  Is  this  one  of  the  un- 
necessary things  ?     Now  a  man  should  take  away  not  only 


M.  Antoninus.     IV.  91) 

unnecessary  acts,   but  also  unnecessary  tlioughts,  for  tlius 
superfluous  acts  will  not  follow  after. 

25.  Try  Low  the  life  of  the  good  man  suits  thee,  the  life  of 
him  who  is  satisfied  with  his  portion  out  of  the  whole,  and 
satisfied  with  his  own  just  acts  and  benevolent  disposition. 

26.  Hast  thou  seen  those  things  ?  Look  also  at  these. 
Do  not  disturb  thyself.  Make  thyself  all  simplicity.  Does 
any  one  do  wrong  ?  It  is  to  himself  that  he  does  the  wrong. 
Has  anything  happened  to  thee  ?  Well ;  out  of  the  universe 
from  the  beginning  everything  which  happens  has  been  ap- 
portioned and  spun  out  to  thee.  In  a  word,  thy  life  is  short. 
Thou  must  turn  to  profit  the  present  by  the  aid  of  reason 
and  justice.     Be  sober  in  thy  relaxation. 

27.  Either  it  is  a  well  arranged  universe^  or  a  chaos 
huddled  together,  but  still  a  universe.  But  can  a  certain 
order  subsist  in  thee,  and  disorder  in  the  All  ?  And  this  too 
when  all  things  are  so  separated  and  diifused  and  sym- 
pathetic. 

28.  A  black  character,  a  wcimcmioh  character,  a  stubborn 
character,  bestial,  childish,  animal,  stupid,  counterfeit,  scur- 
rilous, fraudulent,  tyrannical. 

29.  If  he  is  a  stranger  to  the  universe  who  does  not  know 
what  is  in  it,  no  less  is  he  a  stranger  who  does  not  know  what 
is  going  on  in  it.  He  is  a  runaway,  who  flies  from  social 
reason  ;  he  is  blind,  who  shuts  the  eyes  of  the  understanding  ; 
he  is  poor,  who  has  need  of  another,  and  has  not  from  himself 
all  things  which  are  useful  for  life.  He  is  an  abscess  on  the 
universe  w^ho  withdraws  and  separates  himself  from  the 
reason  of  our  common  nature  through  being  disj)leased  with 
the  things  which  hapj)en,  for  the  same  nature  produces  this, 
and  has  produced  thee  too  :  he  is  a  piece  rent  asunder  from 
the  state,  who  tears  his  own  soul  from  that  of  reasonable 
animals,  which  is  one. 

30.  Tlie  one  is  a  philosopher  without  a  tunic,  and  the 
other  without  a  book :  here  is  another  half  naked  :  Bread  7 

*  Antoninus  here  uses  the  word  Koa/xos  both  in  the  sense  of  the 
Universe  and  of  Ordi  r  ;  and  it  is  difficult  to  express  his  meaning. 


V 


100  M.  Antoninus.     IV. 

have  not,  he  says,  and  I  abide  by  reason — And  I  do  not  get 
the  means  of  living  out  of  my  learning,!  and  I  abide  [by  my 
reason]. 

31.  Love  the  art,  poor  as  it  may  be,  which  thou  hast 
learned,  and  be  content  with  it ;  and  pass  through  the  rest 
of  life  like  one  who  has  intrusted  to  the  gods  with  his  whole 
soul  all  that  he  has,  making  thyself  neither  the  tyrant  nor 
the  slave  of  any  man. 

32.  Consider,  for  example,  the  times  of  Vespasian.  Thou 
wilt  see  all  these  things,  people  marrying,  bringing  up  child- 
ren, sick,  dying,  warring,  feasting,  trafficking,  cultivating  the 
ground,  flattering,  obstinately  arrogant,  sii.pecting,  plotting, 
wishing  for  some  to  die,  grumbling  about  the  present,  loving, 
heaping  up  treasure,  desiring  consulship,  kingly  power.  Well 
then,  that  life  of  these  people  no  longer  exists  at  all.  Again, 
remove  to  the  times  of  Trajan.  Again,  all  is  the  same. 
Their  life  too  is  gone.  In  like  manner  view  also  the  other 
epochs  of  time  and  of  whole  nations,  and  see  how  many  after 
gi-eat  efforts  soon  fell  and  were  resolved  into  the  elements. 
But  chiefly  thou  shouldst  think  of  those  whom  thou  hast 
thyself  known  distracting  themselves  about  idle  things, 
neglecting  to  do  what  was  in  accordance  with  theii*  proper  con- 
stitution, and  to  hold  firmly  to  this  and  to  be  content  with  it. 
And  herein  it  is  necessary  to  remember  that  the  attention 
given  to  everything  has  its  proper  vplue  and  proportion.  For 
thus  thou  wilt  not  be  dissatisfied,  if  thou  appliest  thyself  to 
smaller  matters  no  further  than  is  fit. 

33.  The  words  which  were  formerly  familiar  are  now 
antiquated :  so  also  the  names  of  those  who  were  famed  of 
old,  are  now  in  a  manner  antiquated,  Camillus,  Caeso,  Yolcsus, 
Leonnatus,  and  a  little  after  also  Scipio  and  Cato.  then  Au- 
gustus, then  also  Hadrianus  and  Antoninus.  For  all  things 
soon  pass  away  and  become  a  mere  tale,  and  complete 
oblivion  soon  buries  them.  And  I  say  this  of  those  who 
have  shone  in  a  wondrous  way.  For  the  rest,  as  soon  as 
they  have  breathed  out  their  breath,  they  are  gone,  and  no 
man  speaks  of  them.     And,  to  conclude  the  matter,  what  is 


M.  Antoninub      IV.  ]r>l 

even  an  eternal  rcracmbvance  ?  A  mere  nothing.  What 
then  is  tliat  about  which  we  ought  to  employ  our  serious 
pains  ?  This  one  thing,  thoughts  just,  and  acts  social,  and 
words  which  never  lie,  and  a  disposition  which  gladly  accepts 
all  that  happens,  as  necessary,  as  usual,  as  flowing  from  a 
principle  and  source  of  the  same  kind. 

34.  AVillingly  give  thyself  up  to  Clotho  [one  of  the  fates], 
allowing  her  to  spin  thy  thread |  into  whatever  things  she 
pleases. 

35.  Everything  is  only  for  a  day,  both  that  which  remem- 
bers and  that  which  is  remembered. 

36.  Observe  constantly  that  all  things  take  place  by  change, 
and  accustom  thyself  to  consider  that  the  nature  of  the 
Universe  loves  nothing  so  much  as  to  change  the  things 
which  are  and  to  make  new  things  like  them.  For  every- 
thing that  exists  is  in  a  manner  the  seed  of  that  which  will 
be.  But  thou  art  thinking  only  of  seeds  which  are  cast 
into  the  earth  or  into  a  womb :  but  this  is  a  very  vulgar 
notion. 

37.  Thou  wilt  soon  die,  and  thou  art  not  yet  simple,  nor 
free  from  perturbations,  nor  without  suspicion  of  being  hurt 
by  external  things,  nor  kindly  disposed  towards  all ;  nor  dost 
thou  yet  place  wisdom  only  in  acting  justly. 

38.  Examine  men's  ruling  principles,  even  those  of  the 
wise,  what  kind  of  things  they  avoid,  and  what  kind  they 
pursue. 

39.  What  is  evil  to  thee  does  not  subsist  in  the  ruling 
principle  of  another ;  nor  yet  in  any  turning  and  mutation 
of  thy  corporeal  covering.  Where  is  it  then  ?  It  is  in  that 
part  of  thee  in  which  subsists  the  pow-er  of  forming  opinions 
about  evils.  Let  this  power  then  not  form  [such]  opinions, 
and  all  is  well.  And  if  that  which  is  nearest  to  it,  the  poor 
body,  is  cut,  burnt,  filled  with  matter  and  rottenness,  never- 
theless let  the  part  which  forms  opinions  about  these  things 
be  quiet,  that  is,  let  it  judge  that  nothing  is  either  bad  or 
good  which  can  happen  equally  to  the  bad  man  and  the  good. 
For  that  which  happens  equally  to  him  who  lives  contrary 


l'(J2  -M.  Antoninus.     IV. 

to  nature  and  to  liim  who  lives  according  to  nature,  is  neither 
according  to  nature  nor  contrary  to  nature. 

40.  Constantly  regard  the  universe  as  one  living  being, 
having  one  substance  and  one  soul;  and  observe  how  all 
things  have  reference  to  one  perception,  the  perception  of 
this  one  living  being  ;  and  how  all  things  act  with  one  move- 
ment ;  and  how  all  things  are  the  co-operating  causes  of  all 
things  which  exist ;  observe  too  the  continuous  spinning  of 
the  thread  and  the  contexture  of  the  web. 

41.  Thou  art  a  little  soul  bearing  about  a  corpse,  as  Epic- 
tetus  used  to  say  (i.  c.  19). 

42.  It  is  no  evil  for  things  to  undergo  change,  and  no  good 
for  things  to  subsist  in  consequence  of  change. 

43.  Time  is  like  a  river  made  up  of  the  events  which 
happen,  and  a  violent  stream;  for  as  soon  as  a  thing  has 
been  seen,  it  is  carried  away,  and  another  comes  in  its  place, 
and  this  will  be  carried  away  too. 

44.  Everything  which  happens  is  as  familiar  and  well 
known  as  the  rose  in  spring  and  the  fruit  in  summer ;  for 
such  is  disease,  and  death,  and  calumny,  and  treachery,  and 
whatever  else  delights  fools  or  vexes  them. 

45.  In  the  series  of  things  those  which  follow  are  always 
aptly  fitted  to  those  which  have  gone  before ;  for  this  series 
is  not  like  a  mere  enumeration  of  disjointed  things,  which 
has  only  a  necessary  sequence,  but  it  is  a  rational  connection  : 
and  as  all  existing  things  are  arranged  together  harmoniously, 
so  the  things  which  come  into  existence  exhibit  no  mere  suc- 
cession, but  a  certain  wonderful  relationship,  (vi.  38  ;  vii.  9  ; 
VII.  75,  note.) 

46.  xilways  remember  the  saying  of  Heraclitus,  tliat  the 
death  of  earth  is  to  become  water,  and  the  death  of  water  is 
to  become  air,  and  the  death  of  air  is  to  become  fire,  and 
reversely.  And  think  too  of  him  who  forgets  whither  the 
way  leads,  and  that  men  qua-rrel  with  that  with  which  they 
are  most  constantly  in  communion,  the  reason  which  governa 
the  universe ;  and  the  things  which  they  daily  meet  with 
seern  to  them  strange  :  and  consider  that  we  ought  r.ot  to  act 


M.  Antoninus.     I]'.  lO.*! 

aod  speak  as  if  wc  were  asleep,  for  even  in  sleep  wo  seem  tn 
act  and  speak ;  and  thatj  we  ouglit  not,  like  children  who 
learn  from  their  i)arents,  simply  to  act  and  speak  as  we  have 
been  taught. | 

47.  If  any  god  told  thee  that  thou  slialt  die  to-morrow,  or 
certainly  on  the  day  after  to-morrow,  thou  wouldst  not  care 
much  whether  it  was  on  the  third  day  or  on  the  morrow, 
unless  thou  wast  in  the  highest  degree  mean-spirited, — for 
how  small  is  the  difference  ? — so  think  it  no  great  thing  to 
die  after  as  many  years  as  thou  canst  name  rather  than  to- 
morrow. 

48.  Think  continually  how  many  physicians  are  dead  after 
often  contracting  their  eyebrows  over  the  sick  ;  and  how 
many  astrologers  after  predicting  with  great  pretensions  the 
deaths  of  others ;  and  how  many  philosophers  after  endless 
discourses  on  death  or  immortality  ;  how  many  heroes  after 
killing  thousands ;  and  how  many  tyrants  who  have  used 
theii-  power  over  men's  lives  with  terrible  insolence  as  if  they 
were  immortal ;  and  how  many  cities  are  entirely  dead,  so  to 
speak,  Helice'  and  Pompeii  and  Herclanum,  and  others 
innumerable.  Add  to  the  reckoning  all  whom  thou  hast 
known,  one  after  another.  One  man  after  burying  another 
has  been  laid  out  dead,  and  another  buries  him ;  and  all  this 
in  a  short  time.  To  conclude,  always  observe  how  ephemeral 
and  worthless  human  things  are,  and  what  was  yesterday  a 
little  mucus,  to-morrow  will  be  a  mummy  or  ashes.  Pass 
then  through  this  little  space  of  time  conformably  to  nature, 
and  end  thy  journey  in  content,  just  as  an  olive  falls  off  when 
it  is  ripe,  blessing  nature  who  produced  it,  and  thanking  th<- 
tree  on  which  it  grew. 

49.  Be  like  the  promontory  against  which  the  waves  con- 
tinually break,  but  it  stands  firm  and  tames  the  fury  of  the 
water  around  it. 

Unhappy  am  I,  because  this  has  happened  to  me — Not  so, 

»  Ovid,  Met.  xv.  293  : 

Si  qiiaeras  Hehcen  et  Burin  Aohaidas  lubes, 
luvenies  sub  aquis. 


]04  M.  Antoninus,     IV. 

but  Hapj)y  am  I,  thougli  this  has  happened  to  me,  because  I 
continue  free  from  pain,  neither  crushed  by  the  present  nor 
fearing  the  future.  For  such  a  thing  as  this  might  have 
happened  to  every  man ;  but  every  man  would  not  have  con- 
tinued free  from  pain  on  such  an  occasion.  Why  then  is 
that  rather  a  misfortune  than  this  a  good  fortune  ?  And  dost 
thou  in  all  cases  call  that  a  man's  misfortune,  which  is  not  a 
deviation  from  man's  nature?  And  does  a  thing  seem  to 
thee  to  be  a  deviation  from  man's  nature,  when  it  is  not 
contrary  to  the  will  of  man's  nature  ?  Well,  thou  knowest 
the  will  of  nature.  Will  then  this  which  has  happened 
prevent  thee  from  being  just,  magnanimous,  temperate,  pru- 
dent, secure  against  inconsiderate  opinions  and  falsehood; 
will  it  prevent  thee  from  having  modesty,  freedom,  and  every- 
thing else,  by  the  presence  of  which  man's  nature  obtains  all 
that  is  its  own  ?  Eemember  too  on  every  occasion  which 
leads  thee  to  vexation  to  apply  this  principle :  not  that  this 
is  a  misfortune,  but  that  to  bear  it  nobly  is  good  fortune. 

50.  It  is  a  vulgar,  but  still  a  useful  helj)  towards  contempt 
of  death,  to  pass  in  review  those  who  have  tenaciously  stuck 
to  life.  What  more  then  have  they  gained  than  those  who 
have  died  early  ?  Certainly  they  lie  in  their  tombs  some- 
where at  last,  Cadicianus,  Fabius,  Julianus,  Lepidus,  or  any 
one  else  like  them,  who  have  carried  out  many  to  be  buried, 
and  then  were  carried  out  themselves.  Altogether  the  in- 
terval is  small  [between  birth  and  death] ;  and  consider  with 
how  much  trouble,  and  in  company  with  what  sort  of  people 
and  in  what  a  feeble  body  this  interval  is  laboriously  passed. 
Do  not  then  consider  life  a  thing  of  any  value. f  For  look 
to  the  immensity  of  time  behind  thee,  and  to  the  time  which 
is  before  thee,  another  boundless  sjDace.  In  this  infinity  then 
what  is  the  difference  between  him  who  lives  three  days  and 
him  who  lives  three  generations?^ 

*  Au  allusion  to  Homer's  Nestor  who  was  living  at  the  war  of  Troy 
among  the  third  generation,  like  old  Parr  with  his  hundred  and  fifty- 
two  years,  and  some  others  in  modern  times  who  have  beaten  Pair  by 
twenty  or  thirty  years,  if  it  is  true;    and  yet  they  died  at  last.     Tha 


M.  Antoninus.     IV.  105 

51.  Always  run  to  the  short  way ;  and  the  short  way  is 
the  natural :  accordingly  say  and  do  everything  in  conformity 
with  the  soundest  reason.  For  such  a  purpose  frees  a  man 
from  trouble,!  and  warfare,  and  all  artifice  and  ostentatious 
display. 

word  is  Tpiyep-qviov  in  Antoninus.    Nestor  is  named  rpiy^puv  by  some 
writers ;  but  here  perhaps  there  is  an  allusion  to  Homer's  Tep-ijvio^  iviroTo 


106  M.  Antoninus.     V. 


I 


V. 

N    the   morning   wlien   thou   risest   unwillingly,  let  this 

thought  be  present — I  am  rising  to  Jhe  work  of  a  human 

X  beings    Whj_then  am  I  dissatisfied  if  I  am  going  to  do  the 

things  for  which  I  exist  and  for  which  I  was  brought  into  the 

world?     Or  have  I  been  made  for  this,  to  lie  in  the  bed- 

'  olothes  and  keep  myself  warm  ? — But  this  is  more  pleasant — 
Dost  thou  exist  then  to  take  thy  pleasure,  and  not  at  all  for 
action  or  exertion  ?  Dost  thou  not  see  the  little  plants,  the 
little  birds,  the  ants,  the  spiders,  the  bees  working  together 
to  put  in  order  their  several  parts  of  the  universe  ?  And  art 
thou  unwilling  to  do  the  work  of  a  human  being,  and  dost 
thou  not  make  haste  to  do  that  which  is  according  to  thy 
nature  ? — But  it  is  necessary  to  take  rest  also — It  is  neces- 
sary:  however  naturejias  fixed  bounds_ta_thia,jLOO  :  she  has 
fixed  bounds  both  to  eating  and  drinking,  and  yet  thou  goest 
beyond  these~boimds71>oyoncl^  what  is  sufficient ;  yet  in  thy 
acts  it  is  not  so,  but  thou  stoppest  short  of  what  thou  canst 
do.  ^Sothou  lovest  not  thysejf,  for  if  thou  didst,  thou 
wouldst  love  thy  nature  and  her  will.  But  those  whoTove 
their  several  arts  exhaust  themselves  in  working  at  them 
im washed  and  without  food  ;  but  thou  vainest  thy  own  nature 
less  than  the  turner  values  the  turning  art,  or  the  dancer  the 
dancing  art,  or  the  lover  of  money  values  his  money,  or  the 
vainglorious  man  his  little  glory.  And  such  men,  when 
they  have  a  violent  affection  to  a  thing;,  choose  neither  to 
"eKt  noFto  sleep  rather  than  to  perfect  the  things  which  they 
care  for.  But  are  the  acts  which  concern  society  more  vile  in 
thy'  eyes  and  less  worthy  of  thy  labour  H, 

/^     2.  How  easy  it  is  to  repel  and  to  wipe  away  every  impres- 

(   sion  which  is  troublesome  or  unsuitable,  and  immediately  to 

V  bo  in  all  tranquillity. 


M.  Antoninus.     V.  107 

3.  Judge  every  word  aud  deed  which  are  according  to 
nature  to^be  fit  for  tliec ;  and  be  not  diverted  hy  the  blamo 
which  follows  from  any  people  nor  by  their  words,  but  if  a 
thing  is  good  to  be  done  or  said,  do  not  consider  it  imworthy 
of  thee.  For  those  persons  have  their  peculiar  leading 
principle  and  foEow  their  peculiar  movement ;  which  things 
do  not  thou  regard,  but  go  straight  on,  following  thy  own 
nature  and  the  common  nature  ;  and  the  way  of  both  is  one. 

4.  I  go  through  the  things  which  happen  according  tc 
natui-e  until  I  shall  full  and  rest,  breathing  out  my  breath 
into  that  element  out  of  which  I  daily  draw  it  in,  and  falling 
upon  that  earth  out  of  which  my  father  collected  the  seed, 
and  my  mother  the  blood,  and  my  nurse  the  milk ;  out  of 
which  dui-ing  so  many  years  I  have  been  supplied  Ti'ith  food 
and  drink ;  which  bears  me  when  I  tread  on  it  and  abuse  it 
for  so  many  pui'poses. 

5.  Thou  sayest,  Men  cannot  admire  the  sharpness  of  thy 
wits — Be  it  so  :  but  there  are  many  other  thin-gs  of  which 
thou  canst  not  say,  I  am  not  formed  for  them  by  nature. 
Show  those  qualities  then  which  are  altogether  in  thy  power, 
sincerity,  gravity,  endurance  of  labour,  aversion  to  pleasure, 
contentment  with  thy  portion  and  with  few  things,  benevo- 
lence, frankness,  no  love  of  superfluity,  freedom  from  trifling, 
magnanimity.  Dost  thou  not  see  how  many  qualities  thou 
art  immediately  able  to  exhibit,  in  which  there  is  no  excuse  of 
natui'al  incapacity  aud  unfitness,  and  yet  thou  still  remainest 
voluntarily  below  the  mark  ?  or  art  thou  compelled  through 
being  defectively  furnished  by  nature  to  miu'mur,  and  to  be 
stingy,  and  to  flatter,  and  to  find  fault  with  thy  poor  body,  and 
to  try  to  please  men,  and  to  make  great  display,  and  to  be  so 
restless  in  thy  mind  ?  No  by  the  gods :  but  thou  mightest 
have  been  delivered  from  these  things  long  ago.  Only  if  in 
truth  thou  canst  be  charged  with  being  rather  slow  and  dull 
of  comprehension,  thou  must  exert  thyself  about  this  also,  not 
neglecting  it  nor  yet  taking  pleasure  in  thy  dulness. 

6.  One  man,  when  he  has  done  a  service  to  another,  i& 
ready  to  set  it  down  to  his  account  as  a  favour  conferred. 


108  M.  Antoninus.     V. 

Another  is  not  ready  to  do  this,  but  still  in  his  own  mind  he 
thinks  of  the  man  as  his  debtor,  and  he  knows  what  he  has 
done.  A  third  in  a  manner  does  not  even  know  what  he  has 
done,  but  he  is  like  a  vine  which  has  produced  grapes,  and 
seeks  for  nothing  more  after  it  has  once  produced  its  proper 
fruit.  As  a  horse  when  he  has  run,  a  dog  when  he  has 
tracked  the  game,  a  bee  when  it  has  made  the  honey,  so  a  man 
when  he  has  done  a  good  act,  does  not  call  out  for  others  to 

'^  come  and  see,  but  he  goes  on  to  another  act,  as  a  vine  goes  on 
to  produce  again  the  grapes  in  season — Must  a  man  then  be 
one  of  these,  who  in  a  manner  act  thus  without  observing  it  ? 
— Yes — But  this  very  thing  is  necessary,  the  observation  of 
what  a  man  is  doing :  for,  it  may  be  said,  it  is  characteristic 

yf  of  the  social  animal  to  perceive  that  he  is  working  in  a  social 
manner,  and  indeed  to  wish  that  his  social  partner  also  should 
perceive  it — It  is  true  what  thou  sayest,  but  thou  dost  not 
rightly  understand  what  is  now  said  :  and  for  this  reason  thou 
wilt  become  one  of  those  of  whom  I  spoke  before,  for  even 
they  are  misled  by  a  certain  show  of  reason.  But  if  thou 
wilt  choose  to  understand  the  meaning  of  what  is  said,  do  not 
fear  that  for  this  reason  thou  wilt  omit  any  social  act. 

7.  A  prayer  of  the  Athenians:  Rain,  rain,  O  dear  Zeus, 
down  on  the  ploughed  fields  of  the  Athenians  and  on  the 
plains. — In  truth  we  ought  not  to  pray  at  all,  or  we  ought  to 
pray  in  this  simple  and  noble  fashion. 

8.  Just  as  we  must  understand  when  it  is  said,  That 
Aesculapius  jDrescribed  to  this  man  horse-exercise,  or  bathing 
in  cold  water  or  going  without  shoes  ;  so  we  must  understand 
it  when  it  is  said.  That  the  nature  of  the  universe  prescribed 
to  this  man  disease  or  mutilation  or  loss  or  anything  else  of 
the  kind.  For  in  the  first  case  Prescribed  means  something 
like  this  :  he  prescribed  this  for  this  man  as  a  thing  adapted 
to  procure  health;  and  in  the  second  case  it  means.  That 
which  happens'  to  [or,  suits]  every  man  is  fixed  in  a  manner 
for  him  suitably  to  his  destiny.     For  this  is  what  we  mean 

'  In  tbis  section  there  is  a  play  on  the  meaning  of  avfifiaiveiv. 


M.  Antoninus.     V.  103 

when  we  say  that  tilings  aro  suitable  to  us,  as  the  workmen 
say  of  squared  stones  in  walls  or  the  pyramids,  that  they  are 
suitable,  when  they  fit  them  to  one  another  in  some  kind  of 
connection.  For  there  is  altogether  one  fitness  [harmony]. 
And  as  the  universe  is  made  up  out  of  aUHBodies  to  be  such  a 
body  as  it  is,  so  out  of  all  existing  causes  necessity  I'^destiny] 
is  made  up  to  be  such  a  cause  as  it  is.  And  even  those  who 
are  completely  ignorant  understand  what  I  mean,  for-4lioy 
say,  It  [necessity,  destiny]  brought  this  to  such  a  person. — 
This  tEen'was  brought  and  this  was  prescribed  to  him.  Let 
us  then  receive  these  things,  as  well  as  those  which  Aescu- 
lapius prescribes.  Many  as  a  matter  of  course  even  among 
his  prescriptions  are  disagreeable,  but  we  accept  them  in  the 
hope  of  health.  Let  the  perfecting  and  accomplishment  of 
the  things,  which  the  common  nature  judges  to  be  good,  be 
judged  by  thee  to  be  of  the  same  kind  as  thy  health.  And  so 
accept  everything  which  happens,  even  if  it  seem  disagree- 
able, because  it  leads  to  this,  to  the  health  of  the  universe  and 
to  the  prosperity  and  felicity  of  Zeus  [the  universe].  For  he 
would  not  have  brought  on  any  man  what  he  has  brought,  if 
it  were  not  useful  for  the  whole.  Xeither-does  the  nature  of 
anything,  whatever  it  may  be,  cause  anything  which  is  not 
suitable  to  that  which  is  dii-ected  by  it.  For  two  rea.sons 
then  it  is  right  to  be  content  with  that  which  happens^to 
thee  ;  the  one,  because  it  was  done  for  thee  and  prescribed  for 
thee,  and  in  a  manner  had  reference  to  thee,  originally  from 
)^^  most  ancient  causes  spun  with  thy  destiny ;  and  the  other, 
because  even  that  which  comes  severally  to  every  man  is  to 
the  power  which  administers  the  universe  a  cause  of  felicity 
and  perfection,  nay  even  of  its  very  continuance.  For  the 
integrity  of  the  whole  is  mutilated,  if  thou  cuttest  off  any- 
thing whatever  from  the  conjunction  and  the  continuity  either 
of  the  parts  or  of  the  causes.  And  thou  dost  cut  off,  as  far  as 
it  is  in  thy  power,  when  thou  art  dissatisfied,  and  in  a  manner 
triest  to  put  anything  out  oi  the  way. 

9.  Be  not  disgusted,   nor  discouraged,  nor  dissatisfied,  if 
thou  dost  not  succeed  in  doing  everything  according  to  right 


ilO  M.  Antoninus.     V. 

principles ;  but  when  thou  hast  failed,  return  back  again,  and 
be  content  if  the  greater  part  of  what  thou  doest  is  consistent 
with  man's  nature,  and  love  this  to  which  thou  returnest; 
and  do  not  return  to  philosophy  as  if  she  were  a  master,  but 
act  like  those  who  have  sore  eyes  and  apply  a  bit  of  sponge 
and  egg,  or  as  another  applies  a  plaster,  or  drenching  with 
water.  For  thus  thou  wilt  not  fail  tof  obey  reason,  and  thou 
wilt  repose  in  it.  And  remember  that  philosophy  requires 
only  the  things  which  thy  nature  requires  ;  but  thou  wouldst 
have  something  else  which  is  not  according  to  nature — It  may 
be  objected,  Why  what  is  more  agreeable  than  this  [which  I 
am  doing]  ? — But  is  not  this  the  very  reason  why  pleasure 
deceives  us?  And  consider  if  magnanimity,  freedom,  sim- 
plicity, equanimity,  piety,  are  not  more  agreeable.  For 
what  is  more  agreeable  than  wisdom  itself,  when  thou 
thinkest  of  the  security  and  the  happy  course  of  all  things 
which  depend  on  the  faculty  of  understanding  and  know- 
ledge ? 

10.  Things  are  in  such  a  kind  of  envelo2:)ement  that  they 
have  seemed  to  philosophers,  not  a  few  nor  those  common 
philosophers,  altogether  unintelligible ;  nay  even  to  the 
Stoics  themselves  they  seem  difficult  to  understand.  And  all 
our  9,ssent  is  changeable ;  for  where  is  the  man  who  never 
changes?  Carry  thy  thoughts  then  to  the  objects  themselves, 
and  consider  how  short-lived  they  are  and  worthless,  and  that 
they  may  be  in  the  possession  of  a  filthy  wretch  or  a  whore 
or  a  robber.  Then  turn  to  the  morals  of  those  who  live  with 
thee,  and  it  is  hardly  possible  to  endure  even  the  most 
agreeable  of  them,  to  say  nothing  of  a  man  being  hardly 
able  to  endure  himself.  In  such  darkness  then  and  dirt  and 
in  so  constant  a  flux  both  of  substance  and  of  time,  and  of 
motion  and  of  things  moved,  what  there  is  worth  being 
highly  prized  or  even  an  object  of  serious  pursuit,  I  cannot 
imagine.  But  on  the  contrary  it  is  a  man's  duty  to  comfort 
himself,  and  to  wait  for  the  natural  dissolution  and  not  to  be 
vexed  at  the  delay,  but  to  rest  in  these  jmnciples  only  :  the 
one,  that  nothing  will  happen  to  me  which  is  not  conformable 


M.  Antoninus.     V.  Ill 

to  the  nature  of  the  uuiverse ;  and  tlic  other,  that  it  is  in  my 
power  never  to  act  contrary  to  my  god  and  daemon  :  for  there 
is  no  man  who  will  compel  me  to  this. 

11.  About  what  am  I  now  employing  my  own  soul?  On 
every  occasion  I  must  ask  myself  this  question,  and  inquire, 
what  have  I  now  in  this  part  of  me  which  they  call  the  ruling 
jmuciple  ?  and  whose  soul  have  I  now  ?  that  of  a  child,  or  of 
a  young  man,  or  of  a  feeble  woman,  or  of  a  tyrant,  or  of  a 
domestic  animal,  or  of  a  wild  beast  ? 

12.  What  kind  of  things  those  are  which  appear  good  to 
the  many,  w^e  may  learn  even  from  this.  For  if  any  man 
should  conceive  certain  things  as  being  really  good,  such  as 
prudence,  temperance,  justice,  fortitude,  he  would  not  after 
having  fii'st  conceived  these  endui'e  to  listen  to  anything*)" 
which  should  not  be  in  harmony  wdth  what  is  really  good.j 
But  if  a  mail  has  fii'st  conceived  as  good  the  things  which  appear 
to  the  many  to  be  good,  he  will  listen  and  readily  receive  as 
very  applicable  that  which  was  said  by  the  comic  writer. 
fThus  even  the  many  perceive  the  difference. f  For  were  it 
not  so,  this  saving  would  not  offend  and  would  not  be  rejected 
[in  the  first  case],  while  we  receive  it  when  it  is  said  of 
wealth,  and  of  the  means  which  further  luxury  and  fame,  as 
said  fitly  and  wdttily.  Go  on  then  and  ask  if  we  should  value 
and  think  those  things  to  be  good,  to  which  after  their  first 
conception  in  the  mind  the  words  of  the  comic  writer  might 
be  aptly  applied — that  he  who  has  them,  through  pure 
abundance  has  not  a  place  to  ease  himself  in. 

13.  I  am  composed  of  the  formal  and  the  material;  and 
neither  of  them  will  perish  into  non-existence,  as  neither  of 
them  came  into  existence  out  of  non-existence.  Every  part 
of  me  then  will  be  reduced  by  change  into  some  part  of  the 
universe,  and  that  again  will  change  into  another  part  of  the 
universe,  and  so  on  for  ever.  And  by  consequence  of  such  a 
change  I  too  exist,  and  those  who  begot  me,  and  so  on  for 
ever  in  the  other  direction.  For  nothing  hinders  us  from 
saying  so,  even  if  the  universe  is  administered  according  to 
definite  periods  [of  revolution]. 


112  M.  Antoninus.     V. 

14.  Eeason  and  the  reasoning  art  [philosophy]  are  powers 
ivhich  are  sufficient  for  themselves  and  for  their  own  works. 
They  move  then  from  a  first  principle  which  is  their  own, 
and  they  make  their  way  to  the  end  which  is  proposed  to 
them;  and  this  is  the  reason  why  such  acts  are  named 
Catorthoseis  or  right  acts,  which  word  signifies  that  they 
proceed  by  the  right  rop.d. 

15.  None  of  these  things  ought  to  be  called  a  man's,  which 
do  not  belong  to  a  man,  as  man.  They  are  not  required  of  a 
man,  nor  does  man's  nature  promise  them,  nor  are  tliey  the 
means  of  man's  nature  attaining  its  end.  Neither  then  does 
the  end  of  man  lie  in  these  things,  nor  yet  that  which  aids 
to  the  accomplishment  of  this  end,  and  that  which  aids  towards 
this  end  is  that  which  is  good.  Besides,  if  any  of  these  things 
did  belong  to  man,  it  would  not  be  right  for  a  man  to  despise 
them  and  to  set  himself  against  them ;  nor  would  a  man  be 
worthy  of  praise  who  showed  that  he  did  not  want  these 
things,  nor  would  he  who  stinted  himself  in  any  of  them  be 
good,  if  indeed  these  things  were  good.  But  now  the  more 
of  these  things  a  man  deprives  himself  of,  or  of  other  things 
like  them,  or  even  when  he  is  deprived  of  any  of  them,  the 
more  patiently  he  endures  the  loss,  just  in  the  same  degree 
he  is  a  better  man. 

■  16.  Such  as  are  thy  habitual  thoughts,  such  also  will  be 
the  character  of  thy  mind;  for  the  soul  is  dyed  by  the 
thoughts.  Dye  it  then  with  a  continuous  series  of  such 
thoughts  as  these :  for  instance,  that  where  a  man  can  live, 
there  he  can  also  live  well.  But  he  must  live  in  a  palace ; — 
well  then,  he  can  also  live  well  in  a  palace.  And  again,  con- 
sider that  for  whatever  purpose  each  thing  has  been  con- 
stituted, for  this  it  has  been  constituted,  and  towards  this  it 
is  carried  ;  and  its  end  is  in  that  towards  which  it  is  carried  ; 
and  where  the  end  is,  there  also  is  the  advantage  and  the 
good  of  each  thing.  Now  the  good  for  the  reasonable  animal 
is  society ;  for  that  we  are  made  for  society  has  been  shown 
above.*^     Is  it  not  plain  that  the  inferior  exist  for  the  sake  of 

2  II.  1. 


M.  Antoninus.     V.  113 

the  superior  ?  but  the  things  which  have  life  are  superior  to 
those  which  have  not  life,  and  of  those  which  have  life  the 
sujicrior  are  those  which  have  reason. 

17.  To  seek  what  is  impossible  is  madness:  audit  is  im- 
possible that  the  bad  should  not  do  something  of  this  kind. 

18.  Nothing  happens  to  any  man  which  he  is  not  formed 
by  nature  to  bear.  The  same  things  happen  to  another,  and 
either  because  he  does  not  see  that  they  have  hapj^ened  or 
because  he  would  show  a  great  spirit  he  is  firm  and  remains 
unharmed.  It  is  a  shame  then  that  ignorance  and  conceit 
should  be  stronger  than  wisdom. 

19.  Things  themselves  touch  not  the  soul,  not  in  the  least 
degree ;  nor  have  they  admission  to  the  soul,  nor  can  they 
turn  or  move  the  soul :  but  the  soul  turns  and  moves  itself 
alone,  and  whatever  judgments  it  may  think  proper  to  make, 
such  it  makes  for  itself  the  things  which  present  themselves 
to  it. 

20.  In  one  respect  man  is  the  nearest  thing  to  me,  so  far 
as  I  must  do  good  to  men  and  endure  them.  But  so  far  as 
some  men  make  themselves  obstacles  to  my  proper  acts,  man 
becomes  to  me  one  of  the  things  which  are  indifferent,  no 
less  than  the  sun  or  wind  or  a  wild  beast.  Now  it  is  true 
that  these  may  impede  my  action,  but  they  are  no  impediments 
to  my  affects  and  disposition,  which  have  the  power  of  acting 
conditionally  and  changing  :  for  the  mind  converts  and 
changes  every  hindrance  to  its  activity  into  an  aid ;  and  so 
that  which  is  a  hindrance  is  made  a  furtherance  to  an  act ; 
and  that  which  is  an  obstacle  on  the  road  helps  us  on  this 
road. 

.21.  Eeverence  that  which  is  best  in  the  universe ;  and  this^ 
is  that  which  makes  use  of  all  things  and  directs  all  things. 
And  in  like  manner  also  reverence  that  which  is  best  in 
thyself;  and  this  is  of  the  same  kind  as  that.  For  in  thyself 
also,  that  which  makes  use  of  everything  else,  is  this,  and  thy 
life  is  directed  by  this. 

22.  That  which  does  no  harm  to  the  state,  does  no  harm  to 
the  citizen.     In  the  case  of  every  appearance  of  harm  apply 

z 


114  M.  Antoninus.     V. 

tliis  rule :  if  tlie  state  is  not  harmed  by  this,  neither  am  I 
harmed.  But  if  the  state  is  harmed,  thou  must  not  be  angry 
with  him  who  does  harm  to  the  state.  Show  him  where  his 
error  is. 

23.  Often  think  of  the  rapidity  with  which  things  pass  by 
and  disappear,  both  the  things  which  are  and  the  things 
which  are  produced.  For  substance  is  like  a  river  in  a  con- 
tinual flow,  and  the  activities  of  things  are  in  constant  change, 
and  the  causes  work  in  infinite  varieties ;  and  there  is  hardly 
anything  which  stands  still.  And  consider  this  which  is 
near  to  thee,  this  boundless  abyss  of  the  past  and  of  the  future 
in  which  all  things  disappear.  How  then  is  he  not  a  fool 
who  is  puffed  up  with  such  things  or  plagued  about  them  and 
makes  himself  miserable  ?  for  they  vex  him  only  for  a  time, 
and  a  short  time. 

24.  Think  of  the  universal  substance,  of  which  thou  hast  a 
very  small  portion ;  and  of  universal  time,  of  which  a  short 
and  indivisible  interval  has  been  assigned  to  thee ;  and  of 
that  which  is  fixed  by  destiny,  and  how  small  a  part  of  it 
thou  art. 

25.  Does  another  do  me  wrong  ?  Let  him  look  to  it.  He 
has  his  own  disposition,  his  own  activity.  I  now  have  what 
the  universal  nature  wills  me  to  have ;  and  I  do  what  my 
nature  now  wills  me  to  do. 

26.  Let  the  part  of  thy  soul  which  leads  and  governs  be 
undistm-bed  by  the  movements  in  the  flesh,  whether  of 
pleasure  or  of  pain ;  and  let  it  not  unite  with  them,  but  let 
it  circumscribe  itself  and  limit  those  affects  to  their  parts. 
But  when  these  affects  rise  up  to  the  mind  by  virtue  of  that 
other  sympathy  that  naturally  exists  in  a  body  which  is  all 
one,  then  thou  must  not  strive  to  resist  the  sensation,  for  it 
is  natural :  but  let  not  the  ruling  part  of  itself  add  to  the 
sensation  the  opinion  that  it  is  either  good  or  bad. 

27.  Live  with  the  gods.  And  he  does  live  with  the  gods 
who  constantly  shows  to  them  that  his  own  soul  is  satisfied 
with  that  which  is  assigned  to  him,  and  that  it  docs  all  that 
the  daemon  wishes,  which  Zeus  hath  given  to  every  man  for 


i 


M.  Antomnus.     V.  115 

Ill's  guardian  and  guide,  a  portion  of  liimself.     And  tliis  is 
every  man's  understanding  and  reason. 

28.  Art  tliou  angry  with  liim  whose  arm-joits  stink  ?  art 
thou  angry  with  him  whose  mouth  smells  foul '?  What  good 
will  this  anger  do  thee  ?  He  has  such  a  mouth,  he  has  such 
arm-pits :  it  is  necessary  that  such  an  emanation  must  come 
from  such  things — but  the  man  has  reason,  it  will  be  said, 
and  he  is  able,  if  he  takes  pains,  to  discover  wherein  ho 
offends — I  wishsiheewell  of  thy  discovery.  Well  then,  and 
thou  hast  reason  :  by  thy  rational  faculty  stir  up  his  rational 
faculty ;  show  him  his  error,  admonish  him.  For  if  he  listens, 
thou  wilt  cure  him,  and  there  is  no  need  of  anger.  [fNeither 
tragic  actor  nor  whore.lj^ 

29.  As  thou  intendest  to  live  when  thou  art  gone  out,  *  * 
so  it  is  in  thy  power  to  live  here.  But  if  men  do  not  permit 
thee,  then  get  away  out  of  life,  yet  so  as  if  thou  wert  suffering 
no  harm.  The  house  is  smoky,  and  I  quit  it.*  Why  dost 
thou  think  that  this  is  any  trouble  ?  But  so  long  as  nothing 
of  the  kind  drives  me  out,  I  remain,  am  free,  and  no  man 
shall  hinder  me  from  doing  what  I  choose  ;  and  I  choose  to 
do  what  is  according  to  the  nature  of  the  rational  and  social 
animal. 

30.  The  intelligence  of  the  universe  is  social.  Accordingly 
it  has  made  the  inferior  things  for  the  sake  of  the  superior, 
and  it  has  fitted  the  superior  to  one  another.  Thou  seest 
how  it  has  subordinated,  co-ordinated  and  assigned  to  every 
thing  its  proper  portion,  and  has  brought  together  into  concord 
with  one  another  the  things  which  are  the  best. 

31.  How  hast  thou  behaved  hitherto  to  the  gods,  thy 
parents,  brethren,  children,  teachers,  to  those  who  looked 
after  thy  infancy,  to  thy  friends,  kinsfolk,  to  thy  slaves? 

3  This  is  imperfect  or  corrupt,  or  both.  There  is  also  something 
wrong  or  incomplete  in  the  beginning  of  S.  29,  where  he  says  w?  i^eXdwu 
Qu  Siavorj,  which  Gataker  translates  "  as  if  thou  wast  about  to  quit 
life ;"  but  we  cannot  translate  e^e\9wv  in  that  way.  Other  translations 
are  not  much  more  satisfactory.  I  have  translated  it  literally  and  left 
it  imperfect. 

*  Epictetus,  I.  25.  18. 


116  M.  Antoninus.     V. 

Consider  if  thou  hast  hitherto  behaved  to  all  in  such  a  way 
that  this  may  be  said  of  thee  : 

Never  has  wronged  a  man  in  deed  or  word. 

And  call  to  recollection  both  how  many  things  thou  hast 
passed  through,  and  how  many  things  thou  hast  been  able  to 
endure  :  and  that  the  history  of  thy  life  is  now  complete  and 
thy  service  is  ended  :  and  how  many  beautiful  things  thou 
hast  seen :  and  how  many  pleasures  and  pains  thou  hast 
despised  ;  and  how  many  things  called  honourable  thou  hast 
spurned  ;  and  to  how  many  ill-minded  folks  thou  hast  shown 
a  kind  disposition. 

32.  Why  do  unskilled  and  ignorant  souls  disturb  him  who 
has  skill  and  knowledge  ?  What  soul  then  has  skill  and 
knowledge?  That  which  knows  beginning  and  end,  and 
knows  the  reason  which  pervades  all  substance  and  thi'ough 
all  time  by  fixed  periods  [revolutions]  administers  the 
universe. 

33.  Soon,  very  soon,  thou  wilt  be  ashes,  or  a  skeleton,  and 
either  a  name  or  not  even  a  name  ;  but  name  is  sound  and 
echo.  And  the  things  which  are  much  valued  in  life  are 
empty  and  rotten  and  trifling,  and  [like]  little  dogs  biting 
one  another,  and  little  children  quarrelling,  laughing,  and 
then  straightway  weeping.  But  fidelity  and  modesty  and 
justice  and  truth  are  fled 

Up  to  Olympus  from  the  wide-spread  earth. 

JSesiod,  Worls,  etc.  v.  197. 

What  then  is  there  which  still  detains  thee  here  ?  if  the 
objects  of  sense  are  easily  changed  and  never  stand  still,  and 
the  organs  of  percej^tion  are  dull  and  easily  receive  false 
impressions ;  and  the  poor  soul  itself  is  an  exhalation  from 
blood.  But  to  have  good  repute  amidst  such  a  world  as  this 
is  an  empty  thing.  Why  then  dost  thou  not  wait  in  tran- 
quillity for  thy  end,  whether  it  is  extinction  or  removal  to 
another  state  ?  And  until  that  time  comes,  what  is  sufiicicnt  ? 
Why,  what  else  than  to  venerate  the  gods  and  bless  them, 
and  to  do  good  to  men,  and  to  practise  tolerance  and  self- 


M.  Anioninus.     V.  11 V 

rcstraiut  ;*  but  as  to  cverytliiug  ^vllicll  is  beyond  tlio  limits 
of  the  poor  flesh  and  breath,  to  remember  that  this  is  neither 
thine  nor  in  thy  power. 

34.  Thou  canst  pass  thy  life  in  an  equable  flow  of  hap- 
piness, if  thou  canst  go  by  the  right  way,  and  think  and  act 
in  the  right  way.  These  two  things  are  common  both  to  thci 
soul  of  god  and  to  the  soul  of  man,  and  to  the  soul  of  every 
rational  being,  not  to  be  hindered  by  another ;  and  to  hold 
good  to  consist  in  the  disposition  to  justice  and  the  practice 
of  it,  and  in  this  to  let  thy  desire  find  its  termination. 

35.  If  this  is  neither  my  own  badness,  nor  an  effect  of  my 
own  badness,  and  the  common  weal  is  not  injured,  why  am  I 
troubled  about  it?  and  what  is  the  harm  to  the  common 
weal  ? 

36.  Do  not  be  carried  along  inconsiderately  by  the  appear- 
ance of  things,  but  give  help  [to  all]  according  to  thy  ability 
and  their  fitness ;  and  if  they  should  have  sustained  loss  in 
matters  which  are  indifferent,  do  not  imagine  this  to  be  a 
damage.  For  it  is  a  bad  habit.  But  as  the  old  man,  when 
he  went  aw^ay,  asked  back  his  foster-child's  top,  remembering 
that  it  was  a  top,  so  do  thou  in  this  case  also. 

When  thou  art  calling  out  on  the  Eostra,  hast  thou  for- 
gotten, man,  what  these  things  are  ? — Yes ;  but  they  are 
objects  of  great  concern  to  these  people — wilt  thou  too  then 
be  made  a  fool  for  these  things? — I  was  once  a  fortunate 
man,  but  I  lost  it,  I  know  not  how. — But  fortunate  means 
that  a  man  has  assigned  to  himself  a  good  fortune :  and  a 
good  fortune  is  good  disposition  of  the  soul,  good  emotions, 
good  actions.^ 

5  This  is  the  Stoic  precept  aj/e'xou  koI  airexov.  The  first  part  teaches 
us  to  be  content  with  men  and  things  as  they  are.  The  second  part 
teaclies  us  the  virtue  of  self-restraint,  or  the  government  of  our  passions. 

^  This  section  is  unintelligible.  Many  of  the  ^vords  may  be  corrupt, 
and  the  general  purport  of  the  section  cannot  be  discovered.  Perhaps 
several  things  have  been  improperly  joined  in  one  section.  I  have 
translated  it  nearly  literally.  Different  translators  give  the  section  a 
different  turn,  and  the  critics  have  tried  to  mend  what  they  cannot 
understand. 


il8  ill  Antoninus.     VL 


VI. 

I^HE  substance  of  tlie  universe  is  obedient  and  compliant ; 
and  tbe  reasoiTwliicli  goveFns  it  has  in  itself  no  cause 
for  doin^  evil,  for  it  bas  no  malice,  iior~does~ir~do  evil  'to 
anything,  nor  is  anything  harmed  by  it.  But  all  things  are 
made  and  perfected  according  to  this  reason. 

2.  Let  it  make  no  difference  to  thee  whether  thou  art  cold 
or  warm,  if  thou  art  doing  thy^duty ;  and  whether  thou  art 
drowsy  or  satisfied  with  sleep ;  and  whether  ill-spoken  of  or 
praised ;  and  whetherdying  or  doing  something  else.  For 
it  is  one  of  the  acts^ofn^T^Esact  by  which  we  die  :  it  is 
sufficient  then  in  this  act  also  to  do  well  what  we  have  in 
hand.  (vi.  22,  28.) 

3.  Look  within.  Let  neither  the  peculiar  quality  of  any- 
thing nor  its  value  escape  thee. 

4.  All  existing  things  soon  change,  and  they  will  either 
be  reduced  to  vapour,  if  indeed  all  substance  is  one,  or  they 
will  be  dispersed. 

5.  The  reason  which  governs  knows  what  its  own  disposi- 
tion is,  and  what  it  does,  and  on  what  material  it  works. 

6.  The  best  way  of  avenging  thyself  is  not  to  become  like 
[the  wrong  doer]. 

7.  Take  pleasure  in  one  thing  and  rest  in  it,  in  passing 
from  one  social  act  to  another  social  act,  thinking  of  God. 

8.  The  ruling  principle  is  that  which  rouses  and  turns 
itself,  and  while  it  makes  itself  such  as  it  is  and  such  as  it 
wills  to  be,  it  also  makes  everything  which  happens  appear  to 
itself  to  be  such  as  it  wills. 

9.  In  conformity  to  the  nature  of  the  universe  every  single 
thing  is  accomplished,  for  certainly  it  is  not  in  conformity 
to  any  other  nature  that  each  thing  is  accomplished,  either  a 


M.  Antoninus.     VI.  119 

natui-e  which  externally  comprehends  this,  oi-  a  nature  which 
is  comprehended  within  this  nature,  or  a  nature  external  and 
indei^endcut  of  this.  (xi.  1,  vi.  40,  viii.  50.) 
/  10.  The  universe  is  either  a  confusion,  and  a  mutual  in- 
^  volution  ofthings,  and  a^dispersion  ;  or  it  is  unity  and  order 
and  j)rovidence.  If  then  it  is  the  former,  why  do  I  desire  to 
tarry  in  a  fortuitous  combination  of  things  and  such  a  dis- 
order ?  and  why  do  I  care  about  anything  else  than  how  I 
shall  at  last  become  earth  ?  and  why  am  I  disturbed^  for  the 
dispersion  of  my  elements  will  happen  whatever  I  do.  But 
if  the  other  supposition  is  true,  I  venerate,  and  I  am  firm, 
and  I  trust  in  him  who  governs,     (iv.  27.) 

11.  When  thou  hast  been  compelled  by  circumstances  to 
be  disturbed  in  a  manner,  quickly  return  to  ih  "33lf  and  do 
not  continue  out  of  tune  longer  than  the  compulsion  lasts ; 
for  thou  wilt  hate  more  mastery  over  the  harmony  by  con- 
tinually recui'ring  to  it  ~  ^  " 

12.  If  thou  hadst  a  step-mother  and  a  mother  at  the  same 
time,  thou  wouldst  be  dutiful  to  thy  step-mother,  but  still  thou 
wouldst  constantly  return  to  thy  mother.  Let  the  court  and 
philosophy  now  be  to  thee  step-mother  and  mother :  return 
to  philosophy  frequently  and  repose  in  her,  through  whom 
what  thou  meetest  with  in  the  court  ajDpears  to  thee  tolerable, 
and  thou  appearest  tolerable  in  the  court. 

13.  When  we  have  meat  before  us  and  such  eatables,  we 
receive  the  impression,  that  this  is  the  dead  body  of  a  fish, 
and  this  is  the  dead  body  of  a  bii'd  or  of  a  pig;  and 
again,  that  this  Falernian  is  only  a  little  grape  juice, 
and  this  pui'ple  robe  some  sheep's  wool  dyed  with  the 
blood  of  a  shell-fish :  such  then  are  these  impressions, 
and  they  reach  the  things  themselves  and  penetrate  them, 
and  so  we  see  what  kind  of  things  they  are.  Just  in 
the  same  way  ought  we  to  act  all  through  life,  and  where 
there  are  things  which  appear  most  worthy  of  our  approba- 
tion, we  ought  to  lay  them  bare  and  look  at  their  worthless- 

'    ness  and  strip  them  of  all  the  words  by  which  they  are 
exalted.     For  outward  show  is  a  wonderful  pervcrter  of  tho 


120  If.  Antoninus.     VI. 

reason^  and  when  tliou  art  most  sure  that  then  art  employed 

"alooiit  things  worth  thy  pains,  it  is  then  that  it  cheats  theo 

most.     Consider  then  what  Crates  says  of  Xenocratcs  himself. 

14.  Most  of  the  things  which  the  multitude  admire  are 
referred  to  objects  of  the  most  general  kind,  those  which  are 
held  together  by  cohesion  or  natural  organization,  such  as 
stones,  wood,  fig-trees,  vines,  olives.  But  those  which  are 
admired  by  men,  who  are  a  little  more  reasonable,  are  re- 
ferred to  the  things  which  are  held  together  by  a  living^ 
principle,  as  flocks,  herds.  Those  which  are  admired  by 
men  w^ho  are  still  more  instructed  are  the_yiingsjv\'hich  are 
held  togothoiUaj?:  a  rational^soul,  not  however  a  universal  soul, 
but  rational  so  far  as  it  is  asoul  ski]le(Lin_somejirt,  or  expert 
in  some  other  way,  or  simply  rational  so  far  as  it  possesses  a 
number  of  slaves.  But  he  who  values  a  rational  so.ul,  a  soul 
universal  and  fitted  for  political  life,  regards  nothing  else 
except  this ;  and  above  all  things  lie  keeps  his  soul  in  a  con- 
dition and  in  an  activity  conformable.  to_reasorL_iLnd  social^ 
life,  and  he  co-operates  to  this  end  with  those  who  are  of  the 
same  kind  as  himself. 

15.  Some  things  are  hurrying  into  existence,  and  others 
are  hurrying  out  of  it ;  and  of  that  which  is  coming  into 
existence  part  is  already  extinguished.  Motions  and  changes 
are  continually  renewing  jhe  jworld,  just  as  the  uninterrupted 
course' of  time  is  always  renewing  the  infinite  duration  of 
ages.  In  this  flowing  stream  then,  on  which  there  is  no 
abiding,  what  is  there  of  the  things  which  hurry  by  on  which 
a  man.  would  set  a  high  price  ?  It  would  be  just  as  if  a  man 
should  fall  in  love  with  one  of  the  sparrows  which  fly  by, 
but  it  has  already  past  out  of  sight.  Something  of  this  kind 
is  the  very  life  of  every  man,  like  the  exhalation  of  the  blood 
and  the  respiration  of  the  air.  For  such  as  it  is  to  have 
once  drawn  in  the  air  and  to  have  given  it  back,  which  we  do 
every  moment,  just  the  same  is  it  with  the  whole  respiratory 
power,  which  thou  didst  receive  at  thy  birth  yesterday  and 
the  day  before,  to  give  it  back  to  the  element  from  which 
thou  didst  first  draw  it. 


M.  Antoninus.      VI.  121 

16.  Neither  is  transpiration,  as  in  plants,  a  thin^  to  be 
valued,  nor  respiration,  as  in  domesticated  animals  and  wild 

Ijeasts,  nor  the  receiving  of  imin-essions  by  the  apjjearancos 
of  things,  nor  being  moved  by  desires  as  puppets  by  strings, 
nor  assembling  in  herds,  nor  being  noui'ished  by  food ;  for 
this  is  just  like  the  act  of  separating  and  parting  with  the 
useless  part  of  our  food.  What  then  is  worth  being  valued  ? 
To  be  received  with  clapping  of  hands  ?  No.  Neither  must 
we  value  the  clapping  of  tongues,  for  the  praise  which  comes 
from  the  many  is  a  clapping  of  tongues.  Suppose  then  that 
thou  hast  given  up  this  worthless  thing  called  fame,  what 
remains  that  is  worth  valuing  ?  This  in  my  opinion,  to 
move  thyself  and  to  restrain  tlivself  in  conformity  to  thy 
proper  constitution,  to  which  end  both  all  employments  an3^ 
arts  lead.  For  every  art  aims  at  this,  that  the  thing  which 
has  been  made  should  be  adapted  to  the  work  for  which  it 
has  been  made  ;  and  both  the  vine-planter  who  looks  after 
the  vine,  and  the  horse-breaker,  and  he  who  trains  the  docj, 
seek  this  end.  But  the  education  and  the  teaching  of  youth 
aim  at  something.  In  this  tlien  is  the  value^of  the  educa- 
tion  and  the  teaching.  And  if  thisls~well,  thou^wilt  not 
seek  anything  else.  Wilt  thou  not  cease  to  value  many 
other  things  too?  Then  thou  wilt  be  neither  free,  nor 
sufficient  for  thy  own  haj^piness,  nor  without  passion.  For 
of  necessity  thou  must  be  envious,  jealous,  and  suspicious  of 
those  who  can  take  away  those  things,  and  plot  against  those 
who  have  that  which  is  valued  by  thee.  Of  necessity  a  man 
must  be  altogether  in  a  state  of  perturbation  who  wants  any 
of  these  things  ;  and  besides,  he  must  often  find  fault  with  the 
gods.  But  to  reverence  and  honour  thy  own  mind  will  make 
thee  content  with  thyself,  and  in  harmony  with  society,  and 
in  agreement  with  the  gods,  that  is,  praising  all  that  they 
give  and  have  ordered. 

17.  Above,  below,  all  around  are  the  movements  of  the 
elements.  But  the  motion  of  virtue  is  in  none  of  these :  it 
is  something  more  divmCj^andT  advancing  by  a  way  hardly 
observed  it  goes  happily  on  its  road. 


122  M.  Antoninus.     VI. 

18.  How  strangely  men  act.  They  will  not  praise  those 
who  are  living  at  the  same  time  and  living  with  themselves ; 
but  to  be  themselves  praised  by  posterity,  by  those  whom 
they  have  never  seen  or  ever  will  see,  this  they  set  much 
value  on.  But  this  is  very  much  the  same  as  if  thou  shouldst 
be  grieved  because  those  who  have  lived  before  thee  did  not 
praise  thee. 

19.  If  a  thing  is  difficult  to  be  accomplished  by  thyself,  do 
not  think  that  it  is  impossible  for  man  :  but  if  anything  is 
possible  for  man  and  conformable  to  his  nature,  think  that 
this  can  be  attained  by  thyself  too. 

20.  In  the  gymnastic  exercises  suppose  that  a  man  has  torn 
thee  with  his  nails,  and  by  dashing  against  thy  head  has 
inflicted  a  wound.  Well,  we  neither  show  any  signs  of 
vexation,  nor  are  we  offended,  nor  do  we  suspect  him  after- 
wards as  a  treacherou's  fellow  ;  and  yet  we  are  on  our  guard 
against  him,  not  however  as  an  enemy,  nor  yet  wdth  sus- 
picion, but  we  quietly  get  out  of  his  way.  Something  like 
this  let  thy  behaviour  be  in  all  the  other  parts  of  life ;  let  us 
overlook  many  things  in  those  who  are  like  antagonists  in 
the  gymnasium.  For  it  is  in  our  power,  as  I  said,  to  get 
out  of  the  way,  and  to  have  no  suspicion_nor  hatre^r~ 

""^Llf  any  man  is  able  to  convince  me  and  show  me  that  I 
do  not  think  or  act  right,  I  will  gladly  change ;  for  I  seek 
the  truth  by  which  no  man  was  ever  injured.  But  he  is 
injured  who  abides  in  his  error  and  ignorance. 

22.  I  do  my  duty  :  other  things  trouble  me  not ;  for  they 
are  either  things  without  life,  or  things  without  reason,  or 
things  that  have  rambled  and  know  not  the  way. 

23.  As  to  the  animals  which  have  no  reason  and  generally 
all  things  and  objects,  do  thou,  since  thou  hast  reason  and 
they  have  none,  make  usQ-of  them  with  a  generous  and 
liberalspirrL  But  towards  human  beings,  as  they  have 
reason,  behave  in  a  social  spirit.  And  on  all  occasions  call 
on  the  gods,  and  do  not  perplex  thyself  about  the  length  of 
time  in  which  thou  shalt  do  this ;  for  even  three  houi'S  so 
6nent  are  sufficient. 


M.  Antoninus.     VI.  123 

24.  Alexander  the  Macedonian  and  his  groom  by  death 
were  brought  to  the  same  state  ;  for  either  tliey  were  received 
among  the  same  seminal  principles  of  the  universe,  or  they 
were  alike  dispersed  among  the  atoms. 

25.  Consider  how  many  things  in  the  same  indivisible 
time  take  place  in  each  of  us,  things  which  concern  the  body 
and  things  which  concern  the  soul  :  and  so  thou  wilt  not 
wonder  if  many  more  things,  or  rather  all  things  which 
come  into  existence  in  that  which^jg^the  one  and  all^  which 
W'e  call  Cosmos,  exist  in  it  at  the  same  time. 

26.  If  any  man  should  propose  to  thee  the  question,  how 
the  name  Antoninus  is  written,  wouldst  thou  with  a  straining 
of  the  voice  utter  each  letter?  "What  then  if  they  grow 
angry,  wilt  thou  be  angry  too?  Wilt  thou  not  go  on  with 
composure  and  number  every  letter  ?  Just  so  then  in  this 
life  also  remember  that  every  duty  is  made  up  of  certain 
garts.  These  it  is  thy  duty  to  observe  and  without  being 
disturbed  or  showing  anger  towards  those  who  are  angry 
with  thee  to  go  on  thy  way  and  finish  that  which  is  set  be- 
fore thee. 

27.  How  cruel  it  is  not  to  allow  men  to  strive  after  the 
things  which  appear  to  them  to  be  suitable  to  their  nature 
and  profitable  !  And  yet  in  a  manner  thou  dost  not  allow 
them  to  do  this,  when  thou  art  vexed  because  they  do  wrong. 
For  they  are  certainly  moved  towards  things  because  they 
suppose  them  to  be  suitable  to  their  nature  and  profitable 
to  them — But  it  is  not  so — Teach  them  then,  and  show  them 
without  being  angry. 

28.  Death  is  a  cessation  of  the  impressions  through  the 
senses,  and  of  the  pulling  of  the  strings  which  move  the 
appetites,  and  of  the  discursive  movements  of  the  thoughts, 
and  of  the  service  to  the  flesh,     (ii.  12.) 

29.  It  is  a  shame  for  the  soul  to  be  first  to  give  way  in  this 
life,  when  thy  body  does  not  give  way. 

30.  Take  care  that  thou  art  not  made  into  a  Caesar,  that 
thou  art  not  dyed  wdth  this  dye ;  for  such  things  happen.   /^ 
Keep  thyself  then  simple,   good,  pure,  serious,   free   from 


124  M.  Antoninus.     VI. 

affectation,  a  friend  of  justice,  a  worshipper  of  the  gods,  kind, 
affectionate,  strenuous  in  all  proper  acts.  Strive  to  continue 
to  be  such  as  philosophy  wished  to  make  thee.  Eeverence 
the  gods,  and  help  men.  Short  is  life.  There  is  only  one 
fruit  of  this  terrene  life,  a  pious  disposition  and  social  acts. 
Do  everything  as  a  disciple  of  Antoninus.  Eemember  his 
constancy  in  every  act  which  was  conformable  to  reason,  and 
his  evenness  in  all  things,  and  his  piety,  and  the  serenity  of 
his  countenance,  and  his  sweetness,  and  his  disregard  of 
empty  fame,  and  his  efforts  to  understand  things ;  and  how 
he  would  never  let  anything  pass  without  having  first  most 
carefully  examined  it  and  clearly  understood  it ;  and  how  he 
bore  with  those  who  blamed  him  unjustly  without  blaming 
them  in  return ;  how  he  did  nothing  in  a  hurry ;  and  how  he 
listened  not  to  calumnies,  and  how  exact  an  examiner  of 
manners  and  actions  he  was ;  and  not  given  to  reproach 
people,  nor  timid,  nor  suspicious,  nor  a  sophist ;  and  with 
how  little  he  was  satisfied,  such  as  lodging,  bed,  dress,  food, 
servants ;  and  how  laborious  and  patient ;  and  how  he  was 
able  on  account  of  his  sparing  diet  to  hold  out  to  the  evening, 
not  even  requiring  to  relieve  himself  by  any  evacuations 
except  at  the  usual  hour ;  and  his  firmness  and  uniformity  in 
his  friendships ;  and  how  he  tolerated  freedom  of  sj)eech  in 
those  who  opposed  his  opinions ;  and  the  pleasure  that  he 
had  when  any  man  showed  him  anything  better ;  and  how 
religious  he  was  without  superstition.  Imitate  all  this  that 
thou  mayest  have  as  good  a  conscience,  when  thy  last  hour 
comes,  as  he  had.     (i.  16.) 

31.  Eeturn  to  thy  sober  senses  and  call  thyself  back ;  and 
when  thou  hast  roused  thyself  from  sleep  and  hast  iDerceived 
that  they  were  only  dreams  which  troubled  thee,  now  in  thy 
waking  hours  look  at  these  [the  things  about  thee]  as  thou 
didst  look  at  those  [the  dreams]. 

32.  I  consist  of  a  little  body  and  a  soul.  Now  to  this 
little  body  all  things  are  indifferent,  for  it  is  not  able  to 
perceive  differences.  But  to  the  understanding  those  things 
only  are  indifferent,  which  are  not  the  works  of  its  own 


M.  Antoninus.     VI.  125 

activity.  But  wLatevcr  things  are  the  works  of  its  own 
activity,  all  these  are  in  its  power.  And  of  those  however 
only  those  which  are  done  with  reference  to  the  present ;  for 
as  to  the  future  and  the  past  activities  of  the  mind,  even 
these  are  for  the  present  indifferent. 

33.  Neither  the  labour  which  the  hand  does  nor  that  of 
the  foot  is  contrary  to  nature,  so  long  as  the  foot  does  the  i- 
foot's  work  and  the  hand  the  hand's.  So  then  neither  to  a 
man  as  a  man  is  his  labour  contrary  to  nature,  so  long  as  it 
does  the  things  of  a  man.  But  if  the  labour  is  not  contrary 
to  his  nature,  neither  is  it  an  evil  to  him. 

31.  How  many  pleasures  have  been  enjoyed  by  robbers, 
patricides,  tyrants. 

35.  Dost  thou  not  see  how   the   handicraftsmen   accom- 
modate themselves  up  to  a  certain  point  to  those  who  are  not 
skilled  in  their  craft, — nevertheless  they  cling  to  the  reason 
[the  principles]  of  their  art  and  do  not  endure  to  depart  from 
it?     Is  it  not  strange  if  the  architect  and  the  physician 
shall  have  more  respect  to  the  reason  [the  principles]  of  their 
own  arts  than  man  to  his  own  reason,  which  is  common  to 
him  and  the  gods  ? 
i        36.  Asia,  Europe  are  corners  of  the  universe :  all  the  sea 
I    a  drop  in  the  universe ;  Athos  a  little  clod  of  the  universe : 
I    all  the  present  time  is  a  point  in  eternity.     All  things  are      l- 
I    little,  changeable,  perishable.     All  things  come  from  thence, 
I   from  that  universal  rulmg  power  either  directly  proceeding 
I    or  by  way  of  sequence.     And  accordingly  the  lion's  gaping 
I  jaws,  and  that  which  is  poisonous,  and  every  harmful  thing, 
as  a  thorn,  as  mud,  are   after-products  of   the    grand    and 
I   beautiful.     Do  not  then  imagine  that  they  are   of  another 
!   kind  from  that  which  thou  dost  venerate,  but  form  a  just 
opinion  of  the  ^om-ce  of  all,     (vii.  75.)  ^ 

37.  He  who  has  seen  present  things  has  seen  all,  both  vc^^ 
everything   which   has    taken   place  from  all   eternity    and      ^ 
everything  which  will  be  for  time  without  end ;  for  all  thinga-^-^^^^^^ 
are_of  ong^in  and  of  one  form.  — 

88.  Frequently  consider  the  connection  of  all  things  in 


126  M.  Antoninus,     VI. 

the  universe  and  tkeir  relation  to  one  another.  For  in  a 
manner  all  things  are  implicated  with  one  another,  and  all 
in  this  way  are  friendly  to  one  another ;  for  one^hing  comes 
in  order  idier  another,  and  this  is  hy  virtue  of  thej  active 
movement  and  mutual  conspiration  and  the  unity  of  the 
substance,     (ix.  1.)  ~~— 

397^clapt  thyself  to  the  things  with  which  thy  lot  has 
been  cast :  and  the  men  among  whom  thou  hast  received  thy 
portion,  love  them,  but  do  it  truly  [sincerely]. 

40.  Every  instrument,  tool,  vessel,  if  it  does  that  for 
which  it  has  been  made,  is  well,  and  yet  he  who  made  it  is 
not  tliere.  But  in  the  things  which  are  held  together  by 
nature  there  is  within  and  there  abides  in  them  the  power 
which  made  them  ;  wherefore  the  more  is  it  fit  to  reverence 
this  power,  and  to  think,  that,  if  thou  dost  live  and  act 
according  to  its  will,  everything  in  thee^  is  in  conformity  to, 
intelligence.  And  thus  also  in  the  universe  the  things 
which  belong  to  it  are  in  conformity  to  intelligence.  ^ 

41.  Whatever  of  the  things  which  are  not~within  thy 
power  thou  shalt  suppose  to  be  good  for  thee  or  evil,  it  must 
of  necessity  be  that,  if  such  a  bad  thing  befall  thee  or  the 
loss  of  such  a  good  thing,  thou  wilt  blame  the  gods,  and  hate 
men  too,  those  who  are  the  cause  of  the  misfortune  or  the 
loss,  or  those  who  are  suspected  of  being  likely  to  be  the 
cause ;  and  indeed  we  do  much  injustice,  because  we  make 
a  difference  between  these  things  [because  we  do  not  regard 
these  things  as  indifferentj].^  But  if  we  judge  only  those 
things  which  are  in  our  power  to  be  good'  or  badT^ESsi'o 
remains  no  reason  either  for  finding  fault  with  god  or  stand- 
ing in  a  hostile  attitude  to  man.* 

42.  We  are  all  working  together  to  one  end,  some  with 
knowledge  and  design,  and  others  without   knowing   what 


^  Gataker  translates  this,  "because  we  strive  to  get  these  things," 
comparing  the  use  of  SLa<p4pe(r6ai  in  v.  1,  and  x.  27,  and  ix.  38, 
where  it  appears  that  his  reference  should  be  xi.  10.  He  may  be  right 
in  his  interpretation,  but  I  doubt 

•  Cicero,  De  Natura  Deorum,  in,  32. 


ill.  Antoniiuis.     VI.  127 

tlicy  do ;  as  men  also  when  tbcy  arc  asleep,  of  whom  it  is 
lleraclitus,  I  think,  who  says  that  they  are  labonrers  and  co- 
operators  in  the  things  which  take  place  in  the  universe. 
But  men  co-operate  after  different  fashions :  and  even  those 
co-operate  abundantly,  who  find  fault  with  what  happens  and 
those  who  try  to  oppose  it  and  to  hinder  it ;  for  the  universe 
had  need  even  of  sucTTTiieh  as  these.  It  remains  then  for 
thee  to  understand  among  what  kind  of  workmen  thou 
placest  thyself;  for  he  who  rules  all  things  wdll  certainly 
make  a  right  use  of  thee,  and  he  will  receive  thee  among 
some  part  of  the  co-operators  and  of  those  whose  labours 
conduce  to  one  end.  But  be  not  thou  such  a  part  as  the  mean 
and  ridiculous  verse  in  the  play,  which  Chrysippus  speaks  of.' 
43.  Does  the  sun  undertake  to  do  the  w^ork  of  the  rain,  or 
AesculajDius  the  work  of  the  Fruit -bearer  [the  earth]  ?  And 
how  is  it  with  respect  to  each  of  the  stars,  are  they  not 
different  and  yet  they  w^ork  together  to  the  same  end  ? 
.  44.  If  the  gods  have  determined  about  me  and  about  the 
things  which  must  happen  to  me,  they  have  determined  well, 
for  it  is  not  easy  even  to  imagine  a  deity  without  forethought ; 
and  as  to  doing  me  harm,  why  should  they  have  any  desire 
towards  that  ?  for  what  advantage  would  result  to  them  from 
this  or  to  the  whole,  which  is  the  special  object  of  their  pro- 
vidence? But  if  they  have  not  determined  ^out  me 
individually,  they  have  certainly  determined  about  ^the 
whole  at  least,  and  the  things  which  happen  by  way  of 
sequence  in  this  general  arrangement  J^  ought  to  accept  with 
pleasure  and  to  be  content  with  them.  But  if  they  determine 
about  nothing — which  it  is  wicked  to  believe,  or  if  we  do 
believe  it,  let  us  neither  sacrifice  nor  pray  nor  swear  by  them 
nor  do  anything  else  which  we  do  as  if  the  gods  were  present 
and  lived  with  us — but  if  however  the  gods  determine  about 
none  of  the  things  which  concern  us,  I  am  able  to  determine 
about  myself,  and  I  can  inquire  about  that  which  is  useful ; 
andthat  is  useful  to  every  man  which  is  conformable  to  his 
own  constitution  and  nature.  But  my  nature  is  rational  and 
3  Plutarch,  adversus  Stoicos,  c.  14. 


128  M.  Antoninus.     VL 

social ;  and  my  city  and  country,  so  far  as  I  am  Antoninus,  is 
Eome,  but  so  far  as  I  am  a  man,  it  is  tlie  world.  Tlie  things 
then  which  are  useful  to  these  cities  are  alone  useful  to  me. 

45.  Whatever  happens  to  every  man,  this  is  for  the 
interest  of  the  imiversal :  this  might  be  sufficient.  But  further 
thou  wilt  observe  this  also  as  a  general  truth,  if  thou  dost 
observe,  that  whatever  is  profitable  to  any  man  is  profitable 
also  to  other  men.  But  let  the  word  profitable  be  taken  here 
in  the  common  sense  as  said  of  things  of  the  middle  kind 
[neither  good  nor  bad]. 

46.  As  it  happens  to  thee  in  the  amphitheatre  and  such 
places,  that  the  continual  sight  of  the  same  things  and  the 
uniformity  make  the  spectacle  wearisome,  so  it  is  in  the 
whole  of  life ;  for  all  things  above,  below,  are  the  same  and 
from  the  same.     How  long  then  ? 

47.  Think  continually  that  all  kinds  of  men  and  of  all 
kinds  of  pursuits  and  of  all  nations  are  dead,  so  that  thy 
thoughts  come  down  even  to  Philistiou  and  Phoebus  and 
Origanion.  Now  turn  thy  thoughts  to  the  other  kinds  [of 
men].  To  that  place  then  we  must  remove,  where  there  are 
so  many  great  orators,  and  so  many  noble  philosophers, 
Heraclitus,  Pythagoras,  Socrates ;  so  many  heroes  of  former 
days,  and  so  many  generals  after  them,  and  tyrants  ;  besides 
these,  Eudoxus,  Hipparchus,  Archimedes,  and  other  men  of 
acute  natural  talents,  great  minds,  lovers  of  labour,  versatile, 
confident,  mockers  even  of  the  perishable  and  ephemeral  life 
of  man,  as  Menippus  and  such  as  are  like  him.  As  to  all 
these  consider  that  they  have  long  been  in  the  dust.  What 
harm  then  is  this  to  them  ;  and  what  to  those  whose  names 
are  altogether  unknown?  One  thing  here  is  worth  a  great 
deal,  to  pass  thy  life  in  truth  and  justice,  with  a  benevolent 
disposition  even  to  liars  and  unjust  men. 

48.  When  thou  wishest  to  delight  thyself,  think  of  the 
virtues  of  those  who  live  with  thee  ;  for  instance,  the  activity 
of  one,  and  the  modesty  of  another,  and  the  liberality  of  a 
third,  and  some  other  good  quality  of  a  fourth.  For  nothing 
delights  so  much  as  the  examples  of  the  virtues,  when  they 


M.  Anfontnus.     VI.  121) 

are  exhibited  in  the  morals  of  those  wlio  live  with  lis  and 
present  themselves  in  abundance,  as  far  as  is  possible. 
Wherefore  we  must  keep  them  before  us. 

49.  Thou  art  not  dissatisfied,  I  suppose,  because  thou 
weighest  only  so  many  litraeand  not  three  hundred.  Be  not 
dissatisfied  then  that  thou  must  live  only  so  many  years  and 
not  more  ;  for  as  thou  art  satisfied  with  the  amount  of  sub- 
stance which  has  been  assigned  to  thee,  so  be  content  with  the 
time. 

60.  Let  us  try  to  persuade  them  [men].  But  act  even 
against  their  will,  when  the  principles  of  justice  lead  that 
way.  If  however  any  man  by  using.force  stands  in  thy  way, 
betake  thyself  to  contentment  and  tranquillity,  and  at  the 
same  time  employ  the  hindrance  towards  the  exercise  of  some 
other  virtue  ;  and  remember  that  thy  attempt  was  with  a 
reservation  [conditionally],  that  thou  didst  not  desire  to  do 
impossibilities.  What  then  didst  thou  desire  ? — Some  such 
effort  as  this — But  thou  attainest  thy  object,  if  the  things  to 
which  thou  wast  moved  are  [not]  accomplished.! 

51.  He  who  loves  fame  considers  another  man's  activity  to 
be  his  own  good  ;  and  he  who  loves  pleasure,  his  own  sensa- 
tions ;  but  he  who  has  understanding,  considers  his  own  acts 
to  be  his  own  good. 

52.  It  is  in  our  power  to  have  no  opinion  about  a  thing,  and 
not  to  be  disturbed  in  our  soul ;  for  things  themselves  have 
no  natural  power  to  form  our  judgments. 

53.  Accustom  thyself  to  attend  carefully  to  what  is  said  by 
another,  and  as  much  as  it  is  j)ossible,  be  in  the  speaker's 
mind. 

54.  That  which  is  not  good  for  the  swarm,  neither  is  it 
good  for  the  bee. 

55-  If  sailors  abused  the  helmsman  or  the  sick  the  doctor, 
would  they  listen  to  anybody  else  ;  or  how  could  the  helms- 
man secure  the  safety  of  those  in  the  ship  or  the  doctor  the 
health  of  those  whom  he  attends  ? 

56.  How  many  together  with  whom  I  came  into  the  world 
are  already  gone  out  of  it. 

c 


\ 


130  M.  Antoninus.     VI. 

57.  To  the  jaundiced  honey  tastes  bitter,  and  to  those  bitten 
by  mad  dogs  water  causes  fear  ;  and  to  little  children  the  ball 
is  a  fine  thing.  Why  then  am  I  angry  ?  Dost  thou  tliink 
that  a  false  opinion  has  less  power  than  the  bile  in  the 
jaundiced  or  the  poison  in  him  who  is  bitten  by  a  mad  dog  ? 

58.  No  man  will  hinder  thee  from  living  according  to  the 
reason  of  thy  own  nature  :  nothing  will  happen  to  thee  con- 
trary to  the  reason  of  the  universal  nature. 

59.  What  kind  of  people  are  those  whom  men  wish  to 
please,  and  for  what  objects,  and  by  what  kind  of  acts  ?  How 
soon  will  time  cover  all  things,  and  how  many  it  has  covern:^ 
already. 


M.  Antoninus.     VII.  131 


w 


YJI. 

HAT  is  badness?  It  is  that  which  thou  hast  often 
seen.  And  on  the  occasion  of  everything  which 
happens  keep  this  in  mind,  that  it  is  that  which  thou  hast 
often  seen.  Everywhere  up  and  down  thou  wilt  find  the  same 
things,  with  which  the  old  histories  are  filled,  those  of  the 
middle  ages  and  those  of  oui*  own  day ;  with  which  cities  and 
houses  are  filled  now.  There  is  nothing  new  :  all  things  are 
both  familiar  and  short-lived. 

2.  How  can  our  principles  become  dead,  unless  the  im- 
pressions [thoughts]  whicli  correspond  to  them  are  extin- 
guished ?  But  it  is  in  thy  power  continuously  to  fan  these 
thoughts  into  a  flame.  I  can  have  that  opinion  about 
anything,  which  I  ought  to  have.  K  I  can,  why  am  I 
disturbed  ?  The  things  which  are  external  to  my  mind  have 
no  relation  at  all  to  my  mind. — Let  this  be  the  state  of  thy 
afiects,  and  thou  standest  erect.  To  recover  thy  life  is  in  thy 
power.  Look  at  things  again  as  thou  didst  use  to  look  at 
them  ;  for  in  this  consists  the  recovery  of  thy  life, 

3.  The  idle  business  of  show,  plays  on  the  stage,  flocks  of 
I  sheep,  herds,  exercises  wdth  spears,  a  bone  cast  to  little  dogs, 
I  a  bit  of  bread  into  fish-ponds,  laboimugs  of  ants  and  burden- 
I   carrying,  runnings  about  of  frightened  little  mice,  pui)pets 

pulled  by  strings — [all  alike].  It  is  thy  duty  then  in  the 
midst  of  such  things  to  show  good  humour  and  not  a  proud 
air ;  to  understand  however  that  every  man  is  worth  just  so 
much  as  the  things  are  w^orth  about  which  he  busies  himself. 

4.  In  discourse  thou  must  attend  to  what  is  said,  and  in 
every  movement  thou  must  observe  what  is  doing.  And  in  the 
one  thou  shouldst  see  immedia|;ely  to  what  end  it  refers, 
but  in  the  other  watch  carefully  what  is  the  thing  siguifitd. 


132  M.  Antoninus.     VIL 

5.  Is  my  understanding  sufficient  for  this  or  not  ?  If  it  is 
sufficient,  I  use  it  for  the  work  as  an  instrument  given  by  the 
universal  nature.  But  if  it  is  not  sufficient,  then  either  I 
retire  from  the  work  and  give  way  to  him  who  is  able  to  do 
it  better,  unless  there  be  some  reason  why  I  ought  not  to  do 
iso ;  or  I  do  it  as  well  as  I  can,  taking  to  help  me  the  man 
who  with  the  aid  of  my  ruling  j)rinciple  can  do  what  is  now 
fit  and  useful  for  the  general  good.  For  whatsoever  either 
by  myself  or  with  another  I  can  do,  ought  to  be  directed  to 
this  only,  to  that  which  is  useful  and  well  suited  to  society. 

6.  How  many  after  being  celebrated  by  fame  have  been 
given  up  to  oblivion ;  and  how  many  who  have  celebrated  the 
fame  of  others  have  long  been  dead. 

7.  Be  not  ashamed  to  be  helped ;  for  it  is  thy  business  to 
do  thy  duty  like  a  soldier  in  the  assault  on  a  town.  How 
then,  if  being  lame  thou  canst  not  mount  up  on  the  battle- 
ments alone,  but  with  the  help  of  another  it  is  possible  ? 

8.  Let  not  future  things  disturb  thee,  for  thou  wilt  come 
to  them,  if  it  shall  be  necessary,  having  with  thee  the  same 
reason  which  now  thou  usest  for  present  things. 

9.  All  things  are  implicated  with  one  another,  and  the 
bond  is  holy  ;  and  there  is  hardly  anything  unconnected  with 
any  other  thing.  For  things  have  been  co-ordinated,  and 
they  combine  to  form  the  same  universe  [order].  For  there  is 
one  universe  made  up  of  all  things,  and  one  god  who  pervades 
all  things,  and  one  substance,^  and  one  law,  [one]  common 
reason  in  all  intelligent  animals,  and  one  truth ;  if  indeed 
there  is  also  one  perfection  for  all  animals  which  are  of  the 
same  stock  and  participate  in  the  same  reason. 

10.  Everything  material  soon  disappears  in  the  substance 
of  the  whole ;  and  everything  formal  [causal]  is  very  soon 
taken  back  into  the  universal  reason ;  and  the  memory  of 
everything  is  very  soon  overwhelmed  in  time. 

11.  To  the  rational  animal  the  same  act  is  according  to 
nature  and  according  to  reason. 

12.  Be  thou  erect,  or  be  iitiade  erect,     (iir.  6.) 

*  "  One  substance,"  p.  '66,  note  6. 


M.  Antoninus.      VII.  133 

13.  Just  as  it  is  witli  tlie  members  in  those  bodies  wLicli 
are  united  in  one,  so  it  is  with  rational  beings  which  exist 
BCi)arate,  for  they  have  been  constituted  for  one  co-operation. 
And  the  jjercejjtion  of  this  will  be  more  apparent  to  thee,  ii* 
thou  often  sayest  to  thyself  that  I  am  a  member  [/^eAos]  of 
the  system  of  rational  beings.  But  if  [using  the  letter  r] 
thou  sayest  that  tliou  art  a  part  [/xepos],  thou  dost  not  yet  lovo 
men  from  thy  heart ;  beneficence  does  not  yet  delight  thee  for 
its  own  sake  f  thou  still  doest  it  barely  as  a  thing  of  propriety, 
and  not  yet  as  doing  good  to  thyself. 

14.  Let  there  fall  externally  what  will  on  the  parts  which  can 
feel  the  effects  of  this  fall.  For  those  parts  which  have  felt 
will  complain,  if  they  choose.  But  1,  unless  I  think  that 
what  has  happened  is  an  evil,  am  not  injured.  And  it  is  in 
my  power  not  to  think  so. 

15.  Whatever  any  one  does  or  sa^-s,  I  must  be  good,  just 
as  if  the  gold,  or  the  emerald,  or  the  purple  were  always 
saying  this,  Whatever  any  one  does  or  says,  I  must  be  emerald 
and  keep  my  colour. 

16.  The  ruling  faculty  does  not  distui'b  itself;  I  mean,  does 
not  frighten  itself  or  cause  itself  pain.j  But  if  any  one  else 
can  frighten  or  pain  it,  let  him  do  so.  For  the  faculty  itself 
will  not  by  its  own  opinion  turn  itself  into  such  ways.  Let 
the  body  itself  take  care,  if  it  can,  that  it  suffer  nothing,  and 
let  it  speak,  if  it  suffers.  But  the  soul  itself,  that  which  is 
subject  to  fear,  to  pain,  which  has  completely  the  power 
of  forming  an  opinion  about  these  things,  will  suffer  no- 
thing, for  it  will  never  deviatef  into  such  a  judgment.  The 
leading  principle  in  itself  wants  nothing,  unless  it  makes 
a  want  for  itself ;  and  therefore  it  is  both  free  from  per- 
turbation and  unimpeded,  if  it  does  not  disturb  and  impede 
itself. 

17.  Eudaemonia  [happiness]  is  a  good  daemon,  or  a  good 
thing.  What  then  art  thou  doing  here,  0  imagination  ?  go 
away,  I  inti*eat  thee  by  the  gods,  as  thou  didst  come,  for  I 

"I  have  used  Gataker'3  conjecture  Kara\7]KTiKU3s  instead  of  tbo 
oommon  reading  KaraX-niTTiKwi ;  compare  iv.  20  ;  ix.  42. 


134  M.  Antoninus.     VIL 

want  tliee  not.      But  thou  art  come  according   to  tliy  old 
fashion.     I  am  not  angry  with  thee :  only  go  away. 

18.  Is  any  man  afraid  of  change?  Why  what  can  take 
place  without  change  ?  What  then  is  more  pleasing  or  more 
suitable  to  the  universal  nature  ?  And  canst  thou  take  a 
bath  unless  the  wood  undergoes  a  change  ?  and  canst  thou 
be  nourished,  unless  the  food  undergoes  a  change?  And 
can  anything  else  that  is  useful  be  accomplished  without 
change?  Dost  thou  not  see  then  that  for  thyself  also  to 
change  is  just  the  same,  and  equally  necessary  for  the  uni- 
versal nature  ? 

19.  Through  the  universal  substance  as  through  a  furious 
torrent  all  bodies  are  carried,  being  by  their  nature  united 
with  and  co-operating  with  the  whole,  as  the  parts  of  our 
body  with  one  another.  How  many  a  Chrysippus,  how  many 
a  Socrates,  how  many  an  Epictetus  has  time  already  swal- 
lowed up  ?  And  let  the  same  thought  occur  to  thee  with 
reference  to  every  man  and  thing,     (v.  23  ;  vi.  15.) 

20.  One  thing  only  troubles  me,  lest  I  should  do  some- 
thing which  the  constitution  of  man  does  not  allow,  or  in  the 
way  which  it  does  not  allow,  or  what  it  does  not  allow  now. 

21.  Near  is  thy  forgetfulness  of  all  things  ;  and  near  the 
forgetfulness  of  thee  by  all. 

22.  It  is  peculiar  to  man  to  love  even  those  who  do  wrong. 
And  this  hapi)ens,  if  when  they  do  wrong  it  occurs  to  thee 
that  they  are  kinsmen,  and  that  they  do  wrong  through 
ignorance  and  unintentionally,  and  that  soon  both  of  you  will 
die ;  and  above  all,  that  the  wrong-doer  has  done  thee  no 
harm,  for  he  has  not  made  thy  ruling  faculty  worse  than  it 
was  before. 

23.  The  universal  nature  out  of  the  universal  substance,  as 
if  it  were  wax,  now  moulds  a  horse,  and  when  it  has  broken 
this  up,  it  uses  the  material  for  a  tree,  then  for  a  man,  then 
for  something  else ;  and  each  of  these  things  subsists  for  a 
very  short  time.  But  it  is  no  hardship  for  the  vessel  to  bo 
broken  up,  just  as  there  was  none  in  its  being  fastened  to- 
gether,    (viii.  50.) 


M.  Antoninus.      VII.  135 

24.  A  scowling  look  is  altogctlicr  unnatural ;  wlicn  it  is 
often  assumed,^  the  result  is  that  all  comeliness  dies  away, 
and  at  last  is  so  completely  extinguished  that  it  cannot  bo 
again  lighted  up  at  all.  Try  to  conclude  from  this  very  fact 
that  it  is  contrary  to  reason.  For  if  even  the  perception  of 
doing  wrong  shall  depart,  what  reason  is  there  for  living  any 
longer '? 

25.  Nature  which  governs  the  wdiole  will  soon  change  all 
things  which  thou  seest,  and  out  of  their  substance  will  make 
other  things,  and  again  other  things  from  the  substance  of 
them,  in  order  tliat  the  world  may  be  ever  new.     (xii.  23.) 

26.  When  a  man  has  done  thee  any  wrong,  immediately 
consider  with  what  opinion  about  good  or  evil  he  has  done 
wrong.  For  w^hen  thou  hast  seen  this,  thou  wilt  pity  him, 
and  wilt  neither  wonder  nor  be  angry.  For  either  thou  thy- 
self thinkest  the  same  thing  to  be  good  that  he  does  or 
another  thing  of  the  same  kind.  It  is  thy  duty  then  to  pardon 
him.  But  if  thou  dost  not  think  such  things  to  be  good  or 
evil,  thou  wilt  more  readily  be  well  disposed  to  him  who  is 
in  error. 

27.  Think  not  so  much  of  what  thou  hast  not  as  of  what 
thou  hast :  but  of  the  things  which  thou  hast  select  the  best, 
and  then  reflect  how  eagerly  they  would  have  been  sought,  if 
thou  hadst  them  not.  At  the  same  time  however  take  care 
that  thou  dost  not  through  being  so  pleased  wdth  them  ac* 
custom  thyself  to  overvalue  them,  so  as  to  be  disturbed  if  ever 
thou  shouldst  not  have  them. 

/    28.  Eetire  into  thyself.      The    rational    principle  which 
rules  has  this  nature,  that  it  is  content  with  itself  when  it 

■ — does  what  is  just,  and  so  secui.'es  tranquillity. 

29.  Wipe  out  the  imagination.  Stop  the  pulling  of  the 
striags.  Confine  thyself  to  the  present.  Understand  well 
what  happens  either  to  thee  or  to  another.  Divide  and  dis- 
tribute every  object  into  the  causal  [formal]  and  the  material. 
Think  of  thy  last  hour.  Let  the  wrong  which  is  done  by  a 
man  stay  there  where  the  wrong  was  done.  (viii.  29.) 
*  This  is  corrupt. 


136  M.  Antoninus.     VIL 

30.  Direct  tliy  attention  to  what  is  said.  Let  tliy  under- 
standing enter  into  the  things  that  are  doing  and  the  things 
which  do  them.     (vii.  4.) 

31.  Adorn  thyself  with  simplicity  and  modesty  and  with 
indifference  towards  the  things  which  lie  between  virtue  and 
vice.  Love  mankind.  Follow  God.  The  poet  says  that 
Law  rules  all — j  And  it  is  enough  to  remember  that  law 
rules  all.f'* — 

32.  About  death  :  whether  it  is  a  dispersion,  or  a  resolution 
into  atoms,  or  annihilation,  it  is  either  extinction  or  change. 

33.  About  pain :  the  pain  which  is  intolerable  carries  us 
off;  but  that  which  lasts  a  long  time  is  tolerable;  and  the 
mind  maintains  its  own  tranquillity  by  retiring  into  itself, f 
and  the  ruling  faculty  is  not  made  worse.  But  the  parts 
which  are  harmed  by  pain,  let  them,  if  they  can,  give  their 
opinion  about  it. 

34.  About  fame:  look  at  the  minds  [of  those  who  seek 
fame],  observe  what  they  are,  and  what  kind  of  things  they 
avoid,  and  what  kind  of  things  they  pursue.  And  consider 
that  as  the  heaps  of  sand  piled  on  one  another  hide  the 
former  sands,  so  in  life  the  events  which  go  before  are  soon 
covered  by  those  which  come  after. 

35.  From  Plato  :^  the  man  who  has  an  elevated  mind  and 
takes  a  view  of  all  time  and  of  all  substance,  dost  thou  sup- 
pose it  possible  for  him  to  think  that  human  life  is  anything 
great  ?  it  is  not  possible,  he  said. — Such  a  man  then  will 
think  that  death  also  is  no  evil — Certainly  not. 

36.  From  Antisthenes  :  It  is  royal  to  do  good  and  to  be 
abilsed. 

37.  It  is  a  base  thing  for  the  countenance  to  be  obedient 
and  to  regulate  and  compose  itself  as  the  mind  commands, 
and  for  the  mind  not  to  be  regulated  and  composed  by  itself 

38.  It  is  not  right  to  vex  ourselves  at  things, 
For  they  care  nought  about  it.^ 

^  The  end  of  this  section  is  unintelligible. 

«  Plato,  Pol.  VI.  486. 

^  From  the  Bellerophon  of  Euripides. 


M.  Antoninus.      VII.  137 

39.  To  tlie  immortal  gods  and  us  give  joy. 

do.  Life  must  be  reaped  like  the  ripe  cars  of  corn  : 

Que  man  is  born  ;  another  dies.'  i 

41.  If  gods  care  not  for  me  and  for  my  children, 
There  is  a  reason  for  it. 

42.  For  the  good  is  with  me,  and  the  just.^ 

43.  No  joining  others  in  their  wailing,  no  violent  emotion. 

44.  From  Plato  :^  But  I  would  make  this  man  a  sufficient 
answer,  which  is  this  :  Thou  sayest  not  well,  if  thou  thinkest 
that  a  man  who  is  good  for  anything  at  all  ought  to  compute 
the  hazard  of  life  or  death,  and  should  not  rather  look  to  this 
only  in  all  that  he  does,  whether  he  is  doing  what  is  just  or 
unjust,  and  the  works  of  a  good  or  a  bad  man. 

45.  ^  For  thus  it  is,  men  of  Athens,  in  tiiith  :  wherever  a 
man  has  placed  himself  thinking  it  the  best  place  for  him,  or 
has  been  placed  by  a  commander,  there  in  my  opinion  he 
ought  to  stay  and  to  abide  the  hazard,  taking  nothing  into 
the  reckoning,  either  death  or  anything  else,  before  the  base- 
ness [of  deserting  his  -post], 

46.  But,  my  good  friend,  reflect  whether  that  which  is  noble 
and  good  is  not  something  difierent  fi'om  saving  and  being 
saved  ;  forf  as  to  a  man  living  such  or  such  a  time,  at  least 
one  who  is  really  a  man,  consider  if  this  is  not  a  thing  to  be 
dismissed  from  the  thoughts  :|  and  there  must  bo  no  love  of 
life :  but  as  to  these  matters  a  man  must  intrust  them  to  the 
deity  and  believe  what  the  women  say,  that  no  man  can 
escape  his  destiny,  the  next  inquiry  being  how  he  may  best  \ 
live  the  time  that  he  has  to  live.^°  ' 

"  From  the  Hypsipyle  of  Euripides.  Cicero  (Tuscul.  m.  25.)  has 
ti-anslated  six  lines  from  Euripides,  and  among  them  are  these  two 
lines, — 

Eeddenda  terrae  est  terra :  tum  vita  omnibus 
Metenda  ut  fruges :  Sic  jubet  necessitas. 

'  See  Aristophanes,  Acharnenses,  v.  G61. 

^  From  the  Apologia,  c.  16. 

10  Plato,  Gorgias,  c.  QS  (512).  In  this  passage  the  text  of  Antoninus 
has  iareov,  which  is  perhaps  right;  but  there  is  a  difficulty  in  the 
words  f-O]  yap  tovto  /xey,  rh  ^riv  oTcoaovS^  XP^^^^  rovye  ws   a.Ky]dus   &vZpa 


138  M.  Ayitoninus.     ViL 

47.  Look  round  at  the  courses  of  the  stars,  as  if  thou  wert 
going  along  with  them ;  and  constantly  consider  the  changes 
of  the  elements  into  one  another ;  for  such  thoughts  purge 
away  the  filth  of  the  terrene  life. 

48.  This  is  a  fine  saying  of  Plato  •}^  That  he  who  is  dis- 
coursing about  men  should  look  also  at  earthly  things  as  if 
he  viewed  them  from  some  higher  place ;  should  look  at  them 
in  their  assemblies,  armies,  agricultm-al  labours,  marriages, 
treaties,  births,  deaths,  noise  of  the  courts  of  justice,  desert 
places,  various  nations  of  barbarians,  feasts,  lamentations, 
markets,  a  mixture  of  all  things  and  an  orderly  combination 
of  contraries. 

49.  Consider  the  j)ast;  such  great  changes  of  political 
supremacies.  Thou  may  est  foresee  also  the  things  which 
will  be.  For  they  will  certainly  be  of  like  form,  and  it  is 
not  possible  that  they  should  deviate  from  the  order  of  the 
things  which  take  place  now :  accordingly  to  have  contem- 
plated human  life  for  forty  years  is  the  same  as  to  have  contem- 
plated it  for  ten  thousand  years.    For  what  more  wilt  thou  see  ? 

50.  That  which  has  grown  from  the  earth  to  the  earth, 
But  that  which  has  sprung  from  heavenly  seed, 
Back  to  the  heavenly  realms  returns.^* 

This  is  either  a  dissolution  of  the  mutual  involution  of  the 
atoms,  or  a  similar  dispersion  of  the  unsentient  elements. 

51.  With  food  and  di-inks  and  cunning  magic  arts 
Turning  the  channel's  course  to  'scape  from  death.^^ 

The  breeze  which  heaven  has  sent 
We  must  endure,  and  toil  without  complaining. 

52.  Another  may  be  more  expert  in  casting  his  opponent ; 
but  he  is  not  more  social,  nor  more  modest,  nor  better  dis- 
ciplined to  meet  all  that  happens,  nor  more  considerate  with 
respect  to  the  faults  of  his  neighbours. 


eareoj/   eVri,  Koi  ov,  &c.     The   conjecture   €vkt4ov  for   eareoj/  does  not 
mend  the  matter. 

"  It  is  said  that  this  is  not  in  the  extant  Nvri tings  of  Plato. 

'2  From  the  Chrysippus  of  Euripides. 

^3  The  tirst  two  lines  are  from  the  Suppliccs  of  Euripides,  v.  1 1 10. 


M.  Antoninus.     VII.  139 

53.  Where  any  work  can  be  done  conformably  to  tlio 
reason  which  is  common  to  gods  and  men,  there  we  have 
nothing  to  fear  :  for  where  we  are  able  to  get  profit  by 
means  of  the  activity  which  is  successful  and  proceeds  ac- 
cording to  our  constitution,  there  no  harm  is  to  be  suspected. 

54.  Everywhere  and  at  all  times  it  is  in  thy  power  piously 
to  acquiesce  in  thy  present  condition,  and  to  behave  justly  to 
those  who  arc  about  thee,  and  to  exert  thy  skill  upon  thy 
present  thoughts,  that  nothing  shall  steal  into  them  without 
being  well  examined. 

55.  Do  not  look  around  thee  to  discover  other  men's  ruling 
principles,  but  look  straight  to  this,  to  what  nature  leads 
thee,  both  the  universal  natui-e  through  the  things  which 
happen  to  thee,  and  thy  own  nature  through  the  acts  which 
must  be  done  by  thee.  But  every  being  ought  to  do  that 
which  is  according  to  its  constitution  ;  and  all  other  things 
have  been  constituted  for  the  sake  of  rational  beings,  just  as 
among  irrational  things  the  inferior  for  the  sake  of  the 
superior,  but  the  rational  for  the  sake  of  one  another. 

The  j)i'ii^e  principle  then  in  man's  constitution  is  the 
social.  And  the  second  is  not  to  yield  to  the  persuasions  of 
the  body,  for  it  is  the  peculiar  office  of  the  rational  and  in- 
teltlgent  motion  to  circumscribe  itself,  and  never  to  be  over- 
powered either  by  the  motion  of  the  senses  or  of  the  appe- 
tites, for  both  are  animal ;  but  the  intelligent  motion  claims 
superiority  and  does  not  permit  itself  to  be  overpowered 
by  the  others.  And  with  good  reason,  for  it  is  formed  by 
nature  to  use  all  of  them.  The  third  thing  in  the  rational 
constitution  is  freedom  from  error  and  from  deception.  Let 
then  the  ruling  principle  holding  ftist  to  these  things  go 
straight  on,  and  it  has  what  is  its  own. 

56.  Consider  thyself  to  be  dead,  and  to  have  completed  thy 
life  up  to  the  present  time ;  and  live  according  to  nature  the 
remainder  which  is  allowed  thee. 

57.  Love  that  only  which  happens  to  thee  and  is  spun 
with  the  thread  of  thy  destiny.     For  what  is  more  suitable  ? 

68.  In  everything  which  happens   keep  before  thy  eyes 


140  M.  Antoninus.     VIL 

those  to  wliom  the  same  things  happened,  and  how  they  wero 
vexed,  and  treated  them  as  strange  things,  and  found  fault 
with  them :  and  now  where  are  they  ?  Nowhere.  Why 
then  dost  thou  too  choose  to  act  in  the  same  way  ?  and  why 
dost  thou  not  leave  these  agitations  which  are  foreign  to 
nature,  to  those  who  cause  them  and  those  who  are  moved 
by  them  ?  and  why  art  thou  not  altogether  intent  upon  the 
right  way  of  making  use  of  the  things  which  happen  to  thee  ? 
for  then  thou  wilt  use  tliem  well,  and  they  will  be  a  mate- 
rial for  thee  [to  work  on].  Only  attend  to  thyself,  and 
resolve  to  be  a  good  man  in  every  act  which  thou  doest :  and 
remember         *         *         *         «         ^-u 

59.  Look  within.  Within  is  the  fountain  of  good,  and  it 
will  ever  bubble  up,  if  thou  wilt  ever  dig. 

60.  The  body  ought  to  be  compact,  and  to  shov/no  irregu- 
larity either  in  motion  or  attitude.  For  what  the  mind  shows 
in  the  face  by  maintaining  in  it  the  expression  of  intelligence 
and  propriety,  that  ought  to  be  required  also  in  the  whole 
body.  But  all  these  things  should  be  observed  without 
affectation. 

61.  The  art  of  life  is  more  like  the  wrestler's  art  than  the 
dancer's,  in  respect  of  this,  that  it  should  stand  ready  and 
firm  to  meet  onsets  which  are  sudden  and  unexpected. 

62.  Constantly  observe  who  those  are  whose  approbation 
thou  wishest  to  have,  and  what  ruling  principles  they  possess. 
For  then  thou  wilt  neither  blame  those  who  offend  involun- 
tarily, nor  wilt  thou  want  theu'  approbation,  if  thou  lookest 
to  the  sources  of  their  opinions  and  appetites. 

63.  Every  soul,  the  philosopher  says,  is  involuntarily 
deprived  of  truth ;  consequently  in  the  same  way  it  is 
deprived  of  justice  and  temperance  and  benevolence  and 
everything  of  the  kind.  It  is  most  necessary  to  boar  this 
constantly  in  mind,  for  thus  thou  wilt  be  more  gentle  to- 
wards all. 

1*  This  section  is  obscure,  and  the  conclusion  is  so  corrupt  that  it  is 
impossible  to  give  any  probable  meaning  to  it.  It  is  better  to  leave  ii 
as  it  is  than  to  patch  it  up,  as  some  critics  and  translators  have  done. 


M.  Antoninus.      VIl.  Ill 

64.  Ill  every  pain  let  this  tliouglit  be  present,  tluit  tlicro 
is  no  dishonour  in  it,  nor  does  it  make  the  governing  intel- 
ligence worse,  for  it  does  not  damage  the  intelligence  either 
so  far  as  the  intelligence  is  rational  ^^  or  so  far  as  it  is  social. 
Indeed  in  the  case  of  most  pains  let  this  remark  of  Epicurus 
aid  thee,  that  pain  is  neither  intolerable  nor  everlasting,  if 
tliou  bearest  in  mind  that  it  has  its  limits,  and  if  thou  addest 
nothing  to  it  in  imagination  :  and  remember  this  too,  that 
we  do  not  perceive  that  many  things  which  are  disagreeable 
to  us  are  the  same  as  pain,  such  as  excessive  drowsiness,  and 
the  being  scorched  by  heat,  and  the  having  no  appetite. 
When  then  thou  art  discontented  about  any  of  these  things, 
say  to  thyself,  that  thou  art  yielding  to  pain. 

65.  Take  care  not  to  feel  towards  the  inhuman,  as  they 
feel  towai'ds  men.^^ 

66.  How  do  we  know  if  Telauges  was  not  superior  in 
character  to  Socrates  ?  for  it  is  not  enough  that  Socrates  died 
a  more  noble  death,  and  disputed  more  skilfully  wdth  the 
sophists,  and  passed  the  night  in  the  cold  with  more  en- 
durance, and  that  when  he  was  bid  to  arrest  Leon  ^'  of 
Salamis,  he  considered  it  more  noble  to  refuse,  and  that  he 
walked  in  a  swaggering  way  in  the  streets  ^^ — though  as  to 
this  fact  one  may  have  great  doubts  if  it  was  true.  But  we 
ought  to  inquire,  what  kind  of  a  soul  it  was  that  Socrates 
possessed,  and  if  he  was  able  to  be  content  with  being  just 
towards  men  and  pious  towards  the  gods,  neither  idly  vexed 
on  account  of  men's  villany,  nor  yet  making  himself  a  slave 
to  any  man's  ignorance,  nor  receiving  as  strange  anything 

'5  The  text  has  vXiK-fj,  which  it  has  been  proposed  to  alter  to  KoyiKi], 
and  this  change  is  necessary.  We  shall  then  have  in  this  section 
XoyiKT]  and  K0LVWVLK7}  assoclated,  as  we  Lave  in  s.  G8  \oyiK-r]  and 
TToXiriK-r],  and  in  s.  72. 

^^  -I  have  followed  Gataker's  conjecture  ol  hrdvdpcoiroi  instead  of  the 
MSS.  reading  ol  oLudpwiroi. 

^^  Leon  of  Salamis.  See  Plato,  Epist.  7 ;  Apolog.  c.  20 :  Epictems, 
IV.  i;  160  ;  TV.  7,  30. 

1^  Aristophan.   Nub.    3G2.    on    ^pivBv^i   t     eV   Tolaiv    bluls    ko).    tu 


142  M.  Antonmus.     VIL 

that  fell  to  liis  stare  out  of  tlie  universal,  nor  enduring  it  as 
intolerable,  nor  allowing  liis  understanding  to  sympathize 
with  the  affects  of  the  miserable  flesh. 

67.  Nature  has  not  so  mingledf  [the  intelligence]  with  the 
composition  of  the  body,  as  not  to  have  allowed  thee  the 
power  of  circumscribing  thyself  and  of  bringing  under  sub- 
jection to  thyself  all  that  is  thy  own  ;  for  it  is  very  possible 
to  be  a  divine  man  and  to  be  recognised  as  such  by  no  one. 
Always  bear  this  in  mind  ;  and  another  thing  too,  that  very 
little  indeed  is  necessary  for  living  a  happy  life.  And 
because  thou  hast  despaired  of  becoming  a  dialectician  and 
skilled  in  the  knowledge  of  nature,  do  not  for  this  reason 
renounce  the  hope  of  being  both  free  and  modest  and  social 
and  obedient  to  God. 

68._It  is  in  thy  power  to  live  free  from. all  .compulsion  in 
the  greatest  tranquillity  of  mind,  even  if  all  the  world  cry 
out  against  thee  as  much  as  they  choose,  and  even  if  wild 
beasts  tear  in  pieces  the  members  of  this  kneaded  matter 
which  has  grown  aromid  thee.  For  what  hinders  the  mind 
in  the  midst  of  all  this  from  maintaining  itself  in  tranquil- 
lity and  in  a  just  judgment  of  all  surrounding  things  and  in 
a  ready  use  of  the  objects  which  are  presented  to  it,  so  that 
the  judgment  may  say  to  the  thing  which  falls  under  its 
observation  :  This  thou  art  in  substance  [reality],  though  in 
men's  opinion  thou  may  est  appear  to  be  of  a  different 
kind ;  and  the  use  shall  say  to  that  which  falls  under  the 
hand :  Thou  art  the  thing  that  I  was  seeking ;  for  to  me  that 
which  presents  itself  is  always  a  material  for  virtue  both 
rational  and  political,  and  in  a  word,  for  the  exercise  of  art, 
which  belongs  to  man  or  God.  For  everything  which 
happens  has  a  relationship  either  to  God  or  man,  and  is 
neither  new  nor  difficult  to  handle,  but  usual  and  apt  matter 
to  work  on. 

69.  The  perfection  of  moral  character  consists  in  this,  in 
passing  every  day  as  the  last,  and  in  being  neither  violently 
excited  nor  torpid  nor  playing  the  hypocrite. 

70.  The  gods  who  are  immortal  are  not  vexed  because 


M.  Antoninus.     VII.  143 

during  so  long  a  time  tlicy  must  tolerate  continually  men 
sucli  as  tliey  are  and  so  many  of  tliem  bad ;  and  besides  this, 
they  also  take  care  of  them  in  all  ways.  But  tliou,  who  art 
destined  to  end  so  soon,  art  thou  wearied  of  enduring  the 
bad,  and  this  too  when  thou  art  one  of  them  ? 

71.  It  is  a  ridiculous  thing  for  a  man  not  to  fly  from  his 
own  badness,  which  is  indeed  possible,  but  to  fly  from  other 
men's  badness,  which  is  imj)ossible. 

72.  Whatever  the  rational  and  j^olitical  [social]  faculty 
finds  to  be  neither  intelligent  nor  social,  it  properly  judges 
to  be  inferior  to  itself. 

73.  When  thou  hast  done  a  good  act  and  another  has 
received  it,  why  dost  thou  still  look  for  a  third  thing  besides 
these,  as  fools  do,  either  to  have  the  reputation  of  having 
done  a  good  act  or  to  obtain  a  return  ? 

74.  No  man  is  tired  of  receiving  what  is  useful.  But  it  is 
useful  to  act  according  to  nature.  Do  not  then  be  tii*ed  of 
receiving  what  is  useful  by  doing  it  to  others. 

75.  The  natui-e  of  the  All  moved  to  make  the  universe. 
But  now  either  everything  that  takes  place  comes  by  way  of 
consequence  or  [continuity] ;  or  even  the  chief  things  towards 
which  the  ruling  power  of  the  universe  directs  its  own  move- 
ment are  governed  by  no  rational  principle.  If  this  is  re- 
membered it  will  make  thee  more  tranquil  in  many  things. 
(VI.  44 ;  IX.  28.)^^ 

^9  It  is  not  easy  to  understand  this  section.  It  has  been  suggested 
that  there  is  some  error  in  t)  aXoyiara,  &c.  Some  of  the  translators 
have  made  nothing  of  the  passage,  and  they  have  somewhat  perverted 
the  words.  The  first  proposition  is,  that  tlie  universe  was  made  by 
some  sufficient  power.  A  beginning  of  the  universe  is  assumed,  and  a 
power  which  framed  an  order.  The  next  question  is,  How  are  things 
produced  now ;  or,  in  other  words,  by  what  power  do  forms  appear  in 
continuous  succession  ?  The  answer,  according  to  Antoninus,  may  be 
this:  It  is  by  virtue  of  the  original  constitution  of  things  that  all 
change  and  succession  have  been  effected  and  are  efiected.  And  this 
is  intelligible  m  a  sense,  if  we  admit  that  the  universe  is  always  one 
and  the  same,  a  continuity  of  identity ;  as  much  one  and  the  same  as 
man  is  one  and  the  same,  which  he  believes  himself  to  be,  though  he 
also  believes  and  cannot  help  believing  that  both  in  his  body  and  in  hi? 


144  M.  Antoninus.     VIl. 

thoughts  there  is  change  and  succession.  There  is  no  real  discontinuity 
then  in  the  universe;  and  if  we  say  that  there  was  an  order  framed  in 
the  beginning  and  that  the  things  which  are  now  produced  are  a 
consequence  of  a  previous  arrangement,  we  speak  of  things  as  we  are 
compelled  to  view  them,  as  forming  a  series  or  succession  ;  just  as  we 
speak  of  the  changes  in  our  own  bodies  and  the  sequence  of  our  own 
thoughts.  But  as  there  are  no  intervals,  not  even  intervals  infinitely 
small,  between  any  two  supposed  states  of  any  one  thing,  so  there  are 
no  intervals,  not  even  infinitely  small,  between  what  we  call  one  thing 
and  any  other  tiling  which  we  speak  of  as  immediately  preceding  or 
following  it.  What  we  call  time  is  an  idea  derived  from  our  notion  of 
a  succession  of  things  or  events,  an  idea  which  is  a  part  of  our  constitu- 
tion, but  not  an  idea  whicli  we  can  suppose  to  belong  to  an  infinite 
intelligence  and  power.  The  conclusion  tlicn  is  certain  that  the  present 
and  the  past,  the  production  of  present  tilings  and  the  supposed  original 
order,  out  of  which  we  say  that  present  things  now  come,  are  one :  and 
the  present  productive  power  and  the  so-called  past  arrangement  are 
only  different  names  for  one  thing.  I  suppose  then  that  Antoninus 
wrote  here  as  people  sometimes  talk  now,  and  that  his  real  meaning  is 
not  exactly  expressed  by  his  words.  There  are  certainly  otlier  passages 
from  wliich,  I  think,  that  we  may  collect  that  he  had  notions  of  pro- 
duction something  like  what  I  have  expressed. 

We  now  come  to  the  alternative :  "  or  even  the  chief  things 

principle."  I  do  not  exactly  know  what  he  means  by  to.  Kvpiwrara, 
"  the  chief,"  or,  "  the  most  excellent,"  or  whatever  it  is.  But  as  he 
speaks  elsewhere  of  inferior  and  superior  things,  and  of  the  inferior 
being  for  the  use  of  the  superior,  and  of  rational  beings  being  the 
highest,  he  may  here  mean  rational  beings.  He  also  in  this  alternative 
assumes  a  governing  power  of  the  universe,  and  tliat  it  acts  by  directing 
its  power  towards  these  chief  objects,  or  making  its  special,  proper, 
motion  towards  them.  And  here  he  uses  the  noun  (6/j/.n5  j  "  movement," 
which  contains  the  same  notion  as  the  verb  (wp/x-na-e)  "  moved,"  which 
he  used  at  the  beginning  of  the  paragraph  when  he  was  speaking  of 
the  making  of  the  universe.  If  we  do  not  accept  the  first  hypothesis, 
he  says,  we  must  take  the  conclusion  of  the  second,  that  the  "  chief 
things  towards  which  the  ruling  power  of  the  universe  directs  its  own 
movement  are  governed  by  no  rational  principle."  The  meaning  then 
is,  if  there  is  a  meaning  in  it,  that  though  there  is  a  governing  power, 
which  stiives  to  give  eliect  to  its  efforts,  we  must  conclude  that  there  is  no 
rational  direction  of  anything,  if  the  power  which  first  made  the  universe 
does  not  in  some  way  govern  it  still.  Besides,  if  we  assume  that  any- 
thing is  now  produced  or  now  exists  without  the  action  of  the  supreme 
intelligence,  and  yet  that  this  intelligence  makes  an  effort  to  act,  we 
obtain  a  oonchisiou  which  cannot  be  reconciled  with  the  nature  of  a 


M.  Antoninus.     VII.  145 

guprcme  power,  whose  existence  Antoninus  always  assumes.  Tlie 
tranqtiillity  that  a  man  may  gain  from  these  reflections  must  result  from 
his  rt-jecting  the  second  Jjypothesis,  and  accepting  the  first;  whatever 
may  be  the  exact  sense  in  which  the  emperor  undei-stood  the  first.  Or. 
as  he  says  elsewhere,  if  there  is  no  providence  which  governs  the  world, 
man  has  at  least  the  power  of  (governing  himself  according  to  the 
constitution  of  his  nature ;  and  so  he  may  be  tranquil,  if  he  does  the 
best  that  he  can. 

If  there  is  no  error  in  the  passage,  it  is  worth  the  labour  to  discover 
the  writer's  exact  meaning  ;  for  I  think  that  he  had  a  meaning,  though 
people  may  not  agree  wliat  it  was.  (Compare  ix.  28.)  If  I  have 
rightly  explained  the  emperor's  meaning  in  this  and  other  passages,  he 
has  touched  the  solution  of  a  great  question. 


146  M.  Antoninus.     VIIL 


VIII. 


THIS  reflection  also  tends  to  tlie  removal  of  the  desire  of 
empty  fame,  that  it  is  no  longer  in  thy  power  to  have 
lived  the  whole  of  thy  life,  or  at  least  thy  life  from  thy 
youth  upwards,  like  a  philosopher  ;  but  both  to  many  others 
and  to  thyself  it  is  plain  that  thou  art  far  from  philosophy. 
Thou  hast  fallen  into  disorder  then,  so  that  it  is  no  longer 
easy  for  thee  to  get  the  reputation  of  a  philosopher ;  and  thy 
plan  of  life  also  opposes  it.  If  then  thou  hast  truly  seen 
where  the  matter  lies,  throw  away  the  thought,  How  thou 
shalt  seem  [to  others],  and  be  content  if  thou  shalt  live  the 
rest  of  thy  life  in  such  wise  as  thy  nature  wills.  Observe 
then  what  it  wills,  and  let  nothing  else  distract  thee  ;  for 
thou  hast  had  experience  of  many  wanderings  without  having 
found  happiness  anywhere,  not  in  syllogisms,  nor  in  wealth, 
nor  in  reputation,  nor  in  enjoyment,  nor  anywhere.  Where 
is  it  then?  In  doing  what  man's  nature  requires.  How 
then  shall  a  man  do  this  ?  If  he  has  principles  from  which 
come  his  affects  and  his  acts.  What  principles  ?  Those 
which  relate  to  good  and  bad  :  the  belief  that  there  is  no- 
thing good  for  man,  which  does  not  make  him  just,  temperate, 
manly,  free ;  and  that  there  is  nothing  bad,  which  does  not 
do  the  contrary  to  what  has  been  mentioned. 

2.  On  the  occasion  of  every  act  ask  thyself,  How  is  this 
with  respect  to  me  ?  Shall  I  repent  of  it  ?  A  little  time 
and  I  am  dead,  and  all  is  gone.  What  more  d'^  I  seek,  if 
what  I  am  now  doing  is  the  work  of  an  intelligent  living  being, 
and  a  social  being,  and  one  who  is  under  the  same  law  with  God? 

3.  Alexander  and  Caius  ^  and  Pompeius,  what  are  they  in 
comparison  with  Diogenes  and  Heraclitus  and  Socrates? 
For  they  were  acquainted   with    things,  and    their    causes 

1  Caius  is  C.  Julius  Caesar,  the  dictator;  and  Pompeius  is  Ca. 
Pompeius,  named  Magnus. 


M.  Antoninus.      VIII.  147 

[forms],  and  their  matter,  and  tlie  ruling  princijiles  of  these 
men  were  the  same  [or  conformable  to  their  jjursuitsj.  But 
as  to  the  others,  how  many  things  had  they  to  care  for,  and 
to  how  many  things  were  they  slaves. 

4.  [Consider]  that  men  will  do  the  same  things  neverthe- 
less, even  though  thou  shouldst  burst. 

5.  This  is  the  chief  thing:  Be  not  i3erturbed,  for  all  things 
are  according  to  the  nature  of  the  universal  ;  and  in  a  little 
time  thou  wilt  be  nobody  and  nowhere,  like  Iladrianus  and 
Augustus.  In  the  next  place  having  fixed  thy  eyes  steadily 
on  thy  business  look  at  it,  and  at  the  same  time  remembering 
that  it  is  thy  duty  to  be  a  good  man,  and  what  man's  nature 
demands,  do  that  without  turning  aside  ;  and  speak  as  it  seems 
to  thee  most  just,  only  let  it  be  with  a  good  disposition  and 
with  modesty  and  without  hypocrisy. 

6.  The  nature  of  the  universal  has  this  work  to  do,  to 
remove  to  that  place  the  things  which  are  in  this,  to  change 
them,  to  take  them  away  hence,  and  to  carry  them  there.  All 
things  are  change,  yet  we  need  not  fear  anything  new.  All 
things  are  familiar  [to  us]  ;  but  the  distribution  of  them  still 
remains  the  same. 

7.  Every  nature  is  contented  with  itself  when  it  goes  on 
its  way  well ;  and  a  rational  nature  goes  on  its  way  well, 
when  in  its  thoughts  it  assents  to  nothing  false  or  uncertain, 
and  when  it  dii-ects  its  movements  to  social  acts  only,  and 
when  it  confines  its  desires  and  aversions  to  the  things  which 
are  in  its  power,  and  when  it  is  satisfied  with  everything  that 
is  assigned  to  it  by  the  common  natiu-e.  For  of  this  common 
nature  every  particular  nature  is  a  part,  as  the  natui-e  of  the 
leaf  is  a  part  of  the  nature  of  the  plant ;  except  that  in  the 
plant  the  nature  of  the  leaf  is  part  of  a  nature  which  has  not 
perception  or  reason,  and  is  subject  to  be  impeded  ;  but  the 
natui-e  of  man  is  part  of  a  nature  which  is  not  subject  to  im- 
pediments, and  is  intelligent  and  just,  since  it  gives  to  every- 
thing in  equal  portions  and  according  to  its  worth,  times, 
substance,  cause  [form],  activity,  and  incident.  But  examine, 
not  to  discover  that  any  one  thing  compared  with  any  other 


148  M.  Ayitoninus,     VIII. 

single  thing  is  equal  in  all  respects,  but  by  taking  all  the 
parts  together  of  one  thing  and  comparing  them  with  all  the 
parts  together  of  another. 

8.  Thou  hast  not  leisure  [or  ability]  to  read.  But  thou 
hast  leisure  [or  ability]  to  check  arrogance  :  thou  hast  leisure 
to  be  superior  to  pleasure  and  pain :  thou  hast  leisure  to  be 
superior  to  love  of  fame,  and  not  to  be  vexed  at  stupid  and 
ungrateful  people,  nay  even  to  care  for  them. 

9.  Let  no  man  any  longer  hear  thee  finding  fault  with  the 
court  life  or  with  thy  own.     (v.  16.) 

10.  Eepentance  is  a  kind  of  self-reproof  for  having  neg- 
lected something  useful ;  but  that  which  is  good  must  be 
something  useful,  and  the  perfect  good  man  should  look  after 
it.  But  no  such  man  would  ever  repent  of  having  refused  any 
sensual  pleasure.     Pleasure  then  is  neither  good  nor  useful. 

11.  This  thing,  what  is  it  in  itself,  in  its  own  constitu- 
tion ?  What  is  its  substance  and  material  ?  And  what  its 
causal  nature  [or  form]  ?  And  what  is  it  doing  in  the 
world  ?     And  how  long  does  it  subsist  ? 

12.  When  thou  risest  from  sleep  with  reluctance,  remem- 
ber that  it  is  according  to  thy  constitution  and  according  to 
human  nature  to  perform  social  acts,  but  sleeping  is  common 
also  to  irrational  animals.  But  that  which  is  according  to  each 
individual's  nature  is  also  more  peculiarly  its  own,  and  more 
suitable  to  its  nature,  and  indeed  also  more  agreeable,    (v.  1.) 

13.  Constantly  and,  if  it  be  possible,  on  the  occasion  of 
every  impression  on  the  soul,  apply  to  it  the  princijDles  of 
Physic,  of  Ethic,  and  of  Dialectic. 

14.  Whatever  man  thou  meetest  with,  immediately  say  to 
thyself :  W  hat  opinions  has  this  man  about  good  and  bad  ?  For 
if  with  respect  to  pleasure  and  pain  and  the  causes  of  each, 
and  with  respect  to  fame  and  ignominy,  death  and  life  he  has 
such  and  such  opinions,  it  will  seem  nothing  wonderful  or 
strange  to  me,  if  he  does  such  and  such  things ;  and  I  shall 
bear  in  mind  that  he  is  compell(3d  to  do  so.^ 

2  Antoninus  V.  16.  Thucydides,  iii.  10 ;  eV  yap  red  SiaWdaaovri  rrjs 
yv(Jof.ir)s  Kol  at  Siacpopal  twv  epywv  KaQiinavTai. 


M.  Antoninus.      VIII.  149 

14.  Remember  that  as  it  is  a  shame  to  be  surprised  if  the 
fig-tree  produces  figs,  so  it  is  to  be  surprised  if  the  world 
produces  such  and  such  things  of  which  it  is  productive ;  and 
for  the  physician  and  the  helmsman  it  is  a  shame  to  be 
surj^rised,  if  a  man  has  a  fever,  or  if  the  wind  is  unfavourable. 

16.  Eemember  that  to  change  thy  opinion  and  to  follow 
him  who  corrects  thy  error  is  as  consistent  with  freedom  as 
it  is  to  persist  in  thy  error.  For  it  is  thy  own,  the  activity 
which  is  exerted  according  to  thy  own  movement  and  judg- 
ment, and  indeed  according  to  thy  own  understanding  too. 

17.  If  a  thing  is  in  thy  own  power,  why  dost  thou  do  it  ? 
but  if  it  is  in  the  power  of  another,  whom  dost  thou  blame  ? 
the  atoms  [chance]  or  the  gods  ?  Both  are  foolish.  Thou 
must  blame  nobody.  For  if  thou  canst,  correct  [that  which 
is  the  cause]  ;  but  if  thou  canst  not  do  this,  correct  at  least  the 
thing  itself ;  but  if  thou  canst  not  do  even  this,  of  what  use  is 
it  to  thee  to  find  fault  ?  for  nothing  should  be  done  without  a 
purpose. 

18.  That  which  has  died  falls  not  out  of  the  universe.  If 
it  stays  here,  it  also  changes  here,  and  is  dissolved  into  its 
proper  parts,  which  are  elements  of  the  universe  and  of  thy- 
self.    And  these  too  change,  and  they  murmur  not. 

19.  Everything  exists  for  some  end,  a  horse,  a  vine.  Why 
dost  thou  wonder  ?  Even  the  sun  will  say,  I  am  for  some 
purpose,  and  the  rest  of  the  gods  will  say  the  same.  For 
what  purpose  then  art  thou?  to  enjoy  pleasure?  See  if 
common  sense  allows  this. 

20.  Nature  has  had  regard  in  everything  no  less  to  the  end 
than  to  the  beginning  and  the  continuance,  just  like  the  man 
who  throws  up  a  ball.  What  good  is  it  then  for  the  ball  to 
be  thrown  up,  or  harm  for  it  to  come  down,  or  even  to  have 
fallen?  and  what  good  is  it  to  the  bubble  while  it  holds 
together,  or  what  harm  when  it  is  burst  ?  The  same  may  be 
said  of  a  light  also. 

21.  Turn  it  [the  body]  inside  out,  and  see  what  kind  of 
thing  it  is  ;  and  when  it  has  grown  old,  what  kind  of  thing  it 
becomes,  and  when  it  is  diseased. 


150  M.  Antoninus.      VIII. 

Short  lived  are  both  the  praiser  and  the  praised,  and  the 
rememberer  and  the  remembered :  and  all  this  in  a  nook  of 
this  part  of  the  world  ;  and  not  even  here  do  all  agree,  no, 
not  any  one  with  himself :  and  the  whole  earth  too  is  a  point. 

22.  Attend  to  the  matter  which  is  before  thee,  whether  it  is 
an  opinion  or  an  act  or  a  word. 

Thou  sufferest  this  justly :  for  thou  choosest  rather  to 
become  good  to-morrow  than  to  be  good  to-day. 

23.  Am  I  doing  anything  ?  I  do  it  with  reference  to  the 
good  of  mankind.  Does  anything  happen  to  me  ?  I  receive 
it  and  refer  it  to  the  gods,  and  the  source  of  all  things,  from 
which  all  that  happens  is  derived. 

24.  Such  as  bathing  appears  to  thee — oil,  sweat,  dirt,  filthy 
water,  all  things  disgusting — so  is  every  part  of  life  and 
everything. 

25.  Lucilla  saw  Verus  die,  and  then  Lucilla  died.  Secunda 
saw  Maximus  die,  and  then  Secunda  died.  Epitynchanus  saw 
Diotimus  die,  and  then  Epitynchanus  died.  Antoninus 
saw  Faustina  die,  and  then  Antoninus  died.  Such  is  every- 
thing. Celer  saw  Hadrianus  die,  and  then  Celer  died.  And 
those  sharp-witted  men,  either  seers  or  men  inflated  with 
pride,  where  are  they?  for  instance  the  sharp-witted  men, 
Charax  and  Demetrius  the  Platonist  and  Eudaemon,  and  any 
one  else  like  them.  All  ephemeral,  dead  long  ago.  Some 
indeed  have  not  been  remembered  even  for  a  short  time, 
and  others  have  become  the  heroes  of  fables,  and  again  others 
have  disappeared  even  from  fables.  Remember  this  then, 
that  this  little  compound,  thyself,  must  either  be  dissolved,  or 
thy  poor  breath  must  be  extinguished,  or  be  removed  and 
placed  elsewhere. 

26.  It  is  satisfaction  to  a  man  to  do  the  proper  works  of  a 
man.  Now  it  is  a  proper  work  of  a  man  to  be  benevolent  to 
his  own  kind,  to  despise  the  movements  of  the  senses,  to  form 
a  just  judgment  of  plausible  appearances,  and  to  take  a 
survey  of  the  nature  of  the  universe  and  of  the  things  which 
happen  in  it. 

27.  There   are   three   relations  fbotween   thee  and    other 


M.  Antoninus.     VI 1 1.  lol 

things] :  the  one  to  the  body^  which  surrounds  thee  ;  the 
second  to  the  divine  cause  from  which  all  things  come  to  all  • 
and  the  third  to  those  who  live  with  thee. 

28.  Pain  is  either  an  evil  to  the  body — then  let  the  body 
say  what  it  thinks  of  it — or  to  the  soul ;  but  it  is  in  the 
power  of  the  soul  to  maintain  its  own  serenity  and  tran- 
quillity, and  not  to  think  that  pain  is  an  evil.  For  everv 
judgment  and  movement  and  desire  and  aversion  is  within, 
and  no  evil  ascends  so  high. 

29.  Wipe  out  thy  imaginations  by  often  saying  to  thyself : 
now  it  is  in  my  power  to  let  no  badness  be  in  this  soul,  nor 
desire  nor  any  perturbation  at  all ;  but  looking  at  all  things 
I  see  what  is  their  nature,  and  I  use  each  according  to  its 
value. — Eemember  this  power  which  thou  hast  from  nature. 

30.  Speak  both  in  the  senate  and  to  every  man,  whoever 
he  may  be,  appropriately,  not  with  any  affectation :  use  j^lain 
discourse. 

31.  Augustus'  court,  wife,  daughter,  descendants,  ancestors, 
sister,  Agrippa,  kinsmen,  intimates,  friends,  Areius,*  Maecenas, 
physicians  and  sacrificing  priests — the  whole  court  is  dead. 
Then  turn  to  the  rest,  not  considering  the  death  of  a  single 
man,  [but  of  a  whole  race],  as  of  the  Pomj)eii ;  and  that 
which  is  inscribed  on  the  tombs — The  last  of  his  race. 
Then  consider  what  trouble  those  before  them  have  had  that 
they  might  leave  a  successor ;  and  then,  that  of  necessity 
some  one  must  be  the  last.  Again  here  consider  the  death  of 
a  whole  race. 

32.  It  is  thy  duty  to  order  thy  life  well  in  every  single 
act ;  and  if  every  act  does  its  duty,  as  far  as  is  possible,  be 
content ;  and  no  one  is  able  to  hinder  thee  so  that  each  act 
shall  not  do  its  duty—  But  something  external  will  stand  in 

^  The  text  has  a'tnuv  -which  in  Antoninus  means  '*  form,"  "  formal." 
Accordingly  Schultz  recommends  either  Valkenaer's  emendation  ayyflov, 
"  body,"  or  Corais'  o-cc/jloltlov.     Compare  xii.  13,  x.  38. 

*  Areius  {Jipeios)  was  a  philosopher,  who  was  intimate  with  Augustus: 
Sneton,  Augustus,  c.  89 ;  Plutarch,  Antoninus,  80 ;  Dion  Cassius,  51, 
c.  16.  ^ 


152  M.  Antoninus.     VIII. 

the  way — Nothing  will  stand  in  the  way  of  thy  acting  justly 
and  soberly  and  considerately — But  perhaps  some  other 
active  power  will  be  hindered — Well,  but  by  acquiescing  in 
the  hindrance  and  by  being  content  to  transfer  thy  efforts  to 
that  which  is  allowed,  another  opportunity  of  action  is 
immediately  put  before  thee  in  place  of  that  which  was 
hindered,  and  one  which  will  adapt  itself  to  this  ordering  of 
which  we  are  speaking. 

33.  Eeceive  [wealth  or  prosperity]  without  arrogance  ;  and 
be  ready  to  let  it  go. 

34.  If  thou  didst  ever  see  a  hand  cut  off,  or  a  foot,  or  a 
head,  lying  anywhere  apart  from  the  rest  of  the  body,  such 
does  a  man  make  himself,  as  far  as  he  can,  who  is  not  content 
with  what  happens,  and  separates  himself  from  others,  or 
does  anything  unsocial.  Suppose  that  thou  hast  detached 
thyself  from  the  natural  unity — for  thou  wast  made  by 
natm-e  a  part,  but  now  thou  hast  cut  thyself  off — yet  here 
there  is  this  beautiful  provision,  that  it  is  in  thy  power  again 
to  unite  thyself.  God  has  allowed  this  to  no  other  part,  after 
it  has  been  separated  and  cut  asunder,  to  come  together 
again.  But  consider  the  kindness  by  which  he  has  dis- 
tinguished man,  for  he  has  put  it  in  his  power  not  to  be 
separated  at  all  from  the  universal ;  and  when  he  has  been 
separated,  he  has  allowed  him  to  return  and  to  be  united  and 
to  resume  his  place  as  a  part. 

35.  As  the  nature  of  the  universal  has  given  to  every 
rational  being  all  the  other  powers  that  it  has,f  so  we  have 
received  from  it  this  power  also.  For  as  the  universal 
nature  converts  and  fixes  in  its  predestined  place  everything 
which  stands  in  the  way  and  opposes  it,  and  makes  such 
things  a  part  of  itself,  so  also  the  rational  animal  is  able  to 
make  every  hindrance  its  own  material,  and  to  use  it  for  such 
purposes  as  it  may  have  designed.^ 

*  The  text  is  corrupt  at  the  beginning  of  the  paragraph,  but  the 
meaning  will  appear  if  the  second  XoyiKoiu  is  changed  into  (iXcav :  thougli 
this  change  alone  will  not  establish  the  grammatical  completeness  ol 
the  text. 


M.  Antonimis.     VIII.  ];j3 

36.  Do  not  disturb  thyself  by  thinking  of  the  whole  of  thy 
life.  Let  not  thy  thoughts  at  once  embrace  all  the  various 
troubles  wliich  thou  mayest  expect  to  befall  tlice  :  but  on 
every  occasion  ask  thyself,  What  is  there  in  this  which  is 
intolerable  and  past  bearing  ?  for  thou  wilt  be  ashamed  to 
confess.  In  the  next  place  remember  that  neither  the  future 
nor  the  past  pains  thee,  but  only  the  present.  But  this  is 
reduced  to  a  very  little,  if  thou  only  circumscribest  it,  and 
chidest  thy  mind,  if  it  is  unable  to  hold  out  against  even 
this. 

37.  Does  Panthea  or  Pergamus  now  sit  by  the  tomb  of 
Verus?®  Does  Chaurias  or  Diotimus  sit  by  the  tomb  of 
Hadrianus?  That  would  be  ridiculous.  Well,  suppose  they 
did  sit  there,  would  the  dead  be  conscious  of  it  ?  and  if  the 
dead  were  conscious,  would  they  be  pleased  ?  and  if  they 
were  pleased,  would  that  make  them  immortal  ?  Was  it  not  in 
the  order  of  destiny  that  these  persons  too  should  first  become 
old  women  and  old  men  and  then  die  ?  What  then  would 
those  do  after  these  were  dead  ?  All  this  is  foul  smell  and 
blood  in  a  bag. 

38.  If  thou  canst  see  sharp,  look  and  judge  wisely,|  says 
the  philosopher. 

39.  In  the  constitution  of  the  rational  animal  I  see  no 
virtue  which  is  opposed  to  justice ;  but  I  see  a  virtue  which 
is  opposed  to  love  of  pleasure,  and  that  is  temperance. 

40.  If  thou  takest  away  thy  opinion  about  that  which 
appears  to  give  thee  pain,  thou  thyself  standest  in  perfect 
security — Who  is  this  self? — The  reason — But  I  am  not 
reason — Be  it  so.  Let  then  the  reason  itself  not  trouble 
itself.  But  if  any  other  part  of  thee  suffers,  let  it  have  its 
own  opinion  about  itself     (vii.  16.) 

41.  Hindi-ance  to  the  perceptions  of  sense  is  an  evil  to  the 
animal  nature.  Hindrance  to  the  movements  [desires]  is 
equally  an  evil  to  the  animal  nature.  And  something  else 
also  is  equally  an  impediment  and  an  evil  to  the  constitution 
of  plants.      So  then  that  which  is  a  hindrance  to   the  in- 

^  '*  Verus  ■'  is  a  conjecture  of  Sauinaise,  and  perhaps  the  true  readmg. 


154  M.  Antoninus.     VIIL 

telligence  is  an  evil  to  the  intelligent  nature.  Apply  all 
these  things  then  to  thyself.  Does  pain  or  sensuous  pleasure 
affect  thee  ?  The  senses  will  look  to  that. — Has  any  obstacle 
opposed  thee  in  thy  efforts  towards  an  object  ?  if  indeed  thou 
wast  making  this  effort  absolutely  [unconditionally,  or 
without  any  reservation],  certainly  this  obstacle  is  an  evil  to 
thee  considered  as  a  rational  animal.  But  if  thou  takest  [into 
consideration]  the  usual  course  of  things,  thou  hast  not  yet 
been  injured  nor  even  impeded.  The  things  however  which 
are  proper  to  the  understanding  no  other  man  is  used  to 
impede,  for  neither  fire,  nor  iron,  nor  tyrant,  nor  abuse, 
touches  it  in  any  way.  When  it  has  been  made  a  sphere,  it 
continues  a  sphere,     (xi.  12.) 

42.  It  is  not  fit  that  I  should  give  myself  pain,  for  I  have 
never  intentionally  given  pain  even  to  another. 

43.  Different  things  delight  different  people.  But  it  is 
my  delight  to  keep  the  ruling  faculty  sound  without  turning 
away  either  from  any  man  or  from  any  of  the  things  which 
happen  to  men,  but  looking  at  and  receiving  all  with  welcome 
eyes  and  using  everything  according  to  its  value. 

44.  See  that  thou  secure  this  present  time  to  thyself :  for 
those  who  rather  pursue  posthumous  fame  do  not  consider 
that  the  men  of  after  time  will  be  exactly  such  as  these 
whom  they  cannot  bear  now ;  and  both  are  mortal.  And 
what  is  it  in  any  way  to  thee  if  these  men  of  after  time 
utter  this  or  that  sound,  or  have  this  or  that  opinion  about 
thee? 

45.  Take  me  and  cast  me  where  thou  wilt ;  for  there  I 
shall  keep  my  divine  part  tranquil,  that  is,  content,  if  it  can 
feel  and  act  conformably  to  its  proper  constitution.  Is  this 
[change  of  place]  sufficient  reason  why  my  soul  should  be 
unhappy  and  worse  than  it  was,  depresse  ?,  expanded, 
shrinking,  affrighted?  and  what  wilt  thou  find  which  is 
sufficient  reason  for  this  ?^ 

7  b^eyoix4vn  in  this  passage  seems  to  liave  a  passive  sense.  It  is 
difficult  to  find  an  apt  expression  for  it  and  some  of  the  other  worda  A 
comparison  with  xi.  12,  will  help  to  explain  the  meaning. 


M.  Antoninus.      VJII.  155 

46.  Nothing  can  liapixn  to  any  man  wliicli  is  nut  a  Luman 
accident,  nor  to  an  ox  which  is  not  according  to  the  nature 
of  an  ox,  nor  to  a  vine  which  is  not  according  to  the  nature 
of  a  vine,  nor  to  a  stone  which  is  not  pro2)er  to  a  stone.  If 
then  there  happens  to  each  thing  both  what  is  usual  and 
natural,  why  shouldst  thou  complain  ?  For  the  common 
nature  brings  nothing  which  may  not  be  borne  by  thee. 

47.  Jf  thou  art  pained  by  any  external  thing,  it  is  not  this 
thing  that  disturbs  thee,  but  thy  own  judgment  about  it. 
And  it  is  in  thy  power  to  wipe  out  this  judgment  now.  But 
if  anything  in  thy  own  disposition  gives  thee  pain,  who 
hinders  thee  from  correcting  thy  opinion  ?  And  even  if  thou 
art  pained  because  thou  art  not  doing  some  particular  thing 
which  seems  to  thee  to  be  right,  why  dost  thou  not  rather 
act  than  complain  ? — But  some  insuperable  obstacle  is  in  the 
way  ? — Do  not  be  gi'ieved  then,  for  the  cause  of  its  not  being 
done  depends  not  on  thee — But  it  is  not  worth  while  to  live, 
if  this  cannot  be  done — Take  thy  departure  then  from  life 
contentedly,  just  as  he  dies  who  is  in  full  activity,  and  well 
pleased  too  with  the  things  which  are  obstacles. 

48.  Remember  that  the  ruling  faculty  is  invincible,  when 
self-collected  it  is  satisfied  with  itself,  if  it  does  nothing  which 
it  does  not  choose  to  do,  even  if  it  resist  from  mere  obstinacy. 
What  then  will  it  be  when  it  forms  a  judgment  about 
anything  aided  by  reason  and  deliberately  ?  Therefore  the 
mind  which  is  free  from  passions  is  a  citadel,  for  man  has 
nothing  more  secure  to  which  he  can  fly  for  refuge  and  for  the 
future  be  inexpugnable.  He  then  who  has  not  seen  this  is  an 
ignorant  man ;  but  he  who  has  seen  it  and  does  not  fly  to  this 
refuge  is  unhappy. 

49.  Say  nothing  more  to  thyself  than  what  the  first 
appearances  report.  Suppose  that  it  has  been  reported  to 
thee  that  a  certain  person  speaks  ill  of  thee.  This  has  been 
reported ;  but  that  thou  hast  been  injured,  that  has  not  been 
reported.  I  see  that  my  child  is  sick.  I  do  see  ;  but  that  he 
is  in  danger,  I  do  not  see.  Thus  then  always  abide  by  the 
fii-st  appearances,  and  add  nothing  thyself  from  within,  and 


156  M.  Antoninus.     VIII. 

then  nothing  happens  to  thee.  Or  rather  add  something, 
like  a  man  who  knows  everything  that  happens  in  the 
world. 

50.  A  cucumber  is  bitter— Throw  it  away. — There  arc 
briars  in  the  road — Turn  aside  from  them. — This  is  enough. 
Do  not  add,  And  why  were  such  things  made  in  the  world  ? 
For  thou  wilt  be  ridiculed  by  a  man  who  is  acquainted  with 
nature,  as  thou  wouldst  be  ridiculed  by  a  carpenter  and  shoe- 
maker if  thou  didst  find  fault  because  thou  seest  in  their 
workshop  shavings  and  cuttings  from  the  things  which  they 
make.  And  yet  they  have  places  into  which  they  can  throw 
these  shavings  and  cuttings,  and  the  universal  natui-e  has  no 
external  space;  but  the  wondrous  part  of  her  art  is  that 
though  she  has  circumscribed  herself,  everything  within  her 
which  appears  to  decay  and  to  grow  old  and  to  be  useless  she 
changes  into  herself,  and  again  makes  other  new  things  from 
these  very  same,  so  that  she  requires  neither  substance  from 
without  nor  wants  a  place  into  which  she  may  cast  that  which 
decays.  She  is  content  then  with  her  own  space,  and  her  own 
matter  and  her  own  art. 

51.  Neither  in  thy  actions  be  sluggish  nor  in  thy  con- 
versation without  method,  nor  wandering  in  thy  thoughts, 
nor  let  there  be  in  thy  soul  inward  contention  nor  external 
effusion,  nor  in  life  be  so  busy  as  to  have  no  leisure. 

Suppose  that  men  kill  thee,  cut  thee  in  pieces,  curse  thee. 
What  then  can  these  things  do  to  prevent  thy  mind  from 
remaining  pure,  wise,  sober,  just  ?  For  instance,  if  a  man 
should  stand  by  a  limpid  pure  spring,  and  curse  it,  the  spring 
never  ceases  sending  up  potable  water ;  and  if  he  should  cast 
clay  into  it  or  filth,  it  will  speedily  disperse  them  and  wash 
them  out,  and  will  not  be  at  all  polluted.  How  then  shalt 
thou  possess  a  perpetual  fountain  [and  not  a  mere  well]  ?  By 
forming  |  thyself  hourly  to  freedom  conjoined  with  content- 
ment, simplicity  and  modesty. 

52.  He  who  does  not  know  what  the  world  is,  does  not 
know  where  he  is.  And  he  who  does  not  know  for  what 
purpose  the  world  exists,  does  not  know  who  he  is,  nor  what 


M.  Antoninus,     VIII.  157 

the  world  is.  But  he  wlio  has  failed  in  any  one  of  these 
things  could  not  even  say  for  what  purpose  he  exists  himself. 
What  then  dost  thou  think  of  him  who  [avoids  or]  seeks  the 
praise  of  those  who  applaud,  of  men  who  know  not  either 
where  they  are  or  who  they  are  ? 

53.  Dost  thou  wish  to  be  praised  by  a  man  who  curses  him- 
self thrice  every  hour  ?  w^ouldst  thou  wish  to  please  a  man 
who  does  not  please  himself  ?  Does  a  man  please  himself  who 
repents  of  nearly  everything  that  he  does  ? 

54.  No  longer  let  thy  breathing  only  act  in  concert  with 
the  air  which  surrounds  thee,  but  let  thy  intelligence  also 
now  be  in  harmony  with  the  intelligence  which  embraces  all 
things.  For  the  intelligent  power  is  no  less  diffused  in  all 
parts  and  pervades  all  things  for  him  who  is  willing  to 
draw  it  to  him  than  the  aerial  power  for  him  who  is  able  to 
respire  it. 

55.  Generally,  wickedness  does  no  harm  at  all  to  the 
universe ;  and  particularly,  the  wickedness  [of  one  man] 
does  no  harm  to  another.  It  is  only  harmful  to  him  who  has 
it  in  his  power  to  be  released  from  it,  as  soon  as  he  shall 
choose. 

56.  To  my  own  free  will  the  free  will  of  my  neighbour  is 
just  as  indifferent  as  his  jjoor  breath  and  flesh.  For  though 
we  are  made  especially  for  the  sake  of  one  another,  still  the 
ruling  power  of  each  of  us  has  its  own  office,  for  otherwise 
my  neighbour's  wickedness  would  be  my  harm,  which  God  has 
not  willed  in  order  that  my  unhappiness  may  not  depend  on 
another. 

57.  The  sun  appears  to  be  poured  down,  and  in  all 
directions  indeed  it  is  diffused,  yet  it  is  not  effused.  For 
this  diffiision  is  extension  :  Accordingly  its  rays  are  called 
Extensions  [aKxtves]  because  they  are  extended  [ciTro  tov  iKT^iv- 
€o-^at].*  But  one  may  judge  what  kind  of  a  thing  a  ray  is,  if 
he  looks  at  the  sun's  light  passing  through  a  narrow  opening 
into  a  darkened  room,  for  it  is  extended  in  a  right  line,  and 
as  it  were  is  divided  when  it  meets  with  any  solid  body  which 

^  A  piece  of  bad  etymology. 


/ 


158  M.  Antoninus,     VIIL 

stands  in  the  way  and  intercepts  the  air  beyond ;  but  there 
the  light  remains  fixed  and  does  not  glide  or  fall  off.  Such 
then  ought  to  be  the  out-pouring  and  diffusion  of  the  under- 
standing, and  it  should  in  no  way  be  an  effusion,  but  an 
extension,  and  it  should  make  no  violent  or  impetuous 
collision  with  the  obstacles  which  are  in  its  way ;  nor  yet  fall 
down,  but  be  fixed  and  enlighten  that  which  receives  it.  For 
a  body  will  deprive  itself  of  the  illumination,  if  it  does  not 
admit  it. 

58.  He  who  fears  death  either  fears  the  loss  of  sensation 
or  a  different  kind  of  sensation.  But  if  thou  shalt  have  no 
sensation,  neither  wilt  thou  feel  any  harm ;  and  if  thou  shalt 
acquire  another  kind  of  sensation,  thou  wilt  be  a  different 
kind  of  living  being  and  thou  wilt  not  cease  to  live. 

59.  Men  exist  for  the  sake  of  one  another.  Teach  them 
then  or  bear  with  them. 

60.  lu  one  way  an  arrow  moves,  in  another  way  the  mind. 
The  mind  indeed  both  when  it  exercises  caution  and  when  it 
is  employed  about  inquiry,  moves  straight  onward  not  the 
less,  and  to  its  object. 

61.  Enter  into  every  man's  ruling  faculty;  and  also  let 
every  other  man  enter  into  thine.^ 

^  (JuDipare  Epictetus,  iii.  ^,  VI, 


^ 


M.  Antoninus.     IX,  15.9 


IX. 

HE  who  acts  unjustly  acts  impiously.  For  since  tlie 
universal  natui-e  has  made  rational  animals  for  the  sake 
of  one  another  to  help  one  another  according  to  their  deserts, 
but  in  no  way  to  injure  one  another,  he  who  ti'ansgresses  her 
will,  is  clearly  guilty  of  impiety  towards  the  highest  divinity. 
And  he  too  who  lies  is  guilty  of  impiety  to  the  same  divinity ; 
for  the  imiversal  natui-e  is  the  nature  of  things  that  are  ;  and 
things  that  are  have  a  relation  to  all  things  that  come  into 
existence.^  And  further,  this  universal  nature  is  named 
truth,  and  is  the  prime  cause  of  all  things  that  are  true.  He 
then  who  lies  intentionally  is  guilty  of  impiety  inasmuch  as 
he  acts  unjustly  by  deceiving ;  and  he  also  who  lies  uninten- 
tionally, inasmuch  as  he  is  at  variance  with  the  universal 
nature,  and  inasmuch  as  he  disturbs  the  order  by  fighting 
against  the  nature  of  the  world :  for  he  fights  against  it,  who 
is  moved  of  himself  to  that  which  is  contrary  to  truth,  for  he 
had  received  powers  from  nature  through  the  neglect  of 
which  he  is  not  able  now  to  distinguish  falsehood  from  truth. 

^  "  As  tliere  is  not  any  action  or  natural  event,  which  we  are  ac- 
quainted with,  so  single  and  unconnected  as  not  to  Lave  a  respect  to  some 
other  actions  and  events,  so,  possibly  each  of  them,  when  it  has  not  an 
immediate,  may  yet  have  a  remote,  natural  relation  to  other  actions 
and  events,  much  beyond  the  compass  of  this  present  world."  Again  : 
"  Things  seemingly  the  most  insignificant  imoginable,  are  perpetually 
observed  to  be  necessary  conditions  to  other  things  of  the  greatest 
importance ;  so  that  any  one  thing  whatever,  may,  for  aught  we  know 
to  the  coutraiy,  be  a  necessary  condition  to  •  any  other. ' — Butler's 
Analogy,  Chap.  7.  See  all  the  chapter.  Some  critics  take  to 
inrdpxovra  in  this  passage  of  Antoninus  to  be  the  same  as  ra  ovra:  but 
if  that  were  so,  he  might  have  said  irphs  &\\r]\a  instead  of  irphs  to 
virdpxovra.  Perhaps  the  meaning  of  ivphs  to.  v-Kapxovra  may  be  '  to  aU 
prior  things.'     It  so,  the  translation  is  still  correct.     See  vi.'  oS. 


160  M.  Antoninus.    IX. 

And  indeed  he  wlio  pursues  pleasure  as  good,  and  avoids  pain 
as  evil,  is  guilty  of  impiety.  For  of  necessity  such  a  man 
must  often  find  fault  with  the  universal  nature,  alleging  that 
it  assigns  things  to  the  bad  and  the  good  contrary  to  their 
deserts,  because  frequently  the  bad  are  in  the  enjoyment  of 
pleasure  and  possess  the  things  which  procure  pleasure,  but 
the  good  have  pain  for  their  share  and  the  things  which  cause 
pain.  And  further,  he  who  is  afraid  of  pain  will  sometimes 
also  be  afraid  of  some  of  the  things  which  will  happen  in  the 
world,  and  even  this  is  impiety.  And  he  who  pursues 
pleasure  will  not  abstain  from  injustice,  and  this  is  plainly 
impiety.  Now  with  respect  to  the  things  towards  which  the 
universal  nature  is  equally  affected — for  it  would  not  have 
made  both,  unless  it  was  equally  affected  towards  both — 
towards  these  they  who  wish  to  follow  nature  should  be  of 
the  same  mind  with  it,  and  equally  affected.  With  respect  to 
pain,  then,  and  pleasure,  or  death  and  life,  or  honour  and 
dishonour,  which  the  universal  nature  employs  equally,  who- 
ever is  not  equally  affected  is  manifestly  acting  impiously. 
And  I  say  that  the  universal  nature  employs  them  equally, 
instead  of  saying  that  they  happen  alike  to  those  who  are 
produced  in  continuous  series  and  to  those  who  come  after 
them  by  virtue  of  a  certain  original  movement  of  Providence, 
according  to  which  it  moved  from  a  certain  beginning  to  this 
ordering  of  things,  having  conceived  certain  principles  of  the 
things  which  were  to  be,  and  having  determined  powers 
productive  of  beings  and  of  changes  and  of  such  like  succes- 
sions,    (vii.  75). 

2.  It  would  be  a  man's  happiest  lot  to  depart  from  mankind 
without  having  had  any  taste  of  lying  and  hypocrisy  and 
luxui'y  and  pride.  However  to  breathe  out  one's  life  when 
a  man  has  had  enough  of  these  things  is  the  next  best  voyage, 
as  the  saying  is.  Hast  thou  determined  to  abide  with  vice, 
and  has  not  experience  yet  induced  thee  to  fly  from  this 
pestilence  ?  For  tlie  destruction  of  the  understanding  is  a 
pestilence,  much  more  indeed  than  any  such  corruption  and 
change  of  this  atmosphere  wliich  surrounds  us.     For  this 


M.  Antoninus.     IX.  161 

corruption  is  a  pestilence  of  animals  so  far  as  they  ara 
animals ;  but  the  other  is  a  pestilence  of  men  so  far  as  they 
ai'C  men. 

■  3.  Do  not  despise  death,  but  be  well  content  with  it,  since 
this  too  is  one  of  those  things  w^hich  nature  wills.  For  such 
as  it  is  to  be  young  and  to  grow  old,  and  to  increase  and  to 
reach  maturity,  and  to  have  tefith  and  beard  and  gray  hairs, 
and  to  beget,  and  to  be  pregnant  and  to  bring  forth,  and  all 
the  other  natural  operations  which  the  seasons  of  thy  life 
bring,  such  also  is  dissolution.  This,  then,  is  consistent  with 
the  character  of  a  reflecting  man,  to  be  neither  careless  nor 
impatient  nor  contemptuous  with  respect  to  death,  but  to 
wait  for  it  as  one  of  the  oj^crations  of  nature.  As  thou  now 
waitest  for  the  time  when  the  child  shall  come  out  of  thy 
wife's  womb,  so  be  ready  for  the  time  when  thy  soul  shall 
fall  out  of  this  envelope.^  But  if  thou  requirest  also  a  vulgar 
kind  of  comfort  which  shall  reach  thy  heart,  thou  wilt  be 
made  best  reconciled  to  death  by  observing  the  objects  from 
which  thou  art  going  to  be  removed,  and  the  morals  of  those 
with  whom  thy  soul  will  no  longer  be  mingled.  For  it  is 
no  way  right  to  be  offended  with  men,  but  it  is  thy  duty  to 
care  for  them  and  to  bear  with  them  gently ;  and  yet  to 
remember  that  thy  departure  will  be  not  from  men  who  have 
the  same  principles  as  thyself.  For  this  is  the  only  thing, 
if  there  be  any,  which  could  draw  us  the  contrary  way  and 
attach  us  to  life,  to  be  permitted  to  live  with  those  who  have 
the  same  principles  as  ourselves.  But  now  thou  seest  how 
great  is  the  trouble  arising  from  the  discordance  of  those 
who  live  together,  so  that  thou  mayst  say,  Come  quick,  0 
death,  lest  perchance  I,  too,  should  forget  myself. 

4.  He  who  does  wrong  does  wrong  against  himself.  He 
who  acts  unjustly  acts  unjustly  to  himself,  because  he  makes 
himself  bad. 

5.  He  often  acts  unjustly  who  does  not  do  a  certain  thing ; 
not  only  he  who  does  a  certain  thing. 

6.  Thy  present  opinion  founded  on  understanding,   and 

3  Note  21  of  the  Philosophy,  p.  64. 


162  M.  Antoninus.     IX. 

thy  present  conduct  directed  to  social  good,  and  thy  present 
disposition  of  contentment  with  everything  which  happens  | — 
that  is  enough. 

7.  Wipe  out  imagination :  check  desire :  extinguish  appe- 
tite :  keep  the  ruling  faculty  in  its  own  power. 

8.  Among  the  animals  which  have  not  reason  one  life  is 
distributed  ;  but  among  reasonable  animals  one  intelligent 
soul  is  distributed :  just  as  there  is  one  earth  of  all  things 
which  are  of  an  earthy  nature,  and  we  see  by  one  light,  and 
breathe  one  air,  all  of  us  that  have  the  faculty  of  vision  and 
all  that  have  life. 

9.  All  things  which  participate  in  anything  which  is 
common  to  them  all  move  towards  that  which  is  of  the  same 
kind  with  themselves.  Everything  which  is  earthy  turns 
towards  the  earth,  everything  which  is  liquid  flows  together, 
and  everything  which  is  of  an  aerial  kind  does  the  same,  so 
that  they  require  something  to  keep  them  asunder,  and  the 
ap2)lication  of  force.  Fire  indeed  moves  upwards  on  account 
of  the  elemental  fire,  but  it  is  so  ready  to  be  kindled  together 
with  all  the  fire  which  is  here,  that  even  every  substance 
which  is  somewhat  dry,  is  easily  ignited,  because  there  is  less 
mingled  with  it  of  that  which  is  a  hindrance  to  ignition. 
Accordingly  then  everything  also  which  participates  in  the 
common  intelligent  nature  moves  in  like  manner  towards 
that  which  is  of  the  same  kind  with  itself,  or  moves  even 
more.  For  so  much  as  it  is  superior  in  comparison  with  all 
other  things,  in  the  same  degree  also  is  it  more  ready  to 
mingle  with  and  to  be  fused  with  that  which  is  akin  to  it. 
Accordingly  among  animals  devoid  of  reason  we  find  swarms 
of  bees,  and  herds  of  cattle,  and  the  nurture  of  young  birds, 
and  in  a  manner,  loves ;  for  even  in  animals  there  are  souls, 
and  that  power  which  brings  them  together  is  seen  to  exert 
itself  in  the  superior  degree,  and  in  such  a  way  as  never  has 
been  observed  in  plants  nor  in  stones  nor  in  trees.  But  in 
rational  animals  there  are  political  communities  and  friend- 
ships, and  families  and  meetings  of  people  ;  and  in  wars, 
treaties  and  armistices.     But  in  the  things  which  are  still 


M.  Antoninus.     IX.  163 

superior,  even  though  tlicy  are  separated  from  one  another, 
unity  in  a  manner  exists,  as  in  the  stars.  Thus  the  ascent  to 
the  higher  degree  is  able  to  produce  a  sympathy  even  in 
things  which  are  separated.  See,  then,  what  now  takes  i)lace. 
For  only  intelligent  animals  have  now  forgotten  this  mutual 
desire  and  inclination,  and  in  them  alone  the  property  of 
flowing  together  is  not  seen.  But  still  though  men  strive  to 
avoid  [this  unionj,  they  are  caught  and  held  by  it,  for  their 
natui'e  is  too  strong  for  them ;  and  thou  wilt  see  what  I  say, 
if  thou  only  observest.  Sooner,  then,  will  one  find  anything 
earthy  which  comes  in  contact  with  no  earthy  thing  than  a 
man  altogether  separated  from  other  men. 

10.  Both  man  and  God  and  the  universe  produce  fruit ;  at 
the  proper  seasons  each  produces  it.  But  if  usage  has 
especially  fixed  these  terms  to  the  vine  and  like  things,  this 
is  nothing.  Keason  produces  fruit  both  for  all  and  for  itself, 
and  there  are  produced  from  it  other  things  of  the  same  kind 
as  reason  itself. 

11.  If  thou  art  able,  correct  by  teaching  those  who  do 
wrong ;  but  if  thou  canst  not,  remember  that  indulgence  is 
given  to  thee  for  this  pui^pose.  And  the  gods,  too,  are 
indulgent  to  such  persons ;  and  for  some  purposes  they  even 
help  them  to  get  health,  wealth,  reputation ;  so  kind  they 
are.     And  it  is  in  thy  power  also  ;  or  say,  who  hinders  thee  ? 

12.  Labom'  not  as  one  who  is  wretched,  nor  yet  as  one  who 
would  be  pitied  or  admired  :  but  direct  thy  will  to  one  thing 
only,  to  put  thyself  in  motion  and  to  check  thyself,  as  the 
social  reason  requires. 

13.  To-day  I  have  got  out  of  all  trouble,  or  rather  1  have 
cast  out  all  trouble,  for  it  was  not  outside,  but  within  and  in 
my  opinions. 

14.  All  things  are  the  same,  familiar  in  experience,  and 
ephemeral  in  time,  and  worthless  in  the  matter.  Everything 
now  is  just  as  it  was  in  the  time  of  those  whom  we  have 
bui'ied. 

15.  Things  stand  outside  of  us,  themselves  by  themselves, 
neither  knowing  aught  of  themselves,  nor  expressing  anj 


164  M.  Antoninus.     IX, 

judgment.     "What  is  it,  then,  which  does  judge  about  them  ? 
The  ruling  faculty. 

16.  Not  in  passivity,  but  in  activity,  lie  the  evil  and  the 
good  of  the  rational  social  animal,  just  as  his  virtue  and  his 
vice  lie  not  in  passivity,  but  in  activity.^ 

17.  For  the  stone  which  has  been  thrown  up  it  is  no  evil 
to  come  down,  nor  indeed  any  good  to  have  been  carried  up. 
(^viii.  20.) 

18.  Penetrate  inwards  into  men's  leading  principles,  and 
thou  wilt  see  what  judges  thou  art  afraid  of,  and  what  kind 
of  judges  they  are  of  themselves. 

19.  All  things  are  changing  :  and  thou  thyself  art  in  con- 
tinuous mutation  and  in  a  manner  in  continuous  destruction, 
and  the  whole  universe  too. 

20.  It  is  thy  duty  to  leave  another  man's  wrongful  act 
there  where  it  is.     (vii.  29,  ix.  38.) 

21.  Termination  of  activity,  cessation  from  movement  and 
opinion,  and  in  a  sense  their  death,  is  no  evil.  Turn  thy 
thoughts  now  to  the  consideration  of  thy  life,  thy  life  as  a 
child,  as  a  youth,  thy  manhood,  thy  old  age,  for  in  these  also 
every  change  was  a  death.  Is  this  anything  to  fear  ?  Turn 
thy  thoughts  now  to  thy  life  under  thy  grandfather,  then  to 
thy  life  imder  thy  mother,  then  to  thy  life  under  thy  father  ; 
and  as  thou  findest  many  other  differences  and  changes  and 
terminations,  ask  thyself.  Is  this  anything  to  fear  ?  In  like 
manner,  then,  neither  are  the  termination  and  cessation  and 
change  of  thy  whole  life  a  thing  to  be  afraid  of. 

22.  Hasten  [to  examine]  thy  own  ruling  faculty  and  that 
of  the  universe  and  that  of  thy  neighbour  :  thy  own  that 
thou  mayst  make  it  just :  and  that  of  the  universe,  that  thou 
mayst  remember  of  what  thou  art  a  part ;  and  that  of  thy 
neighbour,  that  thou  mayst  know  whether  he  has  acted 
iguorantly  or  with  knowledge,  and  that  thou  mayst  also  con- 
eider  that  his  ruling  faculty  is  akin  to  thine. 

23.  As  thou  thyself  art  a  component  part  of  a  social  system, 
so  let  every  act  of  thine  be  a  component  part  of  social  Ufa 

'  a  «'  Virtutis  omnia  laus  in  actione  consistit." — Cicero,  De  Off.  i.  6, 


M.  Antoninus,     IX.  1G5 

Whatever  act  of  thine  then  has  no  reference  either  immediately 
or  remotely  to  a  social  end,  this  tears  asunder  thy  life,  and 
does  not  allow  it  to  be  one,  and  it  is  of  the  nature  of  a  mutiny, 
just  as  when  in  a  popular  assembly  a  man  acting  by  himself 
stands  aj^art  from  the  general  agreement. 

24.  Quarrels  of  little  children  and  their  sports,  and  poor 
spirits  carrying  about  dead  bodies  [such  is  everythingj  ;  and 
so  what  is  exhibited  in  the  representation  of  the  mansions  of 
the  dead*  strikes  our  eyes  more  clearly. 

25.  Examine  into  the  qualty  of  the  form  of  an  object,  and 
detach  it  altogether  from  its  material  part,  and  then  contem- 
plate it ;  then  determine  the  time,  the  longest  which  a  thing 
of  this  peculiar  form  is  naturally  made  to  endure. 

26.  Thou  hast  endured  infinite  troubles  through  not  being 
contented  with  thy  ruling  faculty,  when  it  does  the  things 
which  it  is  constituted  by  nature  to  do.   But  enoughj  [of  this]. 

27.  When  another  blames  thee  or  hates  thee,  or  when  men 
say  about  thee  anything  injurious,  approach  their  poor  souls, 
penetrate  within,  and  see  what  kind  of  men  they  are.  Thou 
wilt  discover  that  there  is  no  reason  to  take  any  trouble  that 
these  men  may  have  this  or  that  opinion  about  thee.  How- 
ever thou  must  be  well  disposed  towards  them,  for  by  nature 
they  ai'o  friends.  And  the  gods  too  aid  them  in  all  ways,  by 
dreamy,  by  signs,  towards  the  attainment  of  those  things  on 
which  they  set  a  value  .f 

28.  The  periodic  movements  of  the  universe  are  the  same, 
up  and  dow^n  from  age  to  age.  And  either  the  universal  in- 
telligence puts  itself  in  motion  for  every  separate  eifect,  and 
if  this  is  so,  be  thou  content  with  that  which  is  the  result  of 
its  activity  ;  or  it  puts  itself  in  motion  once,  and  everything 
else  comes  by  way  of  sequence^  in  a  manner ;  or  indivisible 
elements  are  the  origin  of  all  things. — In  a  word,  if  there  is 

*  rh  TTJs  Ne/cin'as  may  be,  as  Gataker  coojectures,  a  dramatic  repre- 
seutation  of  the  state  of  the  dead.  Scliultz  supposes  that  it  may  be  also 
a  reference  to  the  Ne'/c i;«o  of  the  Odyssey  (lib.  xi.) 

»  The  words  which  immediately  follow  kut  iTraKoXovd-n<riu  are  corrupt 
But  the  meaning  is  hardly  doubtful.    (Compare  vn.  15.) 


166  M.  Antoninus.     IX. 

a  god,  all  is  well ;  and  if  chance  rules,  do  not  thou  also  be 
governed  by  it  (vi.  44,  vii.  75). 

Soon  will  the  earth  cover  us  all :  then  the  earth,  too,  will 
change,  and  the  things  also  which  result  from  change  will 
continue  to  change  for  ever,  and  these  again  for  ever.  For 
if  a  man  reflects  on  the  changes  and  transformations  which 
follow  one  another  like  wave  after  wave  and  their  rapidity, 
he  will  despise  everything  which  is  perishable,  (xn.  21.) 

29.  The  universal  cause  is  like  a  winter  torrent :  it  carries 
everything  along  with  it.  But  how  worthless  are  all  these 
poor  people  who  are  engaged  in  matters  political,  and,  as 
they  suppose,  are  playing  the  philosopher !  All  drivellers. 
Well  then,  man  :  do  what  nature  now  requires.  Set  thyself 
in  motion,  if  it  is  in  thy  power,  and  do  not  look  about  thee 
to  see  if  any  one  will  observe  it ;  nor  yet  expect  Plato's 
Eepublic  :^  but  be  content  if  the  smallest  thing  goes  on  well, 
and  consider  such  an  event  to  be  no  small  matter.  For  who 
can  change  men's  opinions  ?  and  without  a  change  of  opinions 
what  else  is  there  than  the  slavery  of  men  who  groan  while 
they  pretend  to  obey  ?  Come  now  and  tell  me  of  Alexander 
and  Philippus  and  Demetrius  of  Phalerum.  They  themselves 
shall  judge  whether  they  discovered  what  the  common  nature 
required,  and  trained  themselves  accordingly.  But  if  they 
acted  like  tragedy  heroes,  no  one  has  condemned  me  to  imitate 
them.  Simple  and  modest  is  the  work  of  philosophy.  Draw 
me  not  aside  to  insolence  and  pride. 

30.  Look  down  from  above  on  the  countless  herds  of  men 
and  their  countless  solemnities,  and  the  infinitely  varied 
voyagings  in  storms  and  calms,  and  the  difi'erences  among 
those  who  are  born,  who  live  together,  and  die.  And  consider, 
too,  the  life  lived  by  others  in  olden  time,  and  the  life  of 
those  who  will  live  after  thee,  and  the  life  now  lived  among 
barbarous  nations,  and  how  many  know  not  even  thy  name, 
and  how  many  will  soon  forget  it,  and  how  they  who  perhaps 
now  are  praising  thee  will  very  soon  blame  thee,  and  that 

8  Those  who  wish  to  know  what  Plato's  Eepublic  is,  may  now  study 
it  in  the  accurate  translation  of  Davics  and  Vanerhan. 


M.  Antoninus.     IX.  167 

neither  a  postliumous  name  is  of  any  value,  nor  reputation, 
nor  anything  else. 

31.  Let  there  be  freedom  from  perturbations  with  respect 
to  the  things  which  come  from  the  external  cause  ;  and  let 
there  be  justice  in  the  things  done  by  virtue  of  the  internal 
cause,  that  is,  let  there  be  movement  and  action  terminating 
in  this,  in  social  acts,  for  this  is  according  to  thy  nature. 

32.  Thou  canst  remove  out  of  the  way  many  useless  things 
among  those  which  disturb  thee,  for  they  lie  entirely  in  thy 
opinion  ;  and  thou  vnlt  then  gain  for  thyself  ample  space  by 
comprehending  the  whole  universe  in  thy  mind,  and  by  con- 
templating the  eternity  of  time,  and  observing  the  rapid 
change  of  every  several  thing,  how  short  is  the  time  from 
bii'th  to  dissolution ,  and  the  illimitable  time  before  birth  as 
well  as  the  equally  boundless  time  after  dissolution. 

33.  All  that  thou  seest  will  quickly  perish,  and  those  who 
have  been  spectators  of  its  dissolution  will  very  soon  perish 
too.  And  he  who  dies  at  the  extrcmest  old  age  will  be 
brought  into  the  same  condition  with  him  who  died  pre- 
maturely. 

34.  What  are  these  men's  leading  principles,  and  about 
what  kind  of  things  are  they  busy,  and  for  what  kind  of 
reasons  do  they  love  and  honour  ?  Imagine  that  thou  seest 
their  poor  souls  laid  bare.  When  they  think  that  they  do 
harm  by  their  blame  or  good  by  their  praise,  what  an  idea ! 

35.  Loss  is  nothing  else  than  change.  But  the  universal 
nature  delights  in  change,  and  in  obedience  to  her  all  things 
are  now  done  well,  and  from  eternity  have  been  done  in  like 
form,  and  will  be  such  to  time  without  end.  What,  then,  dost 
thou  say  ?  That  all  things  have  been  and  all  things  always 
will  be  bad,  and  that  no  power  has  ever  been  found  in  so 
many  gods  to  rectify  these  things,  but  the  world  has  been  con- 
demned to  be  bound  in  never  ceasing  evil?  (iv.  45,  vii.  18.) 

36.  The  rottenness  of  the  matter  which  is  the  foundation 
of  everything !  water,  dust,  bones,  filth :  or  again,  marble 
rocks,  the  callosities  of  the  earth ;  and  gold  and  silver,  the 
Bediments ;  and  garments,  only  bits  of  hair  ;  and  purple  dye^ 


168  M.  Antoninus.    IX. 

blood ;  and  everything  else  is  of  the  same  kind.  And  that 
which  is  of  the  nature  of  breath  is  also  another  thing  of  the 
same  kind,  changing  from  this  to  that. 

37.  Enough  of  this  wretched  life  and  murmuring  and  apish 
tricks.  Why  art  thou  disturbed?  What  is  there  new  in 
this  ?  What  unsettles  thee  ?  Is  it  the  form  of  the  thing  ? 
Look  at  it.  Or  is  it  the  matter  ?  Look  at  it.  But  besides 
these  there  is  nothing.  Towards  the  gods,  then,  now  become 
at  last  more  simple  and  better.  It  is  the  same  whether  we 
examine  these  things  for  a  hundred  years  or  three. 

38.  If  any  man  has  done  wrong,  the  harm  is  his  own.  But 
perhaps  he  has  not  done  wrong. 

39.  Either  all  things  proceed  from  one  intelligent  source 
and  come  together  as  in  one  body,  and  the  part  ought  not  to 
find  fault  with  what  is  done  for  the  benefit  of  the  whole ;  or 
there  are  only  atoms,  and  nothing  else  than  mixture  and  dis- 
persion. Why,  then,  art  thou  disturbed  ?  Say  to  the  ruling 
faculty,  Art  thou  dead,  art  thou  corrupted,  art  thou  playing 
the  hypocrite,  art  thou  become  a  beast,  dost  thou  herd  and 
feed  with  the  rest  ?^ 

40.  Either  the  gods  have  no  power  or  they  have  power. 
If,  then,  they  have  no  power,  why  dost  thou  pray  to  them  ? 
But  if  they  have  power,  why  dost  thou  not  pray  for  them  to 
give  thee  the  faculty  of  not  fearing  any  of  the  things  which 
thou  fearest,  or  of  not  desiring  any  of  the  things  which  thou 
desirest,  or  not  being  pained  at  anything,  rather  than  pray 
that  any  of  these  things  should  not  hapjjen  or  happen '?  for 
certainly  if  they  can  co-operate  with  men,  they  can  co-operate 
for  these  purposes.  But  perhaps  thou  wilt  say,  the  gods 
have  placed  them  in  thy  power.  Well,  then,  is  it  not  better 
to  use  what  is  in  thy  power  like  a  free  man  than  to  desire  in 
a  slavish  and  abject  way  what  is  not  in  thy  power  ?  And 
who  has  told  thee  that  the  gods  do  not  aid  us  even  in  the 

7  There  is  some  corruption  at  the  end  of  this  section  :  but  I  think 
that  the  translation  expresses  the  emperor's  meaning.  Whether  intelli- 
gence rules  all  things  or  chance  rules,  a  man  must  not  be  disturbed. 
He  must  use  the  power  that  he  has,  and  be  tranquil. 


M.  Antoninus.     IX.  109 

things  which  are  in  our  power  ?  Begin,  then,  to  pray  for 
such  things,  and  thou  wilt  see.  One  man  prays  thus  :  How 
shall  I  be  able  to  lie  with  that  woman  ?  Do  thou  pray  thus : 
How  shall  I  not  desire  to  lie  with  her  ?  Another  prays  thus  : 
How  shall  I  be  released  from  this  ?  Another  prays  :  How 
shall  I  not  desire  to  be  released  ?  Another  thus  :  How  shall 
I  not  lose  my  little  son  ?  Thou  thus  :  How  shall  I  not  be 
afraid  to  lose  him?  In  fine,  turn  thy  prayers  this  way,  and 
see  what  comes. 

41.  Epicurus  says,  In  my  sickness  my  conversation  was 
not  about  my  bodily  sujBferings,  nor,  says  he,  did  I  talk  on 
such  subjects  to  those  who  visited  me ;  but  I  continued  to 
discourse  on  the  nature  of  things  as  before,  keeping  to  this 
main  point,  how  the  mind,  while  participating  in  such  move- 
ments as  go  on  in  the  poor  flesh,  shall  be  free  from  perturba- 
tions and  maintain  its  proper  good.  Nor  did  I,  he  says, 
give  the  physicians  an  opportunity  of  putting  on  solemn 
looks,  as  if  they  were  doing  something  great,  but  my  life 
went  on  well  and  happily.  Do,  then,  the  same  that  he  did 
both  in  sickness,  if  thou  art  sick,  and  in  any  other  circum- 
stances ;  for  never  to  desert  philosophy  in  any  events  that 
may  befall  us,  nor  to  hold  trifling  talk  either  with  an  ignorant 
man  or  with  one  unacquainted  with  nature,  is  a  princij)le  of 
all  schools  of  philosophy ;  but  to  be  intent  only  on  that 
which  thou  art  now  doing  and  on  the  instrument  by  which 
thou  doest  it. 

42.  When  thou  art  offended  with  any  man's  shameless 
conduct,  immediately  ask  thyself,  Is  it  possible,  then,  that 
shameless  men  should  not  be  in  the  world  ?  It  is  not  possible. 
Do  not,  then,  require  what  is  impossible.  For  this  man  also 
is  one  of  those  shameless  men  who  must  of  necessity  be  in 
the  world.  Let  the  same  considerations  be  present  to  thy 
mind  in  the  case  of  the  knave,  and  the  faithless  man,  and  of 
every  man  who  does  wrong  in  any  way.  For  at  the  same 
time  that  thou  dost  remind  thyself  that  it  is  impossible  that 
such  kind  of  men  should  not  exist,  thou  wilt  become  more 
kindly  disposed  towards  every  one  individually.     It  is  useful 


170  M.  Antoninus.     IX. 

to  perceive  this,  too,  immediately  when  the  occasion  arises, 
what  virtue  nature  has  given  to  man  to  oppose  to  every 
wrongful  act.  For  she  has  given  to  man,  as  an  antidote 
against  the  stupid  man,  mildness,  and  against  another  kind  of 
man  some  other  power.  And  in  all  cases  it  is  possible  for 
thee  to  correct  by  teaching  the  man  who  is  gone  astray ;  for 
every  man  who  errs  misses  his  object  and  is  gone  astray. 
Besides  wherein  hast  thou  been  injured  ?  For  thou  wilt  find 
that  no  one  among  those  against  whom  thou  art  irritated  has 
done  anything  by  which  thy  mind  could  be  made  worse  ;  but 
that  which  is  evil  to  thee  and  harmful  has  its  foundation  only 
in  the  mind.  And  what  harm  is  done  or  what  is  there 
strange,  if  the  man  who  has  not  been  instructed  does  the 
acts  of  an  uninstructed  man  ?  Consider  whether  thou  shouldst 
not  rather  blame  thyself,  because  thou  didst  not  expect  such 
a  man  to  err  in  such  a  way.  For  thou  hadst  means  given 
thee  by  thy  reason  to  suppose  that  it  was  likely  that  he  would 
commit  this  error,  and  yet  thou  hast  forgotten  and  art  amazed 
that  he  has  erred.  But  most  of  all  when  thou  blamest  a  man 
as  faithless  or  ungrateful,  turn  to  thyself.  For  the  fault  is 
manifestly  thy  own,  whether  thou  didst  trust  that  a  man 
who  had  such  a  disposition  would  keep  his  promise,  or  when 
conferring  thy  kindness  thou  didst  not  confer  it  absolutely, 
nor  yet  in  such  way  as  to  have  received  from  thy  very  act  all 
the  profit.  For  what  more  dost  thou  want  when  thou  hast 
done  a  man  a  service  ?  art  thou  not  content  that  thou  hast 
done  something  conformable  to  thy  nature,  and  dost  thou 
seek  to  be  paid  for  it  ?  just  as  if  the  eye  demanded  a  re- 
compense for  seeing,  or  the  feet  for  walking.  For  as  these 
members  are  formed  for  a  particular  purpose,  and  by  working 
according  to  their  several  constitutions  obtain  what  is  their 
own  f  so  also  as  man  is  formed  by  nature  to  acts  of  bene- 
volence, when  he  has  done  anything  benevolent  or  in  any 
other  way  conducive  to  the  common  interest,  he  has  acted 
conformably  to  his  constitution,  and  he  gets  what  is  his  own. 

^  ATre'xei  rh  tdiov.    This  sense  of  oTrexeiv  occurs  in  XI.  1,  and  iv,  40,- 
ftlso  in  St.  Matthew,  vi.  2,  airexovai  rhv  ixiaOSy,  and  in  Epictetus. 


M.  Antoninus.    X  171 


.  % 


TT  /'ILT  thou,  then,  my  soul,  never  be  good  and  simple  and 
VV  one  and  naked,  more  manifest  than  the  body  which 
surrounds  thee  ?  Wilt  thou  never  enjoy  an  afifectionate  and 
contented  disposition  ?  Wilt  thou  never  be  full  and  without 
a  want  of  any  kind,  longing  for  nothing  more,  nor  desiring 
anything,  either  animate  or  inanimate,  for  the  enjoyment  of 
pleasures?  nor  yet  desiring  time  wherein  thou  shalt  have 
longer  enjoyment,  or  place,  or  pleasant  climate,  or  society  of 
men  with  whom  thou  mayst  live  in  harmony  ?  but  wilt  thou 
be  satisfied  with  thy  present  condition,  and  pleased  with  all 
that  is  about  thee,  and  wilt  thou  convince  thyself  that  thou 
hast  everything  and  that  it  comes  from  the  gods,  that  every- 
thing is  well  for  thee,  and  will  be  well  whatever  shall  please 
them,  and  whatever  they  shall  give  for  the  conservation  of 
the  perfect  living  being,^  the  good  and  just  and  beautiful, 
which  generates  and  holds  together  all  things,  and  contains 
and  embraces  all  things  which  are  dissolved  for  the  pro- 
duction of  other  like  things  ?  Wilt  thou  never  be  such  that 
thou  shalt  so  dwell  in  community  with  gods  and  men  as 
neither  to  find  fault  with  them  at  all,  nor  to  be  condemned  by 
them  ? 

2.  Observe  what  thy  nature  requires,  so  far  as  thou  art 
governed  by  nature  only :  then  do  it  and  accept  it,  if  thy 
nature,  so  far  as  thou  art  a  living  being,  shall  not  be  made 
worse  by  it.  And  next  thou  must  observe  what  thy  nature 
requires  so  far  as  thou  art  a  living  being.  And  all  this  thou 
mayst  allow  thyself,  if  thy  nature,  so  far  as  thou  art  a 
rational  animal,  shall  not  be  made  worse  by  it.     But  the 

1  That  is,  God  (iv.  40),  as  he  is  defined  by  Zeno.  But  the  confusion 
between  gods  and  God  is  strange. 


]72  M.  Antoniyius.     X 

rational  animal  is  consequently  also  a  political  [social] 
animal.  Use  these  rules,  then,  and  trouble  thyself  about 
nothing  else. 

3.  Everything  which  happens  either  happens  in  such  wise 
as  thou  art  formed  by  nature  to  bear  it,  or  as  thou  art  not 
formed  by  nature  to  bear  it.  If,  then,  it  happens  to  thee  in 
such  way  as  thou  art  formed  by  nature  to  bear  it,  do  not 
complain,  but  bear  it  as  thou  art  formed  by  nature  to  bear  it. 
But  if  it  happens  in  such  wise  as  thou  art  not  formed  by 
nature  to  bear  it,  do  not  complain,  for  it  will  perish  after  it 
has  consumed  thee.  Eemember,  however,  that  thou  art  formed 
by  nature  to  bear  everything,  with  respect  to  which  it  depends 
on  thy  own  opinion  to  make  it  endurable  and  tolerable,  by 
thinking  that  it  is  either  thy  interest  or  thy  duty  to  do  this. 

4.  If  a  man  is  mistaken,  instruct  him  kindly  and  show 
him  his  error.  But  if  thou  art  not  able,  blame  thyself,  or 
blame  not  even  thyself. 

•  5.  Whatever  may  happen  to  thee,  it  was  prepared  for  thee 
from  all  eternity ;  and  the  implication  of  causes  was  from 
eternity  spinning  the  thread  of  thy  being,  and  of  that  which 
is  incident  to  it.  (iii.  11 ;  rv.  26.) 

6.  Whether  the  universe  is  [a  concourse  of]  atoms,  or 
nature  [is  a  system],  let  this  first  be  established,  that  I  am  a 
part  of  the  whole  which  is  governed  by  nature ;  next,  I  am 
in  a  manner  intimately  related  to  the  parts  which  are  of  the 
same  kind  with  myself.  For  remembering  this,  inasmuch  as 
I  am  a  part,  I  shall  be  discontented  with  none  of  the  things 
which  are  assigned  to  me  out  of  the  whole ;  for  nothing;  is 
injurious  to  the  part,  jfjt  is  jor  the  advantagfLof JJiajghole^ 
For  the  whole  contains  nothing  which  is  not  for  its  advantage ; 
and  all  natures  indeed  have  this  common  principle,  but  the 
nature  of  the  universe  has  this  principle  besides,  that  it 
cannot  be  compelled  even  by  any  external  cause  to  generate 
anything  harmful  to  itself.  By  remembering,  then,  that  I  am 
a  part  of  such  a  whole,  I  shall  be  content  with  everything 
that  happens.  And  inasmuch  as  I  am  in  a  manner  intimately 
related  to  the  parts  which  are  of  the  same  kind  with  myself, 


M.  Antoninus.     X,  173 

I  shall  do  nothing  unsocial,  but  I  shall  rather  direct  myself 
to  the  things  which  arc  of  the  same  kind  with  myself,  and  I 
shall  turn  all  my  efforts  to  the  common  interest,  and  divert 
them  from  the  contrary.  Now,  if  these  things  are  done  so,  life 
must  flow  on  happily,  just  as  thou  mayst  obsei"ve  that  the  life 
of  a  citizen  is  happy,  who  continues  a  course  of  action  which 
is  advantageous  to  his  fellow-citizens,  and  is  content  with 
whatever  the  state  may  assign  to  him. 

7.  The  parts  of  the  whole,  everything,  I  mean,  which  is 
natiu'ally  comprehended  in  the  universe,  must  of  necessity 
perish  ;  but  let  this  be  understood  in  this  sense,  that  they 
must  undergo  change.  But  if  this  is  naturally  both  an  evil 
and  a  necessity  for  the  parts,  the  whole  would  not  continue 
to  exist  in  a  good  condition,  the  parts  being  subject  to  change 
and  constituted  so  as  to  perish  in  various  ways.  For  whether 
did  nature  herself  design  to  do  evil  to  the  things  which  are 
parts  of  herself,  and  to  make  them  subject  to  evil  and  of 
necessity  fall  into  evil,  or  have  such  results  happened  without 
her  kno\^dng  it  ?  Both  these  suppositions,  indeed,  are  in- 
credible. But  if  a  man  should  even  drop  the  term  Nature 
[as  an  efficient  power],  and  should  speak  of  these  things  as 
natural,  even  then  it  would  be  ridiculous  to  affirm  at  the 
same  time  that  the  parts  of  the  w^hole  are  in  their  nature 
subject  to  change,  and  at  the  same  time  to  be  sui'prised  or 
vexed  as  if  something  were  happening  contrary  to  nature, 
particularly  as  the  dissolution  of  things  is  into  those  things 
of  which  each  thing  is  composed.  For  there  is  either  a  dis- 
persion of  the  elements  out  of  which  everything  has  been 
compounded,  or  a  change  from  the  solid  to  the  earthy  and 
from  the  airy  to  the  aerial,  so  that  these  parts  are  taken  back 
into  the  universal  reason,  whether  this  at  certain  periods  is 
consumed  by  fii'C  or  renewed  by  eternal  changes.  And  do 
not  imagine  that  the  solid  and  the  airy  part  belong  to  thee 
from  the  time  of  generation.  For  all  this  received  its  accre- 
tion only  yesterday  and  the  day  before,  as  one  may  say,  from 
the  food  and  the  air  which  is  inspired.  This,  then,  which 
has  received   [the  accretion],  changes,  not  that  which  thy 


174  M.  Antoninus.    X. 

motlier  brouglit  forth.  But  suppose  that  this  [which  thy 
mother  brought  forth]  implicates  thee  very  much  with  that 
other  part,  which  has  the  peculiar  quality  [of  change],  this 
is  nothing  in  fact  in  the  way  of  objection  to  what  is  said.'^ 

8.  When  thou  hast  assumed  these  names,  good,  modest, 
true,  rational,  a  man  of  equanimity,  and  magnanimous,  take 
care  that  thou  dost  not  change  these  names;  and  if  thou 
shouldst  lose  them,  quickly  return  to  them.  And  remember 
that  the  term  Eational  was  intended  to  signify  a  discrimi- 
nating attention  to  every  several  thing  and  freedom  from 
negligence  ;  and  that  Equanimity  is  the  voluntary  acceptance 
of  the  things  which  are  assigned  to  thee  by  the  common 
nature ;  and  that  Magnanimity  is  the  elevation  of  the  in- 
telligent part  above  the  pleasurable  or  painful  sensations  of 
the  flesh,  and  above  that  poor  thing  called  fame,  and  death, 
and  all  such  things.  If,  then,  thou  maintainest  thyself  in  the 
possession  of  these  names,  without  desiring  to  be  called  by 
these  names  by  others,  thou  wilt  be  another  person  and  wilt 
enter  on  another  life.  For  to  continue  to  be  such  as  thou 
hast  hitherto  been,  and  to  be  torn  in  pieces  and  defiled  in 
such  a  life,  is  the  character  of  a  very  stupid  man  and  one 
overfond  of  his  life,  and  like  those  half-devoured  fighters  with 
wild  beasts,  who  though  covered  with  wounds  and  gore,  still 
intreat  to  be  kept  to  the  following  day,  though  they  will  be 
exposed  in  the  same  state  to  the  same  claws  and  bites.^ 
Therefore  fix  thyself  in  the  possession  of  these  few  names : 
and  if  thou  art  able  to  abide  in  them,  abide  as  if  thou  wast 

"  The  end  of  this  section  is  perhaps  corrupt.  The  meaning  is  very 
obscure.  I  have  given  that  meaning  which  appears  to  be  consistent 
with  the  whole  argument.  The  emperor  liere  maintains  that  the 
essential  part  of  man  is  unchangeable,  and  that  the  other  parts,  if  they 
change  or  perish,  do  not  aft'ect  that  which  really  constitutes  the  man. 
See  the  Philosophy  of  Antoninus,  p.  47,  note  13.  Schultz  supposed  "  thy 
mother"  to  mean  nature,  r)  (pvais.    But  I  doubt  about  that. 

3  See  Seneca,  Epp.  70,  on  these  exhibitions  which  amused  the  people 
of  those  days.  These  fighters  were  the  Bestiarii,  some  of  whom  may 
have  been  criminals,  but  even  if  they  were,  the  exhibition  was  equally 
characteristic  of  the  depraved  habits  of  the  spectators. 


M.  Antoninus.     X.  175 

removed  to  certain  islands  of  the  Happy/  But  if  thou  shalt 
perceive  that  thou  fallest  out  of  them  and  dost  not  maintain 
thy  hold,  go  courageously  into  some  nook  where  thou  shalt 
maintain  them,  or  even  depart  at  once  from  life,  not  in  passion, 
but  with  simplicity  and  freedom  and  modesty,  after  doing 
this  one  [laudable]  thing  at  least  in  thy  life,  to  have  gone  out 
of  it  thus.  In  order,  however,  to  the  remembrance  of  these 
names,  it  will  greatly  help  thee,  if  thou  rememberest  the  gods, 
and  that  they  wish  not  to  be  flattered,  but  wish  all  reasonable 
beings  to  be  made  like  themselves  ;  and  if  thou  rememberest 
that  what  does  the  work  of  a  fig-tree  is  a  fig-tree,  and  that 
what  does  the  work  of  a  dog  is  a  dog,  and  that  what  does  the 
work  of  a  bee  is  a  bee,  and  that  what  does  the  work  of  a  man 
is  a  man. 

9.  Mimi,^  war,  astonishment,  torpor,  slavery,  will  daily 
wipe  out  those  holy  principles  of  thine.  "fHow  many  things 
without  studying  nature  dost  thou  imagine,  and  how  many 
dost  thou  neglect  ?*  But  it  is  thy  duty  so  to  look  on  and  so 
to  do  everything,  that  at  the  same  time  the  power  of  dealing 

"*  The  islands  of  the  Happy  or  the  Fortunatse  Insula  are  spoken  of 
by  the  Greek  and  Roman  writers.  They  were  the  abode  of  Heroes,  like 
Achilles  and  Diomedes,  as  we  see  in  the  Scolion  of  Hai-modius  and 
Aristogiton.  Sertorius  heard  of  the  islands  at  Cadiz  from  some  sailors 
who  had  been  there,  and  he  had  a  wish  to  go  and  live  in  them  and  rest 
from  his  troubles.  (Plutarch,  Sertorius,  c.  8.)  In  the  Odyssey,  Proteus 
told  Menelaus  that  he  should  not  die  in  Argos,  but  be  removed  to 
a  place  at  the  boundary  of  the  earth  where  Khadamanthus  dwelt : 
(Odyssey,  iv.  565.) 

For  there  in  sooth  man's  life  is  easiest : 
Nor  snow  nor  raging  storm  nor  rain  is  there, 
But  ever  gently  breathing  gales  of  Zephyr 
Oceanus  sends  up  to  gladden  man. 

It  is  certain  that  the  writer  of  the  Odyssey  only  follows  some  old 
legend  without  having  any  knowledge  of  any  place  which  corresponda 
tj  his  description.  The  two  islands  which  Sertorius  heard  of  may  be 
Madeira  and  the  adjacent  island.     Compare  Pindar,  01.  ii.  129. 

*  Corais  conjectured /iTo-os  "hatred'  in  place  of  Mimi,  Roman  plnyi 
in  which  action  and  gesticulation  were  all  or  nearly  all. 

^  This  is  corrupt.    See  the  edition  of  Schultz. 


176  M.  Antoninus.    X, 

with  circumstances  is  perfected,  and  the  contemplative  faculty 
is  exercised,  and  the  confidence  which  comes  from  the  know- 
ledge of  each  several  thing  is  maintained  without  showing  it, 
but  yet  not  concealed.  For  when  wilt  thou  enjoy  simplicity 
when  gravity,  and  when  the  knowledge  of  every  several  thing, 
both  what  it  is  in  substance,  and  what  place  it  has  in  the 
universe,  and  how  long  it  is  formed  to  exist  and  of  what 
things  it  is  compounded,  and  to  whom  it  can  belong,  and  who 
are  able  both  to  give  it  and  take  it  away  ? 

10.  A  spider  is  proud  when  it  has  caught  a  fly,  and  another 
when  he  has  caught  a  poor  hare,  and  another  when  he  has 
taken  a  little  fish  in  a  net,  and  another  when  he  has  taken 
wild  boars,  and  another  when  he  has  taken  bears,  and  another 
when  he  has  taken  Sarmatians.  Are  not  these  robbers,  if 
thou  examinest  their  opinions  ?^ 

1 1.  Acquire  the  contemplative  way  of  seeing  how  all  things 
change  into  one  another,  and  constantly  attend  to  it,  and 
exercise  thyself  about  this  part  [of  philosophy].  For  nothing 
is  so  much  adapted  to  produce  magnanimity.  Such  a  man 
has  put  off  the  body,  and  as  he  sees  that  he  must,  no  one 
knows  how  soon,  go  away  from  among  men  and  leave  every- 
thing here,  he  gives  himself  up  entirely  to  just  doing  in  all 
his  actions,  and  in  everything  else  that  happens  he  resigns 
himself  to  the  universal  nature.  But  as  to  what  any  man 
shall  say  or  think  about  him  or  do  against  him,  he  never 
even  thinks  of  it,  being  himself  contented  with  these  two 
things,  with  acting  justly  in  what  he  now  does,  and  being 
satisfied  with  what  is  now  assigned  to  him ;  and  he  lays  aside 
all  distracting  and  busy  pursuits,  and  desii-es  nothing  else 
than  to  accomplish  the  straight  course  through  the  law,'  and 
by  accomplishing  the  straight  course  to  follow  God. 

12.  What  need  is  there  of  suspicious  fear,  since  it  is  in 
thy  power  to  inquire  what  ought  to  be  done  ?     And  if  thou 

'  Marcus  means  to  say  that  conquerors  are  robbers.  He  himself 
warred  against  Sarmatians,  and  was  a  robber,  as  he  says,  like  the  rest. 
But  compare  the  life  of  Avidius  Cassius,  c.  4,  by  Vulcatius. 

*  By  the  law,  he  means  the  divine  law,  obedience  to  the  will  of  God. 


OF  THE 


M.  Antoninus.     X.  177 

Rocst  clear,  go  by  this  Avay  content,  without  turning  back : 
but  if  thou  dost  not  see  clear,  stop  and  take  the  best  advisers. 
But  if  any  other  things  0])i)ose  thee,  go  on  according  to  thy 
powers  with  due  consideration,  keeping  to  that  which  appears 
to  be  just.  For  it  is  best  to  reach  this  object,  and  if  thou 
dost  fail,  let  thy  failure  be  in  attempting  this.  He  who 
follows  reason  in  all  things  is  both  tranquil  and  active  at  the 
same  time,  and  also  cheerful  and  collected. 

13.  Inquire  of  thyself  as  soon  as  thou  wakest  from  sleep 
whether  it  will  make  any  diiference  to  thee,  if  another  does 
what  is  just  and  right.  It  will  make  no  difference,  (vi.  32  ; 
VIII.  55.) 

Thou  hast  not  forgotten,  I  suppose,  that  those  who  assume 
arrogant  airs  in  bestowing  their  praise  or  blame  on  others, 
are  such  as  they  are  at  bed  and  at  board,  and  thou  hast  not 
forgotten  what  they  do,  and  what  they  avoid  and  what  they 
jiursue,  and  how  they  steal  and  how  they  rob,  not  with  hands 
and  feet,  but  with  their  most  valuable  part,  by  means  of  which 
there  is  produced,  when  a  man  chooses,  fidelity,  modesty, 
truth,  law,  a  good  daemon  [happiness]  ?  (vii.  17.) 

14.  To  her  who  gives  and  takes  back  all,  to  nature,  the 
man  who  is  instructed  and  modest  says,  Give  what  thou  wilt ; 
take  back  what  thou  wilt.  And  he  says  this  not  proudly,  but 
obediently  and  well  pleased  with  her. 

15.  Short  is  the  little  which  remains  to  thee  of  life.  Live 
as  on  a  mountain.  For  it  makes  no  difference  whether  a  man 
lives  there  or  here,  if  he  lives  everywhere  in  the  world  as  in 
a  state  [political  community].  Let  men  see,  let  them  know 
a  real  man  who  lives  according  to  nature.  If  they  cannot 
endure  him,  let  them  kill  him.  For  that  is  better  than  to 
live  thus  [as  men  do]. 

16.  No  longer  talk  at  all  about  the  kind  of  man  that  a  good 
man  ought  to  be,  but  be  such. 

17.  Constantly  contemplate  the  whole  of  time  and  the 
whole  of  substance,  and  consider  that  all  individual  things  as 
to  substance  are  a  grain  of  a  fig,  and  as  to  time,  tho  turning 
of  a  gimlet. 


178  M.  Antoninus.     A. 

18.  Look  at  everything  that  exists,  and  observe  that  it  is 
already  in  dissolution  and  in  change,  and  as  it  were  putrefac- 
tion or  dispersion,  or  that  everything  is  so  constituted  by 
nature  as  to  die. 

19.  Consider  what  men  are  when  they  are  eating,  sleeping, 
generating,  easing  themselves  and  so  forth.  Then  w^hat  kind 
of  men  they  are  when  they  are  imperiousf  and  arrogant,  or 
angry  and  scolding  from  their  elevated  place.  But  a  short 
time  ago  to  how  many  they  were  slaves  and  for  what  things ; 
and  after  a  little  time  consider  in  what  a  condition  they  wuU 
be. 

20.  That  is  for  the  good  of  each  thing,  which  the  universal 
nature  brings  to  each.  And  it  is  for  its  good  at  the  time 
when  nature  brings  it. 

21.  '•  The  earth  loves  the  shower  ;"  and  "  the  solemn  aether 
loves  :"  and  the  universe  loves  to  make  whatever  is  about  to 
be.  I  say  then  to  the  universe,  that  I  love  as  thou  lovest. 
And  is  not  this  too  said,  that  "  this  or  that  loves  [is  wont]  to 
be  produced  ?"  ^ 

22.  Either  thou  livest  here  and  hast  already  accustomed 
thyself  to  it,  or  thou  art  going  away,  and  this  was  thy  own 
will ;  or  thou  art  dying  and  hast  discharged  thy  duty.  But 
besides  these  things  there  is  nothing.  Be  of  good  cheer, 
then. 

23.  Let  this  always  be  plain  to  thee,  that  this  piece  of 
land  is  like  any  other ;  and  that  all  things  here  are  the  same 
with  things  on  the  top  of  a  mountain,  or  on  the  sea-shore,  or 
wherever  thou  choosest  to  be.     For  thou  wilt  find  just  what 

9  These  words  are  from  Emipides.  They  arc  cited  by  Aristotle,  Ethic. 
Nicom.  VIII.  1.  Athengeus  (xiii.  296.)  aud  Stobieus  quote  seven 
complete  lines  begiuuiug  ipS,  fxhv  o/m^pov  yala.  There  id  a  similar 
fragment  of  Aeschylus,  Danaides,  also  quoted  by  Athenseus. 

It  was  the  fashion  of  the  Stoics  to  work  on  the  meanings  of  words. 
So  Antoninus  here  takes  the  verb  (piKe'i,  "  loves/'  which  has  also  the 
sense  of  "  is  wont,"  "  uses,"  and  the  like.  He  finds  in  the  common 
language  of  mankind  a  philosophical  truth,  and  most  great  truths  are 
expressed  in  the  common  language  of  life ;  some  understand  them,  but 
most  people  utter  them  without  knowing  how  much  thay  meao. 


M.  Antoninus.     X.  ITD 

Plato  says,  Dwelling  within  the  walls  of  a  city  as  in  a 
shepherd's  fold  on  a  mountain.  [The  three  last  words  are 
omitted  in  the  translation.]'" 

24.  T\Tiat  is  my  ruling  faculty  now  to  me?  and  of  wliat 
nature  am  I  now  making  it  ?  and  for  what  purpose  am  i  now 
using  it  ?  is  it  void  of  understanding  ?  is  it  loosed  and  rent 
asunder  from  social  life  ?  is  it  melted  into  and  mixed  with 
the  poor  flesh  so  as  to  move  together  with  it  ? 

25.  He  who  flies  from  his  master  is  a  runaway ;  but  the 
law  is  master,  and  he  who  breaks  the  law  is  a  runaway. 
And  he  also  who  is  grieved  or  angry  or  afraid,f  is  dissatisfied 
because  something  has  been  or  is  or  shall  be  of  the  things 
which  are  appointed  by  him  who  rules  all  things,  and  he  is 
Law,  and  assigns  to  every  man  what  is  fit.  He  then  svho 
fears  or  is  grieved  or  is  angry  is  a  runaway.^^ 

26.  A  man  deposits  seed  in  a  womb  and  goes  away,  and 
then  another  cause  takes  it,  and  labours  on  it  and  makes  a 
child.  What  a  thing  from  such  a  material !  Again,  the 
child  passes  food  dowTi  through  the  throat,  and  then  another 
cause  takes  it  and  makes  perception  and  motion,  and  in  fine 
life  and  strength  and  other  things ;  how  many  and  how 
strange !  Observe  then  the  tilings  which  are  produced  in 
such  a  bidden  way,  and  see  the  power  just  as  we  see  the 
power  which  carries  things  downwards  and  upwards,  not  with 
the  eyes,  but  still  no  less  plainly,  (vii.  75.J 

27.  Constantly  consider  how  all  things  such  as  they  now 
are,  in  time  past  also  were ;  and  consider  that  they  will  be 
the  same  again.  And  place  before  thy  eyes  entire  dramas 
and  stages  of  the  same  form,  whatever  thou  hast  learned  from 
thy  experience  or  from  older  history ;  for  example,  the  whole 
court  of  Hadi'ianus,  and  the  whole  coiu't  of  Antoninus,  and 
the  whole  coui't  of  Philippus,  Alexander,  Croesus ;  for  all  those 
were  sucb  dramas  as  we  see  now,  only  with  different  actors. 

'0  Plato,  Theffit.  174  D.  E.  But  compare  the  original  with  the  use 
that  Antoninus  has  made  of  it, 

11  Antoninus  is  here  playing  on  the  etymology  of  v6(i.os,  law,  assign- 
ment, that  which  assigns  (y^nei)  to  every  man  his  portion. 


180  M.  Antoninus.    X 

28.  Imagine  every  man  who  is  grieved  at  anything  or  dis- 
contented to  be  like  a  pig  which  is  sacrificed  and  kicks  and 
screams. 

Like  this  pig  also  is  he  who  on  his  bed  in  silence  laments 
the  bonds  in  which  we  are  held.  And  consider  that  only  to 
the  rational  animal  is  it  given  to  follow  voluntarily  w^hat 
happens ;  but  simply  to  follow  is  a  necessity  imposed  on  all. 

29.  Severally  on  the  occasion  of  everything  that  thou  doest, 
pause  and  ask  thyself,  if  death  is  a  dreadful  thing  because  it 
deprives  thee  of  this. 

30.  "When  thou  art  offended  at  any  man's  fault,  forthwith 
turn  to  thyself  and  reflect  in  what  like  manner  thou  dost  err 
thyself:  for  example,  in  thinking  that  money  is  a  good 
thing,  or  pleasure,  or  a  bit  of  reputation,  and  the  like.  For 
by  attending  to  this  thou  wilt  quickly  forget  thy  anger,  if 
this  consideration  also  is  added,  that  the  man  is  compelled : 
for  what  else  could  he  do  ?  or,  if  thou  art  able,  take  away 
from  him  the  compulsion. 

31.  When  thou  hast  seen  Satyron  ^^  the  Socratic,']'  think  of 
either  Eutyches  or  Hymen,  and  when  thou  hast  seen  Eu- 
phrates, think  of  Eutychion  or  Silvanus,  and  when  thou 
hast  seen  Alciphron  think  of  Tropaeoi^horus,  and  when  thou 
hast  seen  Xenophon  think  of  Crito  ^^  or  Severus,  and  when 
thou  hast  looked  on  thyself,  think  of  any  other  Caesar,  and 
in  the  case  of  every  one  do  in  like  manner.  Then  let  this 
thought  be  in  thy  mind,  Where  then  are  those  men  ?  No- 
where, or  nobody  knows  where.  For  thus  continuously  thou 
wilt  look  at  human  things  as  smoke  and  nothing  at  all ; 
esi)ecially  if  thou  reflectest  at  the  same  time  that  what  has' 
once  changed  will  never  exist  again  in  the  infinite  dui-ation 

^2  Nothing  is  known  of  Satyron  or  Satyrion;  nor,  I  believe,  of 
Eutyches  or  Hymen.  Euphrates  is  honourably  mentioned  by  Epictetus 
(ill.  15,  8;  IV.  8,  17).  Pliny  (Epp.  i.  10),  speaks  very  highly  of  him. 
He  obtained  the  permission  of  the  Emperor  Hadrian  to  drink  poison, 
because  he  was  old  and  in  had  health  (Dion  Cassius,  G9,  c.  8). 

^•*  Crito  is  the  friend  of  Socrates ;  and  he  was,  it  appears,  also  a  friend 
of  Xenophon.  When  the  emperor  says  "  seen "  {iSioy),  he  does  not 
ooan  with  the  eves. 


M.  Anfoninus.     X.  181 

©f  time.  But  tliou,  in  what  a  brief  space  of  time  is  tliy 
existence  ?  And  why  art  thou  not  content  to  pass  through 
this  shoi-t  time  in  an  orderly  way  ?  What  matter  and  oppor- 
tunity [for  thy  activity]  art  thou  avoiding  ?  For  what  else- 
are  all  these  things,  except  exercises  for  the  reason,  when  it 
has  viewed  carefully  and  by  examination  into  their  nature 
the  things  which  hapjien  in  life  ?  Persevere  then  until  thou 
shalt  have  made  these  things  thy  own,  as  the  stomach  w^hich  is 
strengthened  makes  all  things  its  own,  as  the  blazing  fire 
makes  flame  and  brightness  out  of  everything  that  is  throT^-n 
into  it. 

32.  Let  it  not  be  in  any  man's  power  to  say  truly  of  thee 
that  thou  art  not  simple  or  that  thou  art  not  good  ;  but  let 
him  be  a  liar  whoever  shall  think  anything  of  this  kind  about 
thee ;  and  this  is  altogether  in  thy  power.  For  who  is  he 
that  shall  hinder  thee  from  being  good  and  simple  ?  Do 
thou  only  determine  to  live  no  longer,  unless  thou  shalt  be 
such.  For  neither  does  reason  allow  [thee  to  live],  if  thou 
art  not  such.^* 

33.  What  is  that  which  as  to  this  material  [our  life]  can 
be  done  or  said  in  the  way  most  conformable  to  reason.  For 
whatever  this  may  be,  it  is  in  thy  power  to  do  it  or  to  say 
it,  and  do  not  make  excuses  that  thou  art  hindered.  Thou 
wilt  not  cease  to  lament  till  thy  mind  is  in  such  a  condition 
that,  what  luxury  is  to  those  who  enjoy  pleasure,  such  shall 
be  to  thee,  in  the  matter  which  is  subjected  and  pre- 
sented to  thee,  the  doing  of  the  things  which  are  conformable 
to  man's  constitution;  for  a  man  ought  to  consider  as  an 
enjoyment  everything  which  it  is  in  his  power  to  do  ac- 
cording to  his  own  nature.  And  it  is  in  his  power  every- 
where. Now,  it  is  not  given  to  a  cylinder  to  move  every- 
where by  its  own  motion,  nor  yet  to  water  nor  to  fire,  nor  to 
anything  else  which  is  governed  by  nature  or  an  irrational 
soul,  for  the  things  which  check  them  and  stand  in  the  way 
are  many.  But  intelligence  and  reason  are  able  to  go 
through  everything  that  opposes  them,  and  in  such  macner 

"  Compare  Epictetus,  i.  29,  28. 


182  M.  Antoninus.     X. 

as  tliey  are  formed  \)j  nature  and  as  they  clioose.  Place 
before  tliy  eyes  this  facility  with  which  the  reason  will  be 
carried  through  all  things,  as  fire  upwards,  as  a  stone  down- 
wards, as  a  cylinder  down  an  inclined  surface,  and  seek  for 
nothing  further.  For  all  other  obstacles  either  affect  the 
body  only  which  is  a  dead  thing ;  or,  except  through  opinion 
and  the  yielding  of  the  reason  itself,  they  do  not  crush  nor  do 
any  harm  of  any  kind  ;  for  if  they  did,  he  who  felt  it  would 
immediately  become  bad.  Now,  in  the  case  of  all  things 
which  have  a  certain  constitution,  whatever  harm  may 
happen  to  any  of  them,  that  which  is  so  affected  becomes 
consequently  worse  ;  but  in  the  like  case,  a  man  becomes 
both  better,  if  one  may  say  so,  and  more  worthy  of  praise  by 
making  a  right  use  of  these  accidents.  And  finally  remem- 
ber that  nothing  harms  him  who  is  really  a  citizen,  which 
does  not  harm  the  state ;  nor  yet  does  anything  harm  the 
state,  which  does  not  harm  law  [order]  ;  and  of  these  things 
which  are  called  misfortunes  not  one  harms  law.  What  then 
does  not  harm  law  does  not  harm  either  state  or  citizen. 

34.  To  him  who  is  penetrated  by  true  principles  even 
the  briefest  precept  is  sufficient,  and  any  common  precept,  to 
remind  him  that  he  should  be  free  from  grief  and  fear.  For 
example — 

Leaves,  some  the  wind  scatters  on  the  ground — 
So  is  the  race  of  men.^^ 

Leaves,  also,  are  thy  children ;  and  leaves,  too,  are  they  who 
cry  out  as  if  they  were  worthy  of  credit  and  bestow  their 
praise,  or  on  the  contrary  curse,  or  secretly  blame  and  sneer ; 
and  leaves,  in  like  manner,  are  those  who  shall  receive  and 
transmit  a  man's  fame  to  after-times.  For  all  such  things 
as  these  "  are  produced  in  the  season  of  spring,"  as  the  poet 
says ;  then  the  wind  casts  them  down;  then  the  forest  pro- 
duces other  leaves  in  their  places.  But  a  brief  existence  is 
common  to  all  things,  and  yet  thou  avoidest  and  pursuest  all 
things  as  if  they  would  be  eternal.     A  little  time,  and  thou 

«  Homer,  II.  vi   146. 


M.  Antoninus.     X.  1S3 

Bhalt  close  thy  eyes ;  and  liim  wlio  lias  attcndetl  thee  to  tliy 
grave  another  soon  will  lament. 

35.  The  healthy  eye  ouglit  to  see  all  visible  things  and 
not  to  say,  I  wish  for  green  things ;  for  this  is  the  condition 
of  a  diseased  eye.  And  the  healthy  hearing  and  smelling 
ought  to  be  ready  to  perceive  all  that  can  be  heard  and 
smelled.  And  the  healthy  stomach  ought  to  be  with  resjiect 
to  all  food  just  as  the  mill  with  respect  to  all  things  which 
it  is  formed  to  grind.  And  accordingly  the  healthy  under- 
standing ought  to  be  prepared  for  everything  which  happens ; 
but  that  which  says,  Let  my  dear  children  live,  and  let  all 
men  praise  whatever  I  may  do,  is  an  eye  which  seeks  for 
green  things,  or  teeth  which  seek  for  soft  things. 

36.  There  is  no  man  so  fortunate  that  there  shall  not  be 
by  him  when  he  is  dying  some  who  are  pleased  with  what  is 
going  to  happen.^®  Suppose  that  he  was  a  good  and  wise 
man,  will  there  not  be  at  last  some  one  to  say  to  himself, 
Let  us  at  last  breathe  freely  being  relieved  from  this  school- 
master ?  It  is  true  that  he  was  harsh  to  none  of  us,  but  I 
perceived  that  he  tacitly  condemns  us. — This  is  what  is  said 
of  a  good  man.  .But  in  our  own  case  how  many  other  things 
are  there  for  which  there  are  many  who  wish  to  get  rid  of 
us.  Thou  wdlt  consider  this  then  when  thou  art  dying,  and 
thou  wilt  depart  more  contentedly  by  reflecting  thus  :  I  am 
going  away  from  such  a  life,  in  which  even  my  associates  in 
behalf  of  whom  I  have  striven  so  much,  prayed,  and  cared, 
themselves  wish  me  to  depart,  hoping  perchance  to  get  some 
little  advantage  by  it.  "Why  then  should  a  man  cling  to  a 
longer  stay  here  ?  Do  not  however  for  this  reason  go  away 
less  kindly  disposed  to  them,  but  preserving  thy  own 
character,  and  friendly  and  benevolent  and  mild,  and  on  the 
other  hand  not  as  if  thou  wast  torn  away ;  but  as  when  a  man 
dies  a  quiet  death,  the  poor  soul  is  easily  separated  from  the 
body,   such  also  ought  thy  departure  from  men  to  be,  for 

'^  He  says  kukov,  but  as  he  affirms  iu  other  places  that  death  is  no 
evil,  he  must  mean  what  others  m^y  call  an  evil,  and  he  means  only 
••  what  is  going  to  happen." 


184  M.  Antoninus.     X. 

nature  united  thee  to  them  and  associated  thee.  But  does 
she  now  dissolve  the  union  ?  Well,  I  am  separated  as  from 
kinsmen,  not  however  dragged  resisting,  but  without  com- 
pulsion; for  this  too  is  one  of  the  things  according  to 
nature. 

37.  Accustom  thyself  as  much  as  possible  on  the  occasion 
of  anything  being  done  by  any  person  to  inquire  with  thy- 
self, For  what  object  is  this  man  doing  this  ?  but  begin  with 
thyself,  and  examine  thyself  first. 

38.  Eemember  that  this  which  pulls  the  strings  is  the 
thing  which  is  hidden  within :  this  is  the  power  of  persua- 
sion, this  is  life,  this,  if  one  may  so  say,  is  man.  In  con- 
templating thyself  never  include  the  vessel  which  surrounds 
thee  and  these  instruments  which  are  attached  about  it.  For 
they  are  like  to  an  axe,  differing  only  in  this  that  they  grow 
to  the  body.  For  indeed  there  is  no  more  use  in  these  parts 
without  the  cause  which  moves  and  checks  them  than  in  the 
weaver's  shuttle,  and  the  writer's  pen  and  the  driver's 
whip.^' 

27  Seo  *'  The  Philosophy  of  Autonirsiis,"  n,  18, 


M.  Antoninus.    XI.  185 


XI. 

THESE  are  the  properties  of  the  rational  soul :  it  sees 
itself,  analyses  itself,  and  makes  itself  such  as  it 
chooses  ;  the  fruit  wliich  it  bears  itself  enjoys — for  the  fruits 
of  plants  and  that  in  animals  which  corresponds  to  fruits 
others  enjoy — it  obtains  its  own  end,  wherever  the  limit  of 
life  may  be  fixed.  Not  as  in  a  dance  and  in  a  play  and  in 
such  like  things,  where  the  whole  action  is  incomplete,  if 
anything  cuts  it  short ;  but  in  every  part  and  wherever  it 
may  be  stopped,  it  makes  what  has  been  set  before  it  full  and 
complete,  so  that  it  can  say,  I  have  what  is  my  own.  And 
further  it  traverses  the  whole  universe,  and  the  sm'rounding 
vacuum,  and  surveys  its  form,  and  it  extends  itself  into  the 
infinity  of  time,  and  embraces  and  comprehends  the  ^  peri- 
odical renovation  of  all  things,  and  it  comprehends  that  those 
who  come  after  us  will  see  nothing  new,  nor  have  those 
before  us  seen  anything  more,  but  in  a  manner  he  who  is 
forty  years  old,  if  he  has  any  understanding  at  all,  has  seen 
by  virtue  of  the  uniformity  that  prevails  all  things  which 
have  been  and  all  that  will  be.  This  too  is  a  property  of 
the  rational  soul,  love  of  one's  neighbour,  and  truth  and 
modesty,  and  to  value  nothing  more  than  itself,  which  is  also 
the  property  of  Law.^  Thus  then  right  reason  diifers  not  at 
all  from  the  reason  of  justice. 

2.  Thou  wilt  set  little  value  on  pleasing  song  and  dancing 
and  the  pancratium,  if  thou  wilt  distribute  the  melody  of  the 
voice  into  its  several  sounds,  and  ask  thyself  as  to  each,  if 
thou  art  mastered  by  this ;  for  thou  wilt  be  prevented  by 
shame  from  confessing  it :  and  in  the  matter  of  dancing,  if 

^  TV  ireoioSLK^v  iraXiyyevecriav.     See  V.  13,  32  ;   X.  7. 
'  Law  is  the  order  by  which  all  things  are  goverucd. 


186  M.  Antoninus.     XL 

at  each  movement  and  attitude  tliou  v/ilt  do  tlie  same;  and 
the  like  also  in  the  matter  of  the  pancratium.  In  all  things, 
then,  except  virtue  and  the  acts  of  virtue,  remember  to  apply 
thyself  to  their  several  parts,  and  by  this  division  to  come  to 
value  them  little :  and  apply  this  rule  also  to  thy  whole 
life. 

3.  What  a  soul  that  is  which  is  ready,  if  at  any  moment  it 
must  be  separated  from  the  body,  and  ready  either  to  be 
extinguished  or  dispersed  or  continue  to  exist ;  but  so  that 
this  readiness  comes  from  a  man's  own  judgment,  not  from 
mere  obstinacy,  as  with  the  Christians,^  but  considerately 
and  with  dignity  and  in  a  way  to  persuade  another,  without 
tragic  show. 

4.  Have  I  done  something  for  the  general  interest  ?  Well 
then  I  have  had  my  reward.  Let  this  always  be  present  to 
thy  mind,  and  never  stop  [doing  such  good]. 

5.  What  is  thy  art  ?  to  be  good.  And  how  is  this  accom- 
plished well  except  by  general  principles,  some  about  the 
nature  of  the  imiverse,  and  others  about  the  proper  constitu- 
tion of  man  ? 

6.  At  fii'st  tragedies  were  brought  on  the  stage  as  means  of 
reminding  men  of  the  things  which  happen  to  them,  and  that 
it  is  according  to  nature  for  things  to  happen  so,  and  that,  if 
you  are  delighted  with  what  is  shown  on  the  stage,  you  should 
not  be  troubled  with  that  which  takes  place  on  the  larger 
stage.  For  you  see  that  these  things  must  be  accomplished 
thus,  and  that  even  they  bear  them  who  cry  ouf*  "O 
Cithaeron."  And,  indeed,  some  things  are  said  well  by 
the  dramatic  writers,  of  which  kind  is  the  following 
especially : — 

Me  and  my  children  if  the  gods  neglect, 
This  has  its  reason  too.^ 


^  See  the  Life  of  Antoninus.  This  is  the  only  passage  in  which 
the  emperor  speaks  of  the  Christians.  Epictetus  (iv.  7,  6)  m  mes  them 
Galilaei. 

■•  Sopliocles,  Oedipus  Kex. 

5  See  VII.  41,  38,  40. 


M.  Antoninus.     XL  187 

And  agaiu — 

Wc  must  not  chafe  and  fret  at  that  whicli  happens. 
Aud— 

Life's  harvest  reap  hke  the  wheat's  fruitful  ear. 

And  other  things  of  the  same  kind. 

After  tragedy  the  old  comedy  was  introduced,  which  had  a 
magisterial  freedom  of  speech,  and  by  its  very  plainness  of 
speaking  was  useful  in  reminding  men  to  beware  of 
insolence;  and  for  this  purpose  too  Diogenes  used  to  take 
from  these  ^\Titers. 

But  as  to  the  middle  comedy  which  came  next,  observe 
what  it  was,  and  again,  for  what  object  the  new  comedy  was 
introduced,  which  gradually  sunk  down  into  a  mere  mimic 
artifice.  That  some  good  things  are  said  even  by  these 
writers,  everybody  knows :  but  the  whole  plan  of  such 
poetry  and  di-amaturgy,  to  what  end  does  it  look  ! 

7.  How  plain  does  it  appear  that  there  is  not  another 
condition  of  life  so  well  suited  for  philosophizing  as  this  in 
which  thou  now  hapi)enest  to  be. 

8.  A  branch  cut  off  from  the  adjacent  branch  must  of 
necessity  be  cut  off  from  the  whole  tree  also.  So  too  a  man 
when  he  is  separated  from  another  man  has  fallen  off  from 
the  whole  social  community.  Now  as  to  a  branch,  another 
cuts  it  off,  but  a  man  by  his  own  act  separates  himself  from 
his  neighboui'  when  he  hates  him  and  turns  away  from  him, 
and  he  does  not  know  that  he  has  at  the  same  time  cut 
himself  off  from  the  whole  social  system.  Yet  he  has  this 
privilege  certainly  from  Zeus  who  framed  society,  for  it  is  in 
our  power  to  grow  again  to  that  which  is  near  to  us,  and 
again  to  become  a  part  which  helps  to  make  up  the  whole. 
However,  if  it  often  happens,  this  kind  of  separation,  it  makes 
it  difficult  for  that  which  detaches  itself  to  be  brought  to 
unity  and  to  be  restored  to  its  former  condition.  Finally, 
the  branch,  which  from  the  first  grew  together  with  the  tree, 
and  has  continued  to  have  one  life  with  it,  is  not  like  that 
which  after  being  cut  off  is  then  ingrafted,  for  this  is  some- 


188  M.  Antoninus.     XL 

thing  like  wliat  the  gardeners  mean  when  they  say  that  it 
grows  with  the  rest  of  the  tree,  butf  that  it  has  not  the  same 
mind  with  it. 

9.  As  those  who  try  to  stand  in  thy  way  w^hen  thou  art 
proceeding  according  to  right  reason,  will  not  be  able  to 
turn  thee  aside  from  thy  proj)er  action,  so  neither  let  them 
drive  thee  from  thy  benevolent  feelings  towards  them,  but  be 
on  thy  guard  equally  in  both  matters,  not  only  in  the  matter 
of  steady  judgment  and  action,  but  also  in  the  matter  of 
gentleness  towards  those  who  try  to  hinder  or  otherwise 
trouble  thee.  For  this  also  is  a  w^eakness,  to  be  vexed  at 
them,  as  well  as  to  be  diverted  from  thy  course  of  action  and 
to  give  way  through  fear;  for  both  are  equally  deserters 
from  their  post,  the  man  who  does  it  through  fear,  and  the 
man  who  is  alienated  from  him  who  is  by  nature  a  kinsman 
and  a  friend. 

10.  There  is  no  nature  which  is  inferior  to  art,  for  the 
arts  imitate  the  natures  of  things.  But  if  this  is  so,  that 
nature  which  is  the  most  perfect  and  the  most  comprehensive 
of  all  natures,  cannot  fall  short  of  the  skill  of  art.  Now  all 
arts  do  the  inferior  things  for  the  sake  of  the  superior ;  there- 
fore the  universal  nature  does  so  too.  And,  indeed,  hence  is 
the  origin  of  justice,  and  in  justice  the  other  virtues  have 
their  foundation :  for  justice  will  not  be  observed,  if  we 
either  care  for  middle  things  [things  indifferent],  or  are  easily 
deceived  and  careless  and  changeable,     (v.  16.  80  ;  vii.  55.) 

11.  If  the  things  do  not  come  to  thee,  the  pursuits  and 
avoidances  of  which  disturb  thee,  still  in  a  manner  thou 
goest  to  them.  Let  then  thy  judgment  about  them  be  at  rest, 
and  they  will  remain  quiet,  and  thou  wilt  not  be  seen  either 
pursuing  or  avoiding. 

12.  The  spherical  form  of  the  soul  maintains  its  figure, 
when  it  is  neither  extended  towards  any  object,  nor  contracted 
inwards,  nor  dispersed  nor  sinks  down,  but  is  illuminated  by 
light,  by  which  it  sees  the  truth,  the  truth  of  all  things  and 
the  truth  that  is  in  itself,     (viii.  41.  45,  xii.  3.) 

13.  Suppose  any  man  shall  despise  me.     Let  him  look  to 


M.  Antoninus.     XL  189 

tliat  himself.  But  I  will  look  to  tliis,  tliat  I  bo  not 
discovered  doing  or  saying  anytliing  deserving  of  contempt. 
Shall  any  man  hate  me  ?  Let  him  look  to  it.  But  I  will  bo 
mild  and  benevolent  towards  every  man,  and  ready  to  show 
even  him  his  mistake,  not  reproachfully,  nor  yet  as  making  a 
display  of  my  endurance,  but  nobly  and  honestly,  like  tho 
great  Phocion,  unless  indeed  he  only  assumed  it.  For  the 
interior  [parts]  ought  to  be  such,  and  a  man  ouglit  to  be  seen 
by  the  gods  neither  dissatisfied  with  anything  nor  complaining. 
For  what  evil  is  it  to  thee,  if  thou  art  now  doing  what  is 
agreeable  to  thy  own  nature,  and  art  satisfied  with  that  which 
at  this  moment  is  suitable  to  the  nature  of  the  universe,  since 
thou  art  a  human  being  placed  at  thy  post  in  order  that  what 
is  for  the  common  advantage  may  be  done  in  some  way  ? 

14.  Men  despise  one  another  and  flatter  one  another ;  and 
men  wish  to  raise  themselves  above  one  another,  and  crouch 
before  one  another. 

15.  How  unsound  and  insincere  is  he  who  says,  I  have 
determined  to  deal  with  thee  in  a  fair  way. — What  art  thou 
doing,  man  ?  There  is  no  occasion  to  give  this  notice.  It 
will  soon  show  itself  by  acts.  The  voice  ought  to  be  plainly 
written  on  the  forehead.  Such  as  a  man's  character  is,f  he 
immediately  shows  it  in  his  eyes,  just  as  he  who  is  beloved 
forthwith  reads  everything  in  the  eyes  of  lovers.  The  man 
who  is  honest  and  good  ought  to  be  exactly  like  a  man  who 
smells  strong,  so  that  the  bystander  as  soon  as  he  comes  near 
him  must  smell  whether  he  choose  or  not.  But  the  afiecta- 
tion  of  simplicity  is  like  a  crooked  stick.^  Nothing  is  more 
disgraceful  than  a  wolfish  friendshij)  [false  friendship]. 
Avoid  this  most  of  all.  The  good  and  simple  and  benevolent 
show  all  these  things  in  the  eyes,  and  there  is  no 
mistaking. 

«  Instead  of  (XKa.\^-q  Saumaise  reads  (XKafx^r].  There  is  a  Greek 
proverb,  ana-^^hv  ^vKov  ovSeiroT  opdov :  '  You  cannot  make  a  crooked 
BLick  straight." 

The  wolfish  friendship  is  an  allusion  tc  the  fable  of  the  sheep  and 
tlie  wolves. 


190  AL  Antoninus:     XL 

16.  As  to  living  in  the  best  way,  this  power  is  in  the  soul, 
if  it  be  indifferent  to  things  which  are  indifferent.  And  it 
will  be  indifferent,  if  it  looks  on  each  of  these  things 
separately  and  all  together,  and  if  it  remembers  that  not  one 
of  them  produces  in  us  an  opinion  about  itself,  nor  comes  to 
us;  but  these  things  remain  immoveable,  and  it  is  we 
ourselves  who  produce  the  judgments  about  them,  and,  as  we 
may  say,  write  them  in  ourselves,  it  being  in  our  power  not 
to  write  them,  and  it  being  in  our  power,  if  perchance  these 
judgments  have  imperceptibly  got  admission  to  our  minds,  to 
wipe  them  out ;  and  if  we  remember  also  that  such  attention 
will  only  be  for  a  short  time,  and  then  life  will  be  at  an  end. 
Besides,  what  trouble  is  there  at  all  in  doing  this  ?  For  if 
these  things  are  according  to  nature,  rejoice  in  them,  and 
they  will  be  easy  to  thee:  but  if  contrary  to  nature,  seek 
what  is  conformable  to  thy  own  nature,  and  strive  towards 
this,  even  if  it  bring  no  reputation ;  for  every  man  is  allowed 
to  seek  his  own  good. 

17.  Consider  whence  each  thing  is  come,  and  of  what  it 
consists,!  and  into  what  it  changes,  and  what  kind  of  a  thing 
it  will  be  when  it  has  changed,  and  that  it  will  sustain 
no  harm. 

18.  [If  any  have  offended  against  thee,  consider  first]: 
What  is  my  relation  to  men,  and  that  we  are  made  for  one 
another ;  and  in  another  respect,  I  was  made  to  be  set  over 
them,  as  a  ram  over  the  flock  or  a  bull  over  the  herd.  But 
examine  the  matter  from  first  principles,  from  this :  If  all 
things  are  not  mere  atoms,  it  is  nature  which  orders  all 
things  :  if  this  is  so,  the  inferior  things  exist  for  the  sake  of 
the  superior,  and  these  for  the  sake  of  one  another,  (n.  1 ; 
IX.  39  ;  V.  16  ;  III.  4.) 

Second,  consider  what  kind  of  men  they  are  at  table,  in  bed, 
and  so  forth:  and  particularly,  under  what  compulsions  in 
respect  of  opinions  they  are ;  and  as  to  theii'  acts,  consider 
with  what  pride  they  do  what  they  do.     (viii.  14;  ix.  34.) 

Third,  that  if  men  do  rightly  what  they  do,  we  ought  not 
to  be  displeased;  but  if  they  do  not  right,  it  is  plain  that 


ill.  Antonimis.     XL  VM 

they  io  so  involuntarily  and  in  ignorance.  For  as  every 
Boul  is  unwillingly  deprived  of  the  truth,  so  also  is  it  unwill- 
ingly deprived  of  the  power  of  behaving  to  each  man  acccjrd- 
ing  to  his  deserts.  Accordingly  men  are  pained  when  they  Are 
called  unjust,  ungrateful,  and  greedy,  and  in  a  word  wrong- 
doers to  their  neighbours.  (vii.  62,  63;  ii.  1;  vu.  26; 
VIII.  29.) 

Fourth,  consider  that  thou  also  doest  many  things  wrong, 
and  that  thou  art  a  man  like  others  ;  and  even  if  thou  dost 
abstain  from  certain  faults,  still  thou  hast  the  disposition  to 
commit  them,  though  either  through  cowardice,  or  concern 
about  rej^utation  or  some  such  mean  motive,  thou  dost  abstain 
from  such  faults,  (i.  17.) 

Fifth,  consider  that  thou  dost  not  even  understand  whether 
men  are  doing  wrong  or  not,  for  many  things  are  done  with  a 
certain  reference  to  circumstances.  And  in  short,  a  man  must 
learn  a  great  deal  to  enable  him  to  pass  a  correct  judgment 
on  another  man's  acts."(ix.  38  ;  iv.  51.) 

Sixth,  consider  when  thou  art  much  vexed  or  grieved,  that 
man's  life  is  only  a  moment,  and  after  a  short  time  we  are  all 
laid  out  dead.  (vii.  58 ;  iv.  48.) 

Seventh,  that  it  is  not  men's  acts  which  distiu'b  us,  for  those 
acts  have  their  foundation  in  men's  ruling  principles,  but  it  is 
our  own  opinions  which  disturb  us.  Take  away  these  opinions 
then,  and  resolve  to  dismiss  thy  judgment  about  an  act  as  if 
it  were  something  grievous,  and  thy  anger  is  gone.  How 
then  shall  I  take  away  these  opinions  ?  By  reflecting  that  no 
wrongful  act  of  another  brings  shame  on  thee  :  for  imless  that 
which  is  shameful  is  alone  bad,  thou  also  must  of  necessity  do 
many  things  wrong,  and  become  a  robber  and  everything  else. 
(v.  25;  Yii.  16.) 

Eighth,  consider  how  much  more  pain  is  brought  on  us  by 
the  anger  and  vexation  caused  by  such  acts  than  by  the  acts 
themselves,  at  which  we  are  angry  and  vexed,  (tv.  39.  49 ; 
VII.  24) 

Ninth,  consider  that  a  good  disposition  is  invincible,  if  it 
be  genuine,  and  not  an  affected  smile  and  acting  a  part.     For 


192  M.  Antoninus.     XL 

what  will  the  most  violent  man  do  to  thee,  if  thou  continuest 
to  be  of  a  kind  disposition  towards  him,  and  if,  as  opportunity 
offers,  thou  gently  admonishest  him  and  calmly  correctest  his 
errors  at  the  very  time  when  he  is  trying  to  do  thee  harm, 
saying.  Not  so,  my  child  :  we  are  constituted  by  nature  for 
something  else  :  I  shall  certainly  not  be  injured,  but  thou  art 
injuring  thyself,  my  child. — And  show  him  with  gentle  tact 
and  by  general  principles  that  this  is  so,  and  that  even  bees 
do  not  do  as  he  does,  nor  any  animals  which  are  formed  by 
nature  to  be  gregarious.  And  thou  must  do  this  neither  with 
any  double  meaning  nor  in  the  way  of  reproach,  but  affection- 
ately and  without  any  rancour  in  thy  soul ;  and  not  as  if  thou 
wert  lecturing  him,  nor  yet  that  any  bystander  may  admire, 
but  either  when  he  is  alone,  and  if  others  are  present  *  *J 

Kemember  these  nine  rules,  as  if  thou  hadst  received  them 
as  a  gift  from  the  Muses,  and  begin  at  last  to  be  a  man  while 
thou  livest.  But  thou  must  equally  avoid  flattering  men  and 
being  vexed  at  them,  for  both  are  unsocial  and  lead  to  harm. 
And  let  this  truth  be  present  to  thee  in  the  excitemeiit  of 
anger,  that  to  be  moved  by  passion  is  not  manly,  but  that 
mildness  and  gentleness,  as  they  are  more  agreeable  to 
human  nature,  so  also  are  they  more  manly;  and  he  who 
possesses  these  qualities  possesses  strength,  nerves  and 
courage,  and  not  the  man  who  is  subject  to  fits  of  passion  and 
discontent.  For  in  the  same  degree  in  which  a  man's  mind  is 
nearer  to  freedom  from  all  passion,  in  the  same  degree  also  is 
it  nearer  to  strength :  and  as  the  sense  of  pain  is  a  charac- 
teristic of  weakness,  so  also  is  anger.  For  he  who  yields  to 
pain  and  he  who  yields  to  anger,  both  are  wounded  and  both 
submit. 

But  if  thou  wilt,  receive  also  a  tenth  present  from  the  leader 
of  the  [Muses  Apollo],  and  it  is  this — that  to  expect  bad  men 
not  to  do  wrong  is  madness,  for  he  who  expects  this  desires 
an  impossibility.  But  to  allow  men  to  behave  so  to  others, 
and  to  expect  them  not  to  do  thee  any  wrong,  is  irrational 
and  tyrannical. 

'  It  appears  that  there  is  a  defect  m  the  text  here. 


M.  Antoninus.     XI.  193 

19.  There  are  four  princijial  aberrations  of  the  snperioi 
faculty  against  which  thou  shouklst  be  constantly  on  thy  guard, 
and  when  thou  hast  detected  them,  thou  sliouldst  wipe  them 
out  and  say  on  each  occasion  thus  :  this  thought  is  not  neces- 
sary :  this  tends  to  destroy  social  union  :  this  which  thou  art 
going  to  say  comes  not  from  the  real  thoughts ;  for  thou 
shouldst  consider  it  among  the  most  absurd  of  things  for  a 
man  not  to  speak  from  his  real  thoughts.  But  the  fourth  is 
when  thou  shalt  reproach  thyself  for  anything,  for  this  is  an 
evidence  of  the  diviner  part  within  thee  being  overpowered 
and  yielding  to  the  less  honourable  and  to  the  perishable  part, 
the  body,  and  to  its  gross  pleasures,  (iv.  24;  ii.  16.) 

20.  Thy  aerial  part  and  all  the  fiery  parts  which  are 
mingled  in  thee,  though  by  nature  they  have  an  upward  ten- 
dency, still  in  obedience  to  the  disposition  of  the  universe 
they  are  overpowered  here  in  the  compound  mass  [the  body]. 
And  also  the  whole  of  the  earthy  part  in  thee  and  the  watery, 
though  their  tendency  is  downward,  still  are  raised  up  and 
occupy  a  position  which  is  not  their  natural  one.  In  this 
manner  then  the  elemental  j^^i'^s  obey  the  universal,  for 
when  they  have  been  fixed  in  any  place  perforce  they  remain 
there  until  again  the  universal  shall  sound  the  signal  for  dis- 
solution. Is  it  not  then  strange  that  thy  intelligent  part  only 
should  be  disobedient  and  discontented  with  its  own  place  '? 
And  yet  no  force  is  imposed  on  it,  but  only  those  things  which 
are  conformable  to  its  nature  :  still  it  does  not  submit,  but  is 
carried  in  the  opposite  direction.  For  the  movement  towards 
injustice  and  intemperance  and  to  anger  and  grief  and  fear  is 
nothing  else  than  the  act  of  one  who  deviates  from  nature. 
And  also  when  the  ruling  faculty  is  discontented  with  any- 
thing that  happens,  then  too  it  deserts  its  post :  for  it  is  con- 
stituted for  piety  and  reverence  towards  the  gods  no  less  than 
for  justice.  For  these  qualities  also  are  comprehended  under 
the  generic  term  of  contentment  with  the  constitution  of 
things,  and  indeed  they  are  prior^  to  acts  of  justice. 

*  The  word  izpecr^vrepa,  N\liich  is  here  translated  "  prior,"  mny  alsc 
mean  •'  superior:"  but  Antoninus  seems  to  say  that  piety  and  reverence 

O 


194  M.  Antoninus.     XI. 

21.  He  who  lias  not  one  and  always  the  same  object  in  life, 
cannot  be  one  and  the  same  all  through  his  life.  But  what 
1  have  said  is  not  enough,  unless  this  also  is  added,  what  this 
object  ought  to  be.  For  as  there  is  not  the  same  opinion 
about  all  the  things  which  in  some  way  or  other  are  con- 
sidered by  the  majority  to  be  good,  but  only  about  some  cer- 
tain things,  that  is,  things  which  concern  the  common 
interest ;  so  also  ought  we  to  propose  to  ourselves  an  object 
which  shall  be  of  a  common  kind  [social]  and  political.  For 
he  who  directs  all  his  own  efforts  to  this  object,  will  make  all 
his  acts  alike,  and  thus  will  always  be  the  same. 

22.  Think  of  the  country  mouse  and  of  the  town  mouse, 
and  of  the  alarm  and  trepidation  of  the  town  mouse.^ 

23.  Socrates  used  to  call  the  opinions  of  the  many  by  the 
name  of  Lamiae,  bugbears  to  frighten  children. 

24.  The  Lacedaemonians  at  their  public  spectacles  used  to 
set  seats  in  the  shade  for  strangers,  but  themselves  sat  down 
anywhere. 

25.  Socrates  excused  himself  to  Perdiccas^"  for  not  going 


of  the  gods  precede  all  virtues,  and  that  other  virtues  are  derived  from 
them,  even  justice,  which  in  another  passage  (xi.  10)  he  makes  the 
foundation  of  all  virtues.  The  ancient  notion  of  justice  is  that  of  giving 
to  every  one  his  due.  It  is  not  a  legal  definition,  as  some  have  supposed, 
but  a  moral  rule  which  law  cannot  in  all  cases  enforce.  Besides  law 
has  its  own  rules,  which  are  sometimes  moral  and  sometimes  imrcoral ; 
but  it  enforces  them  all  simply  because  they  are  general  rules,  and  if 
it  did  not  or  could  not  enforce  them,  so  far  Law  would  not  be  Law. 
Justice,  or  the  doing  what  is  just,  implies  a  universal  rule  and  obedience 
to  it ;  and  as  we  all  live  under  universal  Law,  which  commands  both 
our  body  and  our  intelligence,  and  is  the  law  of  our  nature,  that  is  the 
law  of  the  whole  constitution  of  man,  we  miist  endeavour  to  discover 
what  this  supreme  Law  is.  It  is  the  will  of  the  power  that  rules  all. 
By  acting  in  obedience  to  this  will,  we  do  justice,  and  by  consequence 
everything  else  that  we  ought  to  do. 

9  The  story  is  told  by  Horace  in  his  Satires  (ii.  6),  and  by  others 
since,  but  not  better. 

10  Perhaps  the  emperor  made  a  mistake  here,  for  other  vsrriters  say 
that  it  was  Archelaus,  the  son  of  Perdiccas,  who  invited  Socrates  to 
Macedonia. 


M.  Antoninus.     XI.  195 

to  him,  saying,  It  is  because  I  would  not  perish  by  the  worst 
of  all  ends,  that  is,  I  would  not  receive  a  favour  and  tlicii  bo 
unable  to  retui-n  it. 

26.  In  the  writings  of  the  [Ephesians]"  there  was  this  pre- 
cept, constantly  to  think  of  some  one  of  the  men  of  f(jrmer 
times  who  practised  virtue. 

27.  The  Pythagoreans  bid  us  in  the  morning  look  to  tlic 
heavens  that  we  may  be  reminded  of  those  bodies  which  con- 
tinually do  the  same  things  and  in  the  same  manner  perform 
theii*  work,  and  also  be  reminded  of  their  pui'ity  and  nudity 
For  there  is  no  veil  over  a  star. 

28.  Consider  what  a  man  Socrates  was  when  he  dressed 
himself  in  a  skin,  after  Xanthippe  had  taken  his  cloak  and 
gone  out,  and  what  Socrates  said  to  his  friends  who  were 
ashamed  of  him  and  drew  back  from  him  when  they  saw  him 
dressed  thus. 

29.  Neither  in  writing  nor  in  reading  wilt  thou  be  able  to 
lay  down  rules  for  others  before  thou  shalt  have  first  learned 
to  obey  rules  thyself.     Much  more  is  this  so  in  life. 

30.  A  slave  thou  art :  free  spech  is  not  for  thee. 

31.  And  my  heart  laughed  within.     (Od.  ix.  413.) 

32.  And   virtue   they  will  curse  speaking   harsh   words. 

(Hesiod,  Works  and  Days,  184.) 

33.  To  look  for  the  fig  in  w:inter  is  a  madman's  act :  such 
is  he  who  looks  for  his  child  when  it  is  no  longer  allowed. 
(Epictetus,  III.  24,  87.) 

34.  When  a  man  kisses  his  child,  said  Epictetus,  he  should 
whisj)er  to  himself,  "  To-morrow  perchance  thou  wilt  die  " — 
But  those  are  words  of  bad  omen — "  No  word  is  a  word  of 
bad  omen,"  said  Epictetus,  "  which  expresses  any  work  of 
nature ;  or  if  it  is  so,  it  is  also  a  word  of  bad  omen  to  speak 
of  the  ears  of  corn  being  reaped."     (Epictetus,  iii.  24,  88.) 

35.  The  unripe  grape,  the  ripe  bunch,  the  dried  grape, 
all  are  changes,  not  into  nothing,  but  into  sometLi;-  ,>hich 
exists  not  yet.     (Epictetus,  iii.  24.) 

"  Gataker  suggested  'ETnKovpeiwj/  for  'E<p€(rlwv^ 


196  M.  Antoninus.     XL 

36.  No  man  can  rob  us  of  our  free  will.  (Epictetus, 
HI.  22,  105.) 

37.  Epictetus  also  said,  a  man  must  discover  an  art  [or 
rules]  with  respect  to  giving  his  assent ;  and  in  respect  to 
his  movements  he  must  be  careful  that  they  be  made  with 
regard  to  circumstances,  that  they  be  consistent  with  social 
interests,  that  they  have  regard  to  the  value  of  the  object ; 
and  as  to  sensual  desii-e,  he  should  altogether  keep  away 
from  it ;  and  as  to  avoidance  [aversion]  he  should  not  show  it 
with  respect  to  any  of  the  things  which  are  not  in  our 
power. 

38.  The  dispute  then,  he  said,  is  not  about  any  common 
matter,  but  about  being  mad  or  not. 

39.  Socrates  used  to  say,  What  do  you  want  ?  Souls  of 
rational  men  or  irrational  ? — Souls  of  rational  men — Of  what 
rational  men  ?  ,  Sound  or  unsound  ? — Sound — Why  then  do 
you  not  seek  for  them  ? — Because  we  have  them — Why  then 
do  you  fight  and  quarrel  ? 


M.  Antoninus.     Xll.  3  97 


XII. 

ALL  those  things  at  which  thou  wishest  to  arrive  by  a 
circuitous  road,  thou  canst  have  now,  if  thou  dost  nol 
refuse  them  to  thyself.  And  this  means,  if  thou  wilt  take  no 
notice  of  all  the  past,  and  trust  the  future  to  providence,  and 
direct  the  present  only  conformably  to  piety  and  justice. 
Conformably  to  piety,  that  thou  mayst  be  content  with  the 
lot  which  is  assigned  to  thee,  for  nature  designed  it  for  thee 
and  thee  for  it.  Conformably  to  justice,  that  thou  mayst 
always  speak  the  truth  freely  and  without  disguise,  and  do 
the  things  which  are  agreeable  to  law  and  according  to  the 
worth  of  each.  And  let  neither  anotlier  man's  wickedness 
hinder  thee,  nor  opinion  nor  voice,  nor  yet  the  sensations  of 
the  poor  flesh  which  has  grown  about  thee  ;  for  the  passive 
part  will  look  to  this.  If  then,  w^hatever  the  time  may  be 
when  thou  shalt  be  near  to  thy  dejDarture,  neglecting  every- 
thing else  thou  shalt  respect  only  thy  ruling  faculty  and  the 
divinity  within  thee,  and  if  thou  shalt  be  afraid  not  because 
thou  must  some  time  cease  to  live,  but  if  thou  shalt  fear 
never  to  have  begun  to  live  according  to  nature — then  thou 
wilt  be  a  man  worthy  of  the  universe  which  has  produced 
thee,  and  thou  wilt  cease  to  be  a  stranger  in  thy  native  land, 
and  to  wonder  at  things  which  happen  daily  as  if  they 
were  something  unexpected,  and  to  be  dependent  on  this 
or  that. 

2.  God  sees  the  minds  (ruling  principles)  of  all  men  bared 
of  the  material  vesture  and  rind  and  impurities.  For  with  his 
intellectual  part  alone  he  touches  the  intelligence  only  which 
has  flowed  and  been  derived  from  himself  into  these  bodies. 
And  if  thou  also  usest  thyself  to  do  this,  thou  wilt  rid  thyself 
of  thy  much  trouble.     For  he  who  regards  not  the  peor  fie&h 


193  31.  Antoninus.     XII. 

which  envelopes  him,  surely  will  not  trouble  himself  by 
looking  after  raiment  and  dwelling  and  fame  and  such  like 
externals  and  show. 

3.  The  things  are  three  of  which  thou  art  composed,  a 
little  body,  a  little  breath  [life],  intelligence.  Of  these  the 
first  two  are  thine,  so  far  as  it  is  thy  duty  to  take  care  of 
them  ;  but  the  third  alone  is  properly  thine.  Therefore  if 
thou  shalt  separate  from  thyself,  that  is,  from  thy  under- 
standing, whatever  others  do  or  say,  and  whatever  thou  hast 
done  or  said  thyself,  and  whatever  future  things  trouble  thee 
because  they  may  happen,  and  whatever  in  the  body  which 
envelopes  thee  or  in  the  breath  [life],  which  is  by  nature 
associated  with  the  body,  is  attached  to  thee  independent  of 
thy  will,  and  whatever  the  external  circumfluent  vortex 
whirls  round,  so  that  the  intellectual  power  exempt  from  the 
things  of  fate  can  live  pure  and  free  by  itself,  doing  what  is 
just  and  accepting  what  happens  and  saying  the  truth  :  if 
thou  wilt  separate,  I  say,  from  this  ruling  faculty  the  things 
which  are  attached  to  it  by  the  impressions  of  sense,  and  the 
things  of  time  to  come  and  of  time  that  is  past,  and  wilt 
make  thyself  like  Empedocles'  sphere, — 

All  round,  and  in  its  joyous  rest  reposing  •} 

and  if  thou  shalt  strive  to  live  only  what  is  really  thy  life, 
that  is,  the  present — then  thou  wilt  be  able  to  pass  that 
portion  of  life  which  remains  for  thee  up  to  the  time  of  thy 
death,  free  from  perturbations,  nobly,  and  obedient  to  thy 
own  daemon  [to  the  god  that  is  within  thee],  (ii.  13.  17  ; 
III.  5,  6  ;  XI.  12.) 

4.  I  have  often  wondered  how  it  is  that  every  man  loves 
himself  more  than  all  the  rest  of  men,  but  yet  sets  less  value 
on  his  own  opinion  of  himself  than  on  the  oj)inion  of  others. 
If  then  a  god  or  a  wise  teacher  should  present  himself  to  a 

1  The  verse  of  Empedocles  is  corrupt  in  Antoninus.  It  has  beea 
restorc-d  by  Peyron  from  a  Turin  MS.  thus : 

^ipa/.pos  KVK\oT€p-{}s  ixovh]  TrepiyvBu  yaiocv. 


M.  Antoninus.     XI L  109 

man  and  bid  liim  to  think  of  nothing  and  to  design  nothing 
which  he  would  not  exprt^ss  as  soon  as  he  conceived  it,  ho 
could  not  endure  it  even  for  a  single  day.^  So  much  more 
respect  have  we  to  what  our  neighbours  shall  think  of  uh 
than  to  what  we  shall  think  of  ourselves. 

5.  How  can  it  bo  that  the  gods  after  having  ari-anged  all 
things  well  and  benevolently  for  mankind,  have  overlooked 
this  alone,  that  some  men  and  very  good  men,  and  men  who, 
as  we  may  say,  have  had  most  communion  with  the  divinity, 
and  through  pious  acts  and  religious  observances  have  been 
most  intimate  with  the  divinity,  when  they  have  once  died 
should  never  exist  again,  but  should  be  completely  extin- 
guished  ? 

But  if  this  is  so,  be  assured  that  if  it  ought  to  have  been 
other\vise,  the  gods  would  have  done  it.  For  if  it  were  just, 
it  would  also  be  possible ;  and  if  it  were  according  to  nature, 
natui-e  would  have  had  it  so.  But  because  it  is  not  so,  if  in 
fact  it  is  not  so,  be  thou  convinced  that  it  ought  not  to  have 
been  so  : — for  thou  seest  even  of  thyself  that  in  this  inquiry 
thou  art  disputing  with  the  deity ;  and  we  should  not  thus 
dispute  with  the  gods,  unless  they  were  most  excellent  and 
most  just ; — but  if  this  is  so,  they  would  not  have  allowed 
anything  in  the  ordering  of  the  universe  to  be  neglected 
unjustly  and  ii-rationally. 

6.  Practise  thyself  even  in  the  things  which  thou  despairest 
of  accomplishing.  For  even  the  left  hand,  which  is  ineffectual 
for  all  other  things  for  want  of  practice,  holds  the  bridle 
more  vigorously  than  the  right  hand ;  for  it  has  been  practised 
in  this. 

7.  Consider  in  what  condition  both  in  body  and  soul  a 
man  should  be  when  he  is  overtaken  by  death  ;  and  consider 
the  shortness  of  life,  the  boundless  abyss  of  time  past  and 
future,  the  feebleness  of  all  matter. 

8.  Contemplate  the  formative  principles  [forms]  of  things 
bare  of  their  coverings  ;  the  piu-poses  of  actions ;  consider 
what  pain  is,  what  pleasure  is,  and  death,  and  fame ;  who  is 

2  m.  4. 


200  M.  Antoninus.     XIL 

to   himself  the  cause  of  his  uneasiness;    how  no    man   is 
hindered  by  another ;  that  everything  is  opinion. 

9.  In  the  application  of  thy  principles  thou  must  be  like 
the  pancratiast,  not  like  the  gladiator ;  for  the  gladiator  lets 
fall  the  sword  which  he  uses  and  is  killed ;  but  the  other 
always  has  his  hand,  and  needs  to  do  nothing  else  than 
use  it. 

10.  See  what  things  are  in  themselves,  dividing  them  into 
matter,  form  and  purpose. 

11.  What  a  power  man  has  to  do  nothing  except  what 
god  will  approve,  and  to  accept  all  that  god  may  give  him. 

12.  With  respect  to  that  which  happens  confonnably  to 
nature,  we  ought  to  blame  neither  gods,  for  they  do  nothing 
-svrong  either  voluntarily  or  involuntarily,  nor  men,  for  they 
do  nothing  wrong  except  involuntarily.  Consequently  we 
should  blame  nobody,     (ii.  11,  12,  13  ;  vii.  62  ;  viii.  17.) 

13.  How  ridiculous  and  what  a  stranger  he  is  who  is  sur- 
prised at  anything  which  happens  in  life. 

14.  Either  there  is  a  fatal  necessity  and  invincible  order, 
or  a  kind  providence,  or  a  confusion  without  a  purpose  and 
without  a  director  (iv.  27).  If  then  there  is  an  invincible 
necessity,  why  dost  thou  resist  ?  But  if  there  is  a  providence 
which  allows  itself  to  be  propitiated,  make  thyself  worthy  of 
the  help  of  the  divinity.  But  if  there  is  a  confusion  without 
a  governor,  be  content  that  in  such  a  tempest  thou  hast  in 
thyself  a  certain  ruling  intelligence.  And  even  if  the  tempest 
carry  thee  away,  let  it  carry  away  the  poor  flesh,  the  poor 
breath,  everything  else ;  for  the  intelligence  at  least  it  will 
not  carry  away. 

15.  Does  the  light  of  the  lamp  shine  without  losing  its 
splendour  until  it  is  extinguished ;  and  shall  the  truth  which 
is  in  thee  and  justice  and  temperance  be  extinguished  [before 
thy  death]  ? 

16.  When  a  man  has  presented  the  appearance  of  having 
done  wrong,  [say,]  How  then  do  I  know  if  this  is  a  wrongful 
act  ?  And  even  if  he  has  done  wrong,  how  do  I  know  that 
he  has  not  condemned  himself?  and  so  this  is  like  teai-inj? 


M.  Antoninus.     XII.  201 

his  own  face.  Consider  tliat  lie,  wlio  would  not  havo  tlia 
bad  man  do  wrong,  is  like  the  man  who  would  not  have  tho 
figtree  to  bear  juice  in  the  tigs  and  infants  to  cry  and  the 
horse  to  neigh,  and  whatever  else  must  of  necessity  be.  Foi* 
what  must  a  man  do  who  has  such  a  character  ?  If  then  then 
art  irritable,!  cure  this  man's  disposition.^ 

17.  If  it  is  not  right,  do  not  do  it:  if  it  is  not  true,  do 
not  say  it.     [For  let  thy  efforts  be. — ]* 

18.  In  everything  always  observe  what  the  thing  is  which 
produces  for  thee  an  appearance,  and  resolve  it  by  dividing  it 
into  the  formal,  the  material,  the  purpose,  and  the  time 
within  which  it  must  end. 

19.  Perceive  at  last  that  thou  hast  in  thee  something 
better  and  more  divine  than  the  things  which  cause  the 
various  affects,  and  as  it  were  pull  thee  by  the  strings.  What 
is  there  now  in  my  mind  ?  is  it  fear,  or  suspicion,  or  desire, 
or  anything  of  the  kind?  (v.  11.) 

20.  First,  do  nothing  inconsiderately,  nor  without  a  pur- 
pose. Second,  make  thy  acts  refer  to  nothing  else  than  to  a 
social  end. 

21.  Consider  that  before  long  thou  wilt  be  nobody  and 
nowhere,  nor  will  any  of  the  things  exist  which  thou  now  seest, 
nor  any  of  those  who  are  now  living.  For  all  things  are  formed 
by  nature  to  change  and  be  turned  and  to  perish  in  order  that 
other  things  in  continuous  succession  may  exist,  (ix.  28.) 

22.  Consider  that  everything  is  opinion,  and  opinion  is  in 
thy  power.  Take  away  then,  when  thou  choosest,  thy 
opinion,  and  like  a  mariner,  who  has  doubled  the  promontory, 
thou  wilt  find  calm,  everything  stable,  and  a  waveless  bay. 

23.  Any  one  activity  whatever  it  may  be,  when  it  has 
ceased  at  its  proper  time,  suffers  no  evil  because  it  has 
ceased ;  nor  he  who  has  done  this  act,  does  he  suffer  any  evil 
for  this  reason  that  the  act  has  ceased.     In  like  manner  theil 

3  The  interpreters  translate  yopySs  by  the  words  "  acer,  validusque," 
and  "  skilful."  But  in  Epictetus  (ii.  16,  20 ;  m.  12,  10)  yopyos  means 
*'  vehement,"  "  prone  to  anger,"  "  irritable." 

■*  There  is  something  wrong  here,  or  incomplete. 


202  M.  Antoninus.     XIL 

the  whole  whicli  consists  of  all  the  acts,  which  is  our  life,  if 
it  cease  at  its  proper  time,  suffers  no  evil  for  this  reason  that 
it  has  ceased ;  nor  he  who  has  terminated  this  series  at  the 
proper  time,  has  he  been  ill  dealt  with.  But  the  proper  time 
and  the  limit  nature  fixes,  sometimes  as  in  old  age  the 
peculiar  nature  of  man,  but  always  the  universal  nature,  by 
the  change  of  whose  parts  the  whole  universe  continues  ever 
young  and  perfect.^  And  everything  which  is  useful  to  the 
universal  is  always  good  and  in  season.  Therefore  the  ter- 
mination of  life  for  every  man  is  no  evil,  because  neither  is  it 
shameful,  since  it  is  both  independent  of  the  will  and  not 
opposed  to  the  general  interest,  but  it  is  good,  since  it  is 
seasonable  and  profitable  to  and  congruent  with  the  universal. 
For  thus  too  he  is  moved  by  the  deity  who  is  moved  in  the 
same  manner  with  the  deity  and  moved  towards  the  same 
things  in  his  mind. 

24.  These  three  principles  thou  must  have  in  readiness. 
In  the  things  which  thou  doest  do  nothing  either  incon- 
siderately or  otherwise  than  as  justice  herself  would  act ;  but 
with  respect  to  what  may  happen  to  thee  from  without,  con- 
sider that  it  happens  either  by  chance  or  according  to  provi- 
dence, and  thou  must  neither  blame  chance  nor  accuse 
providence.  Second,  consider  what  every  being  is  from  the 
seed  to  the  time  of  its  receiving  a  soul,  and  from  the  reception 
of  a  soul  to  the  giving  back  of  the  same,  and  of  what  things 
every  being  is  compounded  and  into  what  things  it  is  resolved. 
Third,  if  thou  shouldst  suddenly  be  raised  up  above  the  earth, 
and  shouldst  look  down  on  human  things,  and  observe  the 
variety  of  them  how  great  it  is,  and  at  the  same  time  also 
shouldst  see  at  a  glance  how  great  is  the  number  of  beings 
who  dwell  all  around  in  the  air  and  the  aether,  consider 
that  as  often  as  thou  shouldst  be  raised  up,  thou  wouldst  see 
the  same  things,  sameness  of  form  and  shortness  of  duration. 
Are  these  things  to  be  proud  of  ? 

25.  Cast  away  opinion  :  thou  art  saved.  Who  then  hinders 
thee  from  casting  it  away  ? 

fi  vn.  25. 


M.  Antoninus.     XIl.  203 

26.  When  thou  art  troubled  about  anything,  thou  hast 
forgotten  this,  that  all  things  happen  according  to  tlio 
universal  nature ;  and  forgotten  this,  that  a  man's  wrongful 
act  is  nothing  to  thee  ;  and  further  thou  hast  forgotten  this, 
that  everything  which  huppens,  always  happened  so  and  will 
happen  so,  and  now  happens  so  everywhere ;  forgotten  this 
too,  how  close  is  the  kinship  between  a  man  and  the  whole 
human  race,  for  it  is  a  community,  not  of  a  little  blood  or 
seed,J)ut  of  intelligence.  And  thou  hast  forgotten  this  too, 
that  every  man's  intelligence  is  a  god,  and  is  an  efflux  of  the 
deity  f  and  forgotten  this,  that  nothing  is  k  man's  own,  but 
that  his  child  and  his  body  and  his  very  soul  came  from 
the  deity;  forgotten  this,  that  everything  is  opinion;  and 
lastly  thou  hast  forgotten  that  every  man  lives  the  present 
time  only,  and  loses  only  this. 

27.  Constantly  bring  to  thy  recollection  those  who  have 
compJained  greatly  about  anything,  those  who  have  been  most 
conspicuous  by  the  greatest  fame  or  misfortunes  or  enmities 
or  fortunes  of  any  kind  :  then  think  where  are  they  all  now  ? 
Smoke  and  ash  and  a. tale,  or  not  even  a  tale.  And  let  there 
be  present  to  thy  mind  also  everything  of  this  sort,  how 
Fabius  Catullinus  lived  in  the  country,  and  Lucius  Lupus  in 
his  gardens,  and  Stertinius  at  Baiae,  and  Tiberius  at  Capreae 
and  Yelius  Eufus  [or  Eufus  at  Yelia] ;  and  in  fine  think  of 
the  eager  pursuit  of  anything  conjoined  with  pride  f  and  how 
worthless  everything  is  after  which  men  violently  strain  ; 
and  how  much  more  philosophical  it  is  for  a  man  in  the 
opportunities  presented  to  him  to  show  himself  just,  tem- 
perate, obedient  to  the  gods,  and  to  do  this  with  all  simplicity  : 
for  the  pride  which  is  proud  of  its  want  of  pride  is  the  most 
intolerable  of  all. 

28.  To  those  who  ask.  Where  hast  thou  seen  the  gods  or 
how  dost  thou  comprehend  that  they  exist  and  so  worshipest 
them,  I  answer,  in  the  first  place,  they  may  be  seen  even  with 

^  See  Epictctus,  ii.  S,  9,  etc. 

'  /x€t'  04^(rews.     OiTjcris  koi  riJcpos,  Epict.  I.  8,  6. 


20i  31.  Antoninus.     XII. 

the  eyes  f  in  the  second  place  neither  have  I  seen  even  my 
own  soul  and  yet  I  honour  it.  Thus  then  with  respect  to  the 
gods,  from  what  I  constantly  experience  of  their  power,  from 
this  I  comprehend  that  they  exist  and  I  venerate  them. 

29.  The  safety  of  life  is  this,  to  examine  everything  all 
through,  what  it  is  itself,  what  is  its  material,  what  the 
formal  part ;  with  all  thy  soul  to  do  justice  and  to  say  the 
truth.  What  remains  except  to  enjoy  life  by  joining  one 
good  thing  to  another  so  as  not  to  leave  even  the  smallest 
intervals  between  ? 

30.  There  is  one  light  of  the  sun,  though  it  is  interrupted 
by  walls,  mountains,  and  other  things  infinite.  There  is  one 
common  substance,^  though  it  is  distributed  among  countless 
bodies  which  have  their  several  qualities.  There  is  one  soul, 
though  it  is  distributed  among  infinite  natures  and  individual 
circumscriptions  [or  individuals].  There  is  one  intelligent 
soul,  though  it  seems  to  be  divided.  Now  in  the  things 
which  have  been  mentioned  all  the  other  parts,  such  as  those 
which  are  air  and  matter,  are  without  sensation  and  have  no 

^  "  Seen  even  with  the  eyes."  It  is  supposed  that  this  may  be 
explained  by  the  Stoic  doctrine,  that  the  universe  is  a  god  or  living 
being  (iv.  40),  and  that  the  celestial  bodies  are  gods  (viii.  19).  But  the 
emperor  may  mean  that  we  know  that  the  gods  exist,  as  he  afterwards 
states  it,  because  we  see  what  they  do ;  as  we  know  that  man  has  in- 
tellectual powers,  because  we  see  what  he  does,  and  in  no  other  way 
do  we  know  it.  This  passage  then  will  agree  with  the  passage  in  the 
Epistle  to  the  Komans  (i.  v.  20),  and  with  the  Epistle  to  tlie  Colossians 
(i.  V.  15),  in  which  Jesus  Christ  is  named  "  the  image  of  the  invisible 
god;"  and  with  the  passage  in  the  Gospel  of  St.  John  (xiv,  v.  9). 

Gataker,  whose  notes  are  a  wonderful  collection  of  learning,  and  all 
of  it  sound  and  good,  quotes  a  passage  of  Calvin  which  is  founded  on 
St.  Paul's  language  (Kom.  i.  v.  20) :  "  God  by  creating  the  universe  [or 
world,  mundum],  being  himself  invisible,  has  presented  himself  to 
our  eyes  conspicuously  in  a  certain  visible  form."  He  also  quotes 
Seneca  (De  Benef.  iv.  c.  8) :  "  Quocunque  te  flexeris,  ibi  ilium  videbis 
occurrentem  tibi :  nihil  ab  illo  vacat,  opus  suum  ipse  implet."  Com- 
pare also  Cicero,  Do  Senectute  (c.  22),  Xcnophon's  Cyropaedia  (vin.  7), 
and  Mem.  iv.  3 ;  also  Epictetus,  i.  6,  de  Providentia.  I  think  that  my 
interpretation  of  Antoninus  is  right. 

»  IV.  40. 


M.  Antoninus.     XII.  205 

fellowship  :  and  yet  even  these  parts  the  intelligent  principle 
holds  together  and  the  gravitation  towards  the  same.  But 
intellect  in  a  peculiar  manner  tends  to  that  which  is  of  the 
same  kin,  and  combines  with  it,  and  the  feeling  for  com- 
munion is  not  interrupted. 

31.  What  dost  thou  wish?  to  continue  to  exist?  Well, 
dost  thou  wish  to  have  sensation  ?  movement  ?  growth  ?  and 
then  again  to  cease  to  grow  ?  to  use  thy  speech  ?  to  think  ? 
What  is  there  of  all  these  things  which  seems  to  thee  worth 
desiring  ?  But  if  it  is  easy  to  set  little  value  on  all  these 
things,  turn  to  that  which  remains,  which  is  to  follow  reason 
and  god.  But  it  is  inconsistent  with  honouring  reason  and 
god  to  be  troubled  because  by  death  a  man  will  be  deprived 
of  the  other  things. 

32.  How  small  a  part  of  the  boundless  and  unfathomable 
time  is  assigned  to  every  man  ?  for  it  is  very  soon  swallowed 
up  in  the  eternal.  And  how  small  a  part  of  the  whole  sub- 
stance ?  and  how  small  a  part  of  the  universal  soul  ?  and  on 
what  a  small  clod  of  the  whole  earth  thou  creepest  ?  Reflect- 
ing on  all  this  consider  nothing  to  be  great,  except  to  act  as 
thy  nature  leads  thee,  and  to  endure  that  which  the  common 
nature  brings. 

33.  How  does  the  ruling  faculty  make  use  of  itself?  for  all 
lies  in  this.  But  everything  else,  whether  it  is  in  the  power 
of  thy  will  or  not,  is  only  lifeless  ashes  and  smoke. 

34.  This  reflection  is  most  adapted  to  move  us  to  contempt 
of  death,  that  even  those  who  think  pleasure  to  be  a  good  and 
pain  an  evil  still  have  desi^ised  it. 

35.  The  man  to  whom  that  only  is  good  which  comes  in 
due  season,  and  to  whom  it  is  the  same  thing  whether  he  has 
done  more  or  fewer  acts  conformable  to  right  reason,  and  to 
whom  it  makes  no  difference  whether  he  contemplates  the 
world  for  a  longer  or  a  shorter  time — for  this  man  neither  is 
death  a  terrible  thing,   (m.  7  ,    vi.  23  ;   x.  20  ;   xii.  23.) 

36.  Man,  thou  hast  been  a  citizen  in  this  great  state  [the 
world]  •}''  what  difference  does  it  make  to  thee  whether  for 

^0  n.  IG;  ni.  11;  r^.  29. 


206  31.  Antoninus.     XIL 

five  years  [or  tliree]  ?  for  that  which  is  conformable  to  the 
laws  is  just  for  all.  Where  is  the  hardship  then,  if  no  tyrant 
nor  yet  an  unjust  judge  sends  thee  away  from  the  state,  but 
nature  who  brought  thee  into  it  ?  the  same  as  if  a  praetor  who 
has  employed  an  actor  dismisses  him  from  the  stage'^ — "  But 
I  have  not  finished  the  five  acts,  but  only  three  of  them  " — 
Thou  sayest  well,  but  in  life  the  three  acts  are  the  whole 
drama  ;  for  what  shall  be  a  complete  drama  is  determined  by 
him  who  was  once  the  cause  of  its  composition,  and  now  of  its 
dissolution  :  but  thou  art  the  cause  of  neither.  Depart  then 
satisfied,  for  he  also  who  releases  thee  is  satisfied. 


9K^ 
ofTrtt 


UNWE^S^'^'' 


207 


INDEX. 


ASict^opa  (indiffereutia,   Cicero,  Seneca.  Epp.  82) ;   things  indiffefent, 

neither  good  nor  bad;  tlie  Siiine  as  fxeaa. 
alaxpos,  (turpis,  Cic.%  ugly;  morally  ugly.   . 
otV/o,  cause. 
otTiwSes,  oiTiou,  TO,  the  formal  or  formative  principle,  the  cause. 

CLKOlUiOVTJTOS,  UUSOClal. 

avacpopd,  reference,  relation  to  a  purpose. 

avvire^aiperus,  unconditionally. 

airoppoia,  efflux. 

aTrpoaipera,  rd,  the  things  which  are  not  in  our  will  or  power. 

apx-h,  a  first  principle. 

&Top.oi,  (corpora  individua,  Cic.\  atoms. 

avrapKeia,   est   quae   parvo   conteuta  omne   id  respuit   quod   abundat 

(Cicero) ;  contentment. 
avTdpK7}s,  sufficient  in  itself;  contented. 
acpopfxai,  means,  principles.     The  word  has  also  other  sig-nificatious  in 

Epictetus.     Index  ed.  Schweig. 
yt-yvofxeva,  rd,  tilings  which  are  produced,  come  into  existence. 
Saifxcou,  god,  god  in  man,  man's  intelligent  principle. 
BidOecris,  disposition,  affection  of  the  mind. 
Siaipea-is,   di\'ision   of   things  into  their  parts,   dissection,   resolution, 

analysis. 
SiaX^KTiKT].  ars  bene  disserendi  et  vera  ac  falsa  dijudicandi  (Cic). 
5id\v(rLs,  dissolution,  the  opposite  of  avyKpicris. 
Biduoia,   understanding;    sometimes,   the    mind  generally,   the    whole 

intellectual  power. 
^Syfjiara,  (decreta,  Cic),  principles. 
dvuafjLLs  voepd,  iatellectual  faculty. 
iyKpdma,  temperance,  self-restraint. 
fISos,  in  divisione  formae  tuut,  quas  Graeci  d^T]  vocaut ;  noetri,  si  qiL' 


208  Index. 

haec  forte  tractant,  species  appellant  (Clc.).     But  ilBos  is  used  by 

Epictetus  and  Antoninus  less  exactly  and  as  a  general  term,  like 

genus.     Index  Epict.  ed.  Schweigh. — 'hy  Se  ye  al  irpooTai  ovaiai  irpbs 

TO.  6,Wa  exovcTLU,  ovtw  kul  rh   elSos  irpbs  rh  yhos  exet*    vTTOKiirai  yap 

rh  elSos  Tw  yevei.     (Al'istot.  Cat.  C.  5.) 
dfiapfiei/ri,  (fatalis  necessitas,  fatum,  Cic),  destiny,  necessity. 
e/c/cAiVeis,   aversions,  avoidance,  the  turning  away  from  things;    the 

opposite  of  6p4^€Ls. 
ifirpvxa,   rd,  things  which  have  life. 
ivepyeia,  action,  activity. 
fvvoia,   evvoiai,  notio,  notiones  (Cic.),  or  "notitiae  rerum;"  notions  ol 

things.     (Notiouem  appello  quam  Graeci  turn  evvoiav,  turn  irpokrirpiv, 

Cic). 
evoocris,  7},  the  unity. 
4TTi(TTpo<pT),  attention  to  an  object. 
evQvfxia,  animi  tranquillitas  (Cic). 
evfxeves,   rh,   evfxeveia,   benevolence;    evij.eyf]s   sometimes  means,   well 

contented.  hD 

eijvoia,  benevolence. 
i^ovffia,  power,  faculty. 
eTraKoXovOrjaiv,  Kara,  by  way  of  sequence. 

7]yefxoviK6u,  TO,  the  ruling  faculty  or  part ;  principatus  (Cicero). 
eewpri/xara,  percepta  (Cic),  things  perceived,  general  principles. 
Kadr]K€iv,  TO,  duty,  "  olficium." 
Ka\6s,  beautiful. 

KaTd\r]\l/Ls,  comprehension;  cognitio,  perceptio,  comprehensio  (Cicero). 
KaracTKevr],  constitution. 
Karopdwaeis,  KaropQoofxaTa;  recta,  recte  facta  (Cicero^ ;  right  acts,  those 

acts  to  which  we  proceed  by  the  right  or  straight  road. 
Koa/jLos,  order,  world,  universe. 

Koa-fios,  o  o\os,  the  universe,  that  which  is  the  One  and  the  All   vi.  25). 
Kpiixa,  a  judgment. 
Kvpievou,  Tt)   epoov,  that  which  rules  within  (iv.  1  ,  the  same  as  rh 

TjyefxoviKov.     Diogenes  Laerlius,  vn.,  Zeno.     'qycfxoviKov   8e  eJyai  rh 

KvpidoraTOU  ttjs  xj/uxv^- 
KoyiKo.,  rd,  the  things  which  have  reason. 
XoyiKds,  rational. 
K6yos,  reason. 

\6yos  o-irepuaTtfcJs,  seminal  principle. 
/xeVa,  TO,  thii'gs  indifierent,  viewed  with  respect  to  virtue, 
i/oepo'?,  intellectual. 
v6iJ.os,  law. 

vovs,  intelligence,  understanding. 
OvTjcTiS,  arrogfinoo,  pride.     It  sometimes  means  in  Antoninus  the  eami 

as  Ti/^os;  but  it  also  moans  "  opinion." 


Index.  209 

o.Kovofiia  (dispositio,  ordo,  Cic),  lias  sometimes  the  peculiar  sense  of 
artifice,  or  doing  something  with  an  apparent  purpodo  different  from 
the  real  purpose. 

i\ov,  t6,  the  universe,  the  whole  :  f)  twu  '6\u)v  cpixns. 

ovra,  TO.,  things  which  exist ;  existence,  being. 

ope^is,  desire  of  a  thing,  which  is  opposed  to  ^kkAktis,  aversion. 

dp/xri,  movement  towards  an  object,  appetite ;  appetitio,  naturahs  appe- 
titus,  appetitus  animi  (Cicero). 

ovcrla,  substance  (vi,  49).  Modern  writers  sometimes  incorrectly  trans- 
late it  "  (.'ssentia.'  It  is  often  used  by  Epictetus  in  the  same  sense 
as  uAtj.  Aristotle  (Cat.  c.  5)  defines  ovaia,  and  it  is  properly  trans- 
lated "substantia"  (ed.  Jul.  Pacius).  Porphyrins  (Isag.  c.  2): 
7]  oi/aia  dj/wTarw  ov<ra  Tcp  /xtjScj/  elvai  Trph  avTrjs  y4vos  ^y  t6  y^viKU)- 
rarov. 

irapaKoXovQ-qTiKT]  Siva/^us,  7],  the  power  which  enables  us  to  observe  and 
understand. 

ireTo-ts,  passivity,  opposed  to  ivipyeia :  also,  affect. 

Tre/jio-rao-ety,  circumstances,  the  things  which  surround  us;  troubles, 
difficulties. 

imrpwixivT],  7],  destiny. 

TTpoa'ip^cris,  purpose,  free  will  (Aristot.  Khet.  i.  13). 

■trpoaip^Tci,  rd,  things  which  are  within  our  will  or  power. 

TTpoaipeTLKou,  r6,  free  will. 

■Kp6d€(ns,  a  purpose,  proposition. 

Trp6voia  (provideutia,  Cic),  providence, 

(TKOTTos,  object,  purpose. 

crroix^'^ov,  element. 

crvyKaTaQ^cns  (assensio,  approbatio,  Cic),  assent ;  (TvyKaraBiaiis  (pro- 
bationes,  Gellius,  xix.  1). 

(TvyKpi/xaTa,  things  compounded  (n.  3). 

(TvyKpLffis,  the  act  of  combining  elements  out  of  which  a  body  is  pro- 
duced, combination. 

(TvuOea-is,  ordering,  arrangement  (compositio). 

<rv(TTriixa,  system,  a  thing  compounded  of  parts  which  have  a  certain 
relation  to  one  another. 

v\7],  matter,  material. 

vKiKov,  TO,  the  material  principle. 

vK€^aipe(Tis,  exception,  reservation  ;  fied'  vire^aipea-eus,  conditionally. 

vir60€(ns,  material  to  work  on;  thing  to  employ  the  reason  on;  pro- 
position, thing  assumed  as  matter  for  argrunent  and  to  lead  to 
conclusions.  (Quaestionum  duo  sunt  genera;  alterum  infinitum, 
definitum  alterum.  Definitum  est,  quod  virSdeaiv  Graeci,  nos  causam : 
infinitum,  quod  d4(nv  illi  appellant,  nos  propositum  possumus  nominare. 
Cic.     See  Aristot.  Anal.  Post.  i.  c  2). 

vTroKeififva,  to.,  things  present  or  existing,  vi.  4 ;  or  things  which  are  a 
basis  or  foundation. 


210  Index. 

vir6\r]\pLs,  opinion. 

viroa-raais,  basis,  substance,  being,  foundation  (x.  5).    Epictetus  haa  ri 

rh  virocTTaTiKhy  koL  oixriwdes.      (Justinus  ad  Diogn.  C.  2.) 
{/(piaraadai,  to  subsist,  to  be. 
<pavTa(xiai  (visus,  Cic.) ;  appearances,  thoughts,  impressions  (visa  animi, 

Grellius,  XIX.  1) :  (pavraaia  itrri  rvTvuicns  eV  ^vxv- 
(f>dvTa(rixa,  seems  to  be  used  by  Antoninus  in  the  same  sense  as  <payraffla, 

Epictetus  uses  only  (l>avTa(rla. 
<pavra(rT6v,  that  which  produces  a  (pavraa-ia:  (pavTaarhv  rh  ireiroiriKhs 

r7)v  (pavraciav  alaBr^TSu. 
<pv(ris,  nature. 

<pv<TLs,  7]  rS}v  '6\wv,  the  nature  of  the  universe. 
\\/vx'h,  soul,  life,  living  principle. 
i^ivx^  A.07JK7J,  yofpd,  a  rational  soul,  an  intelligent  souL 


vasvov :  printed  bt  wiixiam  clowks  and  sons,  otamfobd  otbibi 

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